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Abstract  
One of the precursors to this PhD project was an awareness that a great deal of writing 
about music aesthetics, the practice of making music and the nature of listening to 
music, is often either knowingly or unknowingly grounded in a set of philosophical 
debates that predate (sometimes quite considerably) the music that is being written 
about. As such, there is a sense in which critical perspectives on improvised music 
practice, if they are to be relevant, need to take into account more recent 
developments in philosophical and theoretical thought, and one of the objectives of 
this study is to meet that challenge by mapping of some of the key aspects of 
twentieth and twenty-first century thought that have their roots in what could be 
described as ‘philosophies of immanence’ onto various aspects of improvisation. 
 
From the outset, this project is written from a maker’s perspective, and takes the form 
of a piece of extended research that takes as its starting point the idea that musical 
improvisation is a form of creative thinking in action. From this position, the process of 
improvising and an improvised piece of music, to some extent bear the traces of the 
thought that has given rise to both the music and the improvising itself. By grounding 
the research in a set of the afore-mentioned ‘philosophies of immanence’, it is 
therefore my intention to develop new ways of thinking about how improvisation 
works, new ways to describe what is happening when we hear musicians improvising, 
and new ways to understand what kinds of changes and innovations are brought to 
bear on the resources and materials – in other words the musical knowledge, the skills, 
the instruments, and a wider set of musical contexts and environments – that musicians 
have at their disposal during an improvisation. 
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Introduction: Musical improvisation according to contemporary materialist thought 
  
1. Why improvisation and why philosophy?  
 
In his now classic study, Improvisation, Its Nature and Practice in Music, the guitarist 
Derek Bailey states that, ‘improvisation enjoys the curious distinction of being both the 
most widely practised of all musical activities and the least acknowledged and 
understood’ (Bailey, 1992: ix). Problematic and complex though it may be, musical 
improvisation nevertheless enjoys a certain distinction over other forms of musical 
performance and production, in that, at its core, it is a means to manufacture musical 
structures, in ‘real-time’.  
 
From the outset, this project is written from a maker’s perspective, and takes the form of 
a piece of extended research that takes as its starting point the idea that musical 
improvisation is a form of creative thinking in action. From this position, the process of 
improvising and an improvised piece of music, to some extent bear the traces of the 
thought that has given rise to both the music and the improvising itself. But we must be 
careful: throughout this thesis, there is no sense that either the process of improvised 
music making, or a piece of improvised music in any way ‘represent’ a thought process. 
Indeed, as we shall see throughout the thesis, as we engage with various perspectives 
relating to contingency, there is clearly a sense that improvisation can be seen to be a 
‘non-representational’ activity. 1 However, despite this caveat, improvisation nonetheless 
presents us with an opportunity to consider the relationship between the physical and 
intellectual affordances of the human form, that enable us to either directly create sound 
or manipulate other sound-producing devices, and our capacity to go beyond these 
affordances, or limitations in order to create surprising, unintended and unforeseen 
musical outcomes.   
 
1.1 Improvisation in context 
 
Contemporary improvisation, whether we want to call it ‘creative music’, ‘free music’, ‘free 
improvisation’, or simply ‘improvised music’ is a form of musical practice whose ancestry 
can be clearly traced in jazz and related musics. Whilst the purpose of this thesis is to 
address and interrogate the creative processes associated with musical improvisation, my 
interest is in the way that creative choices can be made in relation to a set of given 
                                                
1 Whilst there are a number of antecedents to the term ‘non-representational’, including Simon O’Sullivan’s 
book Art Encounters Deleuze and Guattari: Thought Beyond Representation and Nigel Thrift’s Non-
Representational Theory: Space, Politics, Affect, this thesis does not specifically draw on these works.  
Instead, the use of ‘non-representational’ in the current context signals my intention to respond to some of 
the philosophical challenges laid down by concepts such as Laruelle’s ‘unilateral determination’ (chapter 
three), and Meillassoux’s ‘necessary contingency’ (chapter four), both of which actively reject any sense that 
what is external - but necessary - to human thought, can in any way be represented in human thought or 
perception. 
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resources and materials, and therefore in what follows, the focus is on a set of processes 
are not necessarily associated with jazz, at least in terms of stylistic traits and musical 
reference points. In his landmark article, ‘Improvised Music after 1950: Afrological and 
Eurological Perspectives’, the trombonist and member of the Association for the 
Advancement of Creative Musicians, George Lewis, uses these terms to attempt ‘to 
historically and philosophical deconstruct aspects of the musical belief systems that 
ground African-American and European (including European-American) real-time music-
making.’ (Lewis, 2004: 132). In doing so, Lewis’ aim was to both counteract what he 
identified as an ‘exnomination’ (Lewis, 2004: 139), or erasure of jazz’s role in ‘the 
development of either ‘contemporary’ improvisation or indeterminacy’ (Lewis, 2004: 
144).2 
 
Lewis suggests that certain European improvisers such as Derek Bailey, Evan Parker, and 
by association Cornelius Cardew, developed a practice that reflected ‘their diverse 
backgrounds [and blended] personal narrative reminiscent of an Afrological perspective 
with sonic imagery characteristic of European forms spanning several centuries.’ For 
Lewis, ‘the European form places great emphasis on the social necessity for the role of 
the improviser’, and he offers that the term ‘improvised music’ was adopted, ‘not to 
distinguish it from jazz in the sense of critique but to better reflect the European 
                                                
2 Whilst it is in no way the aim of this thesis to argue against Lewis’ position over the heritage and 
provenance of improvised music, only a brief second glance enables us to question what may well be an 
overly simplistic distinction between the two poles of musical discourse that Lewis identifies. For while he is 
right it to take issue with what he saw is the exnomination of African-American culture and perspectives 
within the ongoing development of improvised music during the latter half of the twentieth century, it is 
maybe too convenient to lay this at the feet of a Eurological set of histories and trajectories. In the essay 
‘John Cage’s Queer Silence or How to Avoid Making Matters Worse’, Jonathan Katz surmises that John 
Cage’s interest in silence was ‘in part an expression of Cage's identity as a closeted homosexual during the 
Cold War, it was also much more than that. Silence was not only a symptom of oppression, it was also a 
chosen mode of resistance’ (Katz, 2017). Katz’s analysis of Cage’s interest, not only in silence, but in noise, 
as well as the uncoded nature of sound itself, suggests that it would be too simple to say that Cage’s lack of 
interest and disavowal of jazz is the result of his intrinsic Eurological perspective. Instead, where for Katz, 
Cage’s interest in ‘freedom from meaning [suggests] freedom from domination, definition, and control in a 
very real world sense’ (Katz, 2017), we might be as well to add to Lewis’ binary pairing a ‘queerological’ 
perspective; one that speaks of another perspective that is all too often occluded in the historical accounts 
of music’s development. Whilst Katz’s focus is on Cage’s frequent return to silence as a musical medium, 
stating that ‘silence, in short, is not another kind of music, but a challenge to the construction of music itself. 
Neither musical nor unmusical, Cage's silence was quite precisely "other," escaping the binaries that 
circumscribed the status quo as the sole arena for contestation (Katz, 2017), we can equally see that Cage’s 
interest in indeterminacy and contingency in music might be a result, not of an exnomination of African-
American perspectives, but of a desire to design a different kind of musical narrative for himself, not 
tethered to any pre-existing cultural context, Afrological or Eurological. As Cage himself tells us, ‘Today, we 
must identify ourselves with noises instead, and not seek laws for the noises, as if we were blacks seeking 
power! Music demonstrates what an ecologically balanced situation could be--one in which whites would 
not have more power than blacks, and blacks no more than whites. A situation in which each thing and each 
sound is in its place, because each one is what it is. Moreover, I'm not the one whose inventing that 
situation. Music was already carrying it within itself despite everything people forced it to endure’ (Katz, 
2017). 
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improvisers’ sense of having created a native model of improvisation, however influenced 
by African forms’ (Lewis, 2004: 151). 
 
Thus, we enter into this project with an awareness that even the seemingly neutral phrase 
‘improvised music’ sits within significant cultural and political contexts. Whilst this 
project’s focus will be on music that does not deliberately seek to place itself either within 
or outside of a jazz or a contemporary classical trajectory, it is clearly not possible to 
ignore the provenance of these musical approaches and attitudes. Lewis’ work reminds us 
that much has been ignored, achieved, brushed-over and fought for in the development 
of a so-called ‘free music’, and this PhD study makes no attempt to ignore the importance 
of this cultural developments; but there is clearly a need to be wary, particularly of any 
unwitting Eurological lacunae. So again, whilst the focus is clearly on a less-obviously jazz-
inflected approach to improvisation, this project is nevertheless an attempt to generate a 
set of conclusions about improvisation in relation to the assemble philosophies of 
immanence that acknowledgedly have the potential – albeit with further research and 
direct application to jazz-based improvisation – to work within a jazz context as well. 
 
Throughout this project, we shall turn to a number of different musicians and their music 
to provide perspectives and illustration of the subjects under discussion, and though 
again, the majority of these exemplars will be drawn from what may appear to be in 
Derek Bailey’s reading ‘non-idiomatic’ improvisation, or what we could otherwise call 
contemporary improvised music, there will also be some acknowledgement of and 
reference to some of the more complex musical developments in the post-1950s musical 
environment, such as indeterminate music of John Cage, and the free jazz of musicians 
such as Ornette Coleman and Cecil Taylor, without whom we would doubtless have a 
very different set of musical practices and documents to be discussing.3 
 
1.2 Points of departure 
 
Theoretical writing about music can sometimes be seen to be making claims about music 
aesthetics, the practice of making music and the nature of listening to music, that are 
often either knowingly or unknowingly grounded in older philosophical material. For 
instance, the percussionist Eddie Prevost, one of the original members of the improvising 
ensemble AMM, who has made a significant contribution to both the distribution and 
critical investigation of improvised music through his independent label, Matchless 
Recordings, and a series of book-length examinations of his own and others’ improvised 
                                                
3 The term ‘non-idiomatic’ was Bailey’s attempt to untether the ‘free music’ practices that he saw emerging 
during the 1960s and 1970s from any obvious cultural provenance, in particular, the jazz / contemporary 
classical music axis that Lewis identifies, instead attempting to root improvisation as an originary musical 
practice that predates any cultural codification or claims to ownership. Whilst Lewis appears to recognise 
the delicacy and self-awareness of Bailey’s approach, it is still worth noting that Bailey’s ideas are 
themselves borne out of a cultural context, and thus the debate continues about the extent to which 
individuals within a particular cultural perspective can make comments about other cultural perspectives – 
hence the decision to place the focus of this current project elsewhere.  
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music making practice, often makes reference to thinkers such as Adorno, Nietzsche and 
Wittgenstein in his writing. There is clearly nothing wrong with making references to such 
writers, given that their work continues to provide us with valuable insights and 
perspectives on contemporary practice. However, philosophical and theoretical enquiry 
continues to evolve, and thus, it would seem that, if critical perspectives on improvised 
music practice are to remain relevant, then they must also make some acknowledgement 
of more recent developments in philosophical thought. Whilst in recent years we have 
seen the emergence of books that have taken up the challenges laid down by two of the 
more prominent philosophical thinkers of the late twentieth century, namely Gilles 
Deleuze and Felix Guattari,4 there is still some way to go before contemporary music 
theory, in a sense, ‘catches up’ with certain aspects of contemporary thought. One of the 
objectives of this study is to therefore meet that challenge, and, as part of the process of 
thinking through various aspects of improvisation, this project also functions as a mapping 
of some of the key aspects of twentieth and twenty-first century thought that have their 
roots in what could be thought of as a philosophy of immanence. Paraphrasing the 
‘Philosophies of Difference’ of the philosopher Francois Laruelle – who we shall encounter 
in chapter three – we could well frame this research project as an examination of 
improvised music practice in terms of ‘Philosophies of Immanence’. All of the thinkers that 
we engage with during this study have undertaken to explore the way in which human 
thought and creative practice, in fact, all of life, and even all geological and cosmological 
movements, interact with an Absolute-Real that is immanent to the movements and 
changes that we experience in what has been variously called the ‘empirical world’, ‘the 
world of real causes’ or the world of ‘lived experience’. 
 
If thinking about music can help us to make music, then ‘updating’ our thoughts about 
music might also have some useful consequences for practice. This PhD study therefore 
has two central concerns. The first is to use contemporary philosophical thought as a 
means to expand the vocabulary for thinking about and talking about improvisation. The 
second is to consider how we might increase our understanding of improvisation itself, by 
confronting some of the emerging paradigms in contemporary thought. 
 
Thus, in the following chapters, we shall encounter the ‘improvisation-assemblage’, the 
‘subject-as-improviser’, the ‘improvisation-stance’, ‘improvisation-in-identity’, ‘music-
fiction’, the ’musician-in-improvisation’, and ‘non-improvisation’; all examples of where 
there is opportunity to enlarge and modifying the language that we use to discuss 
improvisation. Similarly, by starting to think through the process of improvising in terms of 
terms such as these and of the theoretical strategies that underpin them, we can come to 
as to why improvisation may have the potential to surprise, disrupt, challenge, recalibrate 
or even completely overturn our understandings of what music is doing and how it is 
working. 
                                                
4 Notably Edward Campbell’s Music After Deleuze, Ian Buchanan and Marcel Swiboda’s edited collection 
Deleuze and Music, Nick Nesbitt and Brian Hulse’s collection Sounding the Virtual: Gilles Deleuze and the 
Theory and Philosophy of Music and Ian Biddle & Marie Thompson’s collection Sound, Music, Affect. 
  Introduction 
  11 
 
As someone involved in musical improvisation myself, with a long-standing interest in 
performance and pedagogical practices relating to improvisation, philosophical theories 
relating to immanence have increasingly presented themselves as a means to understand 
and think through the act of improvising. In his review of the record Explorations by the 
improvising group Full Circle, in which I played double bass, the improvising saxophonist 
Paul Dunmall made an interesting comment. 
 
The genre of music you hear on this CD is the closest you will get to democracy in 
Western music. No preconceived architecture, no discussing before performance. 
These four musicians walk on stage and sculpt music from the air. (Dunmall, 2004) 
 
Dunmall’s comments about democracy in Western music aside, the suggestion that we 
had made music from nothing, spoke directly to the way in which an immanent 
perspective allows us to offset a bounded set of conditions against the production of new 
thoughts, concepts and experiences, such that, although these thoughts and experiences 
clearly appear within those limited conditions, they do not appear to be of, or the same 
as, those conditions. As a result, this research has engaged with a range of philosophical 
positions that have, for almost half a century interrogated the way in which things may 
seem to emerge ‘from the air’, and yet have their roots firmly grounded in a set of 
physical conditions, practices, environments, thought processes and materials; a 
compelling analogue to the practice and production of improvised music. 
 
Whilst it starts out from the position of the maker, this is not an ad hominem project. 
Contemporary thought can indeed offer valuable insights and perspectives with which to 
consider how as musicians we make improvised music, but it can also suggest to the 
listener new ways of thinking about how an improvisation might come about, and how it 
evolves. As such, whilst the project does not aim to generate a new set of tools for 
measuring and quantifying aesthetic or even musicological merit, it does however, seek 
to offer new positions from which a listener is able to think about what they are listening 
to. 
 
Cornelius Cardew’s ‘Towards and Ethic of Improvisation’ is a key reference point for this 
project, and indeed a signal point of departure, and although this thesis is not in any way 
designed to function as an updating of Cardew’s ‘ethic’, it nonetheless inhabits some of 
the same territory at various stages; thinking through the relationships between 
musicians, environment, instruments (or at least musical tools), and audience, in order to 
further investigate how an improvisation might come about. As noted above, the key 
insights that arise from this study relate to the way in which recent realist and materialist 
philosophical discourse triangulates around notions of contingency (particularly the deep-
rooted sense of non-conceptualisable contingency that we see in the work of Meillassoux, 
Land and Brassier), and a nuanced reading of ‘superposition’ (where Laruelle talks about 
the radical immanence of the One), and how it is that – again, with the ‘non-
representational’ caveat firmly in our minds – improvisation can be thought of as a 
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‘playing out’, or ‘performing of’ such a contingency / superposition. However, 
improvisation neither ‘shows us’, nor ‘sounds like’ contingency; instead, we might think 
that it is the ‘sound of’ contingency, which is no easy answer either, for as we shall see – 
what is there that is not contingent? Improvisation therefore acts as a model, or a vantage 
point, from which to observe a set of perspectives on human thought in action. 5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                
5 Whilst it may be the case that some, maybe many, of the conclusions reached in this study could be 
applied to musical practice more widely, it is not intended for this thesis to function as a universal treatise 
for a philosophy of musical creativity in all its wider forms. Thus, whilst the reader may observe the potential 
to apply some of the arguments in this thesis to songwriting, folk music, composition for instruments within 
a ‘classical’ idiom, or to music for film, television and other visual media, such a venture goes beyond the 
scope of what is written here, since each area would need thorough exploration and qualification. 
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2. Chapter summary 
 
In the first chapter we shall look at the work of Gilles Deleuze, particularly Difference and 
Repetition, and A Thousand Plateaus, co-written with Felix Guattari. This chapter will 
establish an approach to embedding improvisation within philosophical contexts, and 
Deleuze and Guattari will enable us to think about what might be happening when we 
improvise in terms of, amongst others, their ideas relating to assemblages, territories, 
becoming-music and the Body without Organs. Clearly Deleuze and Guattari’s work has 
been used as a means to launch a wide range of studies into creative practices, not least 
because their work explicitly engages with music, art, politics, science and a number of 
related disciplines. Given that Deleuze and Guattari’s work, both their collaborative, along 
with their individual writing, itself represents a now considerable and meticulously 
examined body of work, it may be tempting to reflect on the extent to which it can be 
seen as being ‘contemporary’, however, within the context of this project, their ideas will 
be used to ground not only the examination of improvisation in terms of philosophical 
practice, but also as a means to anchor several of the themes that we shall go on to 
explore in later chapters. In addition, whilst some their ideas may prove to have been 
superseded by more recent developments in contemporary thought, much of their work 
is still a valuable reference point, not least because of their interest in creating new forms 
of thought as a practice in itself, where philosophy becomes ‘the art of forming, 
inventing, and fabricating concepts’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 2).  
 
In chapter two, we encounter the work of Alain Badiou who established his own very 
distinct form of philosophical enquiry by harnessing the power of mathematical 
formulation. In doing so, his work represents a direct challenge to one of Deleuze’s key 
principles, and instead of thinking in terms the production of the new as an interplay 
between actual and virtual aspects of what is around us in one shape or form, for Badiou, 
new events must ‘irrupt’ from outside of our current environment. We can already see a 
developing framework that relates to Paul Dunmall’s suggestion that improvisation is a 
making of something out of nothing, and in this chapter, we shall also see the way in 
which Badiou’s specific use of the term ‘void’, introduces the idea that in creating events, 
we are engaging with something that is radically different to what is already given to us in 
experience and thought. In referencing Badiou’s Being and Event therefore, we come to 
see that the arrival of the event signals an interplay between human thought and that 
which is not (and by definition, cannot) be given in thought. Improvisation is thus framed 
as a searching process, looking for a way to open up the possibility of finding, and 
subsequently forcing the new into existence.6 
 
In chapter three, we shall see the way in which Francois Laruelle moves on from both 
Deleuze and Badiou’s positions, as we come into contact with his long-developed ideas 
relating to non-philosophy. Whilst Laruelle rejects certain of their core principles, in 
                                                
6 As we shall see in chapter two, Badiou makes use of this particular term which is drawn from the 
mathematician Paul Cohen’s set theory. 
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particular Deleuze’s (and Guattari’s) exploration of the plane of immanence and Badiou’s 
adherence to the principle of the void, we can see traces of their ideas in his articulation 
of ‘radical immanence’. In terms of Badiou, he very much holds to the non-
comprehensibility of what he terms ‘the One’, whilst at the same time, he configures a 
relationship between the One and what he refers to as the world of ‘lived experience’ 
(Laruelle, 2011: 246), that resembles Deleuze’s interest in the way that experience and 
thought are already given in this radically immanent One, rather than being necessarily 
separated from it. Laruelle also develops a set of strategies that will enable us to think 
about improvisation in terms of non-philosophy, and we shall therefore investigate the 
concepts of ‘determination-in-the-last-instance’, ‘thinking according to identity’, ‘cloning’ 
and ‘heresy’ as the means by which Laruelle puts radical immanence to work. His more 
recent work on photo-fiction, which includes a passing mention of the idea of ‘music-
fiction’, will also enable us to think comprehensively about the creative nature of 
improvisation, in terms of what is being created and what it is that we are doing when we 
create something. 
 
Chapter four involves a wider survey of thought and our focus will be on developing a 
broader perspective, which will enable us to understand that whilst certain areas of 
contemporary thought still proceed to develop with reference to philosophical 
immanence, there have been significant developments and departures in recent years. As 
we continue to expand the language we use to engage with improvisation, and thus 
investigate the potential to deepen our understanding of it, the chapter will present a 
series of philosophical models that have particular relevance to improvised music making. 
Quentin Meillassoux’s concept of ‘the great outdoors’ of thought, is a demonstration of 
the way in which it must be possible for human thought to think beyond its own limits. 
Whilst Meillassoux does not necessarily provide us with a set of strategies that can be 
directly applied to music making, his ideas do provide substantial ground to think, as with 
Badiou and Laruelle, that it must be possible for human thought to conceive of something 
that is radically outside of our typical human experience, and thus improvisation as an 
activity driven by creative thinking comes to be seen as a possible site, not only for the 
contemplation, but also the production, of that which is beyond human thought. In a not-
unrelated way, we shall see that Ray Brassier is interested in exploring how human 
thought can to some degree exceed its own limits, although his focus is on offsetting a 
human conception of time against an absolute time in order to show that human thought 
and experience must always be permeated by something that does not arise in human 
thought. Reza Negarestani takes a similar focus, and his work will enable us to draw 
together various aspects of chapter four, by exploring what he calls, ‘insider time’, or 
‘Incognitum Hactenus’, which is a means to understand the human capacity to engage 
with a type of time that is beyond human thought and experience. By comparing 
improvisation to the formation of insider time, we shall therefore be able to conclude 
that, by creating new experiences and certainly new sensations of time, improvisation can 
be thought of as a practice that allows us to bring into being something that is beyond 
comprehension. 
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Although it is possible to see connections between certain ideas and themes that emerge 
in chapters three and four, this thesis is not designed to be a scholarly historiography or 
genealogy of philosophy. Nonetheless, it is possible to detect traces, developments and 
further interrogations of a range of ideas across each of the philosophical models that are 
presented in this study. The Speculative Realists’ work, for example, does not simply draw 
on the work of Deleuze, Guattari and Badiou (in other words Deleuze-Guattari + Badiou ≠ 
Speculative Realism). However, it is possible to discern a context from which their work 
emerges. Ray Brassier, one of the original Speculative Realists provides this useful 
commentary on the provenance of the term: 
 
The term ‘speculative realism’ was only ever a useful umbrella term, chosen 
precisely because it was vague enough to encompass a variety of fundamentally 
heterogeneous philosophical research programmes […] There is no ‘speculative 
realist’ doctrine common to the four of us: the only thing that unites us is antipathy 
to what Quentin Meillassoux calls ‘correlationism’—the doctrine, especially 
prevalent among ‘Continental’ philosophers, that humans and world cannot be 
conceived in isolation from one other—a ‘correlationist’ is any philosopher who 
insists that the human-world correlate is philosophy’s sole legitimate concern. Anti-
correlationism is by no means a negligible unifying factor—but our alternatives to 
correlationism are fundamentally divergent and even incompatible in several 
regards. (Brassier, 2009) 
 
In terms of Laruelle and the Speculative Realists, the relationship is more complex, for 
whilst many of his key ideas pre-date the what has been called the ‘Speculative Turn’ 
(Bryant, Srnicek and Harman, 2011),7 certain aspects of his thought (for example, the 
application of non-philosophical principles directly to photography), have emerged in 
parallel to key Speculative texts such as Nihil Unbound and After Finitude. As such, 
although we can clearly see Ray Brassier working through and responding to Laruelle’s 
non-philosophy in Nihil Unbound, and identify traces of Brassier’s thought in later work by 
Negarestani, it is more productive to think of the range of thought that has emerged 
since the early 2000s as embodying a diverse set of engagements within a post-Deleuze-
Badiouian context. In this regard, whilst chapters one and two of this study do establish a 
context that in many ways is built on and further explored in chapters three and four, 
there is not such a strong contextual link between chapters three and four. Instead, whilst 
we can still recognise themes and trajectories that run from Laruelle’s work into 
Speculative Realist thought, overall, we are better served by seeing this as the 
contemporaneous production of thought, rather than as a simple precedent to 
Speculative Realism. 
 
 
                                                
7 See The Speculative Turn, an edited collection of essays examining and critiquing the key ideas 
associated with Speculative Realist enquiry. 
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Our conclusion will turn to two recent philosophical developments in order to take up the 
challenge of using the consequences of this research project in a more creative context, 
and developing a sense of improvisation as a ‘Promethean practice’. As we saw above, 
Brassier made it clear that for him, Speculative Realism was not a movement, and nor 
were the various thinkers associated with this term united in any way beyond their shared 
refusal to accept a philosophical perspective that placed a limit on human thought’s 
capacity to conceive of an absolute that exists independently of our ability to think it. In 
the essay ‘Prometheanism and its Critics’, we see Brassier outlining what he calls a 
‘Promethean project’, whose focus is directed towards understanding the way in which, as 
human beings, we are not only able to conceive of something that is independent from 
us, but we are also able to create it. In an extended discussion that lays out what he sees 
as the traditional objections to Prometheanism, Brassier presents its critics’ insistence on 
maintaining a necessary distinction between what is given and what is made. 
 
The sin of Prometheanism […] consists in destroying the equilibrium between the 
made and the given - between what human beings generate through their own 
resources, both cognitive and practical, and the way the world is, whether 
characterised cosmologically, biologically, or historically. The Promethean trespass 
resides in making the given. (Brassier, 2014: 484) 
 
For Brassier, the ‘Promethean trespass’ is our capacity to produce rational thought as an 
independent process, and by refusing any sanctity of the given over the made, Brassier 
asserts that we can make or become anything. Similarly, Negarestani’s essay ‘The Labor 
of the Inhuman’, focuses on the idea that human reason is intrinsically and necessarily 
autonomous, and independent of the conditions of its production, and thus both writers 
enable us to think that improvisation, as the result of human thought, must similarly 
remain capable of sidestepping any sense of being pre-determined or predictable, once 
again suggesting that improvisation, as a practice that is formed on the inside of human 
thought and experience, nevertheless has the capacity to open out onto that which is 
beyond or outside of human thought. 
 
To speak metaphorically, improvisation becomes a tool for digging – for digging into 
contemporary thought. And, all being well, philosophy will help us to talk about what we 
find, and feedback to teach us more about improvisation itself. 
 
 
  
  Introduction 
  17 
Bibliography 
 
Bailey, D. 1992. Improvisation: Its nature and practice in music. The British National 
Library Sound Archive. 
 
Brassier, R. 2009. Against an Aesthetics of Noise, available at http://ny-
web.be/transitzone/against-aesthetics-noise.html (accessed 18.8.16) 
 
Brassier, R. 2014. ‘Prometheanism and its Critics’, in Mackay, R and Avanessian, A (eds). 
2014. Accelerate: The Accelerationist Reader. Urbanomic: Falmouth. 
 
Bryant, L, Srnicek, N and Harman, G (eds). 2011. The Speculative Turn: Continental 
Materialism and Realism. re.press 
 
Deleuze, G and Guattari, F. 1994. What Is Philosophy? Columbia University Press: New 
York, Chichester 
 
Dunmall, P. 2004. Liner notes for Full Circle - Explorations, available at 
http://www.jazzcds.co.uk/artist_id_581/cd_id_333 (accessed 18.8.16) 
 
Katz, J. 1999. ‘John Cage's Queer Silence; or, How to Avoid Making Matters Worse’. 
Originally published in GLQ: A Journal of Lesbian and Gay Studies, but available at 
http://www.queerculturalcenter.org/Pages/KatzPages/KatzWorse.html (accessed 14.7.17) 
 
Laruelle, F. 2011. ‘The Generic as Predicate and Constant: Non-Philosophy and 
Materialism’, in Bryant, L, Srnicek, N and Harman, G. 2011. The Speculative Turn: 
Continental Materialism and Realism. re.press: Melbourne. 
 
Lewis, G. 2004. ‘Improvised Music After 1950: Afrological and Eurological Perspectives.’ 
in Fischlin, D and Heble, A (eds). The Other Side of Nowhere: Jazz, Improvisation, and 
Communities in Dialogue. Wesleyan University Press: Middletown, Connecticut. 
 
Thrift, N. 2008. Non-representational Theory: Space, Politics, Affect. Routledge: 
Abingdon and New York. 
 
 
 
  
It’s All Around You 
18 
It’s All Around You: Improvisation encounters Deleuze and Guattari 
 
In order to begin an investigation into the means by which contemporary thought can 
offer useful insights and new approaches to thinking about musical improvisation, in this 
first chapter we shall turn to the work of the philosopher Gilles Deleuze and the 
psychoanalyst Felix Guattari in order to generate an initial set of observations about 
improvisation and to establish a theoretical context from which we can broaden our 
investigations into other areas of contemporary thought. Given that their work engages 
with creative practice in a number of ways, and that one of their key works, namely A 
Thousand Plateaus, both appropriates ideas from art and music in order to generate 
philosophical concepts, and at the same time explores creative processes, by drawing on 
philosophical enquiry, it is unsurprising that their ideas have been widely used by 
numerous creative practitioners and theorists. As such, this chapter will undertake a 
similar engagement with their ideas in order to add further depth to existing perspectives 
relating to improvised music, and to develop new insights into contemporary practices, 
thus providing the groundwork and the foundations upon which the remainder of the 
study will be built. We shall begin by establishing two contexts that will underpin the 
chapter, setting out an approach to thinking about improvisation itself, as well as thinking 
through Deleuze, and then Deleuze and Guattari’s formulation of immanence in terms of 
the virtual-actual pairing and the plane of immanence, and as we shall see in later 
chapters, immanence continues to evolve in the hands of the other thinkers. Initially, 
Deleuze maps our engagement with an immanent Real, firstly by thinking about the way 
in which the actual and the virtual are two aspects of the Real, where he was careful to 
distinguish the ‘possible’ from the ‘virtual’ in order to clarify that when we actualise the 
virtual we are not engaging with a metaphysical, transcendental realm, but instead 
creating experience from a real world that surrounds us and infuses us. In his work with 
Guattari, we see the modification of this idea and the plane of immanence was a more 
direct means of addressing the sense in which living, thinking and making is an ongoing 
process of being infused by, and folding in, these immanent flows and forces.  
 
The chapter will then proceed to work through a series of Deleuze and Guattari’s key 
conceptual innovations, which in themselves will provide us with opportunities to re-think 
improvisation, and reflect on what it is that an improviser might be doing when they 
improvise, with the materials that they have to hand. We shall consider an improvisation 
as an ‘assemblage’, where a musician creates a ‘improvisation-assemblage' using sounds, 
structures, rules, ideas, players, properties and materials in order to produce music, and 
go further than this to see a musician themselves as an assemblage; themselves 
becoming a part of a flow of pure intensities and potentiality. The ‘body without organs’ 
and the image of the ‘becoming-musician’ will also enable us to view the act of 
improvising as a disruption, where the ‘BwO’ conveys the sense in which a musician 
immerses themselves completely in experimentation and exploration; and the idea of 
‘becoming’ indicates the way in which an improvisation is a loosening of our awareness of 
a point of departure, or a point of arrival: the creation of music as a process of movement 
and change, potentially in any direction. The ‘refrain’ will provide us with the means to 
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apply Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy more directly to practice, and via the three 
movements of the refrain which progress from the image of a child singing in the dark to 
comfort itself, to the establishing of home, to the leaving of that home in order to join 
with chaos, we will be able to consider the way in which an improvisation can be both an 
intuitive gesture as well as the source of its own frame of reference. In this regard, an 
improvisation is both an impulsive, unpremeditated burst of sound, but it also creates the 
conditions for response, where sounds and music have a particular meaning because they 
have occurred in a particular way. Deleuze and Guattari further this idea with the concept 
of the territory, perhaps one of their most appealing images in terms of creative practice, 
not least because they make a direct comparison between art and nature as creative acts 
where they tell us that,  
 
[T]he brown stagemaker (Scenopoeetes dentirostris) lays down landmarks each 
morning by dropping leaves it picks from its tree, and then turning them upside down 
so the paler underside stands out against the dirt: inversion produces a matter of 
expression […] Can this becoming, this emergence, be called Art? That would make 
the territory a result of art. (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 315) 
In this way, we can conceive of improvisation as a deterritorialisation of music and sound, 
wherein the normal codes for the production of music are suspended, overcome, ‘turned 
upside down’, and then repurposed, or reterritorialised: thus an improvisation, as an act 
of territorialisation, brings into play a new set of structures and affects; and consider the 
ways in which an improvisation might be connected with the production of something 
that is inherently new as well as how it is that an improvisation might create an impact on 
its listeners or audience. For a group of improvisers, a note, a sound or a sequence, 
becomes part of a chain of impulses that force new decisions and responses. Similarly for 
an audience, an improvisation can deterritorialise their understanding of music, leading to 
an expanded conception of music that can consist of an enhanced range of sounds built 
on radically new structures.  
 
Creative endeavour has long been associated with risk-taking, and thus the chapter will 
conclude by thinking about the extent to which an improvisation, if it is to be a successful 
improvisation, does not simply risk being ‘good’ or ‘bad’, instead risks being 
unintelligible, thereby forcing audiences and listeners to create new ways of hearing. 
Ultimately, Deleuze and Guattari’s will enable us to think that the capacity of an 
improvisation to create a disruption, or in Deleuze and Guattari’s terminology, to ‘stand 
on its own’, is its capacity to break with conventional codes and force its listeners and 
audiences to create new codes and tools with which to comprehend and engage with it. 
In this way, we saw that what makes an improvisation ‘successful’ is just this capacity to go 
beyond conventional music coding, by risking unintelligibility and thus forcing the 
creation of new codes of listening, new ways of hearing. 
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1. Searching for sounds, searching for responses 
 
Throughout this study, the term ‘improvisation’ will be used to refer to the time-based 
process of creating coherent musical structures, that draws on a musician’s knowledge of 
musical rules and principles alongside their ability to make use a sound-producing device 
either individually or as part of a group of musicians.1 Thus, in basic terms, an 
improvisation is a ‘performed composition of music’, a definition that is intended to 
respond to and make meaningful reference to a range of improvised music practices, that 
could include rock, jazz and the supposedly ‘non-idiomatic’ style that was initially 
identified and discussed by Derek Bailey in his landmark book, Improvisation: Its Nature 
and Practice in Music.2 
 
During an improvisation a number of things can happen in order to produce sounds and 
structures, for example musicians may experiment with new sounds, new playing 
techniques, or they may employ extreme repetition in order to generate subtle, slowly 
evolving structures. Musicians may interact with other musicians in various ways, paying 
close attention to other people’s ideas, or ignoring them entirely. Similarly, the physical 
properties of a performance space may form material for an improvisation, or in the case 
of musicians such as the saxophonist John Butcher and the trumpet player Peter Evans, 
the design and acoustic properties of the instrument itself can provide a wealth of sonic 
resources with which to create musical structures. A number of seminal recordings of free 
jazz and free improvisation exemplify sonic exploration and investigation in action: 
records such as Ornette Coleman’s Free Jazz, Evan Parker, Derek Bailey and Han 
Bennink’s Topography of the Lungs, AMM’s AMMMusic and The Music Improvisation 
Company’s self-titled debut are all classic examples of various real-time adventures in 
sound, where form and content are developed by musicians who are making moment-to-
                                                
1 In the context of this thesis, the word musician is used to denote any individual who is actively engaged in 
the production of an improvised musical performance and makes no assumptions about an individual’s 
instrumental fluency or technical musical knowledge. Hence, the word ‘musician’ is intended to indicate a 
creative process, whereas the word ‘player’ would tend to suggest that a pre-composed work is being 
performed.  
2 Improvised music has also been described as ‘free improvisation’ by Bailey himself, as ‘free music’ by the 
improvising guitarist and educator Joe Morris, and as ‘free jazz’ by the saxophonist Ornette Coleman 
among others. George Lewis notes that the word ‘free’ within free improvisation, became a symbol for 
‘freedom’ that were aligned with the political quests for freedom such as the Paris protests of 1968. Lewis 
also discusses the way in which freedom, certainly for musicians such as the drummer Elvin Jones and 
bassist Ron Carter, both of whom played key roles in the development of improvised music during the 
1960s, was either meaningless unless it was grounded in some form of structure, or a disingenuous term, 
since it would forever need to be arrived at through self-discipline and self-control. Lewis also references 
the drummer Philly Joe Jones’ conviction that every musician’s playing is already free, ‘every time you play 
a solo you’re free to play what you want to play. That’s freedom right there’ (Lewis, 2004: 154). As with the 
comments in the Introduction regarding the provenance of improvised music as a practice, it is clear that 
the word ‘free’ within the context of improvisation is complex: to some it is a musical statement, whilst to 
others it is a reflection of cultural politics; and to others still, it is a meaningless notion. Thus we shall use the 
term ‘improvised music’, Lewis’ concerns about Afrological erasure notwithstanding. 
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moment choices about what to play. In ’Towards an Ethic of Improvisation’, a manifesto 
statement that was, in many ways, a pivotal and genre-defining treatise for improvised 
music practice, the musician and composer Cornelius Cardew described the process of 
improvising in this way:  
 
We are searching for sounds and for the responses that attach to them, rather than 
thinking them up, preparing them and producing them. The search is conducted in 
the medium of sound and the musician himself is at the heart of the experiment 
(Cardew, 1971). 
 
Cardew has come to stand as one of the key figures in contemporary and improvised 
European music in the second half of the twentieth century, and his influence as a result 
of his role in AMM, the Scratch Orchestra as well as the composer and performer of a 
range of experimental and exploratory works continues to be significant. What is 
interesting about Cardew’s statement here is that, in one sense, it has become the 
standard means by which to theorise improvisation: sound is the medium through which 
experiments in pitch, timbre, rhythm as well as melodic and harmonic combination can be 
carried out in order to achieve unforeseen musical results. However, there is a far subtler 
message here as well, connected to Cardew’s sense of ‘searching for responses’, which 
suggests that an improvisation is not simply about arranging sounds in a novel way. 
Instead, Cardew also demonstrates his interest in creating music that does not trigger 
conditioned reflexes, and as a member of AMM he used improvisation as a means to 
subvert musical norms in order to provoke new responses for audiences and listeners. 
Cardew’s interest in moving AMM and their audiences away from a standardised 
conception of music itself reflects the ideas of renowned Frankfurt School critical theorist 
Theodor Adorno, who claimed that, 
 
Popular music divests the listener of his spontaneity and promotes conditioned 
reflexes. Not only does it not require his effort to follow its concrete stream; it 
actually gives him models under which anything concrete still remaining may be 
subsumed. (Adorno, 1990: 306) 
 
This extract from his classic polemic against the standardisation of popular music 
composition, ’On Popular Music’, argues that a music that simply reproduces a set of pre-
ordained codes can only ever instill in audiences a set of pre-ordained responses. Whilst 
Adorno’s work can be problematic for a variety of reasons, not least because of the 
assumptions he makes about listeners’ ability to make discerning judgements about what 
they are listening to, it is clear that Cardew is interested in talking about and developing a 
music practice that not only creatively explores the way in which music can be produced, 
but also investigates the way in which audiences respond to music. Cardew’s perspective 
will remain significant throughout this project, as it establishes a certain posture that 
improvising musicians can be seen to adopt in relation to their use of musical materials 
and their intended outcome. As an open-ended approach to creating music, an 
improvisation would normally come to have musical coherence by virtue of its own 
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structural and aesthetic details (it should work ‘on its own terms’), and therefore could be 
of any duration and result from any number of musicians working together, using any kind 
of musical or sonic resource in order to create sounds. 
 
Another key point of reference for this chapter will be a conclusion reached by the 
saxophonist and ethnomusicologist David Borgo who, in his introduction to the book 
Sync or Swarm: Improvising Music in a Complex Age, states that, ‘by adopting the 
present progressive, “improvising”, I hope to highlight the fact that […] creative 
musicians are working in and around established practices and codes, improvising music’ 
(Borgo, 2005: 9). Borgo’s proposal can help us to slightly modify Cardew’s proposal by 
suggesting that the word ‘improvising’ not only describes the process of making a piece 
of music up as one goes along, but that it also alludes to a subtler, and (after Deleuze and 
Guattari) a more radical ‘deterritorialisation’ of music as an activity or a concept in itself. In 
this way, Borgo encourages us to think that improvising may not simply be a means to 
spontaneously create music, but also may well by a means of challenging an audience’s 
(and indeed a musician’s) conception of what a piece of music can be.  
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2. Improvisation and immanence 
 
In one sense improvisation is about creating a set of musical sounds and structures that 
had not previously existed in that combination, but at the same time, we could also think 
of an improvisation as a process of transforming something that could potentially happen 
(for example the notes, sounds and musical structures that we could potentially produce) 
into something that is happening, in other words the notes, sounds and structures that we 
actually hear. A key statement from one of Deleuze’s central works, Difference and 
Repetition, will enable us to start thinking about improvisation in relation to his thought, 
and more specifically help us to consider what this sense of production and 
transformation could be. Here, Deleuze warns us against confusing the virtual with the 
possible: 
 
The possible is opposed to the real; the process undergone by the possible is 
therefore a ‘realisation’. By contrast, the virtual is not opposed to the real; it 
possesses a full reality by itself. The process it undergoes is that of actualisation. 
(Deleuze, 2004 DR: 263) 
 
This statement is useful to us in a number of ways, as it introduces certain foundational 
concepts that are not only important to Deleuze and Guattari’s thought, but as we shall 
see in the following chapters, are also the central focus of a range of contemporary 
thinkers. Deleuze’s philosophy is based on a conception of what he refers to here as the 
‘real’ which affirms that there is nothing that in anyway lies beyond human thought’s 
capacity to access it, and that human experience occurs within a ‘real’ world. Over the 
next four chapters, we shall encounter various philosophical positions in respect to the 
real, and explore a number of perspectives on the relationship between human thought 
and various versions of the kind of absolute real that Deleuze is here alluding to. For our 
current purposes, and in simple terms, Deleuze is articulating a philosophy of immanence 
that is pitched against phenomenological thought that would suggest that a world exists 
‘for us’ by virtue of the fact that we can only ever experience the world in terms of our 
own capacity to think or experience it. Deleuze’s real is a real that exists on its own terms, 
and it is a real that we are part of; it does not need human activity to ‘make’ it real. In the 
above passage, we can see Deleuze referring to this idea in his assertion that there is no 
‘possible’ (which is to say that there is nothing ‘unreal’) that is waiting to be ‘realised’, 
instead he uses the terms ‘virtual’ and ‘actual’ to denote what could be thought of as two 
aspects, or two categories of the real. By informing us that the virtual ‘possesses a full 
reality by itself’, and that the ‘process […] it undergoes is that of actualisation’, Deleuze 
shows that the virtual, rather than being a possible state of some-thing from which that 
thing can emerge, can be thought of instead as a state of potentiality, rather than the 
precursor to something specific. Actualisation is thus the process of interacting with this 
virtual potentiality in order to make something or create an event, and it is this dual 
aspect of the real that can be useful to us in terms of thinking about improvisation as 
creation-transformation, since Deleuze’s statement is asking us to consider what it is that 
we are doing when we make things like art or music. In this context, we can think of an 
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improvisation as a process that does not so much make possible sounds ‘real’, but instead 
is an actualisation of an immanent and virtual aspect of what is already real. 
 
Although this appears simplistic, the difference between what is possible and what is 
virtual is of paramount importance not only for Deleuze, but also in relation to Cardew’s 
idea of ‘searching for responses’, in that what the actualisation of the virtual allows for, 
unlike the realisation of the possible, is an entirely new set of outcomes and responses. 
Deleuze goes on to suggest that, ‘the possible and the virtual are further distinguished by 
the fact that one refers to the form of identity in the concept, whereas the other 
designates a pure multiplicity in the Idea which radically excludes the identical as a prior 
condition’ (Deleuze, 2004 DR: 263), which indicates that by describing something as 
‘possible’, we are already making a number of assumptions about what it will be and what 
kind of qualities it will have. This sense of ‘identity in the concept’ suggests that an 
improvisation somehow represents the conditions of its production and that there is a 
character or identity that is pre-existent in the possibility of an improvisation that is simply 
borne out by its performance. Another way of putting this is to say that on the one hand, 
whilst something that is made from what was possible is ‘like’ what was possible, on the 
other hand the actual is not ‘like’ the virtual, and thus an improvisation, as an actualisation 
of the virtual, is in no way a ‘representation’ of the virtual.3 Not only does the use of the 
virtual and the actual, allow us to think about creativity as a non-linear and exponential 
process, in that the outcome of engaging with the virtual cannot be expected (this is 
‘radically excluded’), but it also enables us to affirm Cardew’s sense that improvisation 
really is a search for responses, in that improvised outcomes do not simply re-engage 
familiar reactions. Deleuze also introduces another term, ‘differenciation’, to provide a 
further indication as to how the actual comes to be distinguished from the virtual, stating 
that it ‘expresses the actualisation of this virtual and the constitution of solutions (by local 
integrations)’ (Deleuze, 2004 DR: 261). If differenciation marks and describes the process 
of transition from the virtual to the actual, then we can think in more detail about how this 
might map onto the process of improvising. For example, we can think about the 
moment-to-moment creation of music from which an improvisation is comprised as being 
a series of decisions that ‘constitute solutions’ to the basic improviser’s question ‘what 
sound do I make next?’ In the same way, we could see a completed piece, whether it is 
two minutes or forty minutes long, as being the constitution of a solution, to the question 
‘how do I make a coherent piece of music?’ In these contexts, we could then view 
Deleuze’s ‘local integrations’ in a number of ways, such as a musician’s engagement with 
the physical properties of their instrument or the performance space, their application of 
their skill and knowledge of music, their interaction with other musicians involved in the 
performance, or their response to audience’s attention. As such, although an 
improvisation may well constitute ‘a solution by local integrations’, which would suggest 
that all of the possible contents for an improvisation are already in existence, the 
                                                
3 A number of studies have explored the concept of non-representation in creative prqactice, not least 
Simon O’Sullivan’s Art Encounters Deleuze and Guattari: Thought Beyond Representation and Nigel Thrift’s 
Non-representational Theory: Space, Politics, Affect, both of which, whilst not explicitly referenced, form 
part of the backdrop to this study. 
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outcome of an improvisation, if it really is a differenciating process in the Deleuzian sense, 
can still provoke unexpected responses. 
 
Deleuze’s work with Guattari in A Thousand Plateaus and What Is Philosophy? furthers the 
potential to explore music and improvisation with in terms of immanence, and they use 
the concept of the ‘plane of immanence’ to convey a sense in which human thought is not 
so much preconditioned or foreshadowed by the virtual, but instead we can imagine that 
the world that we experience is ‘infused’ by populations of intensities that make up this 
plane. 
 
Here, there are no longer any forms or developments of forms […] There is no 
structure, any more than there is genesis. There are only relations of movement and 
rest, speed and slowness between unformed elements, or at least between 
elements that are relatively unformed, molecules and particles of all kinds. (Deleuze 
and Guattari, 1987: 266) 
 
This description suggests not only the sense of potential that we encountered as a virtual 
real, but it broadens out what immanence might mean, not by making any concessions to 
what the plane might be immanent to, but thinking in terms of ‘relations of movement’, 
‘unformed elements’, and molecules and particles, which convey an image of an ebb and 
flow, of cohesion and dissipation, both at the level of the individual (in terms of an 
individual being a composite of relations of movement), and at the level of activity and 
movement itself (where an improvisation in process could be understood to be similarly 
comprised of movements and rests between relatively unformed elements). Also worth 
noting at this stage, is that Deleuze and Guattari’s vision for the plane of immanence as 
an amorphous non-space that is populated by movements, relations and components 
that are in a constant state of forming and deforming, in some way reflects Francois 
Laruelle’s interest in the quantum superpositioning of radical immanence that we shall 
encounter in chapter four. Whilst as we shall see, Laruelle takes radical immanence in a 
slightly different direction, the comparison is worthy of consideration, as both articulations 
of immanence enable us to think about the way in which an improviser may to a certain 
extent engage or interact with a set of forces that are not of human origin, but can 
nevertheless impact on and give rise to human creative processes. 
 
We can use the material from A Thousand Plateaus to construct a set of proposals for 
thinking about improvising in relation to Deleuze and Guattari’s version of immanence, 
and it is worth quoting them at length as they begin to put some kind of framework 
around the plane of immanence, and expand its potential for re-use and appropriation: 
 
The tree is given in the seed, but as a function of a plan(e) that is not given. The 
same applies to music. The development or organisational principle does not 
appear in itself, in a direct relation with that which develops or is organised: There 
is a transcendent compositional principle that is not of the nature of sound, that is 
not ‘audible’ by itself or for itself. This opens the way for all possible 
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interpretations. The plan(e) can always be described, but as a part aside, as 
ungiven in that to which it gives rise… Life plan(e), music plan(e), writing plan(e), 
it’s all the same: a plan(e) that cannot be given as such, that can only be inferred 
from the forms it develops and the subjects it forms, since it is for these forms and 
these subjects. (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 266)  
 
We are being presented with a plane that is both immanent to actualised entities, and yet 
at the same time can only be inferred from the existence of the same entities. It is does 
not pre-suppose the form or content of beings, rather it functions as a set of conditions 
which allows for the production of new things. If we think about sound in this context, 
then whilst the plane of immanence does not ‘cause’ sound or music to happen, and 
neither is sound ‘produced from’ this plane, nevertheless, if we hear a sound, then 
Deleuze and Guattari are suggesting that this is because the plane is the context that 
enables sound to be created. In many ways, it is more productive to think that the plane 
of immanence surrounds us at all times and that it is an aspect of the things that we 
experience all the time. Whilst we cannot see or hear the plane, it is nevertheless inherent 
in what is around us, and in this sense, we can think of it as a means to convey a moment 
that could lead to a song being produced, or an aspect of unformed sound, that is open-
ended and without signification. As a development from the virtual-actual paradigm, 
there is clearly a focusing taking place, in that Deleuze and Guattari are now beginning to 
think more particularly about creative contexts (life, writing, music) and the way in which 
conditions feed into the production of new forms. However, Deleuze’s earlier principle of 
non-identity in the concept is still very much in play here, and the suggestion that there 
are conditions of production does not mean that new things must exist and will have 
particular features (for example, a seed will not necessarily grow into a tree), but that the 
existence of conditions can be inferred retrospectively. Having established an immanent 
framework within which to discuss improvisation, we can now proceed to add more detail 
to our investigation. 
 
In What Is Philosophy?, Deleuze and Guattari further elaborate the notion of the plane of 
immanence with particular reference to art and music, with its companion concept, the 
plane of composition, a ‘world before man yet produced by man’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 
1994: 187). Clearly, Deleuze is theorising immanence in a number of different ways, both 
in his own work and in collaboration with Guattari, but what the various concepts have in 
common is that they simultaneously map out an empirical ontology (in which there is no 
inaccessible world or reality that is different to the reality that we can and do encounter in 
our everyday lives), whilst at the same time theorising a movement between two states of 
existing in these ‘real’ contexts. Deleuze and Guattari describe this movement as 
‘becoming’ (Deleuze and Guattari,1987: 233), which signifies that the movement between 
two states, such as ‘becoming-animal’ or ‘becoming-musician’, involves something of a 
loss of identity, such that an individual is no longer wholly themselves, but nor are they 
what they appear to be turning into (an animal or a musician, for instance). Instead this 
third, becoming identity emerges. However, becoming, as might be expected, is a 
complex idea, for whilst becoming is itself a recognisable state, it is also defined by the 
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fact that it is perpetually unfixed, it is in a permanent state of becoming not itself. In a 
sense, becoming is a modification of Deleuze’s earlier concept of actualisation, since it 
does convey a similar sense of transition, although the later term is designed to show 
impermanence and transition are permanent conditions.  
 
As Deleuze and Guattari’s model evolves, they also develop the concept the ‘plane of 
composition' in order to think more particularly about creative practice. 
 
On this plane of composition, as on ‘an abstract vectorial space,’ geometrical 
figures are laid out […] which are no more than cosmic forces capable of merging, 
being transformed, confronting each other, and alternating. (Deleuze and 
Guattari, 1994: 187) 
 
Although Deleuze and Guattari talk of the plane of composition as being populated by 
cosmic forces, it is important to remember that in terms of thinking about improvisation, 
every musical idea and component become part of this plane. This is the ‘world before 
man yet produced by man’ (another reference to the concept of becoming that is a 
prominent feature of their later work), which, for an improviser, must come before any 
action takes place, and yet is populated by the results of previous improvisations and 
musical-sonic occurrences. Thus the ‘abstract vectorial space’ consists of ‘relations of 
movement and rest, speed and slowness between unformed elements’, which for a 
musician could be thought of as a set of conditions from which sounds and structures, can 
emerge that will form the basis of their improvising. 
 
The musician’s action consists in deframing, in finding the opening, taking up the 
plane of composition once more […] to plot a transversal, irreducible to both the 
harmonic vertical and melodic horizontal, that involves sonorous blocs of variable 
individuation but that also opens them up or splits them in a space-time that 
determines their density and their course over the plane. (Deleuze and Guattari, 
1994: 191) 
 
This leaves us with an image of improvising musicians ‘deframing’ the materials that will 
constitute music: sounds, structures, techniques, physical environments, instruments and 
so on, a process which reflects the process of making something using immanent 
materials. In this way, we uncover a resonance with Borgo’s claims about ‘improvising’ 
music: the double process of both deframing a set of immanent elements, or even 
materials, and at the same time creating music. As we shall see later, this process of 
deframing, or what Deleuze and Guattari also refer to as ‘deterritorialisation’, in itself has 
a number of components as does the act of creation, or territorialisation. 
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3. Re-thinking improvisation 
 
3.1 Bodies, eggs and improvisation  
 
For an improviser, one of the most compelling images in A Thousand Plateaus appears in 
the ‘How Do You Make Yourself a Body Without Organs?’ plateau, when Deleuze and 
Guattari work through their interpretation of a masochist’s search for ‘intensities of pain 
[and] pain waves’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 152). The body without organs (also 
written ‘BwO’),4 is a concept that Deleuze and Guattari use to convey a process of 
shutting-down, or closing-off of the world that a masochist triggers in order to almost 
‘switch off’ a normal set of sensations and responses, and instead open themselves up to 
a different kind of experience, more akin to the formlessness of the plane of immanence. 
After instructing us to ’find your body without organs […] find out how to make it’ 
(Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 151), Deleuze and Guattari present us with the masochist’s 
own BwO: 
 
What is certain is that the masochist has made himself a BwO under such 
conditions that the BwO can no longer be populated by anything but intensities of 
pain, pain waves. It is false to say that the masochist is looking for pain but just as 
false to say that he is looking for pleasure in a particularly suspensive or 
roundabout way. The masochist is looking for a type of BwO that only pain can fill, 
or travel over, due to the very conditions under which that BwO was constituted. 
Pains are populations, packs. (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 152) 
 
With their contention that the masochist is using pain as a means to attain a state that 
goes beyond a normal set of conditioned responses, and instead reaching out for a more 
immanent and unfixed experience that is populated by intensities, packs and populations, 
Deleuze and Guattari enable us to imagine what an engagement with the plane of 
immanence might feel like. As we saw earlier, the plane of immanence in A Thousand 
Plateaus is not a fixed space, and neither is there a coupling between an actual and a 
virtual in the way that is presented in Difference and Repetition. Instead, the plane of 
immanence comes across as an aspect of what is presented to us in experience, but 
without a sense of the signified, represented meaning that we would encounter in normal 
experience, where we might be tempted to connect a sensation to a particular meaning. 
The plane of immanence and the intensive state of the BwO work to convey the sense 
that something more amorphous and undetermined is happening: sensations are 
happening, but we don’t know what they are or what they mean. This is a critical point, 
because it tells us that an opening-out onto the plane of immanence is not the direct 
result of extreme pain, but instead, for a masochist, the sensation of extreme pain may be 
a means to trigger the BwO, a state of pure intensity. As such, there may a variety of ways 
to create a body without organs, to allow oneself to be ‘occupied, populated only by 
intensities’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 153); and as Deleuze and Guattari introduce the 
                                                
4 Throughout A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari refer to the Body without organs as the ‘BwO’ 
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notion of the masochist making use of some sort of device or prop make a BwO, we can 
come to see that an improvisation might be a similar opening-out into a state of intensity. 
‘At night,’ the masochist tells us, ‘put on the bridle and attach my hands more tightly, 
either to the bit with the chain, or to the big belt’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 155). 
Where a masochist might make use of a belt, bridle or bit in order to begin the processes 
of shutting-out the world, so too could we suggest that a musician picks up an instrument 
in order to turn themselves into a sound making machine. In the same way that a bridle 
binds the hands in order to create a BwO, so too might the strings of a guitar or the 
mouthpiece of a trumpet change the way that we sense and make things.5 Whereas a 
bridle is used to suspend a normal state of being in order to ‘[bring] forth a plane of 
consistency’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 155), an instrument similarly takes us out of a 
normal state of being and makes us into a sound producer, and where intense pain in the 
masochist’s hands may propagate populations of intensities, so too might the focusing of 
sensation onto the lips, onto the tips of fingers. In the same way, by shutting down a 
normal process of communication and instead thinking in terms of non-representational 
sound, a musician also creates a body without organs. Again, this is not to say that 
creating a body without organs is a literal instruction, instead it is a statement designed to 
communicate the non-representational, non-signifying state of the BwO. A BwO is 
created when the lips or the fingers or the hands or indeed the voice stop working in the 
way that lips, fingers, hands and voices normally work: when a sensation on our lips 
ceases to be what we expect it to be, and when the familiar is no longer recognised by 
our fingers, then we have begun to open ourselves out onto a plane of immanence. Thus, 
when we are presented with the image of ‘the eyes, anus, urethra, breasts, and nose 
[being] sewn shut’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 150), we can further imagine the way in 
which such a closure or blocking of the physical entrance points of the body, a kind of 
‘shutting off’ of the body’s normal functions that enables it to enter an absolute state of 
intensity, conveys as much of a sense of a body whose organs no longer function in the 
way that we understand, as it does of a body whose organs are no longer there: the eyes 
and anus have been sewn shut, and have not been removed, thus they no longer work in 
a way that we would expect. 
 
The masochist is therefore a visceral allusion to the way in which musicians, particularly 
improvising musicians, enter into a heightened state of awareness and concentration 
whilst playing; and their focus is turned towards the moment-to-moment minutiae of 
musical development, using their instrument in the same way that the bit between the 
teeth can bring forth an intensive state. This sense of ‘sewing shut’ an improvisation very 
much reflects the importance of listening whilst improvising, whereby musicians become 
‘sewn into’ the world of the improvisation, where everything becomes directly relevant to 
the music that is being produced; nothing else is relevant and is therefore shut out. By 
listening to what is around them in their environment, by listening to the sounds that they 
                                                
5 It is worth noting that guitar strings create callouses on our fingers, and that using a trumpet mouthpiece 
can crack our lips. In this sense, the production of sound could be seen as an albeit less severe version of 
creating damage in order to produce intensive sensation that Deleuze and Guattari recognise in the 
masochist. 
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and their fellow musicians are creating, and by listening to the gestalt musical form that is 
developing around them, the musicians and all of these elements become part of the 
world of the improvisation, and to extend the sewing analogy, this becomes the ‘material’ 
of the improvisation. Sewing shut is thus a switching off of anything that is not relevant to 
the improvisation, although knowing what to focus on and what to switch off is clearly 
central to the success of any improvisation. 
 
Elsewhere in the plateau, Deleuze and Guattari suggest that by finding, creating and 
becoming a BwO we can become, ‘the intense egg defined by axes and vectors, 
gradients and thresholds, by dynamic tendencies involving energy transformation and 
kinematic movements’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 153). It is worth noting here that 
Deleuze and Guattari’s use of the egg as an image of intensive immanence grows out of 
Deleuze’s earlier work in Difference and Repetition, where he states that, ‘the world is an 
egg […] We think that difference of intensity, as this is implicated in the egg, expresses 
first the differential relations or virtual matter to be organised’ (Deleuze, 2004 DR: 313). 
What is interesting here is the way in which Deleuze and Guattari place the virtual, and 
the process of engaging with the virtual, into a physical context; as an egg that is 
composed of a myriad of potential conditions from which life develops. Following on 
from this, we could well think of an improvisation in such an egg-like way, wherein the 
intensities within an improvisation, as a set of unformed trajectories and conditions that 
are given form through a series of local integrations such as those we described earlier, in 
other words, a musician’s skill and knowledge, the physical properties of the instruments 
themselves, and the complex interrelation that occurs between musicians when they set 
about producing sounds and responding to each-others’ musical gestures.  
 
In using Williams Burroughs’ image of a heroin addict to further illustrate the body 
without organs, Deleuze and Guattari also give us another way to picture an improvising 
musician, and their relationship with a musical instrument and musical processes. Where 
the image of the masochist having their hands bound with a bridle enabled us to think 
about reaching a state of pure intensity, now it is an addict injecting junk that allows us to 
conceive of an individual in a purely intensive state. Burroughs’ junky, who ‘wants The 
Cold like he wants His junk - NOT OUTSIDE where it does him no good but INSIDE so he 
can sit around with a spine like a frozen hydraulic jack […] his metabolism approaching 
Absolute ZERO’ (Burroughs, 1993: 13), to a certain extent brings to mind a musician, 
using their instrument to draw their environment into the improvisation, such that 
everything that is happening around them must exist in terms of the improvisation. If we 
combine Deleuze and Guattari’s sense of zero intensity that characterises ‘the egg [as] the 
milieu of pure intensity […] zero intensity as principle of production (Deleuze and 
Guattari, 1987: 164) with the idea of a junky injecting heroin in order to reach an absolute 
zero point, then we can imagine that an improvising musician is submerged in a not 
dissimilar process. By using a guitar, or a flute, or even a set of drums as a ‘needle’ that 
can ‘inject’ a focused awareness of their sonic surroundings into themselves, in the same 
way that a lightning conductor grounds an electrical current, the ‘addict-musician’ is 
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released into a state of pure intensity, where music can be created from a state of total 
immersion in the process of listening and playing.  
 
Having started the process of thinking about this virtual realm of intensities in terms of 
musical concepts, we are now able to speculatively map out how the improviser can 
interact with these unformed substances. Borgo’s sense of improvising music again 
becomes useful in this regard, since his perspective also implies that the improviser 
suspends a previous sense of music in order to make something new. As with the idea of 
‘sewing shut’, this is not to say that music and sound disappear, instead, via the process 
of improvising, they cease to mean what they previously meant, and a musician, by 
suspending a set of normal conditions, thus enters into an egg-like state of differential 
relations of pure intensity. In his discussion of the improvising pianist Paul Bley, Arrigio 
Cappelletti discusses the way in which Bley’s playing shifted when he began to use 
electric piano and synthesisers: 
 
[Bley’s] effort was to create music appropriate to new instruments, and not just 
adapt the music he had made before to the new context. Bley’s curiosity was not 
purely ‘technological’; it had to do with the transformation of the musical 
language […] Paul Bley’s involvement with electronics ended, but left a strong 
impression on his pianism in trying to bring the electronic and the acoustic piano 
sound closer together (longer held notes, abundant use of harmonics thanks to 
skillful use of the pedal and chords, compression and expansion of time). 
(Cappelletti, 2010: 67-68) 
 
It is an arresting thought that a musician, through their interaction with a musical 
instrument in some way becomes a new kind of body, one that is defined by ‘dynamic 
tendencies involving energy transformation’. In this context, we can think of Paul Bley’s 
encounter with a new type of instrument, his development of a new approach to playing, 
and his willingness to let a synthesiser shape his musical choices and reorient his future 
sensibility, whilst not an exact rendering of the BwO in terms of its allusions to ‘drug 
users, masochists, schizophrenics, lovers’, as a reflection nonetheless of Deleuze and 
Guattari’s idea. The synthesiser took Bley outside of his normal frame of reference, 
forcing him to invent a new style of playing that was not based on, and did not represent, 
his previous approach to playing the piano. Instead, because he was not able to call on, 
or refer to sounds and techniques that were familiar, his playing was temporarily set adrift 
and a new type of music emerged, from a position of pure intensity. 
 
3.2 Becoming and forgetting 
 
Along with the body without organs, ‘becoming' is another of the conceptual tools that 
Deleuze and Guattari assemble in A Thousand Plateaus to theorise the way in which a loss 
of form, or a blurring of identity marks an intersection with the plane of immanence. In 
The Logic of Sense, Deleuze borrows the term from Lewis Carroll’s Alice in Wonderland, 
It’s All Around You 
32 
to communicate the sense in which becoming is a process of moving away from a starting 
point and towards an end point that evades easy identification.  
 
When I say ‘Alice becomes larger’, I mean that she becomes larger than she was. 
By the same token, however, she becomes smaller than she is now. Certainly, she 
is not bigger and smaller at the same time. She is larger now; she was smaller 
before. But it is at the same moment that one becomes larger than one was and 
smaller than one becomes. This is the simultaneity of a becoming whose 
characteristic is to elude the present. […] It pertains to the essence of becoming to 
move and to pull in both directions at once. Alice does not grow without shrinking 
and vice versa. (Deleuze, 2004 LS: 3) 
 
Deleuze’s original idea is to use becoming to suggest a process of transformation that 
involves a similar kind of deforming and loss of structural coherence that we encountered 
in the image of ‘sewing shut’. By simultaneously becoming larger than she was and 
smaller than she will be, Alice loses any fixed characteristics and indeed as Deleuze says, 
she cannot even be observed in the present. Hence, all that we can say about Alice as she 
grows is that she is in an ‘in-between’ state, no longer defined by a set of recognisable 
features, instead she simply is a movement or a trajectory. In A Thousand Plateaus, 
Deleuze and Guattari extend this sense of movement between states to think about how 
creative practice can embody transition and change, stating that ‘the painter and the 
musician do not imitate the animal, they become-animal at the same time as the animal 
becomes what they willed […] becoming is never imitating’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 
305). Here, Deleuze and Guattari use ‘becoming’ to signify that a creative act is non-
representational, it does not exist in order to convey a sense of something else, and it can 
only convey a sense of itself. In this way, were a painting or a piece of music to use paint 
or sound in order to represent an animal, for Deleuze and Guattari, this would be giving 
form or giving voice to a ‘becoming-animal’, and thus a painting or a piece of music, as a 
reaching towards an animal, is forever in a state of becoming, since it will never arrive. To 
help us think about becoming in terms of improvised music, and indeed to conceive of 
improvisation itself as something of a ‘becoming-music’, we shall now consider a set of 
musicians’ perspectives on what music is and how it is made, which will enable us to 
generate a conception of improvisation as process of movement and change. 
 
In contending that sound already is music, and that it does not need to be transformed 
‘into’ music by humans, the composer John Cage tells us that sound does need to 
become anything, it is already a complete music, saying ‘in this new music nothing takes 
place but sounds […] new music: new listening […] just an attention to the activity of 
sounds’ (Cage, 1987: 8-10). In his early work, Cage rejected improvisation, particularly 
when it was likened to his own indeterminate music, and in this spirit, we can therefore 
take this passage as a challenge to improvisation, as it suggests that instead of being a 
means to create music, improvisation would simply be a re-arrangement of an already 
existing music. Cage therefore offers us a way of seeing music as something that is pre-
human, and self-defining, such that sound already is music, because it is already doing 
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what we understand music to be doing, in other words, sound already exists in 
observable structures, it creates contexts for listening as well as responses in those who 
here it. This idea is also reflected in the musician and sound ecologist R. Murray 
Schaefer’s reading of Ancient Greek myths relating to the origins of music, where he 
suggests that music exists in two aspects, the ‘Dionysian’ and the ‘Apollonian’. In the 
former, ‘music arises as subjective emotion’; whereas in the latter, ‘it arises with the 
discovery of sonic properties in the materials of the universe’ (Schafer, 1994: 6), which, if 
we push the point further, would indicate that a human, Dionysian music is only ever an 
expression that takes an already existing, Apollonian music as its raw material (since even 
the human voice takes shape as a result of the interacting physical properties of our vocal 
folds, our breathing, and our mouths acting as resonant chambers). Although Cage’s and 
Schaefer’s ideas challenge us to think carefully about what music is and where it comes 
from, their work demonstrates that music always exists in a double aspect, as sound and 
as non-human phenomenon in its own right, as well as something that humans shape and 
give form to. In this sense, we might think that an improviser is less a creator of music in a 
traditional sense, making music out of unformed, unorganised sound, and more a 
becoming-musician; engaging with a music that is already there in order to make a 
‘becoming-music’. This is not to detract from the creative and compositional aspects of 
improvisation, on the contrary, by framing sound as a whole music in itself, it simply 
provides a broader context within which to think about the production of music, and as a 
result, instead of simply hearing animal-like sounds and rhythms as becoming-animal, and 
becoming-music, in the way that Deleuze and Guattari suggest, Cage’s ideas enable us to 
think that any creative act that produces music is a becoming. The act of making music 
can thus be seen as the creation of a music that is both different to what it was (the music 
in-itself that Cage alludes to) and to what it will become once the musicians have finished 
playing and the improvisation is complete, since it is only at this point that all of the 
movements and changes within and improvisation can come together to be seen as part 
of a coherent whole.  
 
Having established a way of understanding the act of making music in the context of 
becoming, the improvising saxophonist Evan Parker can help us to develop a sense of 
improvisation as a becoming-music in itself. In his description of his influences and 
musical reference points Parker tells us that, 
 
In the case of Albert it was to do with his access to the altissimo register, control of 
the overtones, in the case of Pharaoh, it was to do with his articulation, a certain 
kind of double and triple tonguing. And in Tchicai’s case, to do with his way of 
floating over what was already a non-metric pulse, on those New York Art Quartet 
records…I thought I could achieve…not exactly a synthesis, but I could work my 
way through the gaps that were left between what those people were doing. 
(Parker, in Borgo, 2005: 37) 
 
By making use of what he sees as gaps between his predecessors’ styles and techniques 
in order to develop his own approach to improvising, we can think of Parker as reaching 
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towards their playing, in the same way that Cage and Schafer enable us to suggest that 
composition can be a reaching towards a music that is already there. In this context, we 
could think of Parker as a ‘becoming-musician’, and in the same way that a piece of music 
that harnesses or makes use of animal sounds and rhythms is a becoming-animal, then 
Parker’s improvisations can be thought of as a ‘becoming-Pharoah Sanders-John Tchicai-
New York Art Quartet’. If we turn again to the body without organs, then we can connect 
this sense of becoming to the intensity of BwO, and in the same way that this becoming-
Pharoah Sanders-John Tchicai-New York Art Quartet, sets Parker adrift in between himself 
and his adaptations of these other players’ techniques and innovations, then a BwO that 
is formed during improvisation by the musical interlocking (or binding) of Parker-Sanders-
Tchicai-NYAQ-improvisation, can provide us with a means to think of improvisation as an 
unfixing process that takes in a musician’s relationship not only with their own technique 
and historical and harmonic knowledge, but also their relationship to music and 
improvisation as fixed forms and contexts. This is important, as what is happening during 
an improvisation must fully unfix and become-music and become-improvisation as well. In 
his discussion of sonic perception, Steve Goodman makes use of the term ‘unsound’ to 
describe sounds that are present, but beyond the scope of human hearing (Goodman, 
2010: 183-4). Although Goodman is focusing on a physically already-present 
phenomenon, we can re-route this term to formulate an image of what Evan Parker might 
be making use of when he refers to ‘the gaps’ that are left in between the sounds and 
techniques performed and developed by his saxophonist predecessors. As virtual 
intensities that are directly related to the composition and performance of music, the 
unsound works as a way of describing the becoming-sound and becoming-music that sits 
in Parker’s ‘gaps’. In effect, the unsound works to give a more directly musical detail to 
the contents of the plane of composition; in other words, we could say that Parker is 
making use of the unsound in order to create music. 
 
For a musician, one of the most appealing aspects of A Thousand Plateaus is the way in 
which Deleuze and Guattari take repeated inspiration from other musicians in order to 
either frame their ideas or inspire new lines of thought. Taking the work of Boulez, 
Schumann, Mozart and Berg amongst others as points of reference, they posit music as a 
‘multilinear’ system (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 297), where ‘everything happens at 
once’.6 They contrast this to a ‘punctual’ system, wherein progression and development is 
anchored between two fixed points: they suggest that these points exist on an x-y axis in 
order to illustrate the way in which the punctual system is fundamentally constrained in its 
                                                
6 It is important to note that whilst Deleuze and Guattari’s work can be extremely useful in terms of 
providing possible enlarged perspectives for music and improvisation, their discussion of music itself can at 
times be overly narrow in its focus. For example, when ‘Pierre Boulez as musical historian’ is used to frame 
their notion of becoming-music, their use of the melodic-harmonic musical axis is clearly insufficient as a set 
of variables with which to discuss improvisation or indeed music in general. This suggests that their 
positioning of music within a particular set of vectors either deliberately or otherwise misses Varese’s 
comprehensive redefinition of music as ‘organised sound’. Varese described himself ’not a [as] musician, but 
“a worker in rhythms, frequencies and intensities”’ (Varese, 2004: 20), which clearly problematises a 
simplistic reduction of music to a relationship between melody and harmony. As such, we must keep in 
mind that Deleuze and Guattari’s musical references may at times require further exploration. 
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movement and terms of reference. In framing music as a multilinear system, it progresses 
via a self-sustained, self-defining trajectory; and instead of operating between two already 
established points (punctual), music ‘propels itself by its own non-localisable middle 
(Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 297). This non-localisable middle is no longer attached to 
any external points of reference, rather it is a way of describing a state of potentiality, 
again ‘where everything happens at once’, similar to the way in which the virtual is pure 
difference, pure multiplicity. Deleuze and Guattari go on to say that, ‘the sound block is 
the intermezzo. It is a body without organs, an antimemory pervading musical 
organisation’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 297). This conception of multilinear music 
therefore describes a system, as with becoming-music and the body without organs, that 
is perpetually in a state of flux between fixed and unfixed definitions and reference 
points, in which the sound block is itself an unfixed set of potentials that in a similar way 
to the immanent materials that we discussed earlier, destabilise and deframe an 
otherwise linear trajectory. Sounds, structures, patterns, techniques and so on, all become 
freed from a fixed and punctual movement, where outcomes and response can be 
anticipated and instead have potential to not be music. Again, we have arrived at the 
plane of composition, even further at the plane of immanence, populated, as Deleuze 
and Guattari suggest, ‘only by intensities’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 153). 
 
The notion of the intermezzo provides a further definition of the kind of un-anchoring that 
can occur in order to achieve music, both in terms of creating a piece of music from 
available sounds and concepts as well as creating a broader set of conditions that enable 
us to apprehend something as music in itself. In a sense, this is the most fundamental 
aspect of any experimentation, in that it not only produces new musical forms for an 
audience to consider, but it also enlarges our view of what music can be.  Becoming is 
then to be seen as a radical departure from a fixed point; and more than this, becoming is 
a deliberate forgetting of the point of origin: a journey with no destination or departure, 
again, a system beyond fixed and localised points, which conveys a contingency within 
music, where a multilinear music is not fixed, but instead has both every possible 
reference point and none at the same time.  
 
Deleuze and Guattari talk about memory in this context, and in fact memory plays an 
important role throughout A Thousand Plateaus. In the BwO plateau, Deleuze and 
Guattari suggest that we, ‘substitute forgetting for anamnesis, experimentation for 
interpretation’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 151), and in doing so, emphasise the need 
once more to disregard familiar habits and fixed reference points, and in fact develop a 
distrust for things that purport to be fixed, unalterable references. In the Becoming-
Intense, Becoming-Animal, Becoming-Imperceptible plateau, Deleuze and Guattari also 
tell us that, ‘becoming is an antimemory (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 294), which reflects 
a number of the themes that we now have in play; the sense that experimentation is 
about forgetting pre-given rules and concepts, such that making and improvising could 
be a letting-go of previously held conceptions about materials and forms, and that even 
as an audience it is important to be open new experiences that create new and 
unexpected responses. Again, there is a stronger message here that is about 
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determinedly establishing that becoming and by association, making a body without 
organs, which are both an opening-out onto the plane of immanence, does not come 
about by turning to what is familiar and by relying on habit. This is obviously a fairly 
strong challenge to improvising musicians, who will often rely on a set of techniques, 
knowledges and insights in order to launch and support their creative play. In Aesthetics 
and Music, Andy Hamilton highlights the comments that the saxophonists Lee Konitz and 
Ornette Coleman make about learning and subsequently forgetting musical rules 
(Hamilton, 2007: 206-7). This  idea will be familiar to many musicians, but what makes 
Hamilton’s point so compelling in the light of the idea of becoming as an antimemory, is 
that this might not necessarily mean forgetting in the sense of abandoning, but rather a 
forgetting in the sense of no longer needing to maintain awareness of a set of rules. In 
this sense, we could liken improvising to breathing, or writing with a pen: we breathe 
regularly by forgetting to breathe; we focus on what we are writing about by forgetting 
that we are holding a pen. The same could therefore be said about improvising, it is 
something that we do, without thinking that we are doing it.  
 
Evan Parker’s ideas about his practice also reflect a sense of antimemory in action, in that, 
whilst he has clearly synthesised a set of techniques as well as musical and sonic ideas 
from his forbears, we cannot simply say that this is what his own style and approach are 
based on. Although he adapts and makes use of his predecessors’ techniques, he must 
also forget about the boundaries and expectations of the musical form of improvisation. 
The forgetting of the antimemory is also about an over-proliferation of intensities. This is 
improvisation as a multilinear system, which is not simply a searching for sounds, but is 
also a searching for intensities, for opportunities, openings and suggestions for what kind 
of music could be made. In a practice such as free improvisation, where anything is 
possible given the creative constraints of the performance (such as the physical properties 
of a saxophone, a musician’s technical skill and musical knowledge), then we could say 
that the improviser must, lose their normal focus and almost ‘hear double’, hearing new 
combinations and new versions of sounds, in order to make use of all of the potentials of 
music in order to make music. It is not that ‘virtual’ music is made into ‘actual’ music, 
rather, that all the components of music are ‘sewn shut’ or disrupted by improvising into a 
zero intensity-virtual before new music can be created. Parker therefore allows us to 
reframe Deleuze and Guattari’s ideas in terms of practice, and to understand that the 
challenge of improvisation is to be aware of virtual intensities, to understand their specific 
potentials and yet be prepared and able to both forget them and exceed their existing 
limits. 
 
An improvisation is therefore an interaction with the plane of immanence, where the 
production of a music, albeit a potentially surprising or disconcerting version of music, is 
the actualisation of a virtual immanence. We might now think of this virtual immanence as 
an unsound, going further than Cage and Schafer’s thoughts about the inherently musical 
properties of sound. Instead, improvisation, as a radical and destabilising force, unfixes 
any prior sense of what music and musical materials may be, therefore fully disengaging 
with fixed outcomes and pre-given structures and contexts. In this way, ‘becoming’ allows 
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us to see that any established practices, contexts and definitions, as well as prior 
performances and sounds themselves all aspects of a becoming-music: they are the 
junky’s and the masochist’s intensities, and have no characteristics beyond pure intensity 
and no pre-ordained outcome. As David Borgo suggests, the act of ‘improvising’ music 
literally improvises music: it improvises our conception of what music is. This is to say that 
whilst improvisation is recognisably a means to compose music, we can also begin to see 
that it is also a breaking down of what music is, or at least what music might have been in 
terms of it just being sound; which leads to the possibility that improvisation might not 
only be a means to make music, but more importantly, a means to break with our 
expectations of what music can be. Therefore, improvising becomes more than just a 
process of combining and recombining sounds in order create a piece of music, but it is 
also an act of interference: disrupting our sense of what music can do, and redefining the 
framework of what music is. This gives us a stronger impression of what improvisation as 
becoming-music can be, such that an improvisation is an exponential and contingent 
process that might not necessarily result in a music that is recognisable according to pre-
established categories. If music is both a non-human phenomenon as well as a human 
construction, then a becoming-music is somewhere in between the two and yet it is 
wholly cut off from both: it is only of itself. Improvisation can thus be seen as a process 
that brings forth music but at the same time risks unintelligibility: bringing forth a music 
that is not-music. Although this last point in itself runs the risk of over-inflating 
improvisation’s capacity to generate radical outcomes, nevertheless, this is one of the key 
messages that we can take from Deleuze and Guattari’s conception of becoming: 
becoming is not necessarily becoming anything, is simply a threshold state, where music 
does not necessarily sound ‘like’ music. 
 
3.3 Territories and refrains 
 
One of Deleuze and Guattari’s most powerful images, the ‘Refrain’, can help us to think 
about how a process of experimenting with the materials that we find at hand (a musical 
instrument, our own knowledge of music) and then establishing new relations between 
these materials and our surroundings (other musicians, an audience) can occur. Deleuze 
and Guattari outline three aspects of the refrain, the first opening with the image of ‘a 
child in the dark, gripped with fear, comforts himself by singing under his breath’ 
(Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 311). The refrain is described as a force or a movement that 
can be thought of as ‘a prism, a crystal of space-time [which] acts upon that which 
surrounds it, sound or light, extracting from it various vibrations, or decompositions, 
projections, or transformations’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 348). The refrain is a means 
of picturing or describing the process of giving shape, definition and qualities to aspects 
of our environment. Although our current focus is on music and improvisation, Deleuze 
and Guattari use a range of animal behaviours as examples to illustrate the movement of 
the refrain, although they do make repeated reference to music throughout the refrain 
plateau, which gives us a broad perspective to discuss improvisation in terms of the 
refrain itself. The image of a child singing in the dark is a particularly appropriate one for 
the improviser, as it strongly suggests the process of experimentation and sense of 
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seeking with no fixed reference point or outcome that we have so far described in this 
chapter. If the first aspect of the refrain is an impulsive gesture, an instinctive cry in the 
dark with no pre-ordained outcome, then the second is a move towards generating order: 
‘Now we are at home. But home does not preexist: it was necessary to draw a circle 
around that uncertain and fragile centre, to organise a limited space’ (Deleuze and 
Guattari, 1987: 311). 
 
Deleuze and Guattari emphasise that the three aspects, or movements of the refrain are 
not ’successive moments in an evolution [but instead are] aspects of a single thing’ 
(Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 312), which is to say that the way that the movements can 
occur simultaneously. A song in the dark is a song with no fixed position and no assumed 
outcome, but at the same time it establishes a means of communication, and a means of 
apprehension: we can hear a song, and we can sing back. This is a familiar part of 
improvising, in that one musician will create a musical gesture, which is not only a 
statement in itself, but it is also a question: what kind of response can another musician 
make? In the final movement of the refrain, Deleuze and Guattari make reference to 
improvisation itself, thereby further emphasising, due to the non-sequential nature of the 
refrain, that improvisation is the heart of this process. 
 
Finally, one opens the circle a crack, opens it all the way, lets someone in, calls 
someone, or else goes out oneself, launches forth. One opens the circle not on the 
side where the old forces of chaos press against it but in another region, one created 
by the circle itself […] This time, it is in order to join with the forces of the future, 
cosmic forces. One launches forth, hazards an improvisation. But to improvise is to join 
with the World, or meld with it. One ventures from home on the thread of a tune. 
(Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 311) 
 
This sense of using the home we have constructed for ourselves as a base from which to 
engage with the outside world, and taking a risk, is both an obvious parallel with musical 
improvisation (it is literally an improvisation with the materials that we have in order to 
make connections with others), and at the same time it talks about a larger context for 
what an improvisation is doing. If the first aspect is about impulse and intuition, and the 
second aspect is about generating consistency, then the third aspect of the refrain 
describes the way that the things that we make are always in motion, in a process of 
connecting with their surroundings, being transformed and becoming something else. As 
an image of constant movement, the refrain is another way of speaking about finding 
ourselves always in the middle of something, whether that is a milieu, a multilinear system 
or the process of becoming. The three aspects of the refrain present a compelling image 
about what a creative process might be, but when Deleuze and Guattari claim that, ‘the 
refrain itself is the content of music’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 300), they also enable 
us to think about how it is that we are able create something that is recognisably new or 
original. 
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We are not at all saying that the refrain is the origin of music, or that music begins 
with it. It is not really known when music begins. The refrain is rather a means of 
preventing music, warding it off, or forgoing it. But music exists because the refrain 
exists also, because music takes up the refrain, lays hold of it as a content to take it 
somewhere else. (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 300) 
 
As Deleuze and Guattari suggest, the origins of music itself remain open to debate, given 
that the history of music goes further back in time than our ability to say anything definite 
about its evolution and early development. What is useful to us in this passage are the 
links we can make between the movement of the refrain and the ongoing development 
and use of music, since the process of making uncontextualised statements (singing in the 
dark) that then create a set of aesthetic qualities (the home that did not exist) that can be 
used creatively (the venturing from home), is an inherent feature of improvisation as an 
attempt, not just to spontaneously create music, but at the same time to establish the 
terms on which that music is apprehended. In this regard, it is Deleuze and Guattari’s 
concept of the ‘territory’ that will provide us with one of the most useful tools for thinking 
about creativity and improvisation.  
 
The T factor, the territorialising factor, must be sought […] precisely in the becoming-
expressive of rhythm or melody, in other words, in the emergence or proper qualities 
(colour, odour, sound, silhouette…) […] Can this becoming, this emergence, be called 
Art? That would make the territory a result of art. The artist: the first person to set out 
a boundary stone, or to make a mark. (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 316) 
 
The idea of making a territory and territorialising the materials or the situation at hand is 
therefore significant in terms of what a musician is doing when they create musical 
statements and structures. In simple terms we can see that setting a boundary involves 
placing something that already exists (a stone) on something else that already exists (the 
ground) in order to create something new (a territory), which would not only countermand 
Paul Dunmall’s intuition for sculpting music from thin air, but would also extend the ideas 
that we encountered earlier with becoming, which is to say that a territory is not simple a 
re-arrangement of what already exists, instead it is a disruption of what already exists. 
However, whilst becoming suggests that an artist or musician may be reaching towards 
and representing something (such as an animal) in their work, an act of territorialisation 
takes something that it already there and makes it categorically different to what it 
previously had been. However, what both concepts share is the sense in which something 
comes to be produced, and although it is made by making reference to or use of 
something that already exists, it bears no ‘trace’ of the thing it corresponds to, it is a 
wholly new thing with its own characteristics. Deleuze and Guattari give us a number of 
images about how this territorialisation process can occur, but perhaps most fitting is their 
description of bird song,: ‘the role of the refrain has often been emphasised: it is 
territorial, a territorial assemblage. Bird songs: the bird sings to mark its territory’ (Deleuze 
and Guattari, 1987: 312). Laying a boundary stone and singing a song are both actions 
that mark out a territory or a territorial assemblage, but these actions both go beyond 
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announcing that an area of land is now the domain of a particular individual. Deleuze and 
Guattari’s key argument is that territorialisation creates new qualities and modes of 
behaviour, and this is the central issue in terms of creating new things and searching for 
new responses. In the same way that an area of land marked by boundary stones has 
qualities and functions that differ from unmarked land, then so too do the sounds and 
notes produced within an improvisation differ from those outside of an improvisation. A 
musician might practice scales, or other technical exercises and in doing so may well 
make use of the same notes that would otherwise form part of an improvisation at 
another time. However, within these two contexts, notes and sounds will have very 
different functions and associations. 
 
Having established the concept of the territory, we are given one final term that allows us 
to understand how changes and transformations can occur within established structures 
and forms: deterritorialisation. This is an essential idea in that it enables us to think about 
music itself as a territory with established conventions and features, that something like 
improvisation deterritorialises. Similarly, if we were to think about the various forms of 
genre-based improvisation, such as jazz or rock, then these approaches themselves can 
be seen to be territories with recognisable norms and features that the practice of free 
improvisation deterritorialises. In their unfolding of deterritorialisation, Deleuze and 
Guattari once again use a range of examples to express their ideas, but the image of the 
grass stem is one of the most effective, particularly if we think about it as an instrument or 
a material, in the way that a musician might make use of a saxophone or a musical 
concept: 
 
[T]he matter of expression, ‘grass stem’, acts as a component of passage between the 
territorial assemblage and the courtship assemblage […] The grass stem is a 
deterritorialised component, or one en route to deterritorialisation. (Deleuze and 
Guattari, 1987: 324) 
 
In this example, we learn that Australian grass finches make use of a grass stem in order 
to attract a mate. Deleuze and Guattari examine the process in detail, and conclude that 
the male finch uses the stem to refer to or mimic the action of building a nest in order to 
attract the mate. As such, the stem’s function is completely altered and with this new 
function comes the ability to trigger new responses, it no longer functions as a grass 
stem, it is now simply a component of a bird’s courtship and nest-making activity. 
Throughout the plateau, Deleuze and Guattari are careful to emphasise that none of the 
components within a territorial assemblage have their qualities or functions prior to the 
existence of the assemblage, all component functions are aspects of the assemblage 
itself. This is the important point about an improvisation: that the qualities and attributes 
of an improvisation exist by virtue of that particular improvisation-assemblage, and an 
improviser’s ability to create new responses is to do with an individual’s or a group’s 
ability to deterritorialise and reterritorialise a set of given materials (sounds, structures, 
instruments, musicians) into an assemblage with a particular consistency or set of 
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functions and features. As an example of how music achieves this deterritorialisation, 
Deleuze and Guattari talk about the human voice: 
 
Music is a deterritorialisation of the voice, which becomes less and less tied to 
language, just as painting is a deterritorialisation of the face […] Music seems to have 
a much stronger deterritorialising force, at once more intense and much more 
collective, and the voice seems to have a much greater power of deterritorialisation. 
(Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 302) 
 
By changing the function of the voice, from speech, where meaning is communicated 
directly via words and inflection, to song, where we hear a much more complex and 
indirect set of meanings and associations, we can understand how music alters the way in 
which others respond to the sounds we make. Similarly, an improvisation itself is a 
deframing and a deterritorialisation of music and sound: we may well hear notes and 
sounds that we recognise, but they are now being used for a different purpose, or indeed 
for a number of different purposes, such as communication between musicians, a 
deliberate attempt to create new sounds with an instrument, a determined attempt (as 
with Cardew) to create new kinds of musical structures and forms that would exceed an 
audience’s expectations and so on. The closing statement of the refrain plateau perhaps 
best sums up the value of Deleuze and Guattari’s work on territories in relation to music 
and improvisation. As such, it is worth quoting them at length: 
 
In Schumann, a whole learned labour, at once rhythmic, harmonic, and melodic, has 
this sober and simple result: deterritorialise the refrain. Produce a deterritorialised 
refrain as the final end of music, release it in the Cosmos—that is more important than 
building a new system. Opening the assemblage onto a cosmic force. In the passage 
from one to the other, from the assemblage of sounds to the Machine that renders it 
sonorous, from the becoming-child of the musician to the becoming-cosmic of the 
child, many dangers crop up: black holes, closures, paralysis of the finger and auditory 
hallucinations, Schumann's madness, cosmic force gone bad, a note that pursues you, 
a sound that transfixes you. Yet one was already present in the other; the cosmic force 
was already present in the material, the great refrain in the little refrains, the great 
manoeuvre in the little manoeuvre. Except we can never be sure we will be strong 
enough, for we have no system, only lines and movements. Schumann (Deleuze and 
Guattari, 1987: 350). 
 
This passage captures the entirety of their ideas in this plateau, in that we see them 
referring back to the unfolding of the refrain itself and the opening out onto the cosmos 
through improvisation, in addition to reminding us that music, as both territorialising and 
deterritorialising activity, not only creates new territories and responses, but is all the 
while creating different relationships and iterations of the non-human and cosmic refrain.  
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3.4 The improviser-probe 
 
In addition to making use of the deterritorialising and territorialising movements of the 
refrain, we can further investigate this transitional nature of the improvisation process with 
the aid of another of Deleuze and Guattari’s conceptual strategies. In ‘Pragmatics for the 
Production of Subjectivity: Time for Probe-Heads’, Simon O’Sullivan, following Deleuze 
and Guattari, puts forward this formulation for the concept of the probe-head, suggesting 
that probe-heads ‘“dismantle the strata in their wake…”’. But they are also, as the name 
suggests, productive of other, stranger and more fluid modes of organisation’ (O’Sullivan, 
2006: 312). This sense of production, which is simultaneously a dismantling process, once 
again frames the moment of improvisation: there are clearly conjunctions between the 
deframing-deterritorialisation process and dismantling action of the probe-head. 
O’Sullivan asks the question, ‘what is a probe-head? […] A probe-head might in fact be 
any form of practice – any regime – that ruptures the dominant (faciality). An individual 
‘subject’ in his or her life might operate as a probe-head in this sense’ (O’Sullivan, 2006: 
312-13).  We can thus see the figure of the probe-head as a disruptive agent, who short-
circuits and ruptures the processes and codes that govern a given situation. Deleuze and 
Guattari use the term faciality to describe the kind of system where a probe-head might 
work to rupture a tightly delineated rule set. They liken faciality to a ‘black hole / white 
wall system [that] must already have gridded all of space […] in fact there must not be any 
exterior: no intrusion from the outside’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 179). Such a system 
precludes reference to any alternative schema, and does not acknowledge that anything 
exists beyond its own tightly controlled boundaries. In doing so, it reinforces and 
perpetuates its dominance.  
 
Earlier, we saw Deleuze and Guattari suggesting that music has the potential to be a 
multilinear system. However, it could also be a gridded, punctual system, with a strict set 
of self-perpetuating codes that must be adhered to in order to produce new music. In this 
regard, an improvisation has the potential to be an ‘intrusion’ into music as a dominant 
faciality machine, and the improviser the probe-head who launches that intrusion. 
Deleuze and Guattari further describe faciality as a ‘despotic […] landscapification’ 
(Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 181), which in a musical sense conveys a sense in which 
boundaries appear and then harden around stylistic approaches, such as Atonalism, Neo-
Classicism, New Tonalism or with jazz and improvised musics more specifically, Bebop, 
Postbop, Free Jazz, The New Thing, Fusion, Free Improvisation, Noise Music and so on. A 
free improvisation in this sense can often be purposefully targeted towards disrupting 
dominant regimes of jazz and wider musical conventions, by spontaneously creating and 
manufacturing new sensations, by cutting across a number of rules that supposedly 
govern harmony, rhythm and formal structure. The improviser probe-head must therefore 
work out, ‘how [to] get out of the black hole, [h]ow [to] break through the wall, [h]ow [to] 
dismantle the face’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 186).  
 
The formulation of improvisation as problem-solving activity is a familiar one to many 
musicians. How do you break through the wall of music as a cultural and technical 
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structure? How do you dismantle the face of accepted musical codes and practices in 
order to make new music and a new kind of music? How do you get out of the black hole 
of starting a piece of music with no pre-arranged plan or musical score? Although 
obviously not worded in quite that way, these kinds of questions are commonplace 
amongst improvisers, and in many ways an improvisation can be seen as the successful 
response to these questions. We see Evan Parker using the full range of his musical 
knowledge and instrumental capability, whilst at the same time pushing beyond these 
limits through his exploration of an existing body of musical and instrumental possibility. If 
Parker is a territorialising musician, or even a probe-head, then this can be discerned in 
the way that his improvisations go beyond conventions and limits in order to create new 
musical forms and sound aesthetics. In practical terms, Parker’s use of multiphonics7 in 
combination with circular breathing techniques 8 exemplify the way in which he is able to 
do this, however it is not simply that Parker makes squealing sounds, or that he is able to 
create continuous sound over long durations (in themselves these are simply different 
types of convention). It is the fact that Parker is able to make use of these two techniques, 
in combination with a variety of other ideas and sound, that allows him to break down a 
number of faciality traits or conventions that surround solo performance and musical style. 
 
If David Borgo’s intuition for improvising music is as much about breaking music, as it is 
about making music, then the probe-head is certainly relevant: 
 
Dismantling the face is no mean affair. Madness is a definite danger […] The 
organisation of the face is a strong one. We could say that the face holds within its 
rectangle or circle a whole set of traits, faciality traits, which it subsumes and places 
at the service of significance and subjectification (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 188). 
 
To talk about improvisation in this wider sense is to suggest a complete dismantling of 
the face of music, of musical-faciality. Improvising is thus the ‘definite danger’ of 
‘madness’: the risk that the outcome of an improvisation might be non-musical chaos, that 
has no meaning, because it has no ‘significance’, and makes no reference to musical-
faciality traits.  An improviser, operating as a probe-head, breaking free from 
subjectification, and risking sonic chaos, therefore generates a music that is not 
recognisable within existing codes because it fundamentally breaks with the conventions 
of the dominant musical-faciality. This could certainly be said of a number of 
groundbreaking innovations by jazz and free jazz musicians during the past fifty years, 
including the music of Ornette Coleman, whose improviser-as-probe-head approach 
elicited an unusually negative response from critics and peers: 
                                                
7 Multiphonics are sounds that are produced by a saxophonist singing into their instrument whilst blowing 
through the reed in order to create compound tones, or what are often referred to as ‘squeals’. 
8 Circular breathing is a technique whereby wind instrumentalists use their cheeks as a pump to push air 
through their instrument at the same time as breathing into their lungs, thus enabling a continuous air flow. 
Players who have mastered this technique often sustain an unbroken airflow and can produce continuous  
sound lasting upwards of ten or fifteen minutes, and it is one of the main techniques that has enabled Evan 
Parker to establish such a distinctive approach and style. 
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Ornette Coleman’s wide open improvisation had placed him at the centre of a 
fierce controversy over the musical implications of freedom … [trumpet player] Roy 
Eldridge dismissed him as a fake. ‘I listened to him all kinds of ways,’ Eldridge later 
told an interviewer. ‘I listened to him high and I listened to him cold sober. I even 
played with him. I think he’s jiving, baby.’ The music infuriated [drummer] Max 
Roach so much that he assaulted Coleman physically on one occasion and 
threatened to do so on another (Anderson, 2007: 51) 9. 
 
This also reminds us of Adorno’s  view that music produced according to standardised 
formulae and methods, creates standardised responses, in other words it could be much 
easier to ‘like’ a piece of faciality-music, in that it does not threaten our sense of what 
constitutes good or bad music. Indeed, as Adorno points out we are often glad that any 
challenges a piece of music might present us with are neatly obscured: otherwise we 
might find it disconcerting or upsetting, as evidenced in Max Roach’s violent outburst. 
However, as a probe-head, an improviser may also be acting violently, breaking with and 
destroying a pre-existing model of musical-faciality in order to construct something new. 
 
  
                                                
9 Two of Coleman’s landmark recordings – The Shape of Jazz to Come (1959) and Free Jazz: A Collective 
Improvisation by the Ornette Coleman Double Quartet (1961) – provide direct and visceral evidence of the 
confusion that Coleman’s music may well have caused listeners and audiences at the time. The record 
opens with the track ‘Lonely Woman’ which begins with a strummed, drone-like figure on the double bass 
and proceeds, via a winding unision melody on the alto saxophone and trumpet, into a short solo from 1’48 
through to 2’55 where Coleman improvises over the droning ostinato that Charlie Haden’s bass provides, 
intercut with the ascending bass figure from the piece’s introduction. As such, The Shape of Jazz to Come 
from the very start avoids a number of standard jazz practices, such as having musicians create improvised 
solos and basslines over recognisable set of chord changes. Instead Coleman set up a situation wherein the 
players could begin to co-improvise, following melodic impulses, rather than chordal structures. Free Jazz 
was a fuller development of this idea, and the original liner notes tell us that, ‘there were no preconceptions 
as to themes, chord patterns or chorus lengths’, which resulted in ‘a kind of polyphonic accompaniment 
based on pitch, melodic direction, an emotional complement, then’ (Williams, in Coleman, 1961). With this 
description in mind, whilst the music on Free Jazz certainly sounds ‘like’ jazz, in terms of the 
instrumentation, the swing time produced by the two drummers and the walking basslines deployed by 
Charlie Haden and, at times, his fellow bass player Scott LaFaro, there is also much on this record in terms 
of its conceptual design that likens it to much of the later more open-ended improvisation that we discuss 
elsewhere in this thesis. A good example of this kind of co-improvisation in operation happens early on in 
the piece, where – from twenty seconds onwards – Eric Dolphy begins to solo on bass clarinet. Coleman 
begins to punctuate Dolphy’s playing from fifty seconds, and from 1’50 Coleman and Dolphy are joined by 
the twin trumpets of Freddie Hubbard and Don Cherry, who along with the rapid scalar runs played by 
Scott LaFaro create a mesh and increasingly dense structure which tails off from 3’40, although not before 
both drummers – Billy Higgins and Ed Blackwell – have also started to add increasingly arrhythmic figures 
and passages to the soundscape. In this way, these two records provide us with an indication of the way in 
which Coleman’s music was both structurally as well as sonically disruptive, working against a number of 
deeply embedded and ingrained assumptions about how music – and jazz music in particular – could (or 
possibly should) work. 
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4. Make something new 
 
Whether we are able to make something that is qualitatively new or not, not only 
depends on the particularity of an event, but also relates to the created thing’s 
relationship to its context. Throughout this chapter, there has been a recurrent theme that 
frames recomposition and deframing-deterritorialisation as forming part of, or even 
standing in for, the process of making something. There are clearly a set of perspectives 
that surround the creative processes and indeed improvisation itself, that on the one 
hand would see creativity as a process of bringing into being something that did not 
previously exist, and on the other, would understand it more as re-arrangement of already 
existing materials. The tension between these two positions has a long history that goes 
at least as far back as Ecclesiastes, who tells us ‘what has been will be again, what has 
been done will be done again; there is nothing new under the sun’ (Ecclesiastes 1:9). In 
terms of thinking about whether it is or is not possible to make something that is 
qualitatively new, Deleuze and Guattari give us a compelling model to work with, one that 
enables us to think about the debate in a slightly different way. In simple terms, concepts 
such as the plane of immanence and the refrain allow us to think about making things that 
are new ‘as such’, but are nevertheless made from pre-existing things. In this sense, new 
things are made out of what has come before, but they are not simply a different version 
of what has come before; as our discussions of becoming and the refrain have revealed, 
new things are qualitatively different to what came before, they are different in kind. If we 
think about improvisation as a process that makes use of past ideas and recognisably 
possible or potential sounds (for example, all of the notes that a given instrument can 
produce), then it would be very easy to dismiss improvisation as a mere recycling of 
sounds and a reworking of familiar mental and physical processes on the part of the 
musician, rather than the creation of something new. However, the logical end of this 
position is to say that the creation of a new sound, or indeed the creation of anything new 
as such, would be impossible. In simple terms, the notes and sounds that are available to 
the improviser are clearly limited by the physical nature of the instrument that they are 
playing, and at the same time, the techniques that can be used to create sounds are also 
logically limited by a musician’s physical capabilities. However, although we can be fairly 
certain that striking, bowing or blowing an instrument in a certain way will produce a 
certain sound, do these limits prevent the production of something that is in itself new? 
 
For an improvising musician, there is indeed a sense in which the resources available to 
them would strongly influence and delimit what the musical outcome will be, for example, 
the note middle C on a piano. We can be fairly certain that when we hit the middle C key 
on the piano, a middle C will sound, and that it will have certain qualities. Similarly, if we 
then decide to follow-up the first middle C with another one, and then maybe another, 
would suggest that the improvisation would have a particular character to it, we might 
even think that it sounds fairly boring. Thus the fact that our middle C improvisation 
makes use of a recognised note may initially suggest that nothing new can happen, since 
the results of this improvisation could be easily imagined (inasmuch as we know that it is 
only making use of a middle C), which would seemingly indicate that is simply a 
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recombination of pre-existing materials. By extension, we might also be tempted to think 
that any creative act is only ever a recombining of available materials, and that all we can 
ever do is put what we already have into a different order.  
 
However, for Deleuze and Guattari, this would be to misunderstand what the virtual is and 
how it functions, and rather than thinking that the existence of given materials would 
automatically preclude the creation of something new, we can instead understand that it 
is the way a musician sets a multiplicity of virtual intensities in motion that frames the 
potential for a sound or a group of sounds to create new responses in its listeners. 
 
In this sense, every new middle C that the improviser plays on the piano is an absolutely 
new one: each one has not been played before, since that each one arises from an 
interplay of various virtual movements that prefigure the physical instantiation of the note. 
When we think about a middle C in terms of immanence and the virtual, as one of a 
number of intensities on the plane of immanence, or as an intermezzo-sound block, there 
are a number of other issues to be considered as well: the pianist’s choice of whether or 
not to play the C, when to play it, how loud to play it, and how long for? Indeed, how 
many times should the C be played, and if it is repeated, how fast or slow should the 
repetitions be? In terms of the theorist Clare Colebrook’s view that ‘life is a virtual 
multiplicity, not of things and agents but contemplations and contractions, events and 
responses’ (Colebrook, 2002: 87), all of these questions reflect the idea that an 
improvisation is based not so much on a set of static materials, but on a set of decisions, 
movements and operations. Colebrook’s assertion that life as virtual can help us to move 
away from thinking about a middle C on a piano as a ‘thing’ with fixed features and 
qualities, and instead as a contemplation, or even a provocation: as something that could 
engender an outcome. Colebrook’s use of the word ‘event’ can also help us to frame 
improvisation’s bridging of the virtual and actual, in the sense that when a new middle C 
sounds, this in itself is an event: it is a new occurrence that had not happened before. A 
note C may well have been sounded any number of times, but not that C, and not at that 
time, and not in that particular context. In this sense, an improvisation, as with 
Colebrook’s description of life, becomes one of a series of fleeting moments that gathers 
together and is defined by an available set of impulses and responses. If anything can be 
understood as being new, then just such a brief confluence of events, happening 
together for the first time. 
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5. Affective results 
 
Having explored different approaches to thinking about making an improvisation happen, 
we are now beginning to think about what kinds of qualities an improvisation might have. 
As in the case of Ornette Coleman and Max Roach, an improvisation can certainly 
provoke strong reactions. An improvisation may well consist of one note or a thousand 
notes, and the sounds in an improvisation may be played on a piano or may be created in 
real-time with a synthesiser as the piece develops, but what is it that makes one 
improvisation stand out from another? Are all improvisations doing the same thing given 
that they deterritorialise available materials and construct bodies without organs, or are 
some improvisations more or less successful or appealing, or are some simply better than 
others? Having addressed whether it is possible to make a new piece of music, we can 
now continue to explore how it is that an improvisation creates aesthetic impact. 
 
If we compare a highly ornate improvisation that makes use of new sounds and new 
musical structures with the one-note improvisation that we discussed earlier, beyond the 
obvious differences, how do we start to make judgements about them? Is one a better, 
more satisfying improvisation than the other? Does one create more impact than the 
other? If they are both doing the same type of thing, in that they are both taking hold of 
and deframing given materials and concepts, what is it that distinguishes them, what is 
that makes one or other of them a more successful piece of spontaneously composed 
music? 
 
As we saw above, what distinguishes one particular middle C from any other middle C 
that has been sounded previously, or indeed could be sounded in the future, is that each 
performance is an utterly unique event, because of the aggregate of immanent 
intensities, movements and exchanges that feed into it. The particularity that gives an 
improvisation its uniqueness in time, also means that, although in some ways different 
improvisations may share common features, each one generates different affective 
results. In What Is Philosophy?, Deleuze and Guattari configure a conception of a work of 
art in terms of ‘percepts’ and ‘affects’, saying,  
 
Percepts are no longer perceptions; they are independent of a state of those who 
experience them. Affects are no longer feelings or affections; they go beyond the 
strength of those who undergo them […] The work of art is a being of sensation and 
nothing else: it exists in itself […] The artist creates blocs of percepts and affects, but 
the only law of creation is that the compound must stand up on its own (Deleuze and 
Guattari, 1994: 164). 
We could just as easily apply this description to a piece of music, since Deleuze and 
Guattari go on to tell us that, ‘harmonies are affects’, and that ‘consonance and 
dissonance, harmonies of tone or colour, are affects of music and painting’ (Deleuze and 
Guattari, 1994: 164), and in this sense, if an improvisation does indeed stand up on its 
own as a bloc of affect, it therefore produces a unique experience for a listener or an 
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audience, according to the ‘law of creation’ that Deleuze and Guattari allude to. In Sound, 
Music, Affect, Biddle and Thompson also show that a bloc of affect, or the ‘sonorous bloc’ 
(Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 189), is independent of both the person who makes it and 
the person who perceives and experiences it. This is an important component of Deleuze 
and Guattari’s model, since the concept of the bloc is an affirmation that art and music do 
not create responses because of the faculties or dispositions of the view or listener, but 
because they contain intrinsic and independently existing attributes. 
 
Art, for Deleuze and Guattari, exists as a bloc of sensations, which is to say a 
compound of affects and percepts that remain independent of both creator and 
perceiver. Music, for its part, is a compound of sonic affects (Biddle and Thompson, 
2013: 10). 
 
In this way, as we saw with the three movements of the refrain and the process of 
territorialisation, a bloc of affect is therefore understood as being able to create 
responses on its own terms, and it is in this context that an improvised series of middle Cs 
on a piano has the potential to be regarded as ‘new’. If an improvised performance 
comes to stand on its own terms and create experiences that are on its own terms (as 
Deleuze and Guattari say, if ‘it exists in itself’) then we can understand it to be a new and 
original creation. We can liken a bloc of affect to the way in which a territory appears 
within an environment, and has an autonomous set of functions and features, that inform 
the way in which we interact with that territory (this is the force of de- and 
reterritorialisation, in that, as we saw, a deterritorialised grass stem becomes a courtship 
and a nest component, that is distanced from its former existence as a plant component. 
If the sensations or experiences that we have as a result of each new percept are similarly 
unique, then we could also think of a piece of improvised music as having a 
deterritorialising power, in that as listeners, we are reterritorialised within the context of 
what we are listening to, so that not only does the performance stand on its own but that 
our listening is disrupted and aligned with the particular features of that performance. 
Deleuze and Guattari further extend this way of understanding listening as a listening 
‘according to’ the terms of a piece of music when they put forward the notion of a 
‘Wagner-universe’, or a ‘Debussy-universe’ as part of their conception of the plane of 
composition. 
 
The work of the plane of composition develops in two directions that involve a 
disaggregation of the tonal frame: the immense uniform area of continuous 
variation that couple and combine the forces that have become sonorous in 
Wagner, or the broken tones that separate and disperse the forces by harmonising 
their reversible passages in Debussy - Wagner-universe, Debussy-universe […] each 
time the musician’s action consists in deframing, in finding the opening, taking up 
the plane of composition once more (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 191). 
 
What these terms suggest is that a composer’s stylistic approach, which for an improviser 
would come through in a piece whilst they are playing it, creates a set of conditions, a 
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‘universe’ that establishes a frame for how we hear the musical content. Clearly, it is 
important that we remember that in an improvisation, as with a Bayreuth performance of 
Tristan und Isolde, or a digital recording of La Mer, we are not listening to the musician as 
such, any more than we are listening to Wagner or Debussy, we are listening to an (albeit 
improvised) musical work, but nevertheless we could also talk of a ‘Parker-universe’, or a 
‘Coleman-universe’. As we can see in the passage above, Deleuze and Guattari identify 
the plane of composition with a process of going against established sonic universes, 
meaning that in order to create a bloc of affect, then it must be wrenched from already-
existing musical contexts. For Wagner, his experiments with chromaticism led to a new 
conception of harmonic freedom within music, coupled with a particular vision for 
combining instrumental and vocal forces both vertically in space, and horizontally in time. 
For Debussy, the new-found possibilities offered by an expanded harmonic practice, 
served to disperse and dissipate the centuries-old confines of traditional Western 
functional harmony. Deleuze and Guattari enable us to see improvising musicians, in a 
similar way to composers such as Wagner and Debussy, who are their forbears, as being 
concerned with engaging with and harnessing sonic forces in order to create something 
that produces affective results for the listener, making use of harmonic relationships, tone 
and timbre in such a way that a new piece of music creates new responses in its audience.  
 
Deleuze and Guattari’s use of the phrase ‘finding the opening’ takes us directly to what 
Evan Parker was talking about in terms of his attempts to ‘find the gaps’ between other 
saxophonist’s stylistic approaches, and we could see this as a short-circuiting process or 
an interruption of expectation, in that one of the things that might strike us in a piece of 
music is its ability to confound or exceed our expectations and current understanding of 
music. So for the improviser, the challenge is to create a piece of music, a time-based 
composition that is the result of their improvisation, that is a compound of affects and 
which uniquely stands up on its own. How we measure an improvisation in this regard 
then becomes as complicated as measuring the difference between Wagner and 
Debussy: is an improvisation good because it incorporates more new sounds, more new 
forms? In this sense the more sonically adventurous and multifaceted performance might 
be the most rewarding, original and creative of our two examples above, the ornate as 
opposed to the one note improvisation. Here, satisfaction comes with an abundance of 
ideas and material. However, in practice this is often not the case, and in fact minimalism 
may prove to be just as compelling and challenging as hyper-abundance. 
 
An improvisation by the musician Mark Wastell using a single Tam Tam (as heard on the 
recording Vibra) may offer a far less sonically intense experience than one of the group 
ensembles put together by John Zorn (for example for the piece Cobra, wherein a 
number of musicians are generating new sounds and new forms in a densely 
interconnected and moment-by-moment creative structure), but to say one creates more 
or less impact due to the density of sounds and structures would be misleading. In fact, 
one of the greatest challenges to the orthodox approach to improvising that consists of a 
rapid generation of new sounds in new combinations in recent times has been the 
development of a number of different scenes within improvised music making circles, that 
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have all come to have particular features and stylistic approaches, such as the lowercase, 
Onkyo, and New London Silence scenes.10 All of these share a predilection for generating 
meditative, relatively static improvisations, as in the case of Taku Sugimoto, an 
improvising musician who was originally associated with the Onkyo style, whose music, 
one reviewer describes as being ‘based around silence, not sound, and thus each piece is 
an incredibly slow and sparse flow of tones’ (Scaruffi, 2003). Although this comment refers 
to one of his composed pieces, it is also a fitting description of his improvising, and 
Sugimoto is elsewhere depicted as ‘simply allow[ing] a note to hang suspended in the air, 
then repeat[ing] it’ (Montgomery, 2000). Throughout the pieces on Sugimoto’s 1998 
album, Opposite, there is an incredibly strong sense of just how deliberate each note or 
each sound is, it is as if the soundscape is being arranged as Sugimoto goes along, with 
each note be carefully considered before being introduced as the next element in the 
evolving music that we hear. This is not to say that Sugimoto’s decisions are pre-
meditated that this is a composition – albeit an open ended one – that is unfolding 
before us, but it is almost as if we are able to sense the guitarist thinking about how to 
respond to each sound that he makes, as if the moment that one sound is made, he is 
immediately alienated from it, and he must think carefully about what sound to produce 
next. Thus, each sound is a sonic challenge to respond, almost as if Sugimoto 
understands that the notes will not just emerge and suggest themselves, but instead that 
he must concentrate to think carefully about what will work, what would be the right note, 
or at least the most appropriate note, to play in the next moment. It might be that the 
right thing to do is to repeat a phrase, to attempt to find a way out by extending a phrase 
rather than making a new sound or paying a completely different note, but what we 
clearly hear is a painstaking process of improvised choosing and sounding of notes and 
guitar sounds. 
 
In many of the pieces, it is almost as if Sugimoto is asking questions such as, ‘how will this 
music live? what needs to happen next?’ Sometimes the music needs to be extended 
through repetition and gradual modification. Sometimes the music requires more definite 
transformation, thus in a very palpable way, Sugimoto’s playing gives a clear indication of 
the way in which improvisation can be thought of as a process of real-time composition. 
On the track ‘Spoon River I’, Sugimoto establishes something of a pattern, wherein he 
plays a two or three note chord and then responds to the sustaining tones with a four-
note melodic phrase that gradually evolves over the course of the following two minutes, 
until this see-sawing is briefly suspended at 2’40 and replaced by what feels at that point 
like an interlude of single suspended notes, before the two part chord and melodic 
fragment motif returns at three minutes and continues until the end of the piece. 
                                                
10 In terms of recognisable ‘scenes’, ‘schools’ or ‘styles’ within contemporary improvised music practice, 
Onkyo emerged in Japan in the late 1990s, whilst New London Silence developed in London in the early 
2000s in parallel with the lowercase movement that was emerging in both Berlin and London. The 
musicians associated with the three approaches tended to display an interest in creating low-volume 
performances, that enabled them to give detailed focus to the quality of the sounds that they were making, 
often using sustained and gradually-evolving tones, rather than the moment-to-moment interplay that 
characterised much jazz-based improvisation. 
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Thinking about Sugimoto’s playing allows us to shift the emphasis of improvisation, and 
think less about the original creation of new forms, and instead about something that in a 
sense celebrates the (re)combinative potentials of improvisation, wherein the mechanics 
of the process rely on the musician’s ability to make constant reference to a limited 
number of materials. This approach again allows to us to speak of Deleuze and Guattari’s 
sense of deframing, in that rather than deframing and deterritorialising music through 
radical aesthetics, Sugimoto accomplishes a far subtler deframing of what appear to be 
more traditional, or at least more familiar musical materials. Sugimoto’s musical aesthetic 
also allows us to think about a zero intensity music, and his work firmly encourages us to 
take a broad view of what the plane of composition could mean for the improvising 
musician. In contrast to a highly coloured, aesthetically diverse performance that self-
consciously searches for the new in a quest for stark originality, what the studied and 
suspended improvisation of Sugimoto does is to affirm that affect is not simply generated 
through the construction of new sounds, or indeed that new aesthetic experiences simply 
rely on constructing new sounds, as we can hear on another track from Opposite, ‘A 
Narrow Path’ which consists of a ten-note scale-like melody that is repeated over and 
over again, with subtle changes to the phrasing and note articulation with each repetition. 
At times, the notes are played staccato, whilst at other notes are accented and sustained 
with string bends to create swells. Equally Sugimoto sometimes plays two strings at once 
to create subtle discords in the repeated but changing medodies. A new, unexpected or 
disruptive sound can indeed be the instigator of a new aesthetic experience, but equally, 
what the sustained and extremely minimal improvisations of the Onkyo and lowercase 
schools show is that the plane of composition signifies the creation of sensations through 
many different means, including repetition, and slow development, thereby 
‘disaggregating the tonal frame’ of many different sonic universes. Aesthetic impact does 
not have to come from sonic diversity and abundance, since deframing and 
deterritorialisation can mean breaking with an equally diverse set of practices, even 
extreme noise and constant variation, which, following Deleuze and Guattari’s 
commentary on the Wagner- and Debussy-universes, would have their own set of frames 
and codes. 
 
Lowercase improvisation demonstrates that an improvising musician can make use of a 
number of different strategies, and harness a variety of forces, and, following Steve 
Goodman, ‘unsound’ intensities. Again, it is not the relationship with a radical, visceral 
aesthetic that allows for the creation of new music, but a much more considered probing, 
a musical working, and a forgetting of the familiar so as to achieve the unfamiliar, as 
Deleuze and Guattari suggest, ’it is not memory that is needed but a complex material 
that is found not in memory but in words and sounds: “Memory, I hate you!”’ (Deleuze 
and Guattari, 1994: 168). Thus an improviser makes use of any number of strategies to 
create a limitless variety of combinations and compounds of affects in order to progress a 
performance, which can be a deliberate experimentation, or it may be a suspension of 
learned technique and knowledge, or indeed a mixture of both, and we have now seen 
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how these strategies combine in order to create something that has its own consistency, 
something that will create sensations for an audience. 
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6. Conclusion: Will it work? 
 
In casting Ornette Coleman as a probe-head creating unintelligible music, we are 
reminded that making something or as Deleuze says bringing into being ‘that which does 
not exist’ (Deleuze, 2004 DR: 185) is a contingent process: it is always possible that music 
might not happen, that an improvisation might not lead to music. Beyond the rare violent 
outbursts of outraged musicians and audiences, this contingency usually goes 
unrecognised, what else would we expect musicians to do but make music?  
 
We have seen the way that an improvising musician engages with the unstable particle 
flows of the virtual to create order, and we have discussed that through improvising, as 
with the refrain, it might not only be sounds, but an entire system that is improvised. If we 
return to our one-note improvisation, we can see the mechanics of the refrain in 
operation: the single C is simultaneously the stable centre in the heart of chaos, in that it 
instantly produces a gravitational pull around itself (we must take notice of it), and at the 
same time the existence of that middle C creates an ordered system of codes: we can 
now talk about different qualities of a piece of music, such as pitch, rhythm, duration, 
speed and volume. This nuanced sense that improvisation is not only the manufacture of 
new sounds, but also the manufacture of music, or at least ‘a’ music, itself as a coherent 
system, can be difficult to identify, but perhaps we can detect such a productive process 
at work. Where Roy Eldridge felt that Ornette Coleman was ‘jiving’, we could now 
reframe Coleman as an improvising probe-head who (as exemplified in his early album 
titles such as The Shape of Jazz to Come, This Is Our Music and Free Jazz) was able to 
deterritorialise music. Evan Parker’s approach to improvising reflects the possibility of 
thinking about improvisation as something more wide-reaching, that is not purely 
governed by the context of a punctual-facial music, saying he likes ‘to think of solo 
saxophone as taking a note for a walk’ (Parker, cited in Borgo, 2005: 36), which would 
suggest that Parker sees his playing as an open-ended process, akin to the becoming-
music of A Thousand Plateaus. An example of this ‘taking a note for a walk’, can be heard 
in the final track of the record Conic Sections, a set of solo improvisations that Parker 
perfroms on soprano saxophone. The entire piece is performed using circular breathing, 
and is thus a continuous stream of sound.  Between 1’30 and 3’30, we hear Parker 
repeating a short melodic phrase in the middle register, which he begins to counterpoint 
with a staccato line that comprises of three and four note patterns (concert A, D and Eb, 
then A, C and Eb, and then with variations) that hint at a stuttering, but loosely rhythmic 
pulse – almost an ostinato in the way that a ‘bassline’ would work in jazz, or groove-based 
music, whilst at the same time he introduces a series of overtones in the instrument’s 
upper register. As such, this relatively small set of notes are being taken for a walk, as 
Parker uses them to explore different combinations and force new notes to erupt as a 
result of the rapid inter-register blowing techniques that he uses. 
 
Coleman and Parker thereby enable us to consider a more radical vision of improvisation, 
wherein an improvisation becomes the point at which a new music is created, where the 
previous rules of the punctual music faciality are put at stake. In such a formulation, an 
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improvisation does not happen by understanding music, instead, music, with the double 
meaning of music as content (the child’s song) and music as organisational structure 
(home), is created by improvising. 
 
Considering improvisation in this way certainly speaks more of the inherent risk-taking 
that improvised music making involves - not ‘If I improvise, will I be able to re-configure 
these given elements in a satisfactory way?’ but rather ‘If I improvise, what will happen? 
Will it work? Will music happen?’ This more focused reading of Deleuze and Guattari’s 
challenge to ‘make something that stands on its own’ reflects Derek Bailey’s definition of 
improvisation, where he writes, ‘in all its roles and appearances, improvisation can be 
considered as the celebration of the moment. And in this the nature of improvisation 
exactly resembles the nature of music. Essentially music is fleeting; its reality is its 
moment of performance’ (Bailey, 1992: 142). As such, Bailey clearly emphasises the 
ephemeral nature of music and improvisation, and although he does not problematise the 
relationship between improvisation and music to the same extent that we have, there is a 
suggestion that music does not necessarily precede improvisation. Indeed, elsewhere he 
states that ‘mankind’s first musical performance couldn’t have been anything other than a 
free improvisation’ (Bailey, 1992: 83), thus emphasising the pre-musical power of 
improvisation, and further supporting the idea that it is through improvising, that music 
comes into existence. The pianist and composer Frederick Rzewski tells us that, 
 
Because improvisation resembles real life, it can illuminate this real life…Music can 
expand our awareness of the irrational, dark side of reality. It can make us aware, if 
only vaguely, of the possibility of other universes right under our noses…Such little 
universes may appear and disappear at any moment…The improvising musician 
simply gives them a voice. (Rzewski, 2005: 270) 
 
The idea that improvisation gives voice to little universes is appealing, as it speaks of the 
potential that improvisation has to go beyond the universe or face of music and enable 
musicians and audiences to connect with experiences that may not solely relate to 
musical contexts. In comparing improvisation to ‘real life’, Rzewski also reminds us of the 
refrain and its elemental, non-human motion of gathering, binding and compounding. 
Although Deleuze and Guattari do not consider the refrain to be the origin of music, 
improvisation is able to encompass both the deterritorialising force of music and the 
territorialising rhythm of refrain. What Deleuze and Guattari take to be music’s capacity to 
make the refrain a ‘deterritorialised content for a deterritorialising form of expression’ is 
also improvisation’s capacity to perform exactly that process on music. But as has been 
shown through reference to the work of improvising musicians such as Cornelius Cardew 
and Evan Parker, improvising does not simply deterritorialise music, it has the power to 
deterritorialise sound and at the same time territorialise and create a new understanding 
of music, as evidenced through musicians’ responses to Ornette Coleman. The 
territorialising power of the refrain is improvisation’s power to create music, again Bailey 
reminds us that improvisation must have preceded music, whilst in order to improvise, the 
probe-head improviser must dismantle (deterritorialise) the face of music. 
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We could go further to claim that an improvisation must self-deterritorialise. It would be 
easy to see improvisation itself as a gridded system, a coded process, an autonomous 
faciality. Thus, if an improvisation does not also exceed its own limits, if an improviser is 
unable to operate at the cutting edge of deterritorialisation, then absolute improvisation 
will remain unattainable. An improviser must therefore themselves be a becoming-
improviser, such that an improvisation would have the potential to be a becoming-
improvisation, and where an improviser as probe-head would be the instigator and 
propelling force behind this process. As Deleuze and Guattari suggest, ‘beyond the face 
lies an altogether different humanity… of ‘probe-heads’; here cutting edges of 
deterritorialisation become operative […] forming strange new becomings’ (Deleuze and 
Guattari, 1987: 191). It is in this sense that we must define both the process and the 
results of improvisation: they are ‘strange new becomings’ that simultaneously speak of 
sonic and systemic upheaval. In simpler terms, the improvising musician Derek Bailey 
states, ‘with every music there is an exciting period when it’s coming together and no one 
has a clue what it’s supposed to sound like. That’s when it’s happening […] once you’ve 
learned everything, it’s over’ (Bailey, 2004: 47). Although Bailey is talking in more general 
terms about playing with other musicians and becoming too familiar with each-others’ 
style and approach, in fact the same holds true for the process of improvising itself: it can 
never be a simple resemblance of what has gone before, since, according to Deleuze and 
Guattari ‘for all of time…music [has had the project] of rendering sonorous, instead of 
reproducing the sonorous’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 346). Therefore, each 
improvisation, must continually create and recreate itself until the improvisation is 
finished, if not, then ‘everybody gets to know the music and as soon as that happens and 
you start playing the music, you stop improvising (Bailey, 2004: 47). 
 
This chapter has explored and created various relationships between musical 
improvisation and a number of Deleuze and Guattari’s conceptual strategies, with a view 
to extending what could be meant by Cornelius Cardew’s idea that improvisation is a 
‘searching for responses’ and David Borgo’s view that improvisation is a really process of 
improvising music. To frame a closing set of remarks, we can turn to the ‘Treatise on 
Nomadology’, or the ‘War Machine’ plateau. In this plateau, Deleuze and Guattari present 
us with the idea that like metal, music is ubiquitous. Music operates in a similar way to 
metal: not everything is music, but at the same time music is a facet, a perspective, a way 
of hearing and understanding everything. It is not that music is heard everywhere, but 
that music is in and part of everything. 
 
If metallurgy has an essential relation with music, it is by virtue not only of the 
sounds of the forge but also of the tendency within both arts to bring into its own, 
beyond separate forms, a continuous development of form and beyond variable 
matters, a continuous variation of matter […] Not everything is metal, but metal is 
everywhere. (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 411) 
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If metal is a ‘continuous variation of matter’ we could say that music is a continuous 
variation of sound. In his essay ‘The Joys of Noise’, the composer and theorist Henry 
Cowell makes a similar claim about music when he states that, 
 
[M]ost shocking of all is the discovery that there is a noise element in the very tone 
itself of all our musical instruments. Consider the sound of a violin. Part of the 
vibrations producing the sound are periodic […] But others are not […] and 
consequently they must be considered noise […] Since the ‘disease’ of noise 
permeates all music, the only hopeful course is to consider that the noise-germ […] 
is a good microbe. (Cowell, 2004: 22) 
 
Although Cowell, is quite clearly positioning noise within the context of music and music-
producing machines, it is a useful way of thinking about sound as a continuum, as 
something that surrounds us and is available to us at all times. The jazz producer and 
critic Joachim Berendt puts forward a similarly comprehensive argument that asserts the 
way in which the physical world is governed by and functions as sound. His book Nada 
Brahma: The World Is Sound encompasses not only music, but spirituality, religion, 
mathematics and science, and in discussing vibration and oscillation patterns at macro 
and microscopic scales, he notes that harmonic relationships can be observed between 
the relative orbits of planets as well as between electrons and protons in atoms. (Berendt, 
1987: 68) By stating that these relationships exist as a physical fact, Berendt is introducing 
the idea that sound, as the physical consequence of harmonic vibration is intrinsic to our 
experience of the world. This is not to say that everything is music in a Cagean sense, but 
that harmonic patterns are as much a feature of the physical world as they are of music, 
which again calls to mind Goodman’s ‘unsound’. For Berendt therefore, the world is 
indeed sound, in a very literal sense of the word. Cowell and Berendt’s ideas about noise 
and sound along with Cage’s redefinition of sound as music, produce an expansive view 
not only of the ubiquitous and all-pervasive nature of sound and music, but also music’s 
capacity to be immanent, virtual and intensive. We can thus formulate a concluding 
statement that likens improvisation to Deleuze and Guattari’s ‘sound block’, the 
antimemory that pervades ‘musical organisation’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 297). For 
Deleuze and Guattari, ‘[the composer Edgard] Varese’s procedure, at the dawn of this 
age, is exemplary: a musical machine of consistency, a sound machine (not a machine for 
reproducing sounds), which molecularises and atomises, ionises sound matter, and 
harnesses a cosmic energy’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 343). However, where they 
conclude that ‘if this machine must have an assemblage, it is the synthesiser’ (Deleuze 
and Guattari, 1987: 343), for us it is the improvisation which harnesses cosmic forces and 
creates compounds of sonorous blocs of affect. If an improvisation comes to stand on its 
own, then what is unique and radical about an improvisation is that it is not even like 
itself. 
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Into the Void: Improvisation and the Event 
 
In this chapter, we shall turn to the work of Alain Badiou, and in particular, the ideas 
that he developed in one of his key books, Being and Event, in order to continue 
mapping improvised music practice to aspects of contemporary thought. By 
working through some of the fine-grained detail in Badiou’s work, including a range 
of terms that he adapts to his purposes, as well as his use of mathematically derived 
equations that enable him to formulate and validate some of his key perspectives, 
our aim will be to think about improvisation in terms of Badiou’s philosophy of the 
Event, and to further interrogate how it is that an improvisation has the capacity to 
create unexpected outcomes, or disrupt conventional musical practices. For the 
philosopher Christopher Norris,  
 
[T]he central thesis of Being and Event […] concerns the remarkable yet well-
documented capacity of reason to transcend the limits of conscious, 
reflective or epistemically accessible thought while yet remaining subject to 
the dictates of a truth-procedure that acts as both a stimulus and check to its 
ventures beyond the confines of received knowledge or accepted method. 
(Norris, 2009: 280) 
 
This is, indeed, both a central, as well as a challenging and compelling feature of 
Badiou’s work, in that he is able to put forward an ontology that recognises that 
what he refers to as a ‘subject’1 is both part of a world, and at the same time is able 
to think beyond that world’s limits and thus bring new things into it. If the previous 
chapter explored the way in which an improvisation is both a reterritorialisation of 
sound as music and a deterritorialisation of the codes and conventions of music and 
even of improvisation itself, then our current task is to consider the way in which an 
improvisation is an attempt to reach beyond the limits of the temporal and physical 
environment in order to force what Badiou calls an ‘irruption’ of an ‘event’ into an 
improviser-subject’s ‘situation’. Unlike Deleuze and Guattari, Badiou is of the 
opinion that beyond what is presented to us in our environment, in what he refers to 
as the situation, is completely unknowable and inaccessible to us. For him there is 
no actual-virtual that captures different aspects of the real, and instead, by thinking 
                                                
1 The term is open-ended enough to be applicable both within the formal mathematical modelling 
that Badiou uses, as well as in a more experiential context, where we might think of a ‘human 
subject’ which suggests a person with certain characteristics, having real experiences. In addition, the 
word ‘subject’ serves another dual purpose for Badiou, in that it can be used to refer to a ‘subject 
under consideration’, in terms of such an individual perspective, but at the same time it allows him to 
make the specific inference that the subject is ‘subject to’ the event, meaning that the subject is the 
result of a formal procedure and at the same time remains ‘faithful’ to a particular experience. 
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in terms of an unpresented inconsistent multiplicity, he configures what he refers to 
as the void of a situation. 
 
The wager of this this chapter is that we can use Badiou’s ‘ontology of the void’  to 
provide an insight into the way in which an improvisation goes beyond our capacity 
to expect or predict a certain outcome, and is therefore by nature an exponential 
process.2 To achieve this, the chapter will be broadly divided into three sections. 
The first is an overview of Badiou’s approach to thinking that will engage with the 
principles and processes that underpin the Event, and we shall examine a set of key 
terms that will provide us with the basic tools for theorising improvisation within this 
context. The second section will then focus more specifically on the generic 
procedure and the process of forcing, enabling us to develop an understanding of 
how Badiou’s subject can be seen within a creative context. Finally, the technology 
of forcing will be applied to the process of improvisation itself, and we shall explore 
the idea of ‘the subject as improviser’. Thus, for our analysis of what we could call 
the ‘improvisation-event’, the capacity of the subject-as-improviser to transcend the 
limits of their ‘sonic situation’ is the moment of improvisation, the act of grasping at 
something beyond what is readily available in order to produce a new music. 
 
As we shall see, by using a procedure that he refers to as the ‘count-as-one’, Badiou 
demonstrates that the void is an ‘inconsistent multiple’ that is at the heart of 
everything and which can cause the ‘irruption […] of an incandescent non-being’ 
(Badiou, 2005: 183) into a situation at any given time. In this way immanence 
becomes not a matter of exchange between things that are different in degree 
(where the virtual and actual are two sides of the same real), but of a passage 
between things that are different in kind; the void is not ‘of’ a presented situation 
and can in no way be registered or understood from that position. Thus, although 
Badiou and Deleuze’s approaches are significantly different, they nonetheless allow 
us to see that what makes an improvisation striking and in many ways marks it out as 
being successful, where musicians can be heard to bring something new into 
musical discourse (which is different to the novelty value of regurgitating shock or 
                                                
2 In Badiou’s reading, it is the void, or what he also temrs as the ‘generic’, that is immanent to all 
things, rather than the plane of immanence that we see in Deleuze and Guattari’s work. Where the 
latter’s version of immanence allows for an emergent movement of matter and energy across regions 
of virtuality and actuality, Badiou insists that the void is just that: an absolute nothing, that is in no 
way ‘like’ anything that we can experience. Although Badiou absolutely proscribes any possible 
knowledge of the void, his ontological model does allow us to at least name it. By using the symbol 
‘ø’ to refer the void, and a mathematical formula known as the ‘power set axiom’, he is able to 
generate the symbol ‘{ø}’, or what he calls the empty set, which allows us to ‘name’ the void, which 
lies at the heart of what is a palpably constructive philosophical model. In simle terms, Badiou shows 
us how things are made; the exponential or at least non-linear and unpredictable nature of the 
creative process, and how our relationship to these things in itself creates further effects within our 
environment. 
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surprise), is that they are able to destabilise the familiar codes that listeners might 
have for appreciating and engaging with a musical performance. For Deleuze and 
Guattari, de- and re-territorialisation remakes the familiar as unfamiliar, whereas for 
Badiou, being faithful to a truth sets up an artist-creator, or subject-as-improviser, as 
someone who forces into hearing, something that categorically had not previously 
been present.   
 
In using the void, the event and the truth procedure as a means to think about the 
emergence of an immanent unknown, Badiou will enable us to see improvisation as 
a searching process, where the concepts of ‘faith’ and ‘fidelity’ will underline the 
importance of an improviser believing in their ability to create musical outcomes 
that are unpredictable, unforeseen and at the same time compelling; not only for 
themselves, but for other musicians and listeners. In addition, because of Badiou’s 
use of mathematical procedures, we can think about a ‘groundlessness’ in regard to 
improvisation; the sense that improvised music comes from nothing and from 
nowhere. At the same time, we can also consider the way in which improvisation as 
a process can force a connection between a strictly limited and finite set of 
resources – in other words, the tools, knowledge, skills and experiences that we 
have to hand - and an infinitely recurring expanse of possibilities for making 
something new. For Badiou, unlike Deleuze and Guattari, the creation of the new, 
such as the improvisation of new music in performance, is not the emergence of 
something out of an already-existing set of conditions; instead, the new is produced 
by the arrival of an unnamed and previously non-existent element, via an ‘event’. An 
event is something that logically cannot be said to have had any kind of prior 
existence in a given situation, and can only be recognised, and responded to, 
retrospectively. The musician must have faith in the fact that something new will 
have happened, and by coupling this sense of fidelity with the process of ‘forcing’ – 
which can be likened to a sense of recognising that something has been made, that 
we have made a breakthrough – improvisation becomes a search for a future 
possibility, and a dynamic process of creative involvement. As a ‘subject-as-
improviser’, although we don't yet know what kind of music will happen, we believe 
that something can happen, and when it has happened – in other words, when we 
have made it happen and we recognise its arrival – this music will have a certain set 
of identifiable, and unique, characteristics. 3 
 
  
                                                
3 Where Deleuze and Guattari informed us that a bloc of affect must ‘stand on its own’, within a 
Badiouian context, we could say that we remain ‘faithful’ to the characteristics of an event, such that 
we have a fidelity to the truth of an improvisation-as-event. 
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1. Developing a language: Badiou’s mathematical ontology 
 
Badiou’s work in Being and Event is underpinned by a number of key principles that 
are designed not only to facilitate his particular philosophical project, but also to 
enable him to create a distinction between his own work, and a range of other 
philosophical practices and perspectives, most notably his contemporary, Deleuze.   
One of Badiou’s most important, and at the same time contentious, assertions is 
that ‘mathematics is ontology’ (Badiou, 2005: xiii & 3).4 Badiou calls this an 
‘axiomatic decision’ (Badiou, 2005: 31), and it is intended to demonstrate his 
conviction that in order to arrive at a particular set of conclusions, we must make a 
decision to think in a certain way. With this claim, Badiou is not simply suggesting 
that ontology can be better described by using mathematical formulae, instead, he 
is wanting to establish that at a fundamental, and thus axiomatic, level that ontology 
and mathematics are the same thing, and that ontology only makes sense in terms 
of mathematical operations. Badiou’s main point of reference is set theory, an area 
of mathematics that studies the properties of sets that was originally developed by 
the mathematicians Georg Cantor and Richard Dedekind in the nineteenth century, 
and later modified by Paul Cohen among others.5 For Badiou’s purposes, the rules 
and procedures surrounding the construction of sets, what counts as being included 
in or belonging to a set, the necessary existence of infinity, along with the critical 
question of how to make a new set and discern the existence of a new component 
within a set, comprise the foundations of his mathematical ontology. Badiou’s claim 
about the mathematical nature of ontology is itself the subject of broader 
philosophical debate that sits outside the remit of this research, but it is worth 
noting that some of the most focused criticism that has been levelled at Badiou, has 
come from his contemporary, Francois Laruelle, whose work we shall engage with 
later in this study.6 
                                                
4 Badiou discusses this point in the preface to Being and Event, where he claims that ‘insofar as 
being, qua being, is nothing other than pure multiplicity, it is legitimate to say that ontology, the 
science of being qua being, is nothing other than mathematics itself.’ Badiou, 2005: xiii) In the 
introduction to the book itself, Badiou goes on to elaborate the point, stating that ‘the science of 
being qua being has existed since the Greeks - such is the sense and status of mathematics. 
However, it is only today that we have the means to know this. It follows from this thesis that 
philosophy is not centred on ontology - which exists as a separate and exact discipline - rather, it 
circulates between this ontology (thus, mathematics), the modern theories of the subject and its own 
history’ (Badiou, 2005: 3) 
5 As we shall see, Cohen’s concept of ‘forcing’ becomes one of the central components of Badiou’s 
truth procedure. 
6 In Anti-Badiou, Francois Laruelle discusses at length Badiou’s assertion that 
‘mathematics=ontology’ (Laruelle, 2013: 81), which Laruelle himself regards as generating two 
outcomes: the reduction of philosophy, ‘in its relation to mathematics, to a meta-ontology’ and a 
similar reconfiguration of philosophy as a ‘weakly encyclopaedic system’ (Laruelle, 2013: 14), which is 
to say that for Badiou, philosophy’s role becomes merely descriptive of the ontological modelling 
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In terms of the breadth and scale of Being and Event and its relation to Badiou’s 
wider philosophical project, it is clear that his philosophical interests go further than 
simply developing a mathematical model for ontological enquiry. Thus, with his 
other principle axiomatic claim that ‘the one is not’ (Badiou, 2005: 23), we can also 
discern Badiou’s ambition to go beyond a tradition in philosophical thought that 
can be traced back to pre-Socratic thinkers, thereby laying down a challenge to 
various philosophical practices, as we see with this critique of Deleuze’s concept of 
the ‘univocity of Being’.7 As such, Badiou’s claim that ’the one is not’, is both a 
reference to an axiom of set theory, and at the same time a direct challenge to 
                                                
that mathematics is able to carry out. In effect, what Badiou is arguing for is that philosophy take on 
a much more secondary role to mathematics, in other words we would have more specific 
philosophies ‘of’ certain practices in the same way that we already have a philosophy ‘of religion’ and 
a philosophy ‘of science’. However, as Laruelle points out, the statement ‘mathematics=ontology’, is 
not itself a mathematical derived axiom, rather it is merely a philosophical claim. For Laruelle, this 
means that in fact, not only is Badiou’s philosophical model a logical impossibility (‘a thesis or an 
axiom cannot stand alone, or claim to found itself’ (Laruelle, 2013: 81)), but it is also emphatically in 
need of philosophy to support it (‘above all OV [Badiou’s ontology of the void] that poses the 
problem of conserving philosophy’ (Laruelle, 2013: 16)). Ultimately, for Laruelle, it would not matter 
what philosophy or ontology was reduced to, since neither would have any more or less purchase on 
the Real, and thus, Badiou’s axiom is not only wrong, but it is also irrelevant. 
7 In Difference and Repetition, we see Deleuze describing ‘the essence of univocal being’ as, ‘a 
single “voice” of Being which includes all its modes, including the most diverse, the most varied, the 
most differenciated’ (Deleuze, 2004: 45). However, Badiou’s book, Deleuze: The Clamor of Being, is 
a direct challenge to this idea, and draws on a similar set of strategies that we say him develop in 
Being and Event, in order to completely invalidate the concepts of the ‘One-All’ (Badiou, 1999: 10), 
and the ‘Univocity of Being’ (Badiou, 1999: 23), since for Badiou, ‘the world's confusion undoubtedly 
means first of all that it can be explained neither by the One nor by the Multiple’ (Badiou, 1999: 9). 
For Badiou, ‘Deleuze’s fundamental problem is most certainly not to liberate the multiple, but to 
submit thinking to a renewed concept of the One (Badiou, 1999: 10), which for Badiou is a 
fundamental de-radicalisation of thought, and a limiting of what the world really is: for him, the world 
in absolute, or real terms is neither a ‘one’ nor a ‘multiple’, it must by definition exceed any human 
attempts to categorise it. As a result, we can also see that a major aspect of Badiou’s own 
philosophical project is concerned with overturning Deleuze (and Guattari’s) approach to thinking 
about the univocity of being and replacing it with his own set-theory derived mathematical ontology. 
In both Deleuze’s own work, and in his collaborations with Guattari, we are presented with a view of 
difference that meshes the relation between human experience and an impersonal difference-in-
itself, where virtual intensities intersect with a world of conscious action, even if this is at the pre-
conscious, non-intentional level of becoming. Badiou allowed for no such continuity in his explication 
of the subject in relation to the void and the event, defining his ideas in opposition to what he sees 
as the weakness and self-contradictory nature of Deleuze’s philosophy of the one-all. For Badiou, 
there can be no scious action, even if this is at the pre-conscious, non-intentional level of becoming. 
Badiou allowed for no such continuity in his explicatione constructed, which enables him to deny that 
there can be any form of finitude. Similarly, his steadfast commitment to the non-conceptualisable 
nature of the void, is a refusal to permit any sort of relation existing between the void and anything 
that is given in experience. 
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Deleuze’s philosophical project, laying out the terms of engagement for Being and 
Event. He subsequently goes on to use a number of concepts to build on this idea, 
and for our current purposes, there are three that have particular relevance: the 
‘Void’, the ‘Subject’, and the ‘Truth Procedure’.  
 
In many ways, the Void is the all-important conceptual component in Badiou’s 
model. If his ‘entire discourse originates in […] the non-being of the one’ (Badiou 
2005: 31), then the image of the Void is the philosophical application of this axiom. 
The Void is the absolute no-thing that underpins everything that we can conceive of 
and think about, and clearly represents the most significant assault on one of the 
central components of what Badiou sees as Deleuze’s philosophy of the One-All. 
The roots and reference points for Badiou’s work are distinct and often draw on the 
work of Lacan, particularly the latter’s use of the matheme and his ideas surrounding 
lack. As with the previous chapter on Deleuze and Guattari’s own philosophy of 
immanence, there are clearly influences and precursors that inform any 
philosopher’s work, and therefore whilst it is important to acknowledge the context 
surrounding a thinker’s work, the current study is not intended as a piece of 
philosophical scholarship, but, rather, an attempt to bring certain conceptual 
resources to bear on improvisation. As such, we shall take Badiou’s work as it is 
presented and use his ideas about the Void and the non-being of the One as a 
means to think about creative processes. 
 
Within the context of a study that is principally focused on establishing a new way of 
understanding improvisation and thinking through the various processes that it 
entails, in the figure of the ‘subject’, Badiou provides us with a compelling means to 
approach the improviser themselves, and to think about how the act of making new 
music might work. In his preface to Being and Event, Badiou informs us that, 
 
A subject is nothing other than an active fidelity to the event of truth. This means 
that a subject is a militant of truth […] The militant of a truth is not only the 
political militant working for the emancipation of humanity in its entirety. He or 
she is also the artist-creator, the scientist who opens up a new theoretical field, 
or the lover whose world is enchanted. (Badiou, 2005: xiii) 
Thus, Badiou’s subject is not a subject of ‘experience’ in a conventional sense, and 
Badiou sets the idea up so as to avoid any possible confusion with notions of 
perception or intuition. Instead, he positions a mathematically -  rather than 
anthropomorphically -  derived subject as a point of determination in relation to a 
particular occurrence, or event. It is an ‘operation’, or a way of thinking about a 
process of bringing something into existence that goes beyond the concerns of an 
individual. Badiou conceives of the occurrence of the new in terms of what he calls a 
a ‘generic’ structure, and as we shall see, Badiou’s particular reading of the word 
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‘generic’ will also play a key role in our analysis of improvisation. We can thus see 
that Badiou’s subject, if nothing else, is some kind of agent of change, an 
orientation towards an event that creates a ‘truth’, and whilst Badiou describes the 
subject simply as an ‘active fidelity’, his assertion that ‘he or she is also the artist-
creator’ provides us with a clear indication that this configuration of a subject can 
allow us to think about improvisation in terms of the framework that Badiou sets up.  
 
If a subject is faithful to a truth, then within Badiou’s conception, the word ‘truth’ 
also has a very particular meaning: 
 
The being of a truth, proving itself an exception to any pre-constituted predicate 
of the situation in which that truth is deployed, is to be called ‘generic'. In other 
words, although it is situated in a world, a truth does not retain anything 
expressible from that situation. A truth concerns everyone inasmuch as it is a 
multiplicity that no particular predicate can circumscribe. The infinite work of a 
truth is thus that of a 'generic procedure'. And to be a Subject (and not a simple 
individual animal) is to be a local active dimension of such a procedure. (Badiou, 
2005: xiii) 
Here, Badiou is indicating that a truth, by definition is something that does not 
come from within a situation that exists in a world that we experience; it is ‘generic’ 
because it arises within a situation, and yet it is not ‘of’ that situation. In this regard, 
Badiou is careful to differentiate between a mathematical modelling of fidelity, 
which asserts that it is possible to develop a commitment to a generic truth that is 
not ‘in’ a situation, but which nevertheless will arrive in that situation, and a more 
conventional understanding of experience. The sense in which a subject is a ‘local 
active dimension’ of a generic procedure, or what Badiou elsewhere refers to as a 
‘truth procedure’ provides us with a useful opportunity to draw a parallel between 
an improvising musician and the kind of artist-creator that Badiou is alluding to, in 
that we could imagine that an improviser might also need to make some kind of 
commitment to an event whilst improvising, and indeed may be the agent of 
change that precipitates such a creative event whilst improvising.8 
                                                
8 Whilst Badiou makes consistent use of practical examples throughout Being and Event, in order to 
illustrate his mathematical proofs, it is not always clear how far we should consider these examples as 
practical evidence of the truth procedure in operation, or whether they are simply metaphorical 
images that are being used to convey a sense of what the mathematical ontology means. It is 
therefore worth acknowledging at this stage that there are certain difficulties that arise from Badiou’s 
approach, in particular his articulation and application of his ideas.  
As has been noted by Daniel Smith, Badiou ‘grants an ontological status to axiomatics alone’ (Smith, 
2003: 5), and as a consequence, Badiou’s attention throughout Being and Event, is focused on 
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In a sense, what Badiou’s work shows is that music, art, or indeed any creative 
process, does not have any kind of representational function – which connects us 
directly to one of the underlying principle of this study, which is that an 
improvisation is not simply a ‘playing out’ of a given philosophical model – and in 
no way does it communicate an inherent meaning, or some sort of ineffable, 
metaphysical truth. For Badiou, a truth is grounded by that which is fundamentally 
unknowable, it is not predicated on any pre-given aspect of a given situation, and it 
does not in any way ‘represent’ any aspect of that situation, a truth is simply the 
emergence, within a situation, of something that had previously not been present, 
and which in no way results from the elements of that situation. As such, when he 
states that the subject is a ‘local active dimension’ of a truth procedure, Badiou is 
telling us that a creative process comes about because of the artist-creator’s, or for 
our purposes the ‘subject-as-improviser’s’, ability to identify and facilitate the arrival 
of a truth, via an event, into a situation. If we accept that a situation can be said to 
exist as part of a world that we can normally experience, and that it is a way of 
                                                
providing a set of proofs for his theoretical model, and thereby formalising the concept of Being 
within a mathematical context. Peter Hallward problematises Badiou’s work in a similar way by 
claiming that Being and Event emphasises, ‘the ontological primacy of mathematical over physical 
reality’ (Hallward, 2003: 53), which implies that whilst the mathematical modelling of ontology is 
compelling, it may not be up to the task of describing the physical world that we inhabit and 
experience. Thus we should be mindful of the risks associated with trying to create practical 
applications for Badiou’s theoretical expositions: in short, it might not work, and we must construct a 
framework that takes into consideration the potential disjuncture between theory and practice. The 
philosopher Ray Brassier in the book Nihil Unbound, undertakes an extensive analysis of Badiou’s 
work, and puts forward a number of his own thoughts on how to approach Badiou’s ontological 
framework (Brassier, 2007: passim, 113-114). What is interesting is that for Brassier, Badiou has 
constructed an ontology and a means of thinking about Being (and therefore the Event) that 
precludes any other approaches to thinking about Being, since Badiou has tightly delimited not only 
the means themselves, but also what it means to think about Being. In doing so, Brassier seems to 
be suggesting that Badiou has trapped himself in something of an echo chamber, which is to say 
that his ideas would seem to serve no other purpose than to perpetuate their own existence, which 
echoes Laruelle’s objections that were noted earlier. However, as Badiou suggests in the 
Introduction to Being and Event, ‘A subject is manifested locally […] Therefore, stricto sensu, there is 
no subject save the artistic, amorous, scientific, or political.’ (Badiou, 2005: 17). Hence, we must be 
aware of the need to treat the ideas that Badiou generates in Being and Event carefully, and 
Brassier’s work very much highlights the dangers of operating in such a potentially self-re-enforcing 
framework. However, this brief passage presents us with a clear indication that Badiou certainly 
intends that his work on the subject and the subject’s relationship to a situation can have a practical 
focus, to the extent that his model of the subject can only work within the practical and creative 
contexts that he lists here. Although there may be pitfalls associated with applying Badiou’s work to 
practical contexts, Brassier nevertheless acknowledges that there are a number of valuable 
consequences to Badiou’s work, not least that ‘Badiou’s inestimable merit is to have disenchanted 
ontology: ‘being’ is insignificant, it means, quite literally, nothing, [t]he question of the meaning of 
being must be abandoned as an antiquated superstition’ (Brassier, 2007: 116). 
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describing the boundaries of our current knowledge, then Badiou’s point is that it is 
impossible that a truth can arise from within our current knowledge. Making 
something like music therefore draws on a fundamental lack of meaning, and that in 
order to understand, we must retrospectively confer meaning on the things that we 
have made; we must remain ‘faithful’ to them. We don’t make things that mean 
anything, on the contrary, the things we make, are themselves the makers of 
meaning, which suggests that music can be disruptive precisely because it does not 
draw on any inherent meaning in the situation that it finds itself in, it forces us to 
understand it on its own terms. Badiou’s subject is therefore not a figure of first-
person subjective experience, but instead a means to understand that a creative 
process is fundamentally about facilitating and creating radical change. In this way, 
although caution is advised, it is clear that there is much that we can take from 
Badiou’s work, and his ideas have the potential to open up new routes to 
challenging and developing our thinking in regard to improvisation and creative 
music practice.  
 
1.1 Making something from nothing 
Since the central project of Being and Event is the axiomatisation of ontology 
through a series of logical demonstrations in set theory, early on Badiou establishes 
the procedure whereby the void, as the underlying principle of being, becomes a 
working part of a constructive ontology. Badiou uses the symbol ‘ø’ to denote the 
void and in combination with a key axiom of set theory, namely the power-set 
axiom, he begins the process of creating a structure that underpins his notion of 
Being and in Meditation Seven, Badiou lays out the process by which we move from 
the nothing of the void to the something of Being.9 In its most basic formation, 
Badiou describes the way in which ø, as a result of what is known as the power set 
operation, an operation whereby the set (or total number) of subsets of ø (which 
Badiou terms p(ø), comes to have an identity written as {ø}. Badiou calls this the 
‘singleton’ of the void, or the null set, and although the void is the only thing that is 
contained within this set, (in other words, to all intents and purposes, it looks as 
though it is a set that is made out of nothing), the power set operation enables us to 
say that whilst the void in itself it is a ‘no-thing’, when we count it as part of its own 
                                                
9 One of the more significant implications of Badiou’s idea of the void is that it is not only a nothing 
that is the absence of anything, but it also denotes the impossibility of describing or comprehending 
what kind of thing that absence-nothing might be. In itself, this double implication relates to a history 
of philosophical and religious thought that has configured that which is beyond human 
understanding in a number of ways, most obviously Platonic idealism and Kant’s concept of the 
noumenon. As we shall see in chapter three, in particular when we turn to the work of Quentin 
Meillassoux and Ray Brassier, our ability to either think of what lies beyond normal experience (which 
Badiou allows for through the process of ‘naming’ the void), as opposed to our ability to think about 
what lies beyond normal experience (which Badiou explicitly does not allow for), has been one of the 
key issues driving forward recent philosophical enquiry. 
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power set (the power set of the void), it suddenly becomes a ‘some-thing’. Thus in a 
strangely tautological way, the void becomes a member of its own power set, and 
thus becomes something that we can recognise and refer to without causing 
ourselves any problems; in other words, whilst the void itself must remain strictly 
incomprehensible and non-conceptualisable (since by definition it is meaningless 
and beyond comprehension), the power set of the void is eminently recognisable 
and useable. As with any other set, the power set of the void can be thought of as a 
set just like any other, and can thus be used non-problematically within Badiou’s 
mathematically driven ontological framework. Badiou refers to this process as the 
‘count-as-one’ (Badiou, 2005: 24), and although he uses it in slightly different 
variations throughout the book, in Meditation Seven, we are given a clear example 
of the way in which the void as a no-thing, or non-entity, comes to operate as a 
foundational unit of being. The void is counted-as-one element within a set, which 
allows us to literally create ‘something' from ‘nothing’. Having demonstrated and 
given proof of this operation, Badiou then demonstrates how it is possible to 
continue this building process, thus generating infinite multiplicities. 
 
Because forming-into-one is a law applicable to any existing multiple, and 
the singleton {ø} exists, the latter’s forming-into-one, which is to say the 
forming-into-one of the forming-into-one of ø also exists: {ø} → {{ø}} […] This 
is where the unlimited production of new multiples commences, each drawn 
from the void by the combined effect of the power-set axiom. (Badiou, 2005: 
92) 
 
This unfolding of the creative potential of the void as basic building block is a good 
example of the tension that we identified earlier between the mathematically-driven 
processes that Badiou develops and his interest in talking about artistic and political 
processes. However, although there are clearly difficulties, and clearly for some 
thinkers, a number of basic incompatibilities between mathematical and the 
practical contexts, Badiou nevertheless provides a stimulating framework within 
which we can consider the way that creative processes can disrupt and reconfigure 
a given context by introducing a hitherto unrecognisable or unforeseen element 
into that context, which for an improviser might be a new approach to organising 
sonic and musical structures, a new way of using or playing a musical instrument, a 
new way of setting up interactions with other musicians, or even something as 
simple as discovering a new sound. 
 
1.2 Situation and presentation  
 
Having discussed some of the underlying themes of Being and Event, and 
acknowledged some of the issues that surround Badiou’s work in the book, we can 
now turn our attention to what, in terms of improvisation, may be one of the most 
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important components of Badiou's philosophical model, namely the ‘situation’. 
What follows is a detailed exploration of the workings of this idea, which will lead 
into the particularities of what Badiou refers to as the ‘historical situation’, a concept 
that has particular relevance to creative practice, and thus improvisation. In simple 
terms, we could describe a situation as a context, or a set of conditions that the 
subject finds themselves in.  
 
Take any situation in particular […] In general, a situation is not such that the 
thesis ‘the one is not’ can be presented therein. On the contrary, because the 
law is the count-as-one, nothing is presented in a situation which is not 
counted: the situation envelops existence with the one. (Badiou, 2005: 52) 
 
In this passage, Badiou shows the count-as-one that we worked through earlier, in 
operation, whereby any given situation results from the forming-into-one of the 
void. As a subject, we cannot and do not register the non-being of the one that we 
saw in the forming-into-one / power set procedure, which means that anything 
within a given situation must function as an unproblematic part of what is given as 
part of that situation. Badiou uses the term ‘consistent multiplicity’ to give further 
clarity to the way in which such a situation can comes to have meaning or 
consistency for a subject within that situation. 
 
Nothing is presentable in a situation otherwise than under the effect of 
structure, that is, under the form of the one and its composition in consistent 
multiplicities. (Badiou, 2005: 52) 
 
What is ‘presentable’ is that which we are able to identify, and therefore if 
something is presentable within a situation, following Badiou’s suggestion that the 
subject is comparable to an artist-creator, we could therefore imagine that it would 
be possible to interact with and experience this presented something. ‘Consistent 
multiplicity’ refers to the way in which the count-as-one / forming-into-one 
procedure becomes part of the structure of a situation, and is simply taken to be a 
normal state-of-affairs within that situation, however, ’inconsistent multiplicity’ is 
only ever, ‘retroactively apprehended as non-one as soon as being-one is a result’ 
(Badiou, 2005: 25). An inconsistent multiplicity is therefore a paradoxical feature 
within a situation, where, although something may purport to be one of its normal 
components, such that it is presented as part of the count, it is in fact 
retrospectively revealed to have been an irregularity, a multiple founded on the 
forming-into-one of the void, which as we shall see, becomes an essential part of 
the truth procedure.  
 
For an improviser, one of the more relevant aspects of Badiou’s conception of the 
event is the way in which its arrival and occurrence can in some ways be described 
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as the result of a subject’s investigations within their situation. This sense of enquiry 
will have great relevance to the discussion of improvisation as event later in the 
chapter, but for now some further close reading of Being and Event will provide 
further insights into how such an investigative process can firstly, produce an event, 
and secondly, produce the subject itself. Although this latter proposition might 
appear curious, in that it suggests that a subject’s investigations produce an event 
which produces the subject, in fact, the entire formulation of the arrival of an event 
is somewhat paradoxical. Again, to help us understand the process, we need to 
work through more of Badiou’s terminology. 
 
Any ordinary situation […] contains a structure, both secondary and supreme, 
by means of which the count-as-one that structures the situation is in turn 
counted-as-one. The guarantee that the one is thus completed by the 
following: that from which its being proceeds - the count - is. ‘Is’ means ‘is-
one’ […] I will hereafter term state of the situation that by means of which the 
structure of a situation - of any structured presentation whatsoever - is 
counted as one, which is to say the one of the one-effect itself. (Badiou, 
2005: 95) 
 
The idea of the ‘state’ of the situation is a means of understanding how a situation 
comes to have consistency as a structure in itself, and the ’second count’ allows us 
to think about the way that the inhabitants of a situation begin to engage with and 
even alter the contents of that situation; in other words how they begin to interact 
with and potentially develop their environment. In the above passage, Badiou 
describes the state as a ‘metastructure’ which serves as the presenting of what is 
included in the situation. Thus, ‘what is included in a situation, belongs to its state’  
(Badiou, 2005: 97). This is a vital distinction to make, for although it may appear to 
be a semantic difference, in fact as we shall see, this process of the second count, or 
the count of the count-as-one, is fundamental to the summoning of an event. To 
briefly recap, Badiou sets out a theory of the situation, the elements of which are 
‘formed-into-one’ as a result of the power-set axiom. These elements can therefore 
be ‘counted-as-one’ within the situation, and are thus ‘included’ in the situation, but 
it is only through a second count, that these elements become ‘presented’ in the 
‘state’ of the situation. This second count also becomes an included part of the 
situation, although for Badiou this count is not itself presented in the state.  
 
As we approach the formation of an event, the distinctions between a situation and 
the state of a situation are of critical importance. In addition, the state of a situation 
also enables us to think more fully about what an individual’s relationship to the 
situation or context that he or she finds themselves in might mean in practice. 
Having established the terminology, Badiou frequently makes the shift from the 
state of the situation as mathematically-derived concept, to state as nation state or 
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physical state. In Meditation Eight, Badiou tells us that, ‘the State is simply the 
necessary metastructure of every historico-social situation which is to say the law 
that guarantees that there is Oneness […] amongst the set of its subsets’ (Badiou, 
2005: 105). Here we see the direct application of the structuring principle of the 
state of the situation applied to Badiou’s notion of ‘historico-social situations’, which 
are situations that do occur in practice and whose inhabitants are people and 
cultures. Later in the book, Badiou gives the example of ‘a family of people [which] 
is a presented multiple of the social situation and […] is also a represented multiple, 
a part, in the sense that each of its members is registered by the registry office, 
possesses French nationality, and so on’ (Badiou, 2005: 174). This more 
comprehensive application of the state-situation model shows the family unit (or set) 
as a presented state of a situation, which is itself made up of a number of subsets, 
that are included in that situation, and that are in themselves situations in other 
presentations. We can therefore think of the second count as an acknowledgement 
of the characteristics and function of a situation, seeing something as something, 
rather than just as a disconnected set of things, similar to understanding a set of 
people as a family, as in Badiou’s example above. If we take this idea of ‘seeing 
something for what it is’, then we could think about the way in which a set of 
sounds, materials and strategies comes to have a consistency as a musical situation, 
and following this, that an improvisation can also have a particular consistency, 
which would mean that the elements within a given situation are counted as part of 
an improvisation. As musicians, we would therefore have a certain relationship with 
the elements that are presented within a situation, which could influence the way 
that we engage with those components or influence the kind of outcome that we 
might expect to create or arrive at. 
 
What is interesting about the concepts of inclusion and presentation is that they 
enable us to think about and understand that in a given situation (or in a more 
practical sense, a given environment) there can be different registers of the same 
thing; which is to say that the things that we relate to and respond to can have 
different kinds of qualities. Knowing that a group of people are a family, rather than 
an unconnected collection of adults and children, means that we will have a 
relationship with that group that is informed by a certain set of knowledges and 
expectations. In the same way, understanding a musical situation as an 
improvisation will give us a particular way of engaging with the materials and 
resources at hand, and give us a certain expectation of the type of outcomes that 
can be achieved. This provides us with a further indication of the way in which 
Badiou’s project differs from that of Deleuze, and as we begin to engage with the 
theory of the event in itself, we shall increasingly see Badiou’s axiomatic decision to 
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make use of a mathematically-driven ontology standing in stark contrast to what has 
been described as Deleuze’s more ‘problematically’ informed approach.10 
 
Having established a framework that enables us to think about contexts and 
environments, and the way in which individuals act in relation to those contexts, 
Badiou moves on to outline the more specific details of the truth procedure. The 
event is a key component in that procedure, as is  what Badiou calls the ’evental 
site’. 
 
I will term evental site an entirely abnormal multiple; that is, a multiple such 
that none of its elements are presented in the situation. The site, itself, is 
presented, but ‘beneath’ it nothing from which it is composed is presented. 
As such, the site is not a part of the situation. I will also say of such a multiple 
that it is on the edge of the void, or foundational. (Badiou, 2005: 175) 
 
The evental site is something of a paradoxical concept that manages to be both a 
part of a situation and yet at the same time it remains apart from that situation. In 
setting up the evental site as something that is ’sutured to the void’, Badiou is 
creating a mechanism that enables an event to transform a situation, and he states 
that, ‘every radical transformational action originates in a point, which, inside a 
situation, is an evental site’ (Badiou, 2005: 176). Here, Badiou is emphasising that 
although an evental site may be identified, this does not mean that an event will 
necessarily happen. However, without an evental site, an event cannot happen, and 
therefore the evental site is simply the point at which, if an event is to occur, it will 
occur there. Positioned as it is simultaneously within a situation and at the edge of 
the void, the evental site is a specifically located phenomenon and for Badiou, 
situations that contain at least one evental site are the key mechanisms through 
which history develops. Indeed as we saw above, Badiou calls such situations 
‘historical situations’, and suggests that they allow us to think about history and 
development as a contingent ‘historicity of certain multiples’ (Badiou, 2005: 176).  
 
                                                
10 In his extensive analysis of the way in which work of Deleuze and Badiou is derived from and 
makes use of mathematical principles, Daniel Smith states that ‘for Deleuze, the ontology of 
mathematics is not reducible to axiomatics, but must be understood much more broadly in terms of 
the complex tension between axiomatics and what he calls “problematics” […] For this reason […] 
the concept of multiplicity, even within mathematics itself, cannot simply be identified with the 
concept of a set; rather, mathematics is marked by a tension between extensive multiplicities or sets 
(the axiomatic pole) and virtual or differential multiplicities (the problematic pole), and the incessant 
translation of the latter into the former’ (Smith, 2003: 2-3). Consequently, we can understand 
Deleuze’s ontology to be informed by a relationship between axiomatics and ‘extensive multiplicities’ 
(Smith, 2003: 3), whilst Badiou’s work can be regarded as being more fully concerned with axiomatics 
‘internal to mathematics’ (Smith, 2003: 3). 
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This characterisation of history as the result of a set of shifting and dynamic 
relationships with the void, via an unfolding of historical situations and evental sites 
is central to expanding a conception of improvisation, since the various 
determinations within Badiou’s model all relate to the way in which an improviser 
operates in a context and with a given set of materials in order to produce 
something that was unexpected, or at least undetermined (and undeterminable) 
prior to their actions. As such, we could very well describe an improvisation itself as 
an historical situation, in which the improviser identifies and explores the evental 
site that lies within it. For example, a musical instrument may allow for the 
production of certain sounds that have not yet been played, or a group of musicians 
may have the capacity to interact with each other, but this has not yet happened. 
New sounds and new structures have the potential to happen, but they might not 
happen and within a situation, they are not as yet counted-as-one. So how does a 
subject engage with the evental site in order to catalyse or facilitate the event? How 
are these new things created? 
 
In Meditation Seventeen, ‘The Matheme of the Event’, Badiou deepens his 
exposition of the event and the evental site, and presents us with a question that, 
not unlike the axiomatic decision that informs the mathematical ontology, forces a 
decision about the way in which an event appears in a situation. Badiou asks, ‘is the 
event or is it not a term of the situation in which it has its site?’ (Badiou, 2005: 181), 
to which his complex response is that the event is both on the edge of the void, and 
at the same part of the situation. What this means is that the event has something of 
a double aspect, one that features as a normal component of a given situation, and 
a more problematic one that has a similarly more complicated composition that 
relates to the no-thingness of the void. The reason that this second aspect is 
problematic is that as we saw earlier, Badiou will not allow for anything of the void 
to be either included or presented within a situation, save for power set of ø (or {ø}), 
which can be counted-as-one. Badiou facilitates the paradoxical relationship 
between the void, the event and the situation by telling us that the event interposes 
‘itself between the void and itself’ (Badiou, 2005: 182). Although this is a complex 
procedure, it is at-root driven by the same logic of inclusion and presentation that 
allows for the forming-into-one of the void, and Badiou informs us that ‘this 
interposition, tied to self-belonging, is the ultra-one, because it counts the same 
thing as one twice: once as a presented multiple, and once as a multiple presented 
in its own presentation’ (Badiou, 2005: 182). Thus the event comes to have a 
consistency in the same way that {ø} makes the uncountable void a countable 
subset, meaning that the event is both a product of the situation, but also derived 
from the presence of the void within that situation. As we shall see, this double 
aspect of the event is a compelling way to think about an improvisation’s capacity 
to produce unexpected and disruptive results whilst using familiar and recognisable 
tools. In other words an improvisation, whilst being firmly embedded within a 
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conventional musical situation (such as a live performance where musicians are 
using musical instruments to create musical structures) has the potential to give rise 
to a radical event that might change the way that the musicians make music, or alter 
the audience’s understanding of music. That an event is a legal part of a situation is 
critical to Badiou’s enterprise, for if an event were to solely emanate from the void, 
then all that could be achieved through the passing of an event would be a naming 
of the elements involved in its passing: literally, nothing would happen. In simple 
terms, for an event to happen, it must already be a term, and thus part of the 
situation that it is in. If the event only presents the elements of its own site, which 
themselves are outside of the current situation, then nothing is presented and 
nothing takes place. 
 
To conclude this brief discussion of some of the underlying principles of Badiou’s 
set-theoretical ontology, based as it is on the non-being of the void, we can say that 
of primary importance is the axiom of decision that runs throughout this model: the 
decision that the one is not; the decision that the subject takes to discern in the 
evental site the trace or seed of the event-to-come; and indeed, the decision to 
accept that the mathematics of set theory is a means by which philosophy can be 
rejuvenated and directed towards a new theory of the subject. 
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2. Forcing 
 
Having established this general framework, we can now proceed to look more 
carefully at the way in which the event occurs, a process that Badiou variously 
describes as the ‘truth procedure’, the ‘generic procedure’ or the ‘faithful 
procedure’. By stepping through the technical details of another of Badiou’s 
mathematical terms, ’forcing’, we shall be able to construct a cohesive framework in 
which to discuss an improviser in relation to Badiou’s configuration of the subject in 
addition to three specific views of improvisation. 
 
Badiou presents us with a conundrum: from within a given situation, wherein 
everything that is presentable is already counted-as-one, and thus ascertainable, 
how do we either perceive or manufacture something new? Unlike Deleuze, who as 
we have seen, looks at the problem from a different perspective, and whose 
ontological model would not recognise the distinction of being inside or outside a 
situation in the manner discussed in Being and Event (talking instead of the virtual, 
and populations of intensities); for Badiou, it is essential that a mechanism is 
constructed that will fully realise the way in which a situation can be changed to 
include new elements. To achieve this, Badiou asserts that the subject becomes a 
subject through a process of recognising something beyond, or outside of, the 
situation that they find themselves in, and adopts another of Cohen’s set-theory 
terms, forcing, to illustrate this process. We have seen how Badiou worked through 
the mathematical relationship between the void and consistent multiples of the 
presented situation in order to provide us with an ontological framework, and now 
we shall see him turn to the relationship between the finite and the infinite (or what 
Badiou describes as the discernible and the indiscernible) in order to go beyond the 
confines of a given situation. 
 
Because the subject is a local configuration of the [truth] procedure, it is clear 
that the truth is indiscernible “for him” - the truth is global […] a subject 
which realises a truth, is nevertheless incommensurable with the latter, 
because the subject is finite, and the truth is infinite. (Badiou, 2005: 396) 
 
Here then is the conundrum: how do we move from the limits of a finite situation, to 
engage with an infinite that is not presented, or indeed presentable within that 
situation? This process relies on a further distinction, between knowledge and truth, 
in order to demarcate what is knowable within a situation (or in Badiou’s terms, that 
which is ‘discernible’ for the subject) and what can be described as truth, defined by 
its relationship with the infinite. In this regard, Badiou presents us with the following 
distinction: ‘the subject, being internal to the situation, can only know, or rather 
encounter, terms or multiples presented (counted as one) in that situation’ and ‘a 
truth is an un-presented part of the situation’ (Badiou, 2005: 396). The idea that 
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knowledge is a circumstantial operation, and that it is based on a relationship to 
things that are given in experience is a central feature of Badiou’s work in Being and 
Event, and in many ways pre-figures the work of Quentin Meillassoux that we shall 
consider in chapter four. Meillassoux uses the term the ‘correlation’ (Meillassoux, 
2008: 5) to describe the way in which certain philosophical traditions have set limits 
around what is knowable and what is thinkable, and which he sees as leading to a 
situation wherein nothing can exist that cannot potentially be conceived or thought 
about. As we shall see, Meillassoux fundamentally disagrees with the so-called 
‘correlationist’ perspectives, and tackles the issue by affirming that it must always be 
possible to think the unthinkable. Clearly, Badiou uses the void as a means to 
picture the way in which humans are able to engage with something that is beyond 
comprehension, and in the truth procedure we see him emphasising the difference 
between knowledge and truth as a means of balancing our engagement with what 
is presented to us and that which goes beyond normal conception. Initially, Badiou 
demonstrates that knowledge itself is made up of two operations: ‘discernment 
(such a presented or thinkable multiple possesses such and such a quality) and 
classification (I can group together, and designate by their common property, those 
multiples that I discern as having nameable characteristics in common)’ (Badiou, 
2005: 328). Knowledge is therefore tightly bound within a set of conditions that are 
at the very least already definable for the individual subject and unproblematically 
presented in experience. The important point within Badiou’s conception of a 
situation is that this knowledge alone is not sufficient to move us beyond the current 
state of the situation: the count-as-one and re-count processes simply confirm what 
it is that we are able to experience and re-affirms that this experience has taken 
place. As Badiou states, ‘knowledge [of and within a situation] is realised as an 
encyclopaedia’ (Badiou, 2005: 328) which, as suggested above, can be seen to be a 
correlative assignation of qualities: the encyclopaedia is the subject’s knowledge of 
a situation.That which can be demonstrated or qualified by knowledge, is therefore 
seen as being veridical and is thus an operator within the encyclopaedia, since 
knowledge is based on discernment and classification within the situation.  
 
A brief discussion of the importance of infinity within Badiou’s ontology will be 
useful to clarify the importance of the relationship of truth with infinity, which will 
allow us to go on to work through the generic procedure. Early on in Being and 
Event, Badiou distinguishes the inconsistent nature of being from the consistency of 
presentation within a situation. At the root of this inconsistency is the unpresentable 
void, which is Badiou’s means of affirming that, as with Meillassoux, not everything 
simply exists for the subject. As we have seen, Badiou will only allow us to name the 
void, ‘ø’, but we can come no closer to conceptualising what it actually is. However, 
the formulation that allows us to use the void as a building block for the consistent 
multiplicity of a situation, is also the process that allows us to approach the infinite. 
The forming-into-one procedure that generates the power set of the void (written 
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p(ø) or {ø}), is the first stage of a demonstration in set theory that shows that for any 
set, what is included in that set, in other words, the total of all of the various subsets 
of that set, will always be in excess of what belongs to the original set.  
 
For example, if a set were to consist of ‘all even numbers between 0 and 10’, then 
2, 4, 6, 8 and 10 would belong to this set. However we could very well say that ‘the 
set of numbers that are also multiples of 4’ (being 4 and 8), is a subset of the 
original set, and is therefore included in the set. We could work through this set of 
even numbers between 0 and 10 to generate a number of subsets, and what would 
quickly become apparent is that there are more subsets than there are original 
elements that belong to the set. Badiou calls this the power-set axiom, saying, ‘if a 
set a exists (is presented) then there also exists the set of all its subsets’ (Badiou, 
2005: 82). The power-set axiom demonstrates that the multiple generated by the 
count of a set’s (or situation’s) subsets, is always greater than the original multiple of 
the set itself. If we follow this principle to its logical conclusion, then we find that 
‘the presentation of an infinity of multiples structures itself’ (Badiou, 2005: 92), which 
suggests that no matter how large a set is, its existence will always mean that an 
infinity of larger sets can always be produced.11 Thus we arrive at the boundaries of 
Badiou’s thought: at one end where we see that the foundation of Being is the void, 
and at the other, that there can be no all-encompassing summation of what is 
presented and presentable in being: Badiou’s mathematical ontology thus 
challenges us to simultaneously think in terms of the nothingness and limitlessness 
of being. 
 
Turning our attention once again to the truth procedure, and Badiou’s distinction 
between knowledge and truth, he separates the idea of a ‘veridical’ statement 
based on knowledge, from what he sees as a ‘true’ statement that is based on 
something is not part of the situation, or more specifically what is not counted-as-
one and presented within the situation. Knowledge and truth therefore stand in 
opposition to each other; the former can be observed within a given situation, 
whilst the latter is beyond knowledge and can only come into being as a result of an 
event. For Badiou, truth is the result of ‘fidelity’, it is constructed via a faithful 
procedure, one that affirms the subject’s connection to both the void and the 
infinite, although it is also important to bear in mind that at no time does Badiou 
suggest that the subject comes into direct contact with the void: the faithful 
relationship is simply the result of the subject’s engagement with what is outside of, 
                                                
11 The self-structuring or self-generating of this ‘infinity of multiples' provides us with a key insight 
into Badiou’s disagreement with Deleuze’s concept of the one-all, since the power set axiom 
demonstrates that there is no such thing as ‘all’, only infinity. For Badiou, mathematics proves that 
there can be no such thing as ‘everything’, because there can be no set that includes everything, and 
therefore, even the thought that there could be anything like a totality of being is completely 
unsupportable.  
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and what is temporarily not counted as part of the situation. This faithful procedure, 
otherwise called the truth procedure, or generic procedure, is the means by which 
the subject comes to be defined (and to define themselves) in relation to an event; 
and Badiou offers a number of illustrations of this process in action.  
 
One example that is particularly relevant to our investigation is what Badiou calls 
‘the Schönberg-event’ (Badiou, 2009: 80), appears in Logics of Worlds, described as 
the ‘sequel’ to Being and Event (also subtitled Being and Event II).12 We shall 
discuss some of the intricacies of this idea later in the chapter, but for now, to give 
an impression of what Badiou means by the word ‘truth’ in the context of the truth 
procedure, it will be helpful to mention his use of the Schönberg-event to describe 
the transition from the functional diatonic harmony that underpinned Western 
classical music up until the late 19th and early 20th centuries, to the Atonalism and 
Serialism of the early-to-mid 20th century. This is not a verifiable truth as such, in that 
Schönberg was certainly not the only composer to have been making use of 
chromatic and non-standard harmonic arrangements and structures in his work, 
however, the ‘truth’ of the Schönberg-event describes and alludes to a set of faithful 
connections that retrospectively shaped a revolution in the language of Western 
music. This a greatly simplified version of Badiou’s account of the development of 
Serialist music, but at this stage Badiou’s description of the Schönberg-event as a 
twenty year process helps us to understand that his version of what constitutes a 
truth is not one that relies on verifiable evidence: knowledge is based on evidence; 
truth is the result of fidelity. How, then, did we move from tonal music to Serialism? 
How do we pass from knowledge to truth? How to become, as Peter Hallward 
suggests, a subject to truth? To move beyond the conundrum of the evental site, 
the subject must embark on a series of enquiries. At this stage, it is important to 
note that the focus of these enquiries is not a truth, or an event, instead the subject 
is simply trying to identify the name of the event. Although this seems to be a 
slightly curious line of enquiry, it is in fact a critical part of the process, for 
identifying the name of the event rather than the event itself allows for a non-
contradiction within the mathematical model of the generic procedure, that is 
similar to using ø to refer to the ‘name’ of the void, rather than the void itself. The 
event, as with the void, cannot be encountered from within a situation, and so 
instead Badiou uses this process of naming as a means of building a connection to 
that which formally sits outside of a situation. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
12 Throughout Logics of Worlds, Badiou makes use of the original spelling of Arnold Schönberg’s 
surname. The composer changed the more commonly used spelling to ‘Schoenberg’ in 1933 or 1934 
after his move to the United States of America. 
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We need to further clarify what we mean by truth, and identify exactly what criteria 
exist that can verify its truth. We know that a truth cannot exist within a situation, 
that it cannot be the result of finite knowledge. This is another way of saying that, 
unless the subject’s enquiries within a situation result in the uncovering of a truth 
that is outside of the finite presentation of the situation (what Badiou refers to as a 
‘finite set of […] minimal reports […] a “finite state” of the process of fidelity’ 
(Badiou, 2005: 330)), then it is not a truth, it is knowledge.13 But at the same time, 
the enquiries are only able to access what is within a situation, therefore a truth 
must in some way be a part of the situation. Thus we come to the interplay between 
finite and infinite multiples within a situation, making reference to the earlier 
discussion of the void as founding principle within any multiple. Again, if we follow 
Badiou’s line of reasoning, we can see that the truth enters the subject’s field of 
perception not as an object of understanding (which would require a connection to 
something outside of the situation), but as an object of knowledge (and therefore 
something that exists non-problematically within the situation). But if truth is infinite, 
then how do we recognise it and how can we have any kind of engagement with it?  
 
 
                                                
13 The finitude of this process is important, as it does not contradict the count-as-one process: what 
the subject is looking for, and what they are able to find, are all perfectly ‘legal’ and presentable 
elements within the situation, thus the target of these finite enquiries can be recognised without 
transgressing any of the principles of set-theory that we have so far seen Badiou invoke. In other 
words, the subject is looking for knowledge and not truth, and Badiou makes it clear that during their 
enquiries, the subject is able to non-problematically observe the elements of their finite situation: 
anything beyond this, as discussed in terms of our knowledge of the void, is inconceivable, as we can 
literally have no knowledge of anything outside of the situation. In a practical sense, these finite 
reports about the presence of the ‘name of the event’, are an attempt to identify fluctuations, 
anomalies, possibilities or even gaps in our immediate environment or creative context and Badiou 
uses the algebraic functions x(+) and x(-) to denote whether or not the enquiries identify a 
connection to the name of the event. Practical or mathematical, the driving force behind this enquiry 
is a decision: we must decide to commit ourselves to a future that may or may not unfold, and thus 
make a decision about whether certain elements are part of the event or not.  
 
Badiou uses the event-site (or what he also terms the ‘evental site’) as part of a set of non-
contradictory conditions that are within the framework that he has assembled for himself, where (x(+)) 
and (x(-)) denote connection or non-connection of the results of the subject’s enquiries to the name 
of the event. This relation or non-relation is central to the way in which truth can be validated within 
what Badiou described above as the ‘truth procedure’, and he states: ‘if a truth exists - the multiple-
referent of […] fidelity (the one-truth) is a part of the situation: the part which groups together all of 
the terms positively connected to the name of the event [all the x(=)’s]’ (Badiou, 2005: 338). Hence a 
truth exists only if the results of the finite enquiry are positive (x(+)). 
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In order for the model to work, Badiou must create the conditions that will allow the 
finite situation of knowledge and discernment, and the infinite truth that is 
indiscernible and generic, to co-exist.14 As a result, what is included in the situation 
as an indiscernible inconsistent multiplicity, can become presented in the situation 
as a discernible consistent multiple. Badiou achieves this by providing the necessary 
means of determining the truthfulness of the subject’s enquiries, which will catalyse 
the event: 
 
[I]f an infinite faithful procedure contains at least one finite enquiry which 
avoids an encyclopaedic determinant, then the infinite positive result of that 
procedure (the class of x(+)’s) will not coincide with that part of the situation 
whose knowledge is designated by this determinant […] We have thus clearly 
formulated a condition for the infinite and positive result of a faithful 
procedure avoiding - not coinciding with - a determinant of the 
encyclopaedia. (Badiou, 2005: 337) 
 
Whilst it is important for us to grasp the underlying mechanics of Badiou’s 
mathematical modelling, Christopher Norris captures this sense of non-coincidence 
in a way that is perhaps more tangible: 
 
What most often brings this about is the act or process of ‘indiscernment’ 
whereby thought is enabled … to exceed the present-best capacities of 
knowledge or formal-demonstrative proof and to do so, moreover, through a 
grasp (albeit a not fully conscious or deliberative grasp) of the particular gap, 
deficiency, lack, conceptual shortfall or other such impediment that has 
hitherto stood in the way of any such advance. (Norris, 2009: 240) 
 
Here, Norris is suggesting that Badiou does not argue for the subject’s full 
recognition of the potential with a given situation to create an event, with a 
                                                
14 Badiou’s modelling of the event involves the interaction of a number of concepts that to some 
degree are interchangeable, or at least serve to describe the behaviour of a similar function within 
the set-theory model. For example, what Badiou puts forward as ‘knowledge’ is another way of 
describing that which is discernible within a situation. Similarly, ’an indiscernible inclusion [in a 
situation], in short, is a truth’ (Badiou, 2005: 338). So knowledge is ‘discernible’, whilst truth is 
‘indiscernible’. But the indiscernible is also another way to speak of what Badiou calls the ‘generic’. 
Although to a large extent, these two terms are interchangeable, the indiscernible suggests that 
something is undetectable or even indiscernible in a conventional and non-Badiouian sense, whereas 
the generic alludes to that which ‘does not allow itself to be discerned [and which] is in reality the 
general truth of a situation’ (Badiou, 2005: 327). However, both the indiscernible and the generic 
attest to the fact that fundamentally, what a situation is grounded on is a truth; a truth that, as 
detailed above, is both infinite and the formed-into-one of the void.  
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particular set of characteristics, rather that the subject recognises the shortcomings 
of the situation, and thus the potential for change or modification. In a way, Norris is 
suggesting that we would recognise the possibility of making something new, not 
because we had spotted an opportunity to develop something, but because we had 
identified an irregularity in the situation, which suggests that something new is 
made, not by building on what was already present, but by filling a gap where 
something was missing.15 There is also a strong practical sense here of recognising 
that we have made something, which in itself echoes Badiou’s own comments about 
‘being quite aware of having written a 'great' book of philosophy’ (Badiou, 2005: xi). 
Forcing is therefore not only about searching out and identifying a gap, but it is also 
knowing that something has been made, something new has occurred: this is the 
‘militancy’ that Badiou speaks of, in that the affirmation of the new must be a 
disruptive act, but it has no prior point of reference.16 Badiou himself states that, 
‘art, science and politics do change the world, not by what they discern, but by what 
they indiscern therein’ (Badiou, 2005: 343), which is to say, it is not that a subject 
necessarily grasps what is missing, but is able however to grasp that something is 
missing, that the current situation is incomplete. In effect, this process of 
indiscernment, the ability to detect incompleteness within a situation, is an intuitive 
understanding that the situation we find ourselves in is ultimately founded on, 
contaminated with, or at least permeated, by the void, which Badiou confirms by 
stating that ‘what qualifies the name of the event is that it is drawn from the void’ 
(Badiou, 2005: 329). Therefore, although the event is not part of the encyclopaedia, 
                                                
15 As we shall see in chapter four, Reza Negarestani develops Deleuze and Guattari’s image of ‘holey 
space’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 413) when he lays out his vision of the ‘( )hole complex’, 
(Negarestani, 2008: 42), in order to convey the sense that, whilst a ‘solid body’ can be corrupted or 
undermined by a ‘vermiculation of holes’, it is in fact ‘irreducible to nothingness’. What is interesting 
in this regard, is that whilst, for Badiou, a consistency would result from the count-as-one, and that 
the subject’s finite enquiries into the name of the event could be seen as a search for what Norris is 
referring to as ‘gaps’ or ‘shortfalls’, in Negarestani’s reading, such a consistency would continuously 
being permeated by holes, whether a subject was making enquiries or not. Whilst this demonstrates 
that there are significant differences in the way that various philosophers are conceiving of the 
relationship between a normal, or ‘presentable’ situation and an unknowable absolute or void that 
underpins that situation, Negarestani’s ( )hole complex provides a useful illustration of the way in 
which Badiou’s thought is part of a wider contemporary philosophical enterprise that is working to 
demonstrate that, whilst the radically new arises within a recognisable context, what makes it new is 
that it is fundamentally outside of any given context or knowledge. 
16 In the Preface to Being and Event, Badiou informs us that, ‘A subject is nothing other than an 
active delity to the event of truth. This means that a subject is a militant of truth. I philosophically 
founded the notion of 'militant' at a time when the consensus was that any engagement of this type 
was archaic. Not only did I found this notion, but I considerably enlarged it. The militant of a truth is 
not only the political militant working for the emancipation of humanity in its entirety. He or she is 
also the artist-creator, the scientist who opens up a new theoretical eld, or the lover whose world is 
enchanted.’ (Badioiu, 2005: xiii) 
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we have reached the point at which we can at least conceptualise a move from the 
finite confines of the situation, to a faithful engagement with the infinite. In practical 
terms, the result will be a recount of the situation, one that will include the event as 
the result of the truth procedure as part of a new encyclopaedia.  
In its most basic formulation, forcing in set-theory ontology enables us to establish, 
or at least decide, that it is possible for an inhabitant of a given situation to believe 
that there can be a relation between what belongs to the generic situation and what 
is presented in the original situation.17 18 As we saw with the principle of 
indiscernibility and the generic, it is strictly impossible that this inhabitant is able to 
have any knowledge of something that is outside of their situation. However, 
Badiou allows that the inhabitant can believe that something outside of their 
situation is possible, and that a relation between what is inside and outside of the 
situation can be generated.  
 
Badiou lays out forcing in such a way so as to demonstrate that it allows an 
inhabitant of a situation to imagine and then generate the necessary non-
paradoxical relation between what is given, or at least what can be given, in 
experience and that which is inaccessible to experience. 
 
Any veracity on the extension will allow itself to be conditioned in the 
situation. The result, and this is absolutely capital, will be the following: 
although an inhabitant of the situation does not know anything of the 
indiscernible, and so of the extension, she is capable of thinking that the 
belonging of such a condition to a generic description is equivalent to the 
veracity of such a statement within that extension. She does so with the 
nominal resources of the situation alone, without having to represent that 
                                                
17 Badiou tells us that he adapts the term ‘forcing’ from Cohen’s mathematical formulation whereby 
a relationship, or correspondence, between certain variables within a situation and its generic 
extension are forcibly generated, or simply forced. 
18 The generic extension, or generic situation, contains both the original situation and the evental 
site, and it is through the event that the generic extension becomes the new situation. If the evental 
site is  the set of conditions within which a change to a situation can be constructed, such as the 
example of the Schönberg-event wherein all the elements of atonalism were already available 
(namely diatonic harmonic theory - the inverse of atonality - and the physical capabilities of 
instruments to achieve the unregulated, chromaticised harmonic language of atonalism), then the 
generic extension is the zone in which the subject has discerned the potential to bring about change. 
The generic extension contains the current situation as well as the situation-to-come. At the same 
time, in order for the subject to become aware of the evental site as an unproblematic element 
within the current situation, the generic extension must also be part of that situation. The underlying 
message here is that the subject is ‘self-making’, suggesting that in a very real sense, we are the 
masters of our own destiny. 
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truth (without having to know of the existence of the generic extension. 
(Badiou, 2005: 411) 
 
This is the central component of forcing that again pre-empts Meillassoux’s 
correlation, in that forcing is a procedure that allows for what is not allowed or 
possible in a situation to become possible. It makes the unthinkable, thinkable. 
Or in the technical terminology of Being and Event, the ‘veracity in a generic 
extension is controllable within the situation by the relation of forcing’ (Badiou, 
2005: 428), where veracity is a property that is observable by the inhabitant of a 
situation, and the situation-to-come of the generic extension (including as it does 
the current situation) is therefore potentially discernible for the inhabitant. This is a 
fascinating process, in that it involves a high degree of speculation on the part of 
the inhabitant or inhabitants of the situation, and the conditioning of the 
indiscernible parts of the generic extension into the discernible elements of the 
situation seem to come about entirely through the activities of those inhabitants. 
This in itself is a powerful affirmation of creative agency, that puts thought and 
action at the heart of a productive process. If as Badiou suggests, a truth is 
something that results from a series of enquiries, beliefs and procedures, then we 
can apply this sense of truth to the creation of music in a number of ways. If we 
once more consider Badiou’s distinction between veracity and truth, he tells us that, 
 
The discernible is veridical. But the indiscernible alone is true. There is no 
truth apart from the generic, because only a faithful procedure aims at the 
one of situational being. A faithful procedure has as its infinite horizon being-
in-truth. (Badiou, 2005: 339) 
 
The faithful procedure is thus the activation of unknowns in the generation of 
becoming, and the final section of this chapter will thus foreground this ideas in 
order to offer a possible account of improvisation as music-yet-to-come, of 
improvisation as forcing. 
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3. Three views of the subject as improviser 
 
3.1 The AMM event 
 
Having established a working model of Badiou’s set theory ontology, we shall now 
turn to three examples of thinking about improvisation put forward by musicians. 
The aim here is to use the truth procedure and forcing in order to explore these 
practitioner perspectives, thereby generating a new means to articulate and 
interpret what improvisation is and what it can do.  
 
Our first example is from the improvising percussionist Eddie Prevost, who, 
alongside Cornelius Cardew, was a founder member of the improvising ensemble 
AMM in the 1960s. AMM, emerged at a pivotal point in the development of free 
improvisation, where a number of different musical and conceptual themes were 
beginning to form into a recognisable approach to the production of music. The 
members of AMM, whose interests and experience combined contemporary 
European electronic and classical music, jazz and fine art, built on the processes and 
aesthetics of these musics and practices to assemble an approach to music making 
that was self-consciously exploratory and open-ended. As Prevost describes, AMM 
was an ‘improvisatory project - not without its difficulties - [which] involved creating 
music as if it was being made for the first time’ (Prevost, 2004: 357). Such a 
description suggests something of a willful naivety on the part of the musicians, a 
deliberate divorcing of themselves from the accepted codes of musical composition 
within their own culturally and historically located situation. The AMM project was 
thus a deliberate rejection of conventional compositional methodologies and of 
fixed and pre-anticipated musical outcomes. Indeed, such was their determination 
to make a radical break with a range of classically and jazz-influenced styles that  
their performances and recordings were themselves a process of asking questions 
about the nature of ‘music’ itself. The AMM musicians’ objective to create music ‘as 
if for the first time’, suggests a desire to make something out of nothing, a music 
without precursor, an image that resonates powerfully with the sense in which 
Badiou describes the forming-into-one of the void. As such, we can imagine AMM 
music as an ‘evental music’, that is, a music that in some way reflects the truth 
procedure. 
 
Prevost’s own admission that, ‘the form AMM music subsequently took followed 
practice […] The resultant music (if “music” is an acceptable term in this context) 
very quickly became self-referential and was called AMM music’ (Prevost, 2004: 
357), draws a number a parallels with Badiou’s use of the term fidelity. We could 
very well understand the coming into being or forming-into-one of AMM music to 
be the result of a commitment that was made to the existence of the evental site 
within the generic extension of music, and that the subsequent ‘following of 
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practice’ that characterised AMM’s approach to music making is an example of 
Badiou’s sense of the future anterior. It is worth pausing briefly to reflect on what 
the future anterior is, as it will inform a number of our discussions from this point on. 
In his unfolding of forcing, Badiou tells us that, 
 
A subject always declares meaning in the future anterior. What is present are 
terms of the situation on the one hand, and names of the subject language on 
the other. Yet this distinction is artificial because the names, being themselves 
presented (despite being empty), are terms of the situation. What exceeds the 
situation is the referential meaning of the names; such meaning exists solely 
within the retroaction of the existence (thus of the presentation) of an 
indiscernible part of the situation. (Badiou, 2005: 400) 
The future anterior is therefore something of an attempt to see into the future, of 
having the confidence to think that not only will something happen, but that 
something will have happened, and that we can imagine ourselves looking back as 
a future-subject at an event that will have by then happened in the past. The future 
anterior is a practical visioning of the indiscernible generic: we cannot see into the 
future, but we can have faith that a future will arrive, we can imagine what it will be 
like, and we can even imagine a future self, looking back and seeing how the future 
was created. Following this, we could say that AMM music was formed by the 
musicians’ suspension of adherence to the given codes of musical practice within 
the situation presented to them, believing instead in a possible music that might 
come to exist in a future, generic extension of their situation. Retrospectively, we 
can say that this music did come into being, it is what AMM music was. The AMM 
music-event, which was borne out by the musicians’ anterior fidelity to the practice 
of AMM music, subsequently became the ‘self-referential’ phenomenon AMM 
music. 
It is useful to consider the creation of music in this way, as it offers a valuable insight 
into what a musician might otherwise describe as musical intuition or insight. 
Certainly, the time-based, ineffable qualities of music (especially improvised music) 
are redolent of the truth procedure, in the way that the evolution of musical 
aesthetics and compositional processes bears some relation to the process of 
making a conscious decision to grasp at something that we cannot quite perceive, 
of having faith that the process of mutating and modifying current conventions will 
result in something. This sense of going beyond the confines of what is given in 
knowledge, of reaching for that which is beyond current understanding or 
comprehension, is picked up by Prevost later in his career as he continues to map 
the improvisatory process. In The First Concert, An Adaptive Appraisal of a Meta 
Music, Prevost discusses the way in which the practice of improvising music, draws 
certain parallels with the notion of ecstasy. Following his own interpretation of the 
notion of ‘ecstasy’, Prevost states that, whilst improvising, musicians, ‘loosen [their] 
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own boundaries [and] exist within another dimension [...] I recall my own playing 
with early AMM. There was a common experience of being lost within the music’ 
(Prevost, 2011: 87). It is certainly tempting to speculate that this enraptured state of 
‘being lost within the music’ could in some way be identified with becoming aware 
of a generic extension, where the familiar confines of the current situation no longer 
serve to work as a satisfying structure that contains the everything that might be 
possible on experience. Whilst Badiou is very much against any sense of mysticism, 
and his mathematised subject is pitched against any kind of affective experience, 
this losing of one’s self in music conveys a similar sentiment to Norris’ reading of 
Badiou, whereby we become lost in the familiarity of the situation because of the 
gaps and fissures that the search for the generic extension uncovers. Prevost’s 
description of a musician’s experience of disorientation or ‘lost-ness’ follows from 
his conviction that, ‘we know we are listening [...] we stand, as it were, outside of 
ourselves and see ourselves as observant beings’ (Prevost, 2011: 86), which not only 
conveys a sense of searching and anticipating, but also describes the way in which a 
musician pays close attention to their own performance as part of a larger network 
of activity. During an improvisation, we listen to the sounds around us: sounds 
made by other musicians, by the environment, the sounds we make ourselves, as 
well as the whole sound that is being created moment-by-moment by all of these 
elements, and we use a musical instrument or our voice to respond in some way. If 
we were to call this a sonic situation, then we could count as elements within that 
situation all of the sounds that are occurring. In addition we can add the musician’s 
instrumental technique, alongside the range of musical variables such as structures, 
combinations of sound and harmonic theory. This process of standing outside of 
ourselves, is analogous to the second count of the situation, which generates the 
state of the situation. Prevost’s musician, lost in the music and ‘outside’ of 
themselves, is momentarily detached from the normal count of the situation, and 
recounts themselves as part of an improvisation-situation. As such, the musician, 
through an act of forcing-as-improvisaiton, themselves becomes one of the set of 
variables among all those that are presented in the situation, thus enabling him or 
her to continue to improvise, with a fidelity to the sounds, ideas and materials that 
are available to them within the ‘situation’ of the improvised performance. 
 
In the track ‘Later During a Flaming Riviera Sunset’ (from the record AMMMUSIC 
1966), a two-part document of a performance that features violin, cello, transistor 
radio, electric guitar, percsussion, prepared piano and saxophone, we hear an 
improvisation that might help to illustrate some of Prevost’s thoughts, and to give a 
sense of the AMM event. In terms of the sonic details, there are audible references 
to the music of composer Morton Feldman in the way that the pianist, Cornelius 
Cardew, makes intermittent use of chordal clusters and sparse runs of notes 
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throughout the two parts of the track.19 The piano is played using traditional 
technique, but some preparations are also audible (adaptations on the strings to 
create more percussive and less conventionally tuned sounds), and it also sounds as 
if Cardew is also directly manipulating the piano’s strings. So the overall effect is of 
a ‘detuned’ piano – an approach that had provenance at least as far back as Henry 
Cowell and possibly Charles Ives, but was brought into wider awareness by John 
Cage’s work, perhaps most famously in the Sonatas and Interludes, for prepared 
piano (1946-48). From approximately 3 minutes into part one until the start of part 
two, the two string instruments (violin and cello) sustain a drone whilst these 
interjections from the piano, along with percussion, continue, although there is no 
obvious interplay between any of these instruments, which certainly suggests that 
the music has not been designed to convey a feeling of moving away from, or 
towards, a particular point. 
 
The use of ‘found sound’ that results from the use of radio broadcasts that appear 
throughout the track sets add to the idea that the musicians are not following, or 
responding to what is happening around them. Instead the broadcasts act as a 
widening of the sound field, functioning as an acknowledgement that what we are 
hearing is only a small part of a much wider set of sonic possibilities. The radio 
broadcasts are both a part of the sound that we are listening to, but they also serve 
as a reminder that there is a certain indifference present in the way that all of the 
sounds are working (or not working) together. The radio broadcasts do not reflect or 
respond to the rest of the sounds that the AMM musicians are making, and the 
musicians are not obviously responding to what they are hearing around them. 
Again the fact that there is a fade-out at the end of the track, suggests that the 
music that AMM were making, was intended to convey the idea that it was only ever 
partially involved in or related to other sound and music that was happening around 
it, that AMMMusic was a music that could start and stop at any point, and that it did 
not adhere to conventional notions for structuring music. 
 
Clearly, there is also a reflection of John Cage’s use of radios (the piece Imaginary 
Landscape IV for twelve radios being the most obvious example), which further 
enhances the feeling of indeterminacy and indifference that is present in the music, 
not only the the indeterminacy of the decisions being made within the performance, 
but also the indeterminacy of the sound sources themselves. Along with this, it 
could be said that Cage’s experiments with location, which he formally explored as 
part of the Variations series of compositions (Variations IV being a good example of 
                                                
19 By the mid-1960s, a number of Feldman’s key contributions to the development of 20th century music had already been 
made, most notably his approach to using graphic notation, which established a particular approach to working with duration 
that we can hear Cardew emulating to a degree. In a piece such as Projections II, within a specified set of timeframes, 
Feldman allowed performers to select their own note pitches, number of notes and note durations, which conveyed a sense in 
the music that sounds were ebbing in and out of existence, rather than working to achieve a defined outcome. 
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his interests in multi-location and multiple sound sources pieces), are also a back 
drop for AMM’s approach on this record.  
 
There’s certainly a fidelity here, a ‘response’ of sorts to the musical and sonic 
contexts of the time; Feldman, Cage, possibly even La Monte Young in the sense 
that the piece’s extended duration and fade out (suggesting that quite literally the 
piece could conceivable go on forever). This music is thus a playing-out of a mid-
1960s musical situation; there is without doubt a history and a context that the 
music is embedded within. Droning strings, atonal piano clusters, prepared piano 
sounds, abstract percussion, towards the end of the second segment (19 minutes 
onwards) a reference to the free jazz of the late 1950s and early 1960s in Prevost 
much more kinetic use of the snare drum – rolls, patterns on the drum’s rim – 
combined with a saxophone performance that clearly bears the mark of someone 
who had listened to the playing of Eric Dolphy, with overblown notes, arrhythmic 
phrasing and irregular intervallic leaps. These genre references suggest that style 
can become content, where the cultures and histories all become a part of a musical 
decision making process, that goes beyond making choices about how to move the 
fingers, hands or mouth to adjust how an instrument is making sounds.  
 
As a result, what remains as an abiding response to listening to these early AMM 
recordings is that musical technique, whilst it is clearly a fundamental part of what is 
happening, in that it enables the musicians to play their instruments, is somewhat 
offset. A piece such as ‘Later During a Flaming Riviera Sunset’ is not an exploration 
of sound or of musical possibilities via instrumental technique, instead it is an 
opening out to a wider set of both sonic, and to an extent, conceptual resources. 
Thus, we have a music that both draws on what we can hear – layered drones, piano 
and percussion interjections, free jazz-style saxophone, random radio sounds – but 
also on the idea of bringing these elements into the context of an improvised 
performance. This is not the sound of a pre-structured performance, of a calculated 
and timed set of occurrences in the vein of a Cage, or even a Feldman-style 
indeterminate composition. Instead this is an intuitive ‘letting-in’ of sound, a 
decision to let things happen and to work through a set of variables with 
perseverance and patience. 
 
One of the most striking aspects of these early recordings is the sense in which the 
AMM musicians – unlike their jazz, free jazz and soon-to-be free improvisation 
contemporaries – are not playing ‘with’ each other. They are not playing along, they 
are mutually playing and composing. This could very well be summed up within the 
context of the ‘AMM event’, but what is important is that this is not manifested in 
the sounds that we hear – it would be possible to make a music that sounded ‘like’ 
the tracks on AMMMUSIC – but that this idea can be inferred from what we are 
hearing. That seems to sit at the heart of the way in which we might want to talk 
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about an AMM event, which does not mean that the music has certain 
characteristics, but that there is an approach in action that could lead to any number 
of outcomes. A later AMM record, It Had Been An Ordinary Enough Day In Pueblo, 
Colorado, context is less satisfying in this context, since we can hear more of a 
dynamic interplay between the two musicians – for example from 9’50 to 11’25 on 
the track ‘Radio Activity’ – where there is a more dynamic drumming style from 
Eddie Prevost that counterpoints the busier, and distorted, guitar playing of Keith 
Rowe. On this later recording, whilst the use of a radio still brings with it a sense of a 
sonic continuum that the AMM musicians are only part of, there is much more a 
sense of Prevost and Rowe trying to create something, rather than acknowledging 
that their musical activity is part of a greater whole.  
 
All the way through the twenty seven minutes and fifty three seconds of ‘Later 
During a Flaming Riviera Sunset’, the various sounds ‘sound’ disconnected, as if 
each instrument is in its own world, and that each musician is less concerned with 
playing along with the other instruments, than being part of a field of sound. We 
could call this ‘parallel’ play rather than ‘interactive’ play, where the guiding 
principle seems to be one of patience, of having the confidence and forbearance to 
persist in laying out and exploring a particular set of sounds, techniques, ideas. 
Overall, the music communicates a feeling that each musician is embedded within 
their own field of ideas, whilst recognising that there is a larger field of sound that 
they are part of. Thus, what seems to be critical to an understanding of an AMM 
event is the idea that the musicians are part of something that goes beyond their 
particular actions and intentions. 
 
Clearly, a musician improvising in the present day would be informed by a different 
set of variables than the AMM musicians, or others who would have been 
improvising in the 1960s. Badiou’s discussion of historical situations is again useful 
here, where he writes, ‘In Theorie du sujet, I introduced the thesis that History does 
not exist […] We can think the historicity of certain multiples, but we cannot think a 
History’ (Badiou, 2005: 176). Badiou’s disavowal of history is relevant since, in the 
context of music, the relationship between, for example, a musical improvisation in 
the 1940s and one in the twenty-first century operates via a series of historical 
situations. Each of these historical situations that has led to a future anterior fidelity, 
that, within the compass of improvised music, could be seen by the casual observer 
as constituting the post-war history of improvised music, from the proto-free 
improvisational experiments of Lennie Tristano,20 through to the contemporary 
                                                
20 In 1949, the pianist Lennie Tristano organised and directed what are widely recognised as being 
the first two recorded examples of ‘free’ improvisation, the tracks ‘Intuition’ and ‘Digression’. For 
David Toop, the recordings represent, ‘the most audacious experiment [that had] yet [been] 
attempted in jazz’, where, using only their skill and intuition, Tristano and five other musicians 
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approaches of musicians such as Rhodri Davies, Peter Evans, Mark Wastell and John 
Butcher.21 However, from a Badiouian perspective, there is no chain of events as 
such, only a historicity; in other words, we have constructed a historical narrative 
retrospectively. As such, we would have to think of each development in improvised 
music as a distinct entity, a rupture that is arrived at through a faithful procedure. 
Later in the chapter, we shall look at how Badiou’s work might be contextualised 
within the idea of a continuum, but in this instance, if we think of all the various 
improvisations that have occurred since Tristano’s improvised music experiments in 
the late 1940s, then we can say that these make up something of a universal 
improvisation situation. In other words, although there cannot be a single individual 
who can have knowledge (both in the traditional as well as the Badiouian sense of 
the word) of all of the improvisations that have taken place since the 1940s, they are 
potentially available to an improviser as a set of reference points, either as audio 
visual documents, or as written or verbal accounts. Badiou’s rejection of history is a 
rejection of what he sees as a conventional version of ‘historical progress’ (Badiou, 
2005: xxiv) as proposed by Hegel, where an ‘absolute knowledge’ of history, can be 
arrived at that proposes history as an evolutionary process. Badiou is much more 
interested in looking at the way in which events are always contingent: something 
else could happen, or maybe nothing could happen, hence his use of the generic 
set as a way of presenting the potential occurrence of an outcome, rather than a 
definite outcome with a given set of features. Hence the term historicity: the 
gathering together of a set of events and faithful subjects into a context, rather than 
the presentation of an inexorable chain of development.  
 
Even now, contemporary experiments in noise, chance, musical naivety or even 
incompetency, experiments in genre and other attempts at going beyond an 
accepted approach to spontaneous musical composition, are all strategies that 
affirm an initial fidelity to a set of events that have structured our current knowledge 
about improvised music making. Prevost describes the music of AMM as ‘laminal’ to 
convey the sense in which during an AMM performance, layers of sound were built 
up over each other, often making it difficult for an audience, (and often the players 
themselves) to identify a point of origin for many, if not all, of the sounds that were 
                                                
created ‘a spontaneous music that would at once be atonal, contrapuntal, and improvised on a jazz 
base’ (Toop, 2016: 102). Tristano’s recordings are therefore a useful point from which to plot a 
‘historicity’ of freely improvised music. 
21 Davies’ Wound Response (2012), Evans’ Nature / Culture (2009), Wastell’s Vibra (2005) and 
Butcher’s Invisible Ear (2003) are all examples of the way in which musical improvisation is an 
increasingly divergent and specialised practice, and in this selection alone, we can hear musicians 
using musical technique, instrument modification, electronic treatment of sound as well as interaction 
with the acoustic properties of the performance environment as a means to trigger the spontaneous 
creation of music. 
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being created. 22 This laminal approach could very much be described as the AMM-
event, or the laminal-improvisation-event, since the way in which both Prevost and 
Cornelius Cardew (another founder member of AMM) discuss the amorphous music 
of AMM are retrospective and anterior descriptions of their improvising process. As 
with the truth procedure, if the AMM musicians came to have faith in a possible 
outcome (an outcome that they could not discern from their position within the 
situation of an improvisation), then the process of making music, alongside the 
retrospective understanding that a music had been made ‘as if for the first time’ that 
is captured in the concept of ‘laminal’ improvisation, is an example of an event and 
a subject-to-truth being created. 
 
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, Prevost’s musical contemporary Evan Parker, 
along with Derek Bailey, was also experimenting with musical and sonic form and 
developed a much more jarring, ‘pointillist’ and dynamic style of playing with 
ensembles such as the Music Improvisation Company (MIC).23 MIC’s self-titled 
debut album showcased a style of playing that Prevost has described as ‘atomistic’, 
where the musicians created short sonic statements, often sparking off each other in 
an antiphonal way, or building up explosive sound masses that gave the music a 
very forward-driven momentum.24 We could very well describe Parker’s work at this 
time as the ‘atomistic-improvisation-event’, since this moment-to-moment, intensely 
dynamic and florid style was developed through performance practice and 
experimentation, in the spirit of musical (and Badiouian) enquiry, in a similar way to 
the laminal approach of AMM. Although both atomistic and laminal playing are very 
much part of a contemporary vocabulary for discussing and making improvised 
music, in terms of Badiouian historicity, whilst this might be normally regarded as a 
history of improvised music, we can now think about improvisation as encompassing 
a more dynamic set of historical events. 
 
We can thus summarise Prevost’s idea of an improvising musician standing outside 
of themselves, as a casting about for a trace of something beyond or in addition to 
                                                
22 In the essay entitled ‘The Discourse of a Dysfunctional Drummer’, Prevost describes the ‘“laminal” 
effect’ of AMM’s approach to improvisation that resulted from the layering together of ‘individual 
contributions’ (Prevost, 2004: 357). Prevost goes on to contrast this laminal effect with an ‘atomistic’ 
approach to ‘combining’ individual contributions, wherein particular sounds, phrases and gestures 
can more readily be associated with a particular musician.  
23 In painting, pointillism is a technique whereby points or dots of colour are used to form an image, 
in much the same way as pixels make up contemporary digital images. The term has been adopted 
by a number of writers and musicians to described a particular approach to playing that consists of 
making short musical gestures, often just a single note or chord, as opposed to longer, more 
developed phrases. David Toop quotes the saxophonist Trevor Watts’ description of the evolution of 
this particular style, ‘I think that trying to sound like [drum] stick patterns, or play rhythmically in the 
gaps, was the beginning of Evan Parker’s staccato style and Derek Bailey’s more pointillistic side’ 
(Watts, in Toop, 2016: 263). 
24 See note 13 
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what is given in experience. This exercise is located in the fissure between the 
finitude of the situation and the infinity of truth. Badiou uses the concept of the 
local and the global in order to frame this difference: 
 
Because the subject is a local configuration of the procedure, it is clear that 
the truth is indiscernible ‘for him’ - the truth is global […] a subject which 
realises a truth, is nevertheless incommensurable with the latter, because the 
subject is finite, and the truth is infinite. (Badiou, 2005: 396) 
 
The situation in this sense is a correlation: we can only know what there is to know 
and we can only think the thinkable. Badiou tells us here that it is impossible for a 
subject to engage with a truth, because a subject and a truth are incommensurable: 
they are different types of thing and truth remains ‘indiscernible’ for the subject. 
However, the generic can be ‘indiscerned’ and if we think of our subject-as-
improviser, then it is through their indiscernment of the generic within music, their 
enquiry into the presence of the evental site, that an improvisation-event can occur. 
As such, an improvisation is a recognising of the generic and then a resulting 
decision to bring into play what was indiscerned, as Prevost suggests, this may well 
be the result of musicians ‘stepping outside’ of themselves. Thus, the importance of 
faith within Badiou’s conception of the event alongside the question of the 
inhabitant’s ability to think, suppose or otherwise imagine that there exists 
something beyond the scope of their immediate situation is not only central to 
Badiou’s mathematical ontology, but in an albeit modified fashion, is also 
fundamental to the process of improvising.25 
 
  
                                                
25 Whilst for our current purposes, we have designated the musician’s situation as their immediate 
musical environment or context, with reference to George Lewis’ work on Afrological and Eurological 
trajectories, we could also consider the way in which cultural and racial histories can make up an 
equally significant situation-as-point-of-reference for musicians, and we could even talk of musicians 
being subject (either intentionally or unknowlingly) to the truth of Afrological and / or Eurological 
perspectives. Similarly, in regard to the British improvisers that are discussed here, we might also 
wish to speculate on the way in which class and socio-economic background can also play a key role 
in determining the parameters of a musician’s situation, and the kinds of truth that they might be 
subject to, as suggested by Ben Watson in his discussions of both Derek Bailey himself, and the 
drummer Tony Oxley, in Derek Bailey and the Story of Free Improvisation, where suggests that both 
Bailey’s and Oxley’s attitudes and approach towards music draw on their working-class backgrounds, 
relaying Oxley’s view that ‘My music is basically political by its existence, because it can’t deny the 
background. If you come from such a place as we come from, you do understand the functions and 
the different strata of society. We know where we were – down there – doing more or less what we 
were told, or starve. We chose to – not starve – but put that in a very prominent position in our 
development, the thing that we thought was important.’ (Oxely, in Watson, 2013: 220). 
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3.2 The future anterior: improvisation as time-travel 
 
In the essay ‘Little Bangs: A Nihilist Theory of Improvisation’, the pianist Frederick 
Rzewski, offers another insight into the nature of improvising, that in some ways 
extends Prevost’s intuition of stepping outside of oneself whilst playing. Rzewski’s 
text serves to offer a way of conceptualising the contingent nature of that which is 
beyond intention and knowledge, and the way in which this non-understandable 
material may well impact on and form part of our improvising. In his discussion of 
what he suggests could be the ‘basic propositions of free improvisation’ (Rzewski, 
2004: 268), Rzewski puts forward the idea that in improvised music, 
 
A circular causality may exist between present and future, so that not only 
does the present influence the future, but the future influences the present 
[…] In music, it is possible to express experiences convincingly, which, if 
expressed in words, appear meaningless. An example would be time flowing 
backwards. An event, the end of a melody, is perceived before the event that 
preceded it. We know what is coming, and time is reversed. In this respect 
again, music resembles dream. (Rzewski, 2004: 269). 
 
In this passage, Rzewski’s use of the term event, whilst it does not express a strict 
sense of Badiou’s future anterior, it nevertheless alludes to a time in the future when 
a musician’s improvised material has developed enough of a consistency to render 
it recognisable by the musician and others who are either involved in making, or are 
simply watching, the improvisation. Rzewski suggests that it is this future 
consistency that can provide a means of understanding or rationalising the 
exploratory playing that is going on in the present, in an even closer approximation 
of the future anterior than the AMM event. In this configuration, improvisation again 
comes across as a continuum or a series, but is now more akin to Badiou’s 
historicity: a stream of possible pasts, presents and futures that are at once 
generated through the act of improvising.  
 
Rzewski is describing a music that arrives spontaneously, with no forbears, a music 
that has no History. Improvisation creates a music that makes its own history, a 
music that explains itself through the formation of its own set of precursors. 
Similarly, when Rzewski talks of time travelling via improvising, he is suggesting that 
the sonic density, or even apparent chaos, of any present-time improvising will only 
make sense once we have heard it in the context of the music that is to come. Here, 
Rzewski presents us with a direct musical manifestation of Badiou’s logic of the 
inhabitant of S’s fidelity to the future anterior of the event, in that the improviser 
through ‘forgetting - momentarily at least - everything that is not relevant to the 
objective of expressing an idea immediately in sound’ (Rzewski, 2004: 267), re-
engineers the present via a faith in an unknown future to come, in which possible 
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future conditions reshape our understanding of the present. Through improvising, a 
musician instantly destabilises the security of the past (suddenly the past may not 
have influenced the present) and simultaneously offers a way of understanding the 
present by affirming the necessity of a faith in the future: the past will only make 
sense because of our actions now, whilst what we are doing now will largely only be 
understandable because of what is yet to come.  
 
This linking of the present to the future, and the simultaneous tethering of the 
future subject to the specific conditions of the present is, as we have seen, a vision 
of forcing in operation. The inhabitant of S is able to reach beyond the confines of 
the present in order to name a possible future; the inhabitant, as improviser, 
becomes faithful to a future music that could potentially exist, called forth by the 
improvisation itself, but which remains unknowable in the present. An improvisation 
as the playing out of the unstable relationship between the musician and the 
generic extension may be one way to describe what is happening during play, such 
that an improvisation becomes a set of finite enquiries into the presence of the 
event. Whilst improvising, we may run through a variety of options that are available 
to us as regards what sound to make next. This note? That note? This combination 
of sounds? A sound produced in a certain way? It is a set of sonic possibilities that is 
certainly large enough so as to appear infinite in the context of improvisation.  
 
In the moment-to-moment interplay of performance, the choice of what notes to 
play, or what sounds to make, whilst appearing to be limitless, takes on an urgent 
character. However, even in the context of so called free improvisation, certain 
conditions apply that may well influence players to use particular types of sound in a 
particular way, and we may well find that there are limits on what would or would 
not be appropriate to play. As with Badiou’s discussion of history versus historicity, 
improvisation is as much an affirmation of certain musical pasts in order to construct 
a particular context within which a given performance might exist and be measured, 
as it is a discipline with a fixed and shared set of rules and procedures. In other 
words, a musician who is playing freely, may well in fact go to great lengths to avoid 
creating music that could be said to be making reference to other styles or pieces of 
music. Derek Bailey, as we saw in the previous chapter, was the first musician to 
identify, or rather invent, the notion of ‘non-idiomatic’ playing (Bailey, 1992: xi): an 
approach to playing that is (at least superficially) free of any reference to a previous 
piece of music or existing style of music, and to some degree, musicians will often 
commit themselves (or be ‘faithful’) to the limits of their instrument or technique so 
as to avoid obvious connections to historical precedents (again, an example of what 
Rzewski describes as ‘forgetting’). By imposing a limit factor such as noise, or 
extremely low volume, or incredibly sparse playing, or only using a sine wave, what 
is generated is a way of bracketing out certain reference points and narrowing down 
the focus of what is appropriate to play within a given performance. In a situation S, 
Into the Void 
96 
then, the improvisation is therefore the result of a set of choices made from a 
particular set of variables. The encyclopaedia of a given improvisation is as much a 
negation of possibility, as it is an acknowledgement of the wide variety of sounds 
that can be made. In this way, an improvisation is genuinely based on all of the 
elements that are the results of previous generic enquiries, whether these are 
choices to generate sound in a certain way, or not to generate sound in a certain 
way.  
 
With this sense of boundless and bounded choice in mind, we can imagine an 
improvisation as a constant running and re-running through of the options that an 
improviser finds themselves presented with within a situation, whilst simultaneously 
giving form to those possibilities in real time performance. This is the process that 
Rzewski describes as ‘little bangs’ (Rzewski, 2005: 266): an ongoing series of little 
universes exploding into and out of existence. These little bangs are therefore the 
enquiries into the future event, some of which are developed, others of which are 
forgotten, but it is this faith-based process, that is to say, that somewhere inside 
these little bangs there may be the seed of a future music, which allows us to intuit 
a musical forcing in action. To the listener, or even to the musician who is 
improvising, an improvisation may not always make sense, and players can often ask 
themselves what is happening in a piece of music, in terms of their own or the other 
players’ contributions or they may question the direction that an improvisation is 
taking. Often, musicians may find themselves casting around for a new idea that will 
help move the music onwards, and this can take the form of some form of holding 
behaviour. For example, the repetition of a musical figure, a more and more sparse 
approach to playing (literally bringing a performance down to as close to silence as 
possible to give each other the chance to think more carefully about what to play, 
what ideas to develop). Similarly, a group of musicians may keep building to a 
maximum volume and sustain that volume in order to generate some kind of exit 
strategy to allow them to develop away from a noise-as-stasis point within the 
improvisation. This is a frequent occurrence within improvised performance; 
creating time to reflect without actually stopping the performance. It is within these 
moments that the casting about for new ideas becomes most obvious, although it 
would be true to say that within any improvised performance where an 
improvisational process is in operation from beginning to end, that this practice of 
generating of sound whilst reflecting on future possibilities is happening at any 
given moment; it is simply easier to identify this process at certain, more reflective 
points within a performance. During these moments of simultaneous creation and 
reflection, a number of ideas, a number of little bangs may be generated and 
added to the sound mass that is being created. Each one of these contributions 
may contain the future direction of the performance, but there may be sounds, 
phrases, rhythms that are more compelling, more arresting that capture the 
musicians’ attention and ultimately drive the development of a piece. It is this 
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commitment to work with a particular idea that is very much analogous to the idea 
of forcing, such that an intuitive rummaging through of various sound ideas 
eventually produces an idea that is heard to contain the possible future of the 
improvisation and as a result, that idea is taken up and developed. As mentioned 
earlier, what is critical for what we might call a Badiouian view of improvisation is 
that, in many cases, to musicians and listeners alike, it may be far from clear what 
this particular musical idea is. In fact, it is only possible to discern the starting point 
for an idea ‘after the event’, which, in Badiouian terms would suggest that a group 
of improvisers, as set of ‘musical subjects’, remain faithful to a particular musical 
outcome that resulted from a set of finite musical enquiries. The musicians were not 
able to know what the ultimate end of their improvisations would be, but after the 
fact, it was apparent where and how a particular musical occurrence was arrived at, 
all of the preceding elements that led to a final outcome can be retrospectively 
identified. An improvisation comes to have aesthetic appeal and integrity due to the 
future anterior fidelity to a set of musical choices that were made within the finite 
situation that preceded it. 
 
3.3 The continuous discontinuity of improvisation  
 
In their 2005 survey of the state of then-contemporary improvised music-making, 
Blocks of Consciousness and the Unbroken Continuum, Brian Marley and Mark 
Wastell explain the second half of the book’s title by making reference to guitarist 
Derek Bailey’s description of his own playing, saying that, ‘[Bailey] felt that his 
improvising was continuous, broken only by the moments when he set down his 
guitar. Music as a continuum which musicians dip in and out of was simply too good 
an idea to pass up’ (Marley and Wastell, 2005: 6). To suggest that an individual’s 
approach to improvising is the sonic realisation of sustained enquiry and 
experimentation is indeed a compelling idea, and can work very simply to provide 
an intuitive and attractive means of understanding a musician’s ongoing 
improvisations. Although it might seem that by using the word ‘continuum’, Marley 
and Wastell are making reference to a way of thinking that Badiou fundamentally 
disagrees with, theirs and Derek Bailey’s idea nevertheless provides us with another 
opportunity to think about improvisation in terms of Being and Event. As we have 
seen, Badiou wants us to consider a contingent, ruptured state of Being, and set 
theory presents us with a void-ridden schema of creativity, wherein the new is 
unaccountable (and literally uncountable): we cannot make any kind of provision for 
it, and neither can we properly include a conception of what may be to come within 
the given confines of experience. Badiou’s is a philosophy in which the new cannot 
be discerned, or captured within a conception of becoming, instead, the new is 
something that breaks with what already surrounds us. As an inhabitant of a 
situation, our memories of the past are elements that are included in that situation, 
as counted-as-one presentations, memories are present for us, and therefore a 
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remembered improvisation, along with our other knowledge of music, all combine 
to produce the finitude of that which is included and counted in experience. The 
indiscernible generic, as uncountable, but nameable feature of the situation cannot 
be said to cohere within any formulation of a continuum, which would seem to 
completely contradict Bailey’s view of a continuous sameness that gives rise to a 
connected chain of improvisations. This would also be slightly unfortunate, given 
that Derek Bailey is recognised as one of the key figures in post-war British 
experimental and improvised music, to the extent that we could even think of ‘non-
idiomatic’ improvisation as the Derek Bailey-event. 
 
We can, however, use Badiou’s ideas about the void to think about Bailey’s intuition 
for a continuum of improvisation from a different perspective. The logic of Badiou’s 
ontology is that Being is founded on the void. Multiplicities are the result of the 
forming-into-one of the void, where the void can be counted as one in the empty 
set, or the singleton of the void, {ø}. The void is therefore an element that is all-
pervasive within a situation, similar to the generic indiscernible, it is simultaneously 
everywhere and nowhere. As previously mentioned, it is only through the event’s 
autonomous forming of its own ultra-one, which interposes itself between itself and 
the void, that we are able to conceive of the new coming into being. Thus, an event 
must always be defined and articulated by its relation to the void, to something that 
is utterly outside of the situation and that is not part of ‘the count’. If both the 
situation and the event are indeed the results of the void, that they are made from 
and proceed to change and be changed because of their albeit tangential 
engagement with this nothingness, then, in simple terms, and following Badiou’s 
dictum that ‘the one is not’, we could very easily conclude that what a series of 
improvisations have in common is in fact nothing. But not the familiar nothing of 
zero, but instead a Badiouian nothing or inconsistent multiplicity. This is a complex 
nothing, that is non-conceptualisable, but if we are to adhere to Badiou’s model, 
then it is a nothing that requires proper acknowledgement. 
 
What each of Derek Bailey’s, or indeed any musician’s, improvisations have in 
common is that-which-cannot-be thought. It can only be named: the void. For our 
current intents and purposes we can call it nothing, but we must remember that it is 
an all-important and foundational nothing, and so for two improvisations to have 
nothing in common, rather than this working as a statement of non-connection, on 
the contrary we can now see this as an entirely affirmative relation. In his 
introduction to Deleuze’s Pure Immanence: Essays on a Life, John Rajchman offers 
us another way of thinking about this sense of commonality. In discussing the 
relationship between Deleuze’s and Spinoza’s philosophies, Rajchman, asserts 
that ’we need a new conception of society in which what we have in common is our 
singularities and not our individualities - where what is common is “impersonal” and 
what is “impersonal” is common’ (Rajchman, 2001: 14). This intuition for the 
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‘impersonal’ being that which we all have in common, can be seen to work in a 
similar way to Badiou’s conception of the generic or indiscernible multiplicity. As we 
have seen, the latter are derived from the void and are unknowable: we are literally 
unable to discern the generic or the indiscernible from within the situation due to 
the fact that they are distinguished by the mark of the void ‘ø’. However, as Badiou 
demonstrates, it is the void that underpins everything, it is the ‘not’ in the ‘one’ that 
‘is not’. This foundational aspect of the void can thus be configured in such a way as 
to demonstrate that what we have in common ‘is nothing’. In fact, as Oliver Feltham 
and Justin Clemens show in An Introduction to Alain Badiou’s Philosophy, the void-
as-nothing is what is common in all sets, in fact, it is the only thing that is common 
to every multiplicity, and thus to everything. In the following passage, we see them 
discussing this in terms of the uncountable nature of the inconsistent multiple, along 
with the count-as-one process that generates the consistent multiple of a situation. 
 
In every situation, there is a being of the ‘nothing’ […] what is nothing in a 
situation must go uncounted […] So for Badiou, every situation is ultimately 
founded on a void […] The void of a situation is simply what is not there, but 
what is necessary for anything to be there. (Clemens and Feltham, 2003: 15-
16) 
 
This necessary nothing that founds and thereby connects everything in a situation is 
that which all improvisations have in common, and in terms of Derek Bailey’s 
intuition for a continuum of improvisation, we could therefore think of this 
impersonal commonality as being the ‘void of improvisation’, as something which 
cannot be known, but nonetheless permeates the process of improvising. Although 
Badiou works to assemble a convincing formulation of the non-possibility of 
continuity in Being, and axiomatises the ontology of the event in terms of the non-
continuous nothingness of the void, Bailey certainly offers us an engaging point of 
departure from which we can think through some potential consequences of 
Badiou’s thought in relation to a musician’s feeling for a continuity or at the very 
least, a ‘continuous discontinuity’, between two or more improvisations. 
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4. Conclusion: Bring the noise 
 
In Noise: A Political Economy of Music, economist Jacques Attali states that, 
 
With noise is born disorder and its opposite: the world. With music is born 
power and its opposite: subversion. In noise can be read the codes of life, 
the relations among men. Clamour, Melody, Dissonance, Harmony; when it is 
fashioned by man with specific tools, when it invades man’s time, when it 
becomes sound, noise is the source of purpose and power, of the dream - 
Music […] All music, any organisation of sounds is then a tool for the creation 
or consolidation of a community, of a totality. (Attali, 1985: 6) 
 
Whilst Attali’s book in many ways a polemic about the way in which the noise of un-
ordered sound can work as an analogy for the clamour of an un-ordered, pre-
societal assemblage of people – and therefore not a work of musicology in the strict 
sense – for all of the void’s inconceivable nature, there is a certain resonance here 
between the way Attali describes noise and Badiou’s conception of the void: noise 
that gives birth to disorder and the world, noise that exists before the count-as-one, 
noise as inconsistent multiplicity. Similarly, when noise is indiscerned, as the generic 
that infuses the situation from within the generic extension, we can produce 
knowable outcomes such as new melodies, dissonance note groupings, surprising 
rhythms and unexpected sounds. Attali expands his vision of the structuring 
(consistency-giving) power of music to create communities and integrated systems. 
Music is therefore a counting process in and of itself: a musician who plays is a 
musician who counts, and in this regard, an improvisation can be seen as both the 
act of counting-as-one the elements of a situation; the making of a second count 
that ‘represents’ the state of the situation as an improvisation (following Badiou’s 
statement that the second count ‘represent[s] the presented’ (Badiou, 2005: 99)); as 
well as a means to generate the conditions within which an evental site can be 
affirmed within the situation’s generic extension, ultimately naming the event and 
retrospectively being seen as the cause of the event. An improvisation is thus an 
enacting of all of the phases of Badiou’s truth procedure: it is a naming of the 
indiscernible-as-noise for the subject to truth, and with a second count that 
represents what is available to the inhabitant of S in the encyclopaedia of the 
situation, it gives it gives particular form to a musical situation. 
 
Although Badiou presents the Schönberg-event as an epoch-defining shift that 
‘breaks the history of music in two’ over a period of ‘nearly twenty years’ (Badiou, 
2009: 80), thinking the event at such a grand scale is not necessarily the only, or 
indeed the most productive, approach, at least for a musician or improviser 
operating within a much more localised and closely contained set of parameters. 
We may wish to consider the Perotin-event of the Ars Nova in 12th Century Paris, 
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wherein the composer Perotin, drawing on Pythagorean principles of mathematical 
ratios in order to generate the musical intervals of the octave, perfect fourth and 
perfect fifth (based on the ratios of 2:1, 3:4 and 3:2 respectively) began to develop 
an entirely new set of rules for the composition and arrangement of music. This 
resulted, for the first time in at least forty thousand years of musical history, in a 
practical formalisation of the use of harmony: this was the first time that musicians 
had been instructed to sing simultaneously using notes that were in a specific 
relation to each other, namely notes that harmonised with each other in fourths or 
fifths. From the earliest discovered instrument (a flute made of vulture bone dating 
from approximately 42 000 BCE), through to the French choirs of the late 1190s, 
there is no evidence to suggest that a systematic approach to composing for 
multiple voices singing in harmony had been devised or considered, and thus we 
may speak of the Perotin-event as an event that was at least 40 000 years in the 
making. However, Perotin was not the first musician-subject-to-truth, a number of 
similarly seismic music-events would have occurred before then, including the 
aforementioned discovery of the mathematical relationship between musical 
intervals (attributed to Pythagoras as a result of his experience of hearing the varied 
but harmonically related sounds of different sized hammers beating metal in a 
blacksmith’s shop (Ashton, 2005: 4), and indeed, no doubt the spacing of the holes 
along the body of the vulture bone flute was the result of a series of finite enquiries 
into the sounds that could be produced by modifying a found physical object. A 
bone flute-event, a Pythagoras-event, a Perotin-event: a set of contingent events 
that have been historicised into a history of music, events at the level of millennia. 
 
Although we made reference in the previous chapter to Derek Bailey’s comment 
that, ‘mankind’s first musical performance couldn’t have been anything other than a 
free improvisation’ (Bailey, 1992: 83), a compelling, but entirely unverifiable 
statement, it is once again useful here to focus our attention to the subject of noise. 
Improvisation as the counting of noise, of the re-presentation of noise as music. 
What we can take from Bailey’s claim is the idea that the first musicians would not 
necessarily have recognised what they were doing as ‘music’, a naivety of the type 
that AMM were striving for. Where Bailey makes claims for music’s origins, Attali 
maps a history of music across centuries, possibly millennia, of cultural, religious and 
latterly political and economic practices that contends music’s gradual 
transformation from an early role as part of ritual sacrifice, to its current existence as 
an autonomous commodity with market value, as Attali says, music is now ‘an 
immaterial pleasure turned commodity’ (Attali, 1985: 3-4). However, at the heart of 
both Bailey’s and Attali’s discussions of the development of music is the sense in 
which improvisation is a means by which musicians can harness and shape noise 
into music, where even the manufacture of music is an event in itself.  
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If an improviser counts and re-presents noise, then he or she is also subject to a 
range of truths. If we consider the types of truths that may shape a musician’s 
decisions, then even at a glance, we quickly realise that musicians are potentially 
subjects to an incredible range of truths that combine to form the situation that an 
improviser finds themselves in. In simple terms, a musician is aware of certain 
musical and sonic materials because they are faithful to their truths. A 21st century 
musician is someone who is faithful to the truth of extended instrumental technique, 
the truth of Serialism, of Atonalism, John Cage’s investigations into silence, the 
truth of Pierre Schaeffer’s invention of the ‘sound object’, the truth of 
indeterminacy, of aleatory practices, of Onkyo, of lower case, of New London 
Silence, of Noise Music, of microtonal tuning systems to name but a few, and the 
musician is subject to their truths because they are all events. The reductionist, 
minimalist practices of musicians such as Mark Wastell, Rhodri Davies, Toshimaru 
Nakamura and Taku Sugimoto that resulted in the New London Silence and Onkyo 
scenes that were described in the previous chapter are examples of this in recent 
times: the New London Silence-event and the Japanese Onkyo-event; and the 
fashion for musicians to play at low volumes and with a restricted amount of sounds 
in the early years of the 21st Century, reflects the way in which a number of 
musicians were still subjects remaining faithful to the truth of these two events. 
Similarly, if we think about musical instruments themselves, we could say that the 
truth of a violin, for example, may be that it is built, played and used in a certain 
way. A violin-event may well consist of a new, previously unknown or unconsidered 
technique being adopted, as for instance in George Brecht’s Solo for Violin, in 
which the ‘performer comes onto the stage, dressed for the occasion, holding his 
instrument and […] proceeds to polish the instrument’ (Nyman, 1999: 78). One 
musician may well remain faithful to the physical form of a violin, whilst another may 
see fit to alter it in some way, such as by adding or subtracting strings and thus 
interrupting or diverting its historical development. Again, we see here that even 
the physical form of an instrument is a matter of historicity rather than simply 
history: a violin looks and sounds a certain way, but there is no permanent history 
behind these manifestations, rather there is a set of contingent histories that are 
brought into play through the present action of a musician’s faith in the truth of 
these histories. The musician, by affirming his or her faith in a certain way of using 
and contextualising the use of an instrument activates a particular set of histories of 
that instrument, this is the process of musical historicisation.  
 
The moment that we begin to play is the moment that we activate our faith in these 
musical truths and simultaneously begin our finite enquiry into the indiscernible 
generic, which in itself is a faith that a future music can happen. Therefore, as much 
as it is a performance of music, an improvisation is an act of faith in, and a search 
for, an event. We can only believe that at some point the search will have come to 
an end, at least, temporarily, and it is only once the performance is complete that 
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the event can be known. Thus the musician is always suspended in a matrix of faiths 
in both the past and the future, where the present is an historicising present that is 
destined to arrive at a future that is already the past. As a matter of faith, 
improvisation is a belief that another state of affairs is possible and it is the creation, 
or forcing, of a possible future. We return time and time again to this notion in 
Badiou’s work: his insistence that the now is not the only possible world, other 
futures are always possible. 
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Parallel Lines: Improvisation and Non-Philosophy 
 
In this chapter we shall think about improvisation in relation to the work of François 
Laruelle, and an approach to thinking that he has called both ‘non-philosophy’, and 
‘non-standard philosophy’.1 Laruelle offers us a valuable opportunity to extend the 
lines of enquiry that we have already established in relation to the work of Deleuze 
and Badiou, but his non-philosophical practice is also a palpable break with a number 
of the theoretical positions that we have so far encountered. Laruelle gathers Deleuze 
up with Nietzsche, Heidegger and Derrida, to question and overturn their various 
‘philosophies of difference’, replacing them instead with his non-philosophy of the 
One, undermining their attempts to show that the Real could in anyway be described 
in terms of ‘differentiation’ or ‘drives’ (although at the same time, Laruelle’s 
commitment to showing that everything is given ‘in-One’ very much extends the idea 
that the Real does not exist ‘outside’ of, or as an alternative to normal experience). At 
the same time, we shall see that Laruelle’s approach is comprehensively different to 
Deleuze (and Guattari’s), for where a Deleuze-Guattarian immanence spoke of 
intensities, drives, multiplicities and populations, Laruelle’s non-philosophy of the One, 
does not allow for any such conceptualising of the One. So rather than thinking about 
the One, Laruelle thinks from the One, and his work enabled us to start thinking of a 
relationship between the One and that which is given in the One, via what he terms 
‘determination-in-the-last-instance’, wherein the world proceeds from the One, but 
can have no retrospective effect on the One. The One is ‘indifferent’ to the world that 
it gives rise to. Thus, the figure of the man-in-person, which is a thinking according to 
identity and a cloning of the One (a concept that we could reconfigure as ‘the 
musician-in-improvisation’), is the way in which Laruelle understands how ruptures and 
experiences are created in the world. For Laruelle, this thinking according to identity is 
a radical immanence, a different approach to thinking immanence than either Deleuze, 
Guattari or Badiou, such that a virtual is not actualised, and a truth does not arrive in 
the shape of an event, instead for Laruelle, the One is simply performed. In this 
regard, Ray Brassier provides a useful perspective on what non-philosophy can be said 
to be doing, such that radical immanence is the pre-condition that underpins anything 
that we might do or think. 
 
Non-philosophy is at once a theoretical practice and a performative theory. Moreover, 
it is precisely in so far as the non-philosopher is already operating according to 
                                                
1 Laruelle modified the description of his method so as to counter misunderstandings and claims that his 
work had supposedly been set up, rather hubristically, as an alternative to philosophy. Instead, the addition 
of the word ‘standard’, was for Laruelle a means by which to clarify both his interest in evolving our 
understanding of philosophy itself, and of its point of focus. As he informs us, the shift to the term clarify 
both his interes’ was an attempt to escape the assertion that his work was a ‘mass negation of philosophy 
(Laruelle, 2013 P&NP: 16). In other words, non-philosophy and non-standard philosophy are both intended 
to suggest that philosophy as it is understood can no longer be seen to hold any privilege as regards 
enabling human knowledge and understanding of the world and our experience of that world; it is simply 
one attempt amongst many to apprehend and comprehend the world that we experience. 
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immanence as ʻalready-performedʼ that he or she cannot help but say what he / she 
does and do as he / she says’. (Brassier, 2003: 31) 
 
We shall see that the ‘heretical decision’ is just such a performing of the One, which is to 
say that heresy, as a cloning of the One, is a ‘rigorously unilateral process’ (Laruelle, 2010: 
50); it is radical immanence in action. Therefore, an immanent, or radically immanent Real 
is not made visible or knowable, or brought into awareness and then faithfully adhered to 
via the process of improvisation (or indeed any process at all): the Real is simply 
performed, rather than achieved.  
 
In what follows, we shall explore a number of key concepts that Laruelle has used in order 
to create his non-philosophical project before proceeding to think about the way in which 
improvisation can again be re-evaluated in terms of Laruelle’s assertions. Given the 
complexity of Laruelle’s terminology, the first part of the chapter will step through a 
sequence of terms, what could even be thought of as some of the core ‘rules’ of non-
philosophy, in order to understand how the model works, looking at the core principles of 
the Real, the One, the vision-in-One, determination-in-the-last-instance, non-thetic 
transcendence and cloning, as well as looking at the way in which Laruelle applies his 
non-philosophical principles to practice by considering aspects of his work on ‘non-
photography’. We shall then proceed to consider the way in which non-philosophical 
enquiry can be applied to improvisation by working through a number of Laruelle’s key 
conceptual innovations, in particular, Laruelle’s notion of the heretic, and the idea of 
thinking in-identity. Finally, the chapter will conclude with an extended exploration of the 
ideas and music of the improvising trumpet player Peter Evans, using the material 
generated in the chapter to help us consider the extent to which Evans can be thought of 
as a ‘non-improviser’. 
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1. Mapping non-philosophy 
 
Via a sustained exploration and dismantling of key aspects of 20th century 
philosophical thought, the afore-mentioned ‘Philosophies of Difference’ of Nietzsche, 
Heidegger, Derrida and Deleuze (Laruelle, 2010 PD), Laruelle developed the concept 
of non-philosophy as a means to rethink our understanding of what philosophy is and 
what it can achieve. In the book A Non-Philosophical Theory of Nature, the theorist 
and Laruelle translator Anthony Paul Smith provides us with an overview of Laruelle’s 
decades-long non-philosophical project and enables us to understand the way in 
which, for Laruelle, the practice of philosophy has no greater claim than science, art, or 
indeed music, as a means to engage with what Laruelle defines as ‘the Real’ (Smith, 
2013). In the context of non-philosophy, the Real (with a notably capital ‘R’) is the term 
that Laruelle uses to describe that which lies beyond human categorisation and 
differentiation (hence his sustained dismantling of the above mentioned ‘philosophies 
of difference’), but which nevertheless gives rise to everything that we experience.2 
One of Laruelle’s key ideas and claims is that conventional philosophical thought to a 
certain extent places itself above other modes of human enquiry and thought, via what 
he calls the ‘Principle of Sufficient Philosophy’ (Laruelle, 2013 AB: xxvi), and in doing 
so, suggests either explicitly or implicitly that disciplines such as science and 
mathematics are following synthetic rules and after-the-fact observations about what 
we call a given world of experience.  
 
By sufficiency, Principle of Sufficient Existence, or objective philosophical 
appearance, I understand that which, existing in itself and being conceived by 
itself, claims to be real and concludes from its existence to its reality. In other 
words that whose existence claims to suffice to be real and not to have need of the 
real to be determined. (Laruelle, 2012 FDH: 394) 
 
In this context, philosophy is seen to have grounded itself (or at least has been 
grounded by generations of philosophical practitioners who have repeatedly affirmed 
and revalidated the claim for philosophy’s unique and privileged access to the Real) as 
a self-sufficient and contained means of furthering human knowledge about the Real, 
whereas mathematics, science, even art and music are only a constructed means of 
apprehending the world as given, and are not able to really describe or engage with 
the world as it is in itself, or with the Real.3 However, Laruelle contends that standard 
philosophy and scientific thought are in fact doing the same kind of thing, they are 
                                                
2 Throughout this chapter, we can make a distinction between the Real with a capital ‘R’ as an 
interchangeable form of the One, whereas the real with a lowercase ‘r’ – as the real which is given in the 
One – denotes the real experiences and thoughts of Laruelle’s ‘lived’ world. The real is ‘real’ by virtue of the 
fact that it is given in the Real / the One; since anything that is given in the One is real (because it is of the 
Real). 
3 A position that even Deleuze and Guattari could be said to perpetuate to a certain extent, given that in 
What Is Philosophy, they suggest that, ‘sciences, arts, and philosophies are all equally creative, although 
only philosophy creates concepts in the strict sense’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 5) 
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both practices that are given within the Real and are therefore both equally of the 
Real; neither has any more or less privileged access to the Real. This is the real thrust 
of the ‘non’ in Laruelle’s non-philosophy and non-standard philosophy, it is a ‘non’ that 
tells us that we need to reconsider what we think philosophy is doing and what it (and 
by extension what any other form of human thought and practice) is able to do. Thus, 
whichever term we use, it is important to understand that Laruelle’s project is a 
reading, or perhaps more accurately an attempt at something of a ‘science’ of 
philosophy whose intended purpose is to radicalise the way in which philosophy 
works, and subsequently can itself be used.  
 
Although the aim of this project is not to critique philosophy itself, but to simply use 
the results of contemporary thought as a means to broaden our understanding of 
improvised music practice, Laruelle’s reconfiguration of philosophy as merely one 
attempt amongst many to interpret and construct a human understanding of the 
world, does serve to remind us that our reflections on improvisation are based on a set 
of philosophical models that are by no means stable. However, his democratisation of 
practice does suggest that a reconsideration of philosophy’s reach may also provide 
us with the grounds to similarly reconsider what improvisation can do, and indeed, will 
enable us to think about what a ‘non-improvisation’ might mean for standard 
improvisational practices. 
 
1.1 The One 
 
As we have seen, Laruelle uses the term ‘the Real’ to denote a ground for experience 
which in itself defies experience, which is to suggest that we can know that a ground 
for everything that we experience exists, but we cannot know anything about it. In the 
book Cartographies of the Absolute, Alberto Toscano and Jeff Kinkle put forward a 
conception of the ‘absolute’ which is analogous to this position: 
 
The ‘absolute’ is a theological and then a philosophical category, gesturing 
towards that which defies representation, which, contrasted to our mortal 
perception, is infinite and unencompassed. (Toscano and Kinkle, 2014: 23) 
 
Whilst Laruelle’s Real similarly refuses representation and exceeds human perception, 
one of the more remarkable things about his approach is that he sets out to design a 
method for thinking ‘from’ this Real, instead of simply thinking about it. Similarly, 
although his project is not entirely dissimilar in its theorising of immanence to some of 
the ideas that we have encountered in the work Deleuze and Badiou, Laruelle 
introduces a significant step-change to the way that we might think about our 
relationship with an immanent absolute, using non-philosophy to think outwards from 
an immanent absolute, rather than thinking about how such an absolute might 
interface with the world of ‘mortal perception’ mentioned above. Laruelle uses the 
figure of ‘the One’ to denote the Real, and it is this key concept that not only 
separates Laruelle’s work from that of Deleuze and clearly Badiou, but also from the 
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established mainstream within Western philosophical thought (another facet of his aim 
to construct a ‘non-standard’ philosophy) that thinks in terms of a ‘representation’ of 
the Real, such as those that Toscano and Kinkle allude to.4 In Philosophy and Non-
Philosophy, Laruelle puts forward the following conception of the One: 
 
The One […] is what must be called the real or the Absolute: the only ultimate 
experience that we can have of the Absolute. It is indeed here a case of saying 
that the Absolute is ‘alongside us.’ Truly speaking […] it is not ‘alongside us’, 
simultaneously near and far, […] it is instead an ‘immediate given’ in the 
definitive sense of the term - we prefer to say: a ‘postural’ given, what we are 
intrinsically in our essence. (Laruelle, 2013 P&NP: 44-45) 
 
In this way, Laruelle enables us to understand that the One is a Real that does not 
need to be accessed via a truth procedure or a body without organs, instead it is 
immanent to everything that is around us (which Laruelle suggests with his use of the 
word ‘postural’), whilst at the same time, everything around us is similarly ‘given in’ 
that Real. Whereas in Difference and Repetition, Deleuze works through a definition of 
‘the univocity of Being’, stating that, ‘the essential in univocity is not that Being is said 
in a single and same sense, but that it is said, in a single and same sense, of all its 
individuating differences or intrinsic modalities’ (Deleuze, 2004: 46), for Laruelle, no 
such statements about Being, or the Real, can be made. In this sense, Laruelle’s non-
philosophical approach is to an extent closer to that of Badiou’s commentary on the 
unknowable nature of Being, although he clearly has a number of misgivings about 
Badiou’s ideas. For example, where Badiou refuses even the contemplation of the 
One, (such that the ‘One is not’), Laruelle finds equal fault in the former’s position, as 
we can see in the following statement: 
 
How to obtain a Being really void of all beings and even of any ultimate and secret 
reference to beings? For this we need the One: Being is thus (not-) One, and it is 
on this condition that it is really void of beings, and not merely nothingness. 
(Laruelle, 2013 AB: 118)  
 
Laruelle circumvents Badiou’s prohibition of Being, of the void-ness of that which is at 
the heart of everything that is given, and instead he insists that nothingness, as with 
Deleuze’s univocal Being, does not go far enough to describe the One: indeed, it can 
never go far enough, since the One is that which must always remain indescribable. As 
Laruelle makes clear in the above distinction, it is not that the One has nothing to do 
                                                
4 Whilst working through Laruelle’s non-philosophical critiques of Western philosophical models goes 
beyond the scope of this project, it is also worth noting that Laruelle’s book Anti Badiou is also a direct 
engagement and refutation of what he terms Badiou’s ‘ontology of the void’, and Laruelle opposes non- 
philosophy to the ‘ontology of the void [...] as context or vision of the world for mathematics’ (Laruelle, 
2013: xxvi). 
Parallel Lines 
  111 
with Being, rather it is that the One exists regardless of beings (human or otherwise), 
and his bracketing off of the (not-) of Badiou’s not-One, suggests that the One is 
neither Being, nor is it not-Being, it is simply itself, the One.5  
 
1.2 Vision-in-One 
 
Although complex, Laruelle’s concepts of the One and the Real can be set out in a 
relatively straightforward manner, such that the One is immanent to itself without 
cause or necessity, and is radically immanent to everything, or that everything is 
‘given’ in the One.6 We shall return to this sense of being given in the One, but for 
now we shall begin to look at some of the more intricate mechanics and detail of non-
philosophy. As with much of Deleuze and Guattari’s work, Laruelle’s theoretical 
approach brings into use a chain of interlinked concepts and strategies whose purpose 
seems to emphasise the break with conventional philosophical practice, as much as it 
supports a re-purposed philosophical method. In order to describe or illustrate what 
the experience of being or experiencing within the One is, or at least might be, 
Laruelle uses the neologism ‘vision-in-One’.7 As we progress through his various books 
and texts, we find echoes of this phrase being used, such as ‘being-in-photo’ which 
appears in The Concept of Non-Photography, and the ‘Man-in-person’ of Future 
Christ.8 Given the centrality of this concept, it is essential that we secure our 
                                                
5 Ray Brassier takes up this point elsewhere and makes a similar claim about the One, telling us that it is 
‘indifferent to [human] decision’ (Brassier, 2003: 30), and that whilst the non-philosophical subject is able 
to differentiate between this immanent One that is the ‘determining’ essence of everything, and his or 
her own power of ‘decision’ which is ‘determinable’ (Brassier, 2003: 30), the One itself remains 
indeterminable, or in other words, foreclosed to thought. Identifying and justifying this difference was 
clearly one of Laruelle’s key philosophical goals, indeed his Philosophies of Difference is entirely 
dedicated to establishing a framework within which to discuss and defend his position in regard to 
Deleuze, Derrida, Heidegger and Nietzsche’s philosophies which are unable, as far as Laruelle is 
concerned, to escape the problem of bilateral determination (where the Real is a determining force, 
that can also be determined, or understood) as opposed to his own model of unilateral determination 
(where the process does not work both ways and the Real cannot be understood). We shall explore 
Laruelle’s use of the idea of unilaterality later in the chapter, but for now it is useful for us to be aware of 
this key distinction between Laruelle’s and Deleuze’s work, that the One is simply a cause, it cannot be 
determined. Clearly, Laruelle’s argument is a complex one, and draws on an extensive knowledge and 
analysis of a wide range of philosophical perspectives and traditions. In terms of our current study, the 
important point to establish is that for Laruelle, everything is given either from or within the One, and 
that as a consequence we must re-think the nature and trajectory of philosophy itself. 
6 Hence we see Laruelle’s rationale for the non-possibility of a Principle of Sufficient Philosophy, since only 
the One can be immanent to itself and self-sufficient, and therefore philosophy is itself simply given in the 
One. 
7 Laruelle tells us that ‘the vision-in-One supports the specific faith-in-the-real of philosophy, i.e.  the 
philosophical hallucination of the Real’ (Laruelle, 1998, tr. Adkins 2016) 
8 In his Translator’s Introduction, Smith acknowledges the awkward and problematic nature of his translation 
of Laruelle’s original phrase Homme-en-personne, such that Laruelle’s phrase could be taken to suggest 
both a reductive as well as an excessive sense of what it means to be a human, namely man could be 
nowhere and man could be anywhere (Smith in Laruelle, 2010 FC: xxii). Smith’s solution is to use the simple 
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understanding of it before going any further in our exploration of non-philosophical 
theory.  
 
In Philosophy and Non-Philosophy, Laruelle outlines the vision-in-One in reference to 
his previously cited assertion of the One as the Real or Absolute, and he states quite 
simply that, ‘vision-in-One is the experience of this real’ (Laruelle, 2013 P&NP: 54). 
Clearly Laruelle is aware that such an assertion raises a number of issues as to how this 
experience manifests itself, and after a detailed exposition about a non-philosophical 
conception of representation, wherein he argues that vision-in-One does not represent 
or identify (with) the real, Laruelle instead thinks in terms of a reflection of the Real. 
However, this idea itself is problematic, since he talks of a ‘real without reflection [that 
determines] a reflection without real’ (Laruelle, 2013 P&NP: 55), and therefore it may 
be useful to think of this experience more as a refraction of the Real, such that we may 
have some kind of glimpse of it, but not its original or complete form. To help us build 
up an understanding of what vision-in-One means and to think about how we might 
apply it, we can turn once again to Smith who, in his translator’s introduction to Future 
Christ, describes, ‘the tracing of the causality of the One in the vision-in-One [which] 
traces the unilateral causal relationship between the Real-One and thought’ (Smith, in 
Laruelle, 2010 FC: xvi). The vision-in-One is thus an indication of a causal relationship 
that goes from the One to the world that we experience (where experience becomes 
analogous to the vision-in-One), and the phrase ‘unilateral causal relationship’ conveys 
the idea that, in a non-philosophical context, this causal relationship can only ever 
proceed from the One; there can be no reciprocal engagement between thought and 
the One, and thus the One cannot be affected by thought. This unilateral, one-way 
causality is what Laruelle means by the phrase ‘given-in’ that occurs repeatedly 
throughout his work, and it is used to convey the sense in which everything that has 
been caused by the Real (which for Laruelle is everything that there is) has no 
subsequent access to its own point of origin. Everything within Laruelle’s non-
philosophical framework centres on this idea of unilaterality, such that it makes no 
sense to speak of any kind of ‘access’ to the One. Hence, the vision-in-One arises in 
the One in the same way that thought arises in the One, and as we saw above, human 
investigative and creative practices such as science, philosophy and music are all 
therefore ‘given-in-One’. 
 
The vision-in-One is not a description of an experience per se, instead it is an 
indication of what kind of experience being ‘given-in-One’ is. Hence, with this 
formulation, Laruelle is suggesting that the vision-in-One is a statement about how we 
come to understand the world as a context that we are given into and which therefore 
                                                                                                                                                            
phrase ‘Man-in-person’ so as to emphasise the ordinary, generic (although not in the Badiouian sense of the 
word) nature of being human, or human-ness.  
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forms the context for, and the horizon of our knowledge.9 The non-philosophical 
principle here is that an activity demonstrates its ‘Real-ness’ simply because it is 
positioned within the One, as opposed to having any special status as regards the 
One-Real. This also tells us why the related concepts of ‘being-in-photo’ and ‘Man-in-
person’ work in the way that they do, and are thus another example of a real 
occurrence that is given within the One. The phrases ‘in-photo’ and ‘in-person’ set up 
contexts that suggest that the elements of a photograph – whose ‘being’ is within that 
photograph – function according to the parameters set up by that photograph, and 
that the attributes of a particular ‘Man’ operate according to the principles of being a 
particular person.10 What is critical to our understanding of Laruelle’s conceptual 
framework at this point is that these statements about context simultaneously remain 
statements about being given-in-One, so whilst the elements of a photograph are 
given within that photograph, they are at the same time ‘in-One’. This nesting of 
contexts shows that a real experience of the features of a photograph (with a 
deliberately lowercase ‘r’) is analogous to being given in-One, but it is also precisely 
what being in-One means, which again reflects Toscano and Kinkle’s statement about 
the non-representability of the absolute: the vision-in-One does not ‘represent’ a 
relationship with the absolute, it is the process of being in the absolute. Also worth 
noting at this stage, is the related non-philosophical recalibration of philosophy as 
practice. It is this very nesting of contexts that allows us to understand why philosophy, 
just as science and music, is given-in-One, and that a thinking-in-philosophy would 
offer no more and no less of a possible route to the vision-in-One than a thinking-in-
music. 
 
1.3 Determination-in-the-last-instance 
 
In a broad sense, one of the key reference points for Laruelle’s use of the Real as a 
foundational context in which the world of experience is given, is Karl Marx’s base-
superstructure model that he outlines in the Preface to A Contribution to the Critique 
of Political Economy: 
 
In the social production of their existence, men inevitably enter into definite 
relations, which are independent of their will, namely relations of production 
appropriate to a given stage in the development of their material forces of 
production. The totality of these relations of production constitutes the 
economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which arises a legal and 
political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social 
consciousness. (Marx, 1904: 11) 
                                                
9 This is an implicit reference to Marx’s comments about the way in which we are given into ‘relations of 
production', and we shall discuss the relationship between Laruelle’s ideas and Marx’s theories in the 
following section of the chapter. 
10 In Future Christ, Laruelle develops the concept of the ‘man-in-person’ to describe the way in which we 
experience being in the world. 
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Marx’s model, which places emphasis on the ‘totality of relations’, is a clear forebear of 
the One as all-encompassing framework that we see in Laruelle’s thought, and by 
establishing that everything is already within a non-philosophical Real-One, Laruelle 
parallels the relations of production as the ‘real foundation’ of social consciousness, by 
suggesting that the One is just such a foundation for human consciousness. However, 
this sense of being given within a real foundation is not the only idea that Laruelle 
borrows from Marxist thought, and in his introduction to Future Christ, Anthony Paul 
Smith sketches a definition for another key non-philosophical concept, the notion of 
determination-in-the-last-instance, Laruelle’s adaptation of a key component of base-
superstructure theory. In For Marx, we see Althusser combing through Friedrich 
Engels’ discussion of the relationship between the productive foundation of society 
and its political, social and cultural superstructure, to establish that, ‘production is the 
determinant factor, but only “in the last instance”’ (Althusser, 1969: 111). Althusser is 
telling us that for Engels, it was vital to establish that the relationship between the 
base and the superstructure remained entirely reciprocal, and that the one-way 
process wherein the superstructure is solely determined by the relations of production 
would only occur when no other forces were in play. In From Decision to Heresy, a 
collection of Laruelle’s writing from 1985 to 2012, Laruelle usefully provides us with his 
own reading of the ‘last instance’, which as we can see from his brief definition, is 
fundamentally another way of describing the One: 
 
By last instance, I describe that which is real in itself, that is to say that which has no 
need of existence in order to be real. Or that which the description as real in itself 
has no need of this description in order to be real in itself, and of which it must be 
constituted. (Laruelle, 2012 FDH: 395) 
 
In one sense, determination-in-the-last-instance is another reference to the process 
that we have already encountered wherein everything in the real world is given in the 
One, but it is also a means of capturing Laruelle’s modification of Engels’ statement, 
which suggests that real is always unilaterally determined by the One-Real. The 
concept of ‘determination’ also enables Laruelle to talk about causality in a very 
particular way, and where we saw above that the vision-in-One is a tracing of a non-
philosophical causality, determination allows us to understand that although the real 
world is given in the One, and is therefore determined by the One, this does not mean 
that it is directly ‘caused’ by the One. We cannot say ‘how’ things come into the world, 
because we can have no knowledge about the One, we can simply say that they are in 
the One. As a system that only allows for a one-way, non-reciprocal relationship 
between the One and that which is given in the One, non-philosophy is also a 
departure from the models that his contemporaries Deleuze and Guattari assembled, 
whose concepts of the actual-virtual and the plane of immanence allowed for a much 
more interactive, ‘two-way’ relationship between human activity and the Real. 
Deleuze’s concept of the univocity of Being suggests that the Real can in some way be 
apprehended, in terms of his assertion that it can be both one and multiple, whilst his 
Parallel Lines 
  115 
and Guattari’s claims about our ability to engage with a plane of immanence suggest 
that we can somehow engage ‘with’ such a Real in order to create territories, art or 
music, that then themselves become the material for future creative acts. However, 
Laruelle’s work specifically forbids any kind of active relationship with the Real - we 
must remain completely unable to ‘experience’ or ‘witness’ the Real, we can only 
unilaterally perform it. These differences aside, non-philosophy, as with Deleuze and 
Guattari’s work, is directed towards understanding and conceiving human experience 
in terms of immanence, where for Laruelle it is the inaccessible, incomprehensible 
One, rather than a uni-vocal Being, that is the overarching cause or context for 
everything that we experience. As Smith tells us, since we are unable to ‘think the Real 
in any meaningful sense […] the point of non-philosophy is simply not to think the 
Real’ (Smith, 2013: 69), which is to say that non-philosophy puts the Real to one side 
as it were, and instead directs our attention towards the process of thinking ‘from it’ 
(Smith, 2013: 69). 
 
1.4 Rethinking practice: Non-philosophy and Non-photography 
 
Having established some basic principles with which to navigate non-philosophy, we 
can now turn to Laruelle’s own discussion of a creative practice, and in the first 
instance, to photography, so as to develop a discourse with which we can go on to 
think about improvisation from a similar vantage point. In The Concept of Non-
Photography, Laruelle introduces the concept of photographic thought, suggesting 
that, by becoming ‘a body absolutely without organs [the photographer] replaces 
himself firstly in his body as in a stance, and renounces all corporeal or psychic 
intentionality’ (Laruelle, 2012 CNP: 12). In so doing, the photographer becomes a real-
photographer, where a pure photographic stance, again a vision-in-One, could almost 
be said to be the ‘Real becoming real’. Clearly, Laruelle’s reference to the body 
without organs draws directly on Deleuze and Guattari’s work, although his use of the 
prefix ‘absolutely’ indicates a wholesale change of use from the body of organs that 
we encounter in Anti-Oedipus and A Thousand Plateaus, where the BwO causes, 
‘asignifying particles or pure intensities to pass or circulate’ across an organism 
(Deleuze and Guattari, 2004: 4). For Laruelle, an ‘absolute body without organs’ can 
offer up no such interaction with an organism, for we can have absolutely no 
knowledge of any of the powers or properties of the absolute, and it would therefore 
make no sense to talk of intensities or particles, whether they asignifying or not. In 
short, Laruelle is telling us that the photographic stance is what we can now 
understand to be a ‘performing’ of the Real, it is a being Real, without trying ‘to be’ 
the Real, as he indicates with the term ‘positional’ in the following passage: 
 
Photographic thought, rather than being purely relational, differential, 
positional, is first of all real, in that sort of undivided experience, lived as non-
positional self-vision-force, which has no need to posit itself simultaneously on 
the object, to divide with itself, to identify itself with the World and to reflect 
itself in itself. (Laruelle, 2012 CNP: 12-13) 
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Although Laruelle does not obviously differentiate between a capitalised and a 
lowercase version of the word ‘real’, he is clearly indicating that the photographic 
thought, in the sense that it is undivided, is of the Real, although the fact that it is also 
‘lived’ and not ‘purely relational’ also tells us that is a real thought. Hence, the 
photographic thought is an instance, or in photographic terms, a ‘snapshot’ of the Real 
in action, of Laruelle’s intuition that, whilst in the lived world there may be a 
categorical division between the real and the Real, the photographic thought is a 
removing of that divide. We shall discuss Laruelle’s interest in positioning photography 
later in the chapter in relation to his interest in quantum theory, but the key point for 
us in the above statement is that the photographic thought exceeds the vision-in-One, 
to become a ‘lived self-vision-force’, which in Deleuze-Guattarian terms we might call a 
becoming-Real. In this context, the photographic stance, the act of thinking in-photo 
and of taking a photograph, is a kind of being-absolute; it is an act of producing a real 
context that conditions its own frame of reference, rather than needing to be 
identified with the world. In this way, for Laruelle, the photograph (which might appear 
curious given that it is an object that presents representations of objects that are seen 
in the world), is seen as being non-representational; the objects within the photograph 
function within the context of that photograph and not because they relate to, or 
represent anything outside of the photograph. 
 
Non-philosophy therefore allows us to understand that the process of making 
something, seen here as ‘vision-force’, is a process of superseding a normal set of 
relations with the real-world and indeed with the Real-One, whereby the taking of a 
photograph or creating an improvisation is a performance or a performing of the Real. 
This becoming non-positional and undivided, which describes the creation of contexts 
and environments that generate real contexts for experience, suggests that we are 
never more a self-vision-force, when we are completely lost or absorbed in what we 
are doing. 
 
Although there are clearly differences between Laruelle's and Badiou’s approach to 
thinking about our relationship to that which is not ‘of’ a world of lived experience, it is 
possible to detect certain similarities. Where, for Badiou, Being (which serves as an 
approximation of Laruelle’s sense of the Real) is configured as something that exists 
outside of our normal, current situation, for Laruelle, the Real is always immanent to, 
and therefore never ‘not present’, in the real world. However, if we remember that 
Badiou’s void or inconsistent multiplicity is also always present within the fundamental 
structure of a situation, and that it is the subject’s belief in the possibility of an event 
that generates a recount of the situation, then we can see that both men are working 
through a process that allows for a non-problematic coincidence between two states 
of being: a being in a lived real world, and the Being of the Real, which is separate to 
normal human experience. 
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1.5 Non-thetic Transcendence and Cloning 
 
Looking at the vision-in-One and photographic stance in this way provides us with a 
strong indication of how we can begin to think about improvisation as a performing of 
the One in non-philosophical terms, and generate similarly non-philosophical concepts 
such as improvisation-force, being-in-improvisation and the improvisation-stance. 
Whilst Laruelle’s use of determination-in-the-last-instance provides us with an insight 
into the way in which the lived world is determined by the One, this is not to say that 
the cause of things can be directly traced back to the One. This is the subtlety of 
Laruelle’s non-philosophical method: although everything may well be given in the 
One, this does not mean that taking a photograph or improvising musically, as a 
‘performing’ of the One, is an encounter with an immanent, ‘virtual’ One. 
 
One of the most complex aspects of Laruelle’s non-philosophy is the way in which the 
One unilaterally determines everything about us and everything that we experience, 
whilst remaining as it were, ‘separate-without-being-separated’ from everything that it 
determines. In the following brief, but densely packed sentence, we see Laruelle 
setting out some of the main vectors of this issue: 
 
It will be said that, in vision-in-One, representation is a non-thetic or non-
positional reflection (of the) real, that it is descriptive, in the last instance at 
least, and not constitutive like philosophy claims to be. (Laruelle, 2013 P&NP: 
55) 
 
Here we see Laruelle using the term ‘non-thetic reflection’ to describe the way in 
which the Real ‘appears’ in the guise of the vision-in-One, a problematic kind of 
appearance that we have already suggested may in practice be more of a refraction 
than a reflection. The fact that this reflection is ‘descriptive’, rather than ‘constitutive’ is 
another example of the way in which Laruelle is clearly working through a similar set of 
issues to Badiou and is attempting to create a context within which a given-in-One 
(which is not unrelated to Badiou’s finite situation) can interact with the One (again, 
not unrelated to Badiou’s Being). Badiou’s use of the evental site is his attempt to 
resolve the impasse of allowing for access to something beyond the world of 
experience whilst remaining in the world of experience, and his adoption of set theory 
allows for a logically unproblematic connection between something that at first does 
not exist within experience and then subsequently does exist. Badiou acknowledges 
the problem of engaging with or encountering something that is outside of or beyond 
current experience and uses the concept of indiscernment as a means by which his 
finite subject is able to ‘name’ rather than identify or understand the generic within a 
situation. In a similar way, Laruelle’s sense of ‘description’ is analogous to Badiou’s 
process of naming, such that the experience of being a real that is given in the One 
can be identified and named, but cannot be interpreted or characterised at all. As 
such, where the event functions as a tracing of immanence, so too does Laruelle’s 
vision-in-One inform us that the One forms a context within which thought, or a 
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creative process can happen, without in any way configuring the One or making any 
claims about how this process might be happening.11  
 
Where Badiou creates the Event and the subject-to-Truth as a means to investigate 
and allow for a connection between the finite and the infinite, Laruelle’s strategy is to 
use what he calls ‘transcendental cloning’ or ‘non-thetic transcendence’ as a means to 
capture a movement between the One (as a non-appearing, yet all-pervasive 
foundation of everything) and the world of experience (or what Laruelle refers to as 
‘Lived Experience’ (Laruelle, 2011: 246)).12 As discussed earlier, in Philosophy and Non-
Philosophy, Laruelle asserts that the things we experience in and as the world, are 
neither representations of the One or the Real, nor is this experience directly 
constituted by the One (it can only be said to be determined-in-the-last-instance, and 
given in the One). With the notion of non-thetic reflection, which suggests that we are 
looking at, and experiencing the reflection of an object that cannot be seen, Laruelle 
provides us with a further concept, unilateral duality. As we have seen, unilaterality is a 
tracing of the non-reciprocal movement from the Real to lived experience and duality 
speaks of the two parts of this formulation, the Real and lived experience. Although 
there is no movement from the world of lived experience back into the Real, such that 
lived experience has nothing to ‘say’ to the Real, and the Real is ‘disinterested’ in lived 
experience, one of the more compelling, and yet obviously complex aspects of non-
philosophy, is that Laruelle asks us to imagine this trajectory from the perspective of 
the One.  
 
As already noted, between Philosophy and Non-Philosophy and Principles of Non-
Philosophy, we see Laruelle developing and reformulating this particularly convoluted 
area of his work. Importantly, he moves beyond the idea of ‘non-thetic reflection’ and 
makes use of the more straightforward term, cloning’, to denote the way in which the 
One is both an active but inaccessible essence for the phenomenal world of 
experience. 
 
Cloning is the result of an empirical term = X which as ‘occasion’ or occasional 
cause’ extracts from the Real a simply transcendental identity by way of a 
                                                
11 As we shall see in the following chapter, Quentin Meillassoux employs a similar approach when he 
introduces the concept of ‘facticity’ in order to show that we can come to understand that we exist within a 
world that has a meaning to us and which we can understand, whilst at the same time we can know that this 
world is not the sum of all possible knowledge, without knowing how this finite knowledge comes about. 
12 Cloning or non-thetic transcendence is the mechanism that we see Laruelle formulating over a period of time, 
and in terms of Laruellian scholarship, between two phases of his own theoretical development (namely Philosophy 
II and Philosophy III). In Principles of Non-Philosophy, he tells us that, ‘Transcendental cloning […] was not present 
in Philosophy II except under the barely drafted and inadequate forms (theory of ‘non-thetic reflection’) (Laruelle, 
PoNP 2013: 36), which gives us an indication that, whilst these different forms of his argument share a basic 
principle, developing the means to describe and track the movement between the One and the world of 
experience was in itself a sustained project. 
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mechanism that is no longer that of the double or philosophical reflection. 
(Laruelle, 2013 PoNP: 31) 
 
This use of the term ‘cloning’, as with Badiou’s deployment of the generic 
indiscernible, is an attempt to generate a non-contradictory movement or 
transposition between the One and the world of lived experience, or what Laruelle 
refers to here as the ‘empirical’ world. Where he talks about ‘transcendental cloning’, 
Laruelle is referring to what could be thought of as a kind of copying of the One, but is 
in fact a unilateral determination of the real world in exactly the same way that the 
One unilaterally determines the world. Laruelle’s use of the word ‘transcendental’ is 
important here as well, since he is using it within a strict context, saying ‘if we 
experience or gain access to transcendence, then it is in the mode of a radical being-
immanent. (Laruelle P&NP, 2013: 68-71). This is at the heart of the idea of cloning; the 
implication that what is being cloned is not an aspect of the Real, but a mode, or an 
operating principle. ‘Double’ and ‘reflection’ thus inform us that the process of cloning 
does not simply create something that ‘looks like’ the One, or that is exactly the same 
as the One, albeit in a different context; instead, as a result of all of the operations and 
processes that we have discussed, cloning is an enacting of the One. In the following 
passage, we see Laruelle developing the relationship between cloning and identity, 
allowing us to expand our understanding of this process: 
 
The theory of cloning is of course fundamental within a thought which is 
nonetheless not one of identity in the philosophical and intentional sense, but a 
thought by and according to identity. More exactly, a thinking in-identity. 
(Laruelle, 2013 PoNP: 32) 
 
Thinking according to identity, or thinking in-identity, is therefore a way of thinking 
about cloning within a practical or lived context and, as we shall see, is one of the 
most valuable non-philosophical tools in terms of thinking about improvisation and the 
production of music. In its basic formation, thinking in-identity clones the One’s 
capacity to be the force of determination-in-the-last-instance, but rather than 
determining anything in the way that the One does, thinking according-to-identity 
remains given in the One. This is the transcendental nature of non-philosophical 
cloning; that reminds us that thinking in-identity ‘does what the One does’, in that is a 
point of determination, but is never ‘not the One’. Thinking in-identity is always given 
in the One, but determination can momentarily be understood as operating according 
to identity and in the One.   
 
One way to think about this process would be to consider the act of creating a self-
referential context, for example a photograph or a musical improvisation, as a cloning. 
In this instance, the contents of the improvisation would no longer simply belong to 
the world, instead they would belong to the improvisation, and they function literally 
as the clone of the world. In sonic terms, we could say that his cloning process creates 
‘distortions’ of the world, an improvisation is clearly given in the One, and it is real, 
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since it is of the world), but the sounds that are constructed no longer operate 
according to a recognised context: the self-vision-force of the improviser has 
reconditioned them as sounds-in-improvisation. As a result, this strange and double 
sense of movement and copying that cloning gives us, enables us to understand that 
thinking according to identity is the same process as thinking according to the One, 
but as with Laruelle’s comments about non-thetic a prioris, the process of cloning is a 
‘living in’ the One, without ‘entering’ into it. The practical outcome of this is that, since 
all of these identities are given in-One, they all have the same capacity to clone the 
Real and thus produce real experiences. As we shall see in the next chapter, Laruelle is 
not alone in thinking that an incomprehensible Real or absolute can be understood as 
being folded into a lived experience of a world that is both real and comprehensible, 
and Reza Negarestani’s use of ‘insider time’ and ‘nested interiorities explores a not 
unrelated trajectory in order to think about our relationship with something that is 
beyond human comprehension. 
 
Also worth noting at this stage, is Laruelle’s use of the term ‘superposition’ in the 
context of cloning, as it indicates another (relatively) recent development in his 
thought; a move towards using an aspect of quantum physics as a means to capture a 
sense of what radical immanence could be ‘like’. For Laruelle, ‘the One-in-the-last-
instance, the absolutely non-mixed […] is radical immanence, or immanence through 
superposition’ (Laruelle, 2013 AB: 118). Quantum superposition is a means to describe 
the way in which, at a quantum scale, particles or waves are not simply in a variety of 
different states such as different speeds, different positions, different energies or as 
particles or waves; instead, until they are measured, quantum particles are said to exist 
in every possible state at once. As such, Laruelle’s contention that radical immanence 
can be understood as superposition suggests that our experience in the lived world is 
a form of observation, or indeed ‘measurement’ of the One as immanence, which is to 
say that human thought takes what is given in the One on the terms that are presented 
to us, but as with quantum physics, we are unable to develop any insights regarding 
the provenance of the world that we observe. 
 
This survey of Laruelle’s non-philosophical project enables us to draw three main 
conclusions that will be of value to our discussions of improvisation. The first is that all 
of the various strategies that we have discussed are different readings of an essentially 
identical process. For example, where Laruelle suggests that ‘experience [of non-
thetic] transcendence, [would be] in the mode of a radical being-immanent’, this is 
another way of describing the self-vision-force that was discussed earlier. As with the 
interconnected framework of terms and ideas that Deleuze and Guattari put forward, 
non-philosophy projects outwards from a set of key principles, and we can see Laruelle 
thinking through a number of ways to put his ideas into practice. Having established 
that we do not ‘see’ the One, but that we see the things that are given-in the One, 
and similarly asserting that whilst we cannot think the One, we can however 
understand that our thought operates within the One, which enables us to 
conceptualise a thinking ‘from’ the One, Laruelle then uses a range of terms including 
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vision-in-One, self-vision-force, the photographic stance, non-thetic transcendence 
and cloning as vehicles with which to play out such a thinking from, and a performing 
of, the One. 
 
Secondly, by configuring radical immanence as superposition, Laruelle introduces the 
idea that the One can be thought of in terms of contingency and uncertainty. This is 
not to say that the One is necessarily contingent, because as Laruelle informs us, we 
can have no knowledge of the identity of the One, however, it does mean that 
because we cannot say anything about what the One is, or why it operates in the way 
that it does, then all that we can say about it is that it is contingent, or as Laruelle 
suggests, that as with the concept of superposition, the One-as-radical immanence, is 
both in every possible state and at the same time in no state. This does not mean that 
the One is unpredictable, but it does mean that we can have no way of predicting 
what the One can or will do, which again brings us back to the idea of unilateral 
determination, and the fact that we cannot understand how things happen in the One, 
we can only see that they are given in the One. Hence we cannot ‘repeat’ the One, 
instead we must non-philosophically ‘clone’ the One. 
 
The final conclusion that we can draw from Laruelle’s work will lead us directly into a 
consideration of practice, and pertains to the relationship between cloning and 
contingency. If we can allow that the One is contingent, since it is not categorisable 
and therefore not predictable, then a cloning of the One would mean a cloning of 
contingency. As we have seen, the self-vision-force of the photographic stance is just 
such a cloning of the One, which suggests that if a creative act is a cloning of 
contingency, then the disruptive tendencies of creative practices could be understood 
as a performing of contingency. 
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2. Non-philosophy and improvisation 
 
2.1 Lost within the music: improvising in-identity 
 
Earlier in the chapter we looked at Laruelle’s image of the photographic stance as a 
way to understand the vision-in-One. Now we can take this image further and see it as 
an instance of what he refers to as ‘thinking in-identity’, where thinking according to 
identity serves as another way of understanding thinking-in-One: by giving ourselves 
to the taking of a photograph or to creating a musical improvisation we are cloning 
the One and thus unilaterally determining a photograph or an improvisation. Laruelle’s 
notion of the photographic stance suggests that in the moment of taking a 
photograph (when the photographer is using their eyes, holding a particular camera 
with their hands, at a particular time and place, in order to create a particular image 
that is completely from their perspective), the photographer (and the photographic 
stance that produces the particular image) is completely situated and located in time 
and space, and has an identity that results from all of these, and no doubt more, very 
specific features. However, the photographic stance also speaks of a stripping away of 
all of these features and perspectives, such that we no longer think of a specific 
person, a specific camera, a specific time or place, we only think the One. If the One is 
the ungraspable absolute that allows for, but remains foreclosed to lived experience, 
then by performing the Real through an act of situated identity, in other words by 
taking up the photographic stance, the photographer becomes or rather clones this 
absolute. Hence, by completely giving themselves to the act of doing something, by 
becoming lost within the photographic stance and by cloning ‘a sort of undivided 
experience’, the photographer performs the ungraspable absolute Real, which, in 
reference to the conclusions above, we can also think of as a superposition-as-
quantum contingency.  
 
If we follow Laruelle’s lead and therefore think of an improviser in a postural, 
performative improvising stance, then we can begin to see how the creative act of 
improvisation is also the clone of determination-in-the-last-instance. The improviser 
inhabits their situated experience of their instrument and their environment, 
experiencing their own thoughts and responses to that environment as a prioristic 
images, as well as observing their interactions with the musical and sonic components 
of that situation, which could take the form of interplay with other musicians, the sonic 
properties of a performance space, and the sounds that they themselves are 
producing on their instrument. All of these components construct the improviser as 
the musician-in-improvisation, where the choices about what sound to make, what 
kind of musical structures could be developed, what kind of instrumental technique 
should be used, all form aspects of the improvising stance.  
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2.2 Inventing music: the improviser as synthesiser 
 
In Perpetual Frontier: The Properties of Free Music, the guitarist and bass player Joe 
Morris suggests that if ‘pioneering a creative frontier’ (Morris, 2012: 1) is the goal of 
improvising musicians, then we could say that these musicians are seeking ‘the highest 
degree of invention possible in every performance’ (Morris, 2012: 2). Morris goes on to 
suggest that, ‘the integrated employment of the properties [of free music] offers the 
greatest possible percent of originality,’and that this originality and innovation is 
‘manifested in a sound’ (Morris, 2012: 31). As such, creating music spontaneously is, 
for Morris, a search for originality, an originality that could be expressed in a variety of 
ways including discovering new sounds, inventing original musical structures, making 
unexpected tempo shifts or arranging instruments in innovative ways.14  
 
Clearly, all of these elements can combine to create a musical experience that contains 
a high degree of originality within the terms that Morris puts forward, but we can also 
think of Morris’ ideas within the context of the improvising stance, where the quest for 
originality not only relates to creating new combinations of the resources that we can 
access in the real, lived world (in other words musical instruments, the acoustic 
properties of a performance space, our own thoughts and musical knowledge, our 
interactions with other musicians), but also pertains to the fact that an improviser and 
an improvisation are both given in the One.  
 
One of Laruelle’s recent projects has been to formulate the concept of ‘photo-fiction’, 
and across two books, The Concept of Non-Photography and Photo-Fiction, A Non-
Standard Aesthetics, he builds a theoretical framework with which to support this idea 
that builds on the by-now familiar sense that, within the context of photo-fiction the 
value of photography lies not in the fact that it is able to create representations of the 
real world (Laruelle, 2012 PF: 16), ‘ 16),  the context of photo-fictioe process of 
unilateral determination (Laruelle, 2012 CNP: 26).15 We can appropriate another 
musical term, ‘synthesiser’, in order to think of an improviser as the creator of a similar 
kind of musical or sonic fiction. Where Laruelle suggests that ‘the photo is not a 
degradation of the World, but a process which is “parallel” to it’ (Laruelle, 2012 CNP: 
                                                
14 In this regard, we could think of changing attitudes towards the arrangement of musical instruments in 
jazz ensembles that occurred during the formative years of Free Jazz, where the traditional boundaries 
between front-line instruments (such as saxophone and trumpet) and rhythm section instruments (in 
particular drums and bass) became blurred. As we saw in the Introduction, Paul Dunmall referred to this re-
calibration of the relationship between instruments as something of a ‘democratic’wprocess in Western 
music. 
15 In the Preface to Photo-Fiction, Laruelle informs us that the book is a, ‘reciprocal liberation of art and 
thought by the under-determination of their means is tested out here on the concept of photography, 
hence the concept of photo-fiction, in waiting for perhaps a music-fiction’ (Laruelle, 2012 PF: 2). Whilst the 
chapter is not an attempt at a music-fiction, nevertheless, it is a re-application of some of Laruelle’s 
theoretical principles relating to non-photography and photo-fiction. 
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19 and 24), the improviser-as-synthesiser improvises, and creates a ‘synthesised’ 
musical fiction, which is parallel to the world; and in the same way as a photo-fiction, 
although a music-fiction exists in the world, it is not ‘of’ that world. The improviser’s 
commitment to invention, can therefore be a reference both to a conventional 
interpretation of improvisation, which would be an improvisation that makes use of 
available resources in the lived world, but now, we could think of an improvisation as 
an acknowledgement of Laruelle’s thoughts on ‘music-fiction’ that frames the process 
of improvising as the creation of a synthesised real within the world.16 
 
Throughout The Perpetual Frontier, Morris goes to great lengths to describe an 
exhaustive array of techniques and resources that a musician can use when conducting 
a search for new forms of musical expression, and his thorough analysis of the various 
improvising and compositional methodologies used by Ornette Coleman, Cecil Taylor, 
Anthony Braxton and Derek Bailey among others, provides something of a catalogue 
of ideas for improvising musicians to make use of and modify in their own practice. In 
his own description of the book, Morris suggests that, 
 
Free music is an art form that has been made by individuals […] who invented 
the way they play their instruments and invented platforms on which to play 
that music, based on whatever aesthetic value they thought mattered to them. 
(Morris, 2012 online) 
 
Here again we see Morris further emphasising the importance of invention, but now 
going beyond a simple discussion of creative invention during the course of 
performance, but broadening his scope to consider some of the broader contexts that 
surround live performance. Inventing techniques, designing performance spaces, as 
well as creating instruments, scales and rhythmic patterns are all examples of the way 
in which the creation of synthesised sound and music fictions clone the One, creating 
new paradigms for musical performance practice, in terms of creating new methods 
and tools to facilitate the creation of music, a music that would therefore not operate 
according to pre-established practices. This is another important aspect of Laruelle’s 
interest in fiction as practice; that a fiction does not ‘represent’ what is in the world, it 
creates (‘synthesises’) its own codes and means of engagement. 
 
Not only does Morris offer new perspectives on the importance of musical invention as 
fiction, but he also provides us with another means of thinking about transcendental 
cloning when he puts forward his views regarding ‘Spirit vs. Technique’ (Morris, 2012: 
22) in improvised music practice. Morris takes the view that phrases such as ‘let the 
spirit come through you’ (Morris, 2012: 22), which suggest that improvising might 
                                                
16 In the context of the current discussion, the term ‘synthesised’ therefore does not refer to creating 
something unreal or fake, instead it is being used to suggest that the process of cloning, within a musical 
context can be likened to a process of synthesizing, and thus a means to produce real (as opposed to Real) 
sounds.  
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precipitate or be the result of some form of transcendental experience, do not suffice 
in terms of discussing the practice of producing music. On the contrary, his work is 
very much focused on developing an expansive lexicon of terms and techniques that 
are specifically designed to illuminate and enhance the act of creating music 
spontaneously. However, in non-philosophical terms, rather than thinking about a 
vague notion of transcendental spiritual communion, we could think of Morris’ ‘spirit’ 
as the One. In this regard, spiritual transcendence, or more accurately non-thetic 
transcendence, would in fact suggest that it is precisely through the rigorous 
application of musical technique and knowledge, that the One could be said to ‘come 
through us’, although as we have seen, a strictly non-philosophical ‘coming through’ 
would in fact be a cloning of the One. However, Morris’ work does suggest that even 
within more formal discourse relating to improvised music practice, in terms of analysis 
and education, Laruelle’s ideas can be used to provide new perspectives on 
established ideas. 
 
In chapter one, we saw how, in A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari use the 
image (after Burroughs) of the junky sitting around ‘with a spine like a frozen hydraulic 
jack’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 153) as an analogy for the way in which the 
individual engages with the plane of consistency and becomes a body without organs. 
Their discussion focuses on the way in which an organism must dismantle itself and 
open ‘the body to connections that presuppose an entire assemblage, circuits, 
conjunctions, levels and thresholds, passages and distributions of intensity, and 
territories and deterritorialisations’ (Deleuze and Guattari,1987: 160). Deleuze and 
Guattari offer us an undoubtedly compelling image of the body without organs as a 
means to propagate distributions of intensities within an assemblage, and by dint of 
their assertion that the act of creating a territory is analogous to creative practitioner 
making a piece of art, they are signalling that a shutting-off and closing-down of the 
body’s functions can convey a sense of a creative process in motion. However, our 
discussion of Joe Morris’ ideas in terms of his views on developing a rigorous free 
music practice alongside our modification of his views on ‘spirit vs technique’ can 
provide us with an alternative sense of what a creative act might be. As our 
interpretation of Morris’ work suggests, one of the more interesting consequences of 
thinking of the improviser in terms of non-philosophy, is that rather than imagining a 
musical performance as an exercise in self-dismantling, where an improviser would go 
beyond themselves and their particular limitations, the non-philosophical improviser 
would proceed absolutely through themselves according to their specific identity, that 
is located, with a particular instrument, with a particular set of skills and knowledges 
and so on, in order to understand that a particular improvisation is a performance of 
the Real. In the previous chapter, we saw Eddie Prevost describing the process of 
improvising to being ‘lost within the music’ (Prevost, 2011: 87). Whilst this might 
initially suggest an out-of-body experience that could be similar to the one we see 
Deleuze and Guattari putting forward, we can also think of Prevost as a musician-in-
improvisation. In this regard, it is precisely because of a particular set of qualities and 
features that Prevost the improviser becomes ‘lost’: it is not that an improviser ‘steps 
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out’ of their normal perspective in order to spontaneously create music, it because he 
or she acts according to identity, and therefore according to the One, that they are 
momentarily able to live an undivided experience, thereby cloning the contingency of 
the One. 
 
2.3 Improvisation as Heresy / The improviser as Heretic 
 
Having mapped out a way of approaching Laruelle’s notion of thinking in-identity that 
can help us to broaden out the framework for what an improvisation is, what it can do 
and how it might come about, we can now turn our attention to another non-
philosophical concept, heresy, in order to conclude this articulation of improvisation in 
a non-philosophical context. Although what follows is a technical discussion of 
Laruelle’s image of the Future Christ, the framework for this conception has significant 
value in terms of understanding primarily what Laruelle actually means when he speaks 
of heresy and can provide us with a clear starting point to begin a discussion of the 
improviser as heretic. Laruelle’s non-philosophical appropriation of the concept of 
heresy is both the consequence of the research and development that informs the 
book Future Christ, but more importantly, according to Smith and other 
commentators, it marks a shift in his broader philosophical output. With non-
philosophical heresy, Laruelle makes a palpable break from the analysis and delimiting 
of difference that features in earlier works such as Philosophies of Difference and 
Philosophy and Non-Philosophy (the work that makes up the majority of Laruelle’s 
output from Philosophy I to Philosophy IV) to the more constructive and creative 
approach that characterises his most recent research under the heading of Philosophy 
V. In this way, heresy appears as a deliberate attempt on Laruelle’s part to move away 
from critiquing other philosophical models, and to develop instead a coherent model 
of what non-philosophy can achieve in regard to religious and scientific thought. 
Whilst Laruelle’s focus is clearly the figure of the heretic within the context of religious, 
particularly Christian, thought, we shall come to see that the heretic and ‘heretical 
decision’ can make a valuable contribution to our discussions of improvised music 
practice. 
 
The figure of the heretic combines a number of the ideas that we have already 
encountered, and at its core we can think of the heretic not only as a non-
philosophical reflection on Christianity and the figure of Jesus Christ, but perhaps 
more simply and more fundamentally, as an attempt to re-calibrate the experience of 
being in the world. Whilst most of what we have covered so far discusses what kind of 
experience being given in the One might be, and how ideas like unilateral 
determination and cloning might provide new insights into creative processes, it is 
only when we encounter the heretic that we begin to think about the consequences of 
turning these non-philosophical operations on ourselves. As we shall see there are 
various parallels that we can draw between Laruelle’s work on the heretic and his more 
recent interest in photo-fiction, and thus, when he tells us that ‘the heretic really is the 
only thinker who happens not in the World but in a background’ (Laruelle, 2010 FC: 
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52) and in making this distinction, as with photo-fiction he is suggesting that whilst in a 
practical sense, the heretic exists in the real world, his or her identity is not dependent 
on the world. Whilst a photograph and photo-fiction are ostensibly both aspects of the 
same real object, a photograph creates meaning by referring to, or representing 
things that appear in the real world, and as we have seen, photo-fiction creates a 
parallel to the real world. Thus the heretical thinker can be discerned as an aspect of a 
real person, and yet, as with photo-fiction, which Laruelle tells us, ‘is lived as an art 
without any bit of realism and it is in this way that it forms an even more intense chaos 
by the absence of the world or of its own sufficiency’ (Laruelle, 2012 PF: 20-21), the 
heretic is not of the real world. This comparison to photo-fiction allows us to see why 
the heretic can be understood to be heretical in a conventionally religious sense, since 
he or she, would not be determined by the codes, practices or conditions of the world 
(in a simple sense, they would not ‘relate’ to them). Laruelle’s comments about photo-
fiction’s lack of its own sufficiency are also key to the heretic’s destabilising tendencies, 
since this idea relates directly to the way in which the heretic is able to apply a 
unilaterally determining self-vision-force to themselves. In other words, the heretic’s 
lack of its own sufficiency is due to the two-part process of firstly being self-
determining as a result of self-vision-force, but then, because of the non-traceability of 
causality within unilateral determination, the heretic appears to arrive without 
provenance. Laruelle goes on to inform us that ‘the heretical decision is this historically 
impossible gesture and nonetheless real’ (Laruelle, 2010 FC: 52), which further 
confirms the contradictory and disruptive nature of heresy. Again, within the real 
world, the heretical figure should not be possible, as it breaks with structures and 
conventions of that world. The heretical decision is therefore an act of self-
determination; it is the making of oneself such that we ourselves become a parallel to 
the world, in many ways akin to Badiou’s use of the concept of forcing. In this way, 
heresy appears to be something of a channeling of contingency-as-superposition, it 
‘plays’ radical immanence into the real world, and at the same time, from a real world 
observer’s point of view, where the One is incomprehensible, the origins of this 
disturbance are impossible to discern. 
 
In The Concept of Non-Photography, we see Laruelle putting forward a similar 
perspective about the propensity of a photograph to be self-determining, which not 
only acts as a precursor to the concept of the photo-fiction, but in some regard could 
be thought of as a development of the heretical decision.  
 
The photo ‘arranges itself’ to precede things on whose basis, nevertheless, it 
has been produced. Far from any empiricism, it is not already amongst things, 
things are already rendered inert and sterile as soon as it appears. These are 
the things that are for all eternity in the photo and nowhere else, at least so far 
as they are ‘in-photo’. (Laruelle, 2011 CNP:100) 
 
In simple terms, a photograph ‘arranging itself’, suggests that the photograph has 
become something other than simply an image of whatever has been photographed; 
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that this ‘heretical’ object has an existence that is independent not only of the things 
that have been photographed, but also of the real world of representation. What 
Laruelle is claiming here, is that not only is the photograph not ‘of’ the things that 
have been photographed, which is one aspect of Laruelle’s non-photography, an 
undermining of the idea of representation; but also, by saying that the photograph 
‘arranges itself’, Laruelle connects the photograph to the process of self-determination 
that we explored above. The sense in which the photograph precedes the things ‘on 
whose basis it has been produced’ both conveys the idea that the photograph creates 
its own context that is not based on real relations, it is self-defining (and again 
‘parallel’ to the world), and at the same time, reconfigures the identity of the images 
that appear in the photograph. Those images now only have an identity by virtue of 
the fact that they are ‘in-photo’, again in a strict non-photographical sense, the images 
do not relate to, or represent anything outside of the photograph, they are a different 
kind of thing. As an example of thinking according to identity, we can clearly see that 
being-in-photo conveys a strong sense of the way in which firstly, the things ‘in’ the 
photograph have an identity due to the fact that they are in that photograph and 
nowhere else, and secondly, that the images that a photograph presents are also 
unilaterally determined. This qualifies Laruelle’s statement about the photograph 
being ‘far from any empiricism’, since the photograph, as with the heretical decision, is 
determined by the One, and not caused by something in the real world. 
 
Whilst the above analysis has drawn comparison between heresy, non-photography 
and photo-fiction in order to further develop a context in which to discuss non-
philosophy and practice, we can also direct some of these terms towards 
improvisation in order to draw some useful conclusions. One of the key insights that 
we can take from Laruelle’s work on heresy is that whilst the heretical decision is 
particular type of thinking-according-to-identity, a self-determined identity, it is also an 
acting outside of real space and time. Obviously in its traditional formulation, heresy 
does not conform to the rules and conventions of the culture or society that it 
heretically transgresses, and in the same way, non-philosophical heresy is seen as 
breaking with a conventional means of understanding things. Ultimately what is 
heretical about non-philosophical heresy is that it seeks to be two types of thing, or at 
least to fold two categories of heresy into itself. On one hand, we can think of a real 
heresy, a given-in-One, that outputs into a world that we can comprehend, a musically 
transgressive heresy of dissonant sounds, counter-intuitive structures, extended 
instrumental techniques, or less obvious heresies that a more contextually nuanced; 
quiet music that should be loud, diatonic music that should be discordant, repetitive 
music that should be varied. On the other hand, we can think in terms of heresy as 
self-determining vision-force, which arrives with no precedent, and does not function 
in relation to real categories, instead it is its own category, it is a cloning of the One 
and a synthesiser of parallel worlds. What is interesting about the sense in which this 
second, ‘synthetic heresy’, creates new categories and new worlds is that such a 
wholesale act of creativity suggests the creation of new parameters within which to 
have experiences, such as time and space itself. 
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Laruelle builds just such a conception of the Future Christ as the heretical figure that 
does not return within what we would normally understand as a conventional 
eschatological context, in other words ‘at the end of time’. Instead, the Future Christ is 
itself a new time, and creates a new time. 
 
The Future Christ is time as subject-time, cloned or born but without a birth 
brought about in the time of the World. (Laruelle, 2010 FC: 123) 
 
Here, Laruelle speaks about the Future Christ as a figure that disrupts time and appears 
as something we do not recognise. This is the real force behind the idea of the heretic: it 
is beyond comprehension and outside of our standard temporal frameworks and physical 
points of reference, and thus it forces the creation of new frameworks and references, and 
as we saw with the heretical decision, the Future Christ is a cloning of the One, it is a 
unilaterally determined identity which itself can determine other identities.  
 
The claim that ‘time is immanent to time’ (Laruelle, 2010 FC: 119), is a further extension to 
this idea, which is to say that even time can be considered as a determination according 
to identity, in that what we take to be clock time in a real sense, is simply a feature of 
lived experience rather than any sort of feature or condition of the One. Clearly, time is a 
central feature of improvised musical performance, given that it is a time based activity, 
and that the duration of a musical performance can very often feel out of step with clock 
time; an indication that time – and the experiences that we have within that time – can 
seem to exist according to the identity of a given improvisation, rather than within strict 
chronometric time. What is also notable in the current context, is that we can identify a 
direct correlation between quantum superposition and the figure of the Future Christ. As 
we have seen, temporal differentiation only occurs at the moment of measurement, since 
prior to measurement, a quantum particle exists in all temporal states. In terms of non-
philosophical heresy, therefore, time becomes determined by the heretical figure of the 
Future Christ, and time can only be understood as real time at the point of determination: 
up until that moment, there can be no concept of time, as there is only radical 
immanence. This is to say that, whilst we might accept time as a fundamental part of our 
experience of the lived world, in fact, as non-philosophy reminds us, time is only one 
other aspect of a world that is given in One, and that outside of this context, our real 
conception of time has no meaning. 
 
Future Christ as distortion of time demonstrates the double aspect of heresy that we 
discussed earlier: a heresy in the conventionally religious conception of the word, which 
undermines and subverts a Christian eschatology, and the non-philosophical, heresy-as-
synthesis which as self-determining radical immanence is able to create a new kind of 
time. As we saw in Laruelle’s non-photographic proposal for being-in-photo, wherein the 
photograph ‘arranges itself to precede things on whose basis it has been produced’, the 
future-in-person of the Future Christ is a future that mirrors this idea. The Future Christ 
does not arrive in the world in a real time, instead the Future Christ creates a parallel time 
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which similarly ‘arranges itself’, thus as an actual rupture in time, the Future Christ is a 
creating of a new kind of future that would not have previously existed, which in more 
straightforward non-philosophical terms would be a determining of the real components 
of that future as being in that future, and nowhere else. Whilst this might appear to be a 
rather obvious statement, one of the main consequences of thinking about time in terms 
of the Future Christ is that it directs us towards contemplating a future that could exist 
both as an extension to our current world (it would be a future that we would be able to 
live in), and yet it would operate according to its own set of principles, which would not 
be drawn from the present; rather, they would be self-determined. Thus the future-in-
person is a state or condition that is absolutely born of a break with a current conception 
of our normal state of existence, and which creates its own set of conditions, values and 
codes. The real import of this idea is that the future does not necessarily need to be a 
continuation of the present, instead, the heretical decision suggests that different kinds of 
futures can be constructed, and as John Cage claims in his ‘Future of Music Credo’, ‘the 
composer (organiser of sound) will not only be faced with the entire field of sound but 
also with the entire field of time’ (Cage, 2004: 27), thus suggesting that a heretical 
musician, is not only a creator of sounds and of music, but also a creator of time. 
 
If the Future Christ and non-philosophical heresy are assertions that the present is only 
ever a determination of Real contingency, and that the self-determination of the 
heretical decision is a means to create new worlds and new kinds of futures, then we 
can begin to see how improvised music practice, can similarly be seen to be a playing 
out of self-determined radical immanence. In his introduction to Songs in the Key of Z: 
The Curious Universe of Outsider Music, the journalist and music historian Irwin Chusid 
sets out to explore and discuss the work of a series of ’unintentional renegades’ 
(Chusid, 2000: x), whose musical practice is ‘fragmented and lacking in common 
structural threads’ (Chusid, 2000: xiv). Whilst this is in no way intended to be a formal 
and scientifically controlled tracking of heresy, Chusid’s interest in a set of creative 
musicians who are seemingly at odds with not only their own cultural contexts and 
environments, but who also have very little in common with each other, does reflect 
certain aspects of our exploration of the heretic. Whilst the book is ostensibly focused 
on musicians whose work falls outside of jazz and improvised music practices, Chusid 
does include the jazz musicians Ornette Coleman, Thelonious Monk and Sun Ra in a 
list of musicians whose work he sees as being ‘difficult to catalogue’ (Chusid, 2000: 
xiv), suggesting that their music, for a variety of reasons, breaks with audiences’ 
expectations. In chapter one, we saw how Coleman’s music was so unsettling, and 
provoked such a negative response that he was physically assaulted by his fellow band 
members early in his career. Coleman’s theory of Harmolodics, which became a 
cornerstone of his musical practice, was described by a later collaborator, the guitarist 
Bern Nix, as ‘a way of looking at music - it’s not a system. It’s a way of [handling] the 
difficulty of dealing with melody, rhythm and harmony [by way of utilising] melodic 
variables, [it’s] exploratory’ (Nix, 2009). Nix’s description indicates the elusiveness of 
Harmolodics, pointing towards its potentially heretical nature, such that it can be 
apprehended in the world, but it is not of the world. Similarly, when Nix relates his 
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own conversation with Coleman about Harmolodics, he tells us, ‘I said to him, “You 
know, to me this sounds like counterpoint.” He said, “Well, it's not exactly 
counterpoint, it's something else.” The way Ornette uses language, he likes to put his 
own spin on everything’ (Nix, 2009), which again suggests that Coleman’s ideas were 
turned towards creating an approach to making music that was not premised on a set 
of accepted codes and practices. We have already examined the notion of unilateral 
determination from a number of perspectives, but in contrasting unilaterality to 
alterity, and suggesting that heresy is ‘the Other than […] and not the Other of’, 
(Laruelle, 2010 FC: 51), Laruelle introduces a conception of otherness that is similar to 
the one the Coleman uses. Here we see Laruelle describing a complete ‘other,’ not 
simply a mirror image or other type of reflection of what we already can see. This is 
the power of the photograph that we saw Laruelle describing earlier, where, by 
arranging itself the photograph does not simply exist in relation to the things that have 
been photographed; it is not the other ‘of’ these things, it is other ‘than’ these things, 
it is something else entirely and it would be a mistake to confuse them. In this way 
although an improvisation may well make use of the same notes or sounds that we 
hear in other musical contexts (as Nix suggests, in melodies, harmonies or rhythms), 
the improvisation is not simply the ‘other’ of these different contexts, the notes are not 
simply re-arranged in an-‘other’ way, instead an improvisation as heresy, which could 
be seen as the result of the improvising stance, is distinctly other ‘than’ any piece of 
music that is not that particular improvisation, which is to say every ‘other’ piece of 
music. 
 
2.4 Non-improvising improvisation  
 
As we have seen, non-philosophy offers a number of opportunities with which to 
discuss improvisation, and before completing this chapter with an extended discussion 
of the work of the improvising trumpet player Peter Evans, we shall perform one final 
non-philosophical operation in order to consider what a non-improvisation might be. 
 
Non-philosophy was designed to destabilise philosophy, by denouncing any special 
status accorded to philosophy in terms of its ability to offer either ‘special knowledge’ 
or ‘privileged access’ to the Real (what Laruelle refers to as the ‘Principle of Sufficient 
Philosophy’), seeing it instead as simply one discourse amongst many. In putting non-
philosophy to work, Laruelle conceived of a non-photography, which as we have seen, 
enabled him to think practically about what photography is doing; what it does to the 
things it photographs, what it tells us about the things that we see in photographs, 
what it tells us about the act of taking a photograph and what might be happening 
when we look at a photograph. Non-photography is not a negation of photography, 
instead it is designed to establish a conception of photography that accepts non-
philosophy’s negation of representation and causality, replacing it instead with two 
key ideas: non-photography as a cloning of radical immanence (which relates to self-
vision-force and the way in which the photograph is a playing out of contingency, in 
other words it shows us that we cannot know, or represent the Real-One), and non-
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photography as a unilateral determination of identity (such that things that appear in a 
photograph exist according to the parallel world of that photograph, but are not 
directly caused by it). 
 
Similarly, non-improvisation would be not a negation of improvisation, instead, by 
acknowledging the same non-photographic principles, cloning of radical immanence 
and unilateral determination of identity, it is an opening-up of improvisation to new 
ways of thinking about the production and experience of sound. As a time-based 
activity, non-improvisation encourages us to think about the various temporal aspects 
of improvisation; new timeframes, new rhythms, new patterns; to an extent, non-
improvisation is an attitude towards improvisation, it is a way of ‘performing 
improvisation’.  
 
One of the particular consequences of thinking through a non-improvisation is that it 
allows us to foreground the fact that improvisation itself is a non-linear process, which 
is how we can understand non-improvisation as a performance of improvisation. 
Where non-improvisation is a process that understands that the improvisation stance is 
a cloning of quantum-superpositioning, then we can trace this contingency through 
both the improviser’s and the improvisation’s determination according to identity. This 
is not to say that improvisation is unpredictable because it performs the contingency 
of the One, but that a non-improvisation is unpredictable because its rules are not 
simply drawn from the real world of lived experience, they are self-determined by a 
heretical improviser. In this way non-improvisation encourages us to think about the 
outcome of an improvisation as a measuring of quantum movement, understanding 
that we can no longer simply say that ‘this decision has caused that outcome’ in a 
conventional formulation of cause-and-effect, but instead, to think that although 
musical and sonic outcomes and aesthetic effects and can be observed, their direct 
causes cannot be traced. In addition, non-improvisation allows us to think in terms of 
improvisation-according-to-identity, where sounds and gestures take on a value and a 
meaning according to an improvisation, which is a meaning ‘other than’ a previous 
meaning (in other words, a non-improvisation does not attempt to make its materials 
‘say something’ or to communicate with an audience), it simply exists in terms of the 
meaning of the context that an improvisation has generated, and as we saw with the 
figure of the Future Christ, even an experience of time can be given according to 
identity. In this sense, non-improvisation resists conventional conceptions of 
improvisation and instead thinks of it as a process of creating synthetic, parallel worlds. 
In his description of photo-fiction, Laruelle tells us that a photo-fiction ‘will produce 
[…] a kind of chaos that is even more intense than the photo […] on the basis of a 
special logic of what we could call an art-fiction or a non-standard aesthetics’ (Laruelle, 
2012 PF: 13). Thus, if we are to understand non-improvisation as a similar kind of 
fiction (if it is to be a music-fiction in the way that Laruelle suggests that music-fiction 
will follow on from photo-fiction), then we can recognise that the musician-in-
improvisation, or a non-improviser as the producer of ‘intense chaos’, is the creator of 
sounds, patterns and even an experience of time that seems to literally come from 
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nowhere. A non-improvisation is disruptive because it interferes with time and 
presents us with sounds and structures that we cannot relate to in ways that we 
recognise. 
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3. Conclusion: Peter Evans, the Non-improviser 
 
The work of trumpeter Peter Evans spans a number of areas of contemporary jazz, 
from the meta-jazz pastiche of the jazz quartet Mostly Other People Do the Killing to 
the experimental jazz-rock of projects such as Pulverise the Sound through to the 
completely free-form improvisation of the live and digitally-manipulated solo 
performances of Nature / Culture. His work demonstrates a familiarity and fluency with 
a range of discourses surrounding post-1960s improvised music practice including 
developments in instrumental technique, experiments in sound aesthetics alongside 
the more formalist debates surrounding organisation, composition and structure within 
improvised music. In terms of the current project then, it seems that Evans’ structural 
and compositional interests, as evidenced in a number of recordings, are rooted in 
firmly in performance.  
 
As this exercise in mapping non-philosophical theory to improvised music practice has 
demonstrated, there are clearly a number of links that can be made between the two, 
and Evans’ approach to playing the trumpet makes him a compelling subject with 
which to consider notions of the non-improviser, the improvising stance and a sense of 
being-in-improvisation. In setting out his approach to playing, Evans communicates a 
number of key themes that will form the basis of this discussion of his work; ‘I’ve 
always liked to play the trumpet a lot, and I was always into finding ways to play as 
much as possible. I like information overload’ (Evans, in Hunter, 2008). His interest in 
music as information overload alludes to his related enthusiasm for using the trumpet 
to create sounds and music that push his own and his audiences’ expectations via an 
expansive sonic palette, and a range of innovative instrumental techniques and 
adaptation of the trumpet. In a non-philosophical sense, this statement communicates 
exactly what Laruelle described with the photographic stance: Evans’ trumpet takes up 
a trumpet stance in order to play the world. As we shall see, Evans’ transformation 
both of the trumpet itself and of the sounds it can produce, gives us a sense of what 
being-in-improvisation could mean, and as a musician-in-improvisation, or a non-
improviser his approach to playing signals a move away from simply thinking about 
improvisation as a re-arrangement of available materials. If we pause to briefly 
compare this sense of the non-improviser to the ‘subject as improviser’ that we 
examined in relation to Badiou’s theory of the Event, then we can quickly see a 
marked difference as to the terms of reference for improvisation in each instance.  
 
For the Badiouian improviser, we saw that an improvisation involved a process of 
‘forcing’, of bringing into existence a sound or a musical form that had hitherto been 
unrecognised or unknown. This sound or form then shaped the progression of an 
improvisation, the musicians involved in a performance developed a fidelity towards 
this improvisation event that then informed the development of the playing and real-
time composition from that point on. In addition, an audience listening to or watching 
an improvised music performance could also be said to develop a fidelity towards a 
particular sound, gesture or musical passage that then shapes their expectation and 
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experience of a piece of music. We could scale this improvisation event up to look at 
the way in which improvised music making, as a school of thought, and as a musical 
practice, is itself the result of a fidelity to one or a number of events. Hence there are 
certain expectations about what does or does not constitute an improvisation, what 
counts as a ‘good’ or ‘bad’ improvisation, and on into debates surrounding stylistic 
and genre-based approaches to playing and analysis. All of these ideas can be traced 
back to a way of thinking about improvisation that sets it up as a process through 
which an improviser brings into being something that was not previously present, 
something that was beyond the finite bounds of our environment, or situation. 
 
For the non-improviser, where the Real is shut off from the lived world, but remains 
radically immanent, non-improvisation is a recognition that improvisation is a cloning 
of the Real and therefore the production of new identities and new forms of 
experience as identities, along with new contexts for experience according to these 
identities. This is what Laruelle is referring to when he uses the term ‘non-standard 
aesthetics’; aesthetics that are not representations or aspects of things in the real 
world. Instead they are aesthetics-as-determinations, which provoke responses in 
accordance to their identity as something that is in the world but at the same time 
parallel to the world, in addition to the way in which unilateral determination draws our 
attention to the One as contingency. As we have already shown, cloning Real 
contingency does not mean that we bring that contingency into the world as 
uncertainty and unpredictability, instead, a non-improvisation according-to non-
standard aesthetics would suggest that chaos is created because we cannot know 
what these non-standard aesthetics mean.17 This is the crux of the argument for us, 
that as non-improviser, Evans is creating sounds, new approaches to playing the 
trumpet, working with different combinations of musicians, engaging with new playing 
environments, new kinds of instruments; all of which, as potential heresies, are not 
being made according to the lived world, they are unilaterally determined and are 
themselves unilaterally determining.  
 
In a piece discussing Evans’ work, the musician Eric Wubbels describes the way in 
which Evans adapts and modifies the trumpet in order to generate new techniques 
and new sounds. 
 
For Evans, the trumpet serves as a point of intersection between the human and 
the technological, and his treatment of the instrument […] is primarily abstract 
and analytical. The trumpet, voice, and microphone are treated as equal 
partners, as if the metal tube of the instrument connected smoothly to the flesh 
tube of the vocal tract through a composite vibrating membrane of lips and 
mouthpiece. (Wubbels, 2009) 
                                                
17 As we shall see in the next chapter, Quentin Meillassoux enables to understand contingency in a similar 
way, as a knowing that we can’t know something. 
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In addition, Evans also uses the trumpet as a vehicle to explore the possibilities for 
creating new kinds of musical structures. As Wubbels goes on to suggest in reference 
to the album Nature / Culture, Evans produces, ‘exactly the result the second-
generation of New Complexity composers attempt to achieve again and again’ 
(Wubbels, 2009). As we know, non-philosophy emphasises practice, thereby asserting 
that unilateral determination is lived rather than explained through philosophical 
speculation, and in this regard, it is worth noting the emphasis that Evans and others 
place on his playing in these passages. He is clearly aware of a range of technical and 
musical antecedents to his practice as a musician, and his performances are focused 
on achieving a particular sound that is in part concerned with pushing the trumpet to 
the limit of its capabilities, whilst at the same exploring the possibilities of 
spontaneously composed music. This emphasis on playing, in particular Evans’ 
decision to push both the himself and the trumpet to the limits of his own and his 
instrument’s capabilities, his ‘abstract and analytical’ approach, very much casts in him 
as a non-philosophical heretic in the sense that he creates himself as self-determining 
vision-force, acknowledging that the answers to the questions he is asking about his 
own and his instrument’s capabilities cannot necessarily be answered by turning to the 
world as he finds it. His sonic and structural innovations, his use of specialist 
techniques, all suggest that his is an approach that opens us up to thinking about 
some of the key tenets of heresy, where the extended technique produces sounds that 
are ‘other than’ what would be considered possible on the trumpet, and where his 
improvisations ‘arrange themselves’ (they are not simply an alternative to standard 
music, they are other than standard music), such that new sounds and new forms are 
beings-in-improvisation. 
 
For Evans, performance is the primary tool for exploration and research, and we can 
see in the following passage, where he talks about his preference for rehearsal over 
performance, that a core interest for him is the use of notated pieces as a starting 
point for further exploration. 
 
In new music ensembles, my favourite part is not playing the concerts —it’s 
rehearsing. I really like rehearsing crazy pieces. But then you play the concert, 
and usually there’s just one, and that’s it. To me that’s not very interesting. It 
seems to make a lot more sense and be more alive if you look at notation as 
something you have to water, and it grows in unexpected ways. (Evans, in 
Hunter, 2008) 
 
In this sense we can think of the way in which the Future Christ as future-in-person 
does not come back ‘in time’, but instead, ‘as subject-time’, thereby creating a new 
context for time. In a similar way, although at a much smaller scale, Evans’ re-
arrangement of scores in ‘unexpected ways’ speaks of a similarly disruptive process of 
derangement and rearrangement of time, where music does not come out in the way 
that a listener, or even a composer would expect, but instead is a heretical 
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modification of its patterns and rhythms. For Evans, embracing the possibility to either 
experience or produce the unexpected is clearly a key part of his approach to music 
making, and as Wubbels observes, ‘watching Evans perform live, it’s clear that, for all 
his monstrous prowess on the trumpet, he still insists on playing at the absolute limit 
of his own technique’ (Wubbels, 2009). This perspective on Evans’ approach to 
performing further suggests that he is aware that neither his instrument, nor his own 
instrumental technique are ‘enough’ to enable him to produce the music that he wants 
to. Clearly Evans is not intentionally adopting an improvisation stance, and neither is 
he deliberately making a heretical decision to become self-visioning point of 
determination, nevertheless, as we saw earlier with the discussion of Joe Morris’ 
attitude towards the importance of practical rigour and technique, Wubbels’ thoughts 
on Evans’ playing convey a sense in which, for Evans, ‘the world is not enough’, and 
that by exceeding his own and his instrument’s capabilities, he will be able an non-
improvised world that could be akin to Laruelle’s music-fiction. 
 
On the album Nature / Culture, Evans uses solo performance as a means to trigger 
and investigate a range of improvisational possibilities with the trumpet. The record 
consists of two sets of pieces, the first a series of studio-based performances that 
make use of multitrack recording and editing processes in order to recontextualise his 
playing, whereas the second set of pieces are the result of a continuous solo 
performance that lasts over forty minutes. When being interviewed about the ideas 
behind his solo performances, Evans described his aims and approach and spoke 
about particular playing techniques and the way in which his interest in excess and 
overload enables him to create and discover new sounds and new compositional 
strategies. 
 
There are very specific types of material that I’ve been working on in the 
context of solo playing […] particularly ways of generating polyphony and 
rhythmic variation with three, four or five notes only. The level of variation and 
complexity that can be derived from the most basic materials is amazing, so 
rather than shy away from returning to certain types of playing, I dive deeper 
into them. Then the challenge is to push myself during performance to the 
edge of what I know, which is the most exciting part, and actually that’s usually 
where the most interesting things happen and where I discover new things to 
cultivate. It’s an endless process, and ‘mastery’ is a total illusion. (Evans, in 
Clark, 2011: 34) 
 
As we can see from this passage, Evans’ approach often begins with a particular focus 
(in this instance experimentation with polyphony in solo performance), which prompts 
further exploration. Evans’ point that he tries to push himself ‘to the edge of what [he] 
know[s]’ is key, since it reflects Laruelle’s thoughts on non-standard aesthetics, 
suggesting that knowledge, as a means to represent the world to himself, clearly 
becomes insufficient to Evans' needs. Non-standard aesthetics do not create 
outcomes because of what they represent or what they communicate, but because 
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they create the conditions for future responses, or for future determinations: this is the 
‘special logic’ that we saw Laruelle alluding to earlier. In this sense, when Evans states 
that he is working at the edge of what he knows, in a non-philosophical context, we 
could take this as an indication that his improvisations require something more than 
just knowledge of the world that he is in. In setting out to deliberately expand on an 
existing vocabulary of the trumpet, Evans conveys a sense of non-improvisation as the 
performing of contingency, in other words, he is not just using what he knows, he is 
trying to use what he does not yet know, and, in regard to a non-improvisation being a 
performing of the One, possibly what he cannot know. However, producing 
improvisations is not simply about identifying rules and then transgressing them, and 
that is certainly not any kind of formula for producing either interesting or musically 
successful improvisations. So this sense of ‘going against the grain’ or working against 
accepted norms, is only part of Evans’ non-improvisational strategy. 
 
The second aspect of Evans’ approach that we need to understand is the open-ended 
nature of his overall performance strategy; he understands that the ‘working-against’ 
elements of his playing can only take him so far. The performances on part two of the 
Nature / Culture record are clearly grounded quite literally in an experimental 
trajectory, in that Evans can certainly articulate his playing strategy as an experiment 
with certain aspects of instrumental technique, but what certainly marks these pieces 
out as being potentially non-improvisational, is the fact that this deliberate 
experimentation is only the starting-point for Evans’ playing. If improvisation is the art, 
or at least the act of starting with an idea and developing it, responding dynamically to 
changes in the performance environment whilst maintaining a clear aesthetic focus, in 
order to arrive at a coherent set of sonic and musical statements, then it is Evans’ 
ability to both recognise such areas for potential formal development within the 
language of trumpet playing, and then play according to those identities and to be 
determined by them. In this sense, the improvisation stance becomes more closely 
focused, and we can observe Evans improvising according-to circular breathing, 
according-to trumpet key noise, or – when Wubbels informs us that Evans inserts a 
microphone into the bell of a trumpet in order to create ‘a kind of paradoxical 
“amplifier mute”’ (Wubbels, 2009) – we could say that he is improvising according-to 
amplifier mute. In these instances and more, we can see Evans inserting himself into a 
particular context, allowing himself to be ‘determined’ by these contexts, and thus 
forcing himself to exceed his current knowledge and understanding. 
 
In another interview excerpt, we can see Evans talking similarly about using particular 
aspects of trumpet playing as catalysts for performance, that then take him further into 
a determined identity and thus beyond his knowledge. To an extent, this alludes to 
Laruelle’s older model of non-thetic transcendence, in the sense that this concept 
allows us to ‘live’ the non-thetic a prioris that are seen in the One, and by working 
absolutely into the fine-grained details of various performance identities, we may be 
able to infer that Evans is thus able to live (via his own performance) the non-thetic a 
prioris of the One and of the various performance contexts. 
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I’m very interested in the way that proportions of different kinds of materials 
distort how they are heard. A mid-register note on a trumpet with a Harmon 
mute; that’s the most clichéd trumpet sound around, from Miles Davis down to 
Chris Botti and anonymous supermarket trumpet noodling. But the actual sonic 
properties of a Harmon muted trumpet are completely insane. If you hold the 
note for 30 seconds, or ten minutes, a completely different frame of reference 
emerges. And what I’m interested in is not just the contrast exposed by 
differences of proportion but the journey the ear makes from disconnecting one 
sound from one signification, and either attaching a new one, or being stranded 
suddenly in a very abstract place. There you go – that’s the one constant 
whatever I’m doing. (Evans, in Clark, 2011: 34) 
 
Evans’ interest in ‘stranding’ either himself or his audience in ‘a very abstract place’ 
strongly communicates this sense of immersion or, non-philosophically speaking, 
improvisation according-to a set of instrumental and performative identities. In this 
sense, we can also discern the emergence of the heretical ‘other’, in the way that this 
abstract place, is almost a direct rendering of Laruelle’s assertion that photo- and 
music-fictions are the constructions of parallel worlds. As with Laruelle’s Future Christ, 
Evans’ is a point of focus that creates new conditions and new points of reference, 
which are themselves new identities and new points of determination. As a non-
improviser, Evans’ music requires listeners to generate a new set of criteria with which 
to understand the sounds and music that he is generating. As he says, a common 
association that listeners may make with the Harmon mute (a device that is fitted into 
the open end of a trumpet in order to produce a more muted and softer sound than is 
normally produced by the trumpet) is the sound and music of the Jazz musician Miles 
Davis. Davis’ music from the 1950s is the archetypal ‘cool’ Jazz, indeed one of his 
landmark albums The Birth of the Cool is very much seen as having generated a 
particular set of associations that audiences have with a laid-back, soft and 
contemplative style of Jazz that still persists today.  
 
What follows is an examination of Evans’ performance during the piece Nature / Culture, 
(CD2, tracks 1-5 of the 2009 album of the same name) that is intended to go some way 
towards broadening out a number of the themes that have been raised in this chapter. As 
an overall piece, Nature / Culture does not have a consistent structural arc, instead, there 
is a sense that we pass through a number of episodes, or in Deleuze-Guattarian terms, we 
could even say ‘plateaus’. Although the piece ‘has been separated into tracks on the disc 
for the listener’s convenience’ (Evans, 2009), each of the tracks contains a number of 
these smaller episodes, where we hear Evans working through and investigating various 
sonic and technical aspects of the trumpet. 
 
Part B is a fascinating example of much of what has been discussed throughout the 
chapter, particularly in relation to the ideas around the heretical decision and the 
distorting effects that we see Laruelle alluding to with the image of the Future Christ. In 
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this track, we hear Evans sustaining a continuous sound for over half of the four-and-a-
half-minute piece, however, this is in no way a simply demonstration of technical prowess; 
instead we hear an act of sonic transformation in its fullest sense. Listening to the piece 
on a CD, rather than seeing the performance live, further emphasises the process that 
Evans is working through since the acousmatic nature of this experience prevents any 
kind of visual distraction from what we can hear. 
 
The piece starts with a low feedback tone, possibly achieved by inserting the condenser 
microphone that Evans mentions in the liner notes too far into the trumpet’s bell. Over 
the course of fifty seconds, we hear and gradually after one minute, we hear Evans rapidly 
fingering the trumpet’s valves, whilst at the same time creating more of the vocalisations 
through the trumpet – akin to explosive and crackling sounds – that we heard on part A.  
The valve noise and feedback continues until just after two minutes, with Evans 
manipulating the feedback so that it opens out and ‘pulses’, with swells in volume and 
high partials becoming audible, until Evans subtly begins to play a sustained note at the 
same pitch as the feedback. From this point until the end of part B, the note is either held 
continuously, or punctuated by tongued notes, although with no gaps long enough for 
Evans to draw breath. We hear Evans mimicking the smeared frequency slides of the 
feeding-back tone, by subtly increasing and decreasing the pitch of his note at first, and 
then, from 3’20 onwards, he starts to push these frequency oscillations further, with 
overblowing, multiphonics and by working closely with the feedback, thereby creating 
three closely interwoven sounds. Evans gradually pulls out of this from 3’50 onwards, 
reducing to a single sustained trumpet note that he then raises and lowers with 
conventional valve strokes, before moving into part C of the performance. 
 
It is during playing such as this that we begin to hear the way in which we could describe 
Evans as a heretical improviser, as his playing passes beyond an easy sense of 
categorisation. Whilst he is clearly making use of a given set of tools, techniques and 
resources – he is not the first musician to use circular breathing, multiphonics or 
amplification to modify and counterpoint their playing – he is able, for a brief period of 
time, to suspend a straightforward categorisation of what we are listening to.  
 
Similarly, towards the end of part C, we hear Evans using the volume pedal to create 
volume swells that slightly distort, giving the impression that the lower notes that he is 
playing are breaking down somewhat. He then further emphasises by playing near to, and 
then away from, the microphone. This sense of destabilisation, of interfering with the 
listener’s sense of distance from what is being hear, although slight, is nevertheless 
unsettling. It makes for a fractured experience, almost as if Evans is resetting the 
trumpet’s position in our awareness with every move towards or away from the 
microphone. It is an interesting effect, because the result is to unbalance our sense of 
listening to either an amplified or unamplified trumpet, although it is obviously the same 
person playing the instrument in the same performance. 
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He continues this work with the amplified signal through part D, at first by playing lower 
notes and vocalisations through the microphone, again slightly overdriving the signal, 
before oscillating between two notes – resulting in a sound not unlike an emergency 
vehicle siren – that he then continues to modulate with swells in speed, volume, changes 
in rhythm, and tonal modifications that he achieves by continuing to manipulate the 
amplified trumpet signal. Eventually, at 4’15, he fully overloads the signal and achieves 
the effect of a distorted guitar or organ, playing a rapid and looping trill that is once more 
facilitated via circular breathing. Evans cuts the amplified signal at 5’25, thus bringing part 
D to a close and taking us into part E, the final episode of the performance, where he 
continues to circular breathe until approximately two minutes, with a dense series of runs 
and short three and two note loops. 
 
Part E continues with a descent into indistinct noise at approximately 4’20, with a variety 
of rapidly keyed valves, overblown sounds and close-miked playing that result in the most 
‘un-trumpet-like’ playing of the entire performance. Whilst this part is by no means 
abrasive, there is a strong sense that Evans is taking the trumpet as far away from its point 
of origin as possible. For this middle section of part E, until approximately seven minutes 
onwards, when he introduces a sustained tone that continues to the end of the piece, we 
hear a blurred and deliberately abstracted set of sounds, as if Evans is trying to transform 
the trumpet tones themselves into the feedback that we have heard throughout the 
performance. These are low register sounds that produce oscillating overtones that 
gradually evolve into the single tone at 7’20. From this point until the end of the piece, 
we hear Evans return to the interplay between the pure trumpet sound and the feedback 
produced by the amplified signal, and as Evans creates a beating tone by varying the 
frequency between the two tones that we hear, he brings the improvisation to an end. 
 
Thus, Evans presents us with a performance that very much reflects a number of the 
themes that Laruelle introduces for us. Whilst it would be hubristic to suggest that Nature 
/ Culture is a radicalisation of music in the way that ideas such as atonalism, serialism, or 
even free improvisation itself fundamentally altered the way that we approach music, or 
that Evans’ technical innovations have forever changed the way that players will approach 
the trumpet; if we are able to say anything about deliberate attempts to innovate in 
music, to think heretically – or at the very least challenge our own conceptions of what is 
possible – then Evans’ performance here provides some directions for thought. We hear 
him re-imagining what a trumpet can do sonically, taking its constituent elements apart 
and turning it instead into a sound-making machine that has more in common with an 
electronic signal processor than a brass instrument with hundreds of years’ worth of 
history within the classical, and more latterly, the jazz tradition. We hear Evans displacing 
the audience’s point of focus – what kind of sound are we listening to? An amplified 
trumpet? An un-amplified trumpet? Multiple trumpets? All of these techniques are 
redolent of the idea of cloning the One, such that even the act of multiplying and 
confusing the boundaries between the various sound sources could be seen (or heard) as 
a performance of radical immanence, where the point of the sound’s origin in many ways 
becomes a matter of superposition.  
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In working against his own and his audiences’ expectations, we can see that the 
various creative constraints that Evans sets himself work as trigger points, forcing him 
to generate a new knowledge that is a cloning radical immanence. Just as non-
philosophy requires that we re-assess our understanding, expectations and conception 
of philosophy, when Evans’ playing moves beyond simple improvisation in the way 
that we have seen, when he creates a stance in relation to improvised music practice, 
and demands of both himself and his audience that we rethink our approach to what 
an instrument or an improvisation can do, then we can fully appreciate that by 
stranding himself in an abstract place, he has not only projected himself and his 
audience into a world that is other than the world that we had previously experienced, 
but using improvisation as a means to clone and perform the One within a lived world, 
he has radically transformed what music can do. He has non-improvised music. 
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In Through the Out Door: Three speculative perspectives on improvisation 
 
In After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of Contingency, the philosopher Quentin 
Meillassoux tells us that, 
 
[W]e know two things […]: first, that contingency is necessary, and hence eternal; 
second, that contingency alone is necessary […] Everything is possible, anything can 
happen - except something that is necessary, because it is the contingency of the 
entity that is necessary, not the entity.1 (Meillassoux, 2016: 65) 
In this brief excerpt, we see Meillassoux setting out the central thesis of After Finitude, 
and claiming that the one thing that we humans can be certain of, is that contingency 
must exist. For a project that aims to generate new ways of thinking about improvisation, 
an activity that thrives on and embraces unfixed outcomes, Meillassoux’s claims about 
contingency are clearly appealing. In what follows, we shall explore the way in which 
Meillassoux, and the thinkers Nick Land, Ray Brassier, Reza Negarestani have undertaken 
to think about how human thought can be contrasted with something that is seen to be 
either outside of, prior to or radically immanent to itself. In many ways, this was one of the 
central concerns of the so-called Speculative Realist movement, where Meillassoux and 
Brassier, among others, developed a means of thinking about human thought’s access to 
an immanence that was radically different in kind to that thought.2 
 
This chapter will thus explore improvisation’s relationship to three perspectives that can 
be associated with Speculative Realism, all of which engage with notions of contingency 
and the destabilisation of human experience. First among these will be an exploration of 
Meillassoux’s use of the concepts of the ‘correlation’ and ‘facticity’ and we shall consider 
the potential to extend some of the conclusions that we reached in the discussion of 
Badiou’s work in regard to the way in which infinity and the void can interact with finite 
thought, in order to think through a ‘de-correlating’ of improvisation, and thus consider 
improvisation as an encounter with something that is not simply a correlation of thought. 
Secondly, we shall use the work of Jane Bennett as a starting point to begin a 
reconsideration of aspects of Deleuze and Guattari’s ideas relating to assemblages and 
intensities. Bennett has furthered the potential to think in terms of the ‘agency’ of what 
she calls ‘vibrant matter’, which would enable us to view an improvisation as a ‘gathering 
of forces’. However, as we shall see, the work of Nick Land and Ray Brassier would 
instead encourage us to see an improvisation as an act of ‘unbinding’ or of dissipation, 
that tends towards an underlying contingency. Thus, this middle section, in musical terms, 
will function as a ‘middle eight’, or a bridge, and by showing that things are ‘deathlike’, 
rather than ‘lifelike’, it will provide us with a means to move from Meillassoux’s abstracted 
logical operations, to a more practically oriented set of discussions. Thus, in the chapter’s 
third and final section, the work of Reza Negarestani will enable us to think about how an 
                                                
1 See also footnote 4  
2 The other two participants at the original Speculative Realism workshop in 2007 were Iain Hamilton Grant 
and Graham Harman. 
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improvisation could be viewed as an act of passage, or a portal between a human 
conception of time, where human time allows for human experience, and an absolute 
time that is normally beyond human comprehension. In this way, the chapter will be a 
mapping of improvisation first as an activity that has a consistency and integrity beyond 
human thought’s capacity to ‘think’ improvisation; secondly, improvisation will be viewed 
as an act of dissolution that reveals an underlying absolute contingency that is beyond a 
human, or indeed a vitalist, conception of the interaction of intensities; and thirdly, and in 
some ways following on from the notion of improvisation as unbinding force, we shall 
understand improvisation’s potential to bring the outside of contingency into the inside of 
human time.  
 
Among the key insights that the chapter will offer, Brassier’s and Meillassoux’s work will 
indicate of some of the key trajectories that have developed under the banner of 
Speculative Realism. It is worth acknowledging in this context, that Meillassoux, to a 
certain extent, has extended some of the lines of enquiry that emerged from our 
explorations of Badiou’s work, however, where the latter configured a finite subject’s 
engagement with a necessarily infinite set that lay outside of the situation in his theory of 
the event, Meillassoux has shifted the offsetting of finitude and infinity in order to contrast 
the idea of a finite philosophical correlation with an unbounded and unboundable ‘great 
outdoors’.3 For Meillassoux, a large part of his philosophical project in the book After 
Finitude is concerned with proving that a non-correlative ‘other’ must exist beyond the 
confines of human thought, and that whilst we are in no way able to attach any definition 
or meaning to this non-correlate, we must at least be able to think it that it exists.  
                                                
3 For our current purposes, Meillassoux’s project will show us firstly, that any correlation between thought 
and the objects of thought does not exist (in other words human thought must be able to conceive of 
something that is not simply another aspect of human thought, it must be able to think outside itself) and 
secondly, that what does exist outside of human thought is necessarily contingent. This latter claim is one of 
the more complex aspects of Meillassoux’s thought, where his ultimate focus is to not only show that, as 
with Badiou’s void and Laruelle’s One, what lies beyond human thought cannot be conceptualised, but 
more centrally, that the things that happen in the lived world are grounded on what he calls a ‘necessary 
contingency’, wherein ‘contingency is such that anything might happen, even nothing at all’ (Meillassoux, 
2008: 62). This then is the underlying contention of Meillassoux’s argument, which is to express the view 
that only absolute contingency can be seen to necessarily exist; in simple terms, nothing is necessary apart 
from the fact that things might or might not happen (or anywhere in between). 
 
[From] absolute necessity of contingency alone we can infer an impossibility that is every bit as 
absolute - for there is in fact something that this primary atom of knowledge ensures us is 
absolutely impossible, even for all powerful chaos, and this something, which chaos will never be 
able to produce, is a necessary entity. Everything is possible, anything can happen - except 
something that is necessary, because it is the contingency of the entity that is necessary, not the 
entity. (Meillassoux, 2008: 62) 
 
We can also take this as a reflection of Laruelle’s concept of determination-in-the-last-instance, in the sense 
that the superposition of the One conveys a similar aspect of undecidability to this absolute contingency: 
we can have no understanding of it, all we are able to do is recognise that it exists. Whilst Meillassoux 
makes no claims about our ability to perform or enact this necessary contingency, in the way that Laruelle 
does, it is not inconceivable that we might draw such a parallel between their work. 
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Once we have stepped through the various stages of Meillassoux’s thought process, 
firstly, by accepting that what is produced by human thought is not the sum of all 
knowledge, and secondly, by applying this axiom to improvisation and understanding 
that although it is a process that is brought about by human thought, we shall be in a 
position to imagine that an improvisation may not entirely be under the control of human 
thought, and thus what is therefore necessarily an aspect of an improvisation is 
contingency: in fact, this is the only thing that can be said to be a necessary part of 
improvisation. We shall therefore come to see that one of Meillassoux’s lasting 
contributions to this study is that he has provided us with further evidence to show that 
knowledge must be able to exceed a thought-world correlate. Although he makes no 
claims about processes such as deterritorialisation, the truth procedure, the heretical 
decision or indeed insider time, in many ways, Meillassoux’s simple affirmation that it 
must be possible to think outside of the correlation suits our purposes very well: for an 
improviser, it must be possible to think, and therefore improvise, outside of ourselves, to 
go beyond what we already think and to create things that are genuinely new and 
unanticipated. 
 
Also worth noting in this regard, is that Meillassoux, along with Brassier and Negarestani, 
and to a certain extent, Land, also questions any attempt to give shape or meaning to 
that which lies beyond what we have seen Laruelle refer to as the world of ‘lived 
experience’. Instead, the focus lies on creating fundamental distinctions between human 
thought (or a real world of experience), and a non-conceptualisable Real-Absolute. 
Therefore, we shall see, for all of these thinkers, that it must remain possible that we are 
able to think the unthinkable, which is to say that we can acknowledge the existence of 
something that does not originate in human thought, even though we can have no way of 
comprehending it. Thus, the idea that, whilst we may not be able to understand an 
immanent Real-Absolute, we are nonetheless ‘of’ it, and therefore we cannot help but 
‘live’ it, or ‘perform’ it, also has much in common with a number of issues that were raised 
in the previous chapter. 
 
Whilst Meillassoux’s great outdoors certainly shows more than a trace of Badiou’s logical 
mathematisation of ontology, we shall see Brassier, Land and Negarestani move the 
argument in a different direction, and develop a set of philosophical models and 
perspectives that suggest that the bifurcation of the finite and the infinite is not able to 
provide the fullest, or indeed the most human-oriented account of human thought. In the 
book Nihil Unbound, Brassier interrogates the possibility of different types of time in 
order to abolish a Meillassouxian notion of the correlation, and his use of anterior, 
posterior and anthropomorphic time is a demonstration of the way in which the 
correlation can never have been possible, since for Brassier, the existence of a future time 
that is completely outside of human thought proves that human thought can never have 
been the limit of what can be imagined or thought about. Similarly, Nick Land also 
generates a conception of this radically non-conceptualisable other of human thought, 
which for him is couched in terms of contingency and absolute randomness, via a 
In Through the Out Door 
148 
repurposing the death-drive of Freud’s essay ‘Beyond the Pleasure Principle’, so as to 
conceive of something that is immanent to human thought, but which is squarely outside 
of and ‘other’ than human thought. 
 
Negarestani’s work introduces arguments that suggest in a different but related way, that 
the human capacity to think in terms of and experience an absolute time is actually 
already in us. In his formulation of ‘insider time’, or Incognitum Hactenus, we see one of 
the more nuanced arguments about human thought’s relationship with an absolute. To a 
degree, Negarestani’s ideas in both the essay, ‘Undercover Softness’ and in his extended 
work of theory-fiction, Cyclonopedia: Complicity with Anonymous Materials, engage with 
the work of the three core thinkers that we encountered in chapters one, two and three. 
Negarestani’s presentation of insider time, as a way of understanding the emergence of 
absolute time into human or vital time, reflects Deleuze’s concept of the fold, where an 
unending series of ‘horizons’ that open a radical outside back onto the inside of thought; 
also makes reference to Badiou’s adherence to an absolute difference between a finite, 
knowable situation and unknowable, uncategorisable void; and finally, insider time 
suggests, as with Laruelle’s heretical decision, that the emergence of absolute time into 
vital time is not a bridging of an impossible divide, instead it is a playing out of a time 
that is already there. In this way, we are encouraged to see that absolute time is both 
outside of and inside of human time, as with Laruelle’s notion of the real being given in 
the One-Real, human time is given in absolute time. Negarestani’s suggestion that 
Incognitum Hactenus ‘is a double-dealing mode of time connecting abyssal time scales to 
our chronological time’ (Negarestani, 2008: 49), is key to its relevance to improvisation, 
since the contention that it is a form, or a mode of time enables us to draw parallels with 
improvisation as a practice or method. Thus, as with Laruelle’s interest in fiction as a 
means to create new worlds within our world, Negarestani uses time to frame a similar 
idea.  
 
Finally, Brassier’s and Negarestani’s perspectives concerning different types of time, that 
contrast a human form of time with a non-correlated, ‘absolute’ time, work in a similar 
manner to one of Meillassoux’s contention that, whilst we exist within a context of human 
time, and that we cannot help but think about time from a human perspective, we are 
nonetheless capable of imagining that a non-human time exists. Brassier and Negarestani 
demonstrate a similar distinction between thought and that which lies beyond thought. In 
addition – and this is important in terms of whether or not an improvisation is a harbinger 
of new experiences – they enable us to think through how some kind of interfacing 
between these two forms of time might occur. We shall trace Negarestani’s idea of 
‘insider time’ as a means to forge a link between these two forms of time in the 
improvisatory experiments of saxophonist John Butcher; wherein Butcher’s description of 
a gradual letting-in half-formed ideas, and half-perceived sonic qualities – something that 
we can understand to have pushed in from outside of his awareness - caused a subtle 
transformation in his own conception of sound. Brassier takes the point further, allowing 
us to think that such an insider time must be a necessary part of human existence. 
Following his logic that ‘that extinction [of human life] has already retroactively terminated 
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[the correlation]’ (Brassier, 2007: 230), we can thus come to understand that humans 
cannot help but ‘enact’ a contingent, absolute time within human and vital time. In this 
regard, since improvisation is the result of human thought - a set of decisions to make a 
sound in a certain way, to respond to any number of our own or other musicians' gestures 
or actions - an improvisation becomes a necessary playing-out of non-human 
contingency, in that as a practice, it becomes a ‘lived’ thinking; a thinking in-action. 
 
As such, this chapter will provide insights into the way in which improvised music can 
disrupt and alter a perception of time, wherein improvised time can feel very different to 
clock time, but the overall trajectory of this idea goes further, and Negarestani’s work on 
Incognitum Hactenus shows another way of understanding that that which is not of 
human conception and human time can become manifest within human time. Throughout 
the chapter, we shall make reference to the work of the improvising musician Stephen 
Nachmanovitch, who aims to show that our biological patterning must ultimately prevent 
us from creating anything that is strictly the result of free choice or a random decision. 
However, following on from the analysis of Laruelle’s work, Negarestani, Brassier and 
Meillassoux will further demonstrate that, the inverse may well be true: that it may be 
impossible for us to avoid creating things that are, in a sense, beyond our control. 
Incognitum Hactenus, as with cloning and photo-fiction, is an indication that 
improvisation as a practice is a means to bring what is outside of human thought onto its 
inside. 
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1. De-correlating improvisation: Quentin Meillassoux and facticity 
 
1.1. A methodology 
 
As we saw in chapter two, Alain Badiou’s ontology-as-mathematics was formulated with a 
number of trajectories in mind, and not least among the overarching aims of Being and 
Event was to significantly progress the field of philosophical thought. As Badiou states in 
the Preface, ‘I thought that I had inscribed my name in the history of philosophy, and in 
particular, in the history of those philosophical systems’ (Badiou, 2005: xi). As regards his 
achievements, we also saw that Badiou is not without his critics. We have already seen 
Ray Brassier raising concerns about Badiou’s work; principally the former’s contention that 
although thought provoking, ultimately all that Badiou had created was a closed and self-
referential system. Since the current chapter is concerned with exploring certain 
developments in philosophical thought that have arisen in the wake of Badiou’s work, 
including with Brassier’s work itself, it is worth reflecting again, briefly, on Brassier’s 
misgivings. 
 
Brassier wonders how in practice a subject would be able to have any engagement with 
anything outside of what Brassier himself sees as Badiou’s closed mathematical system, 
saying, ‘we have no assurances that thinking has any purchase on being in situations other 
than the ontological situation’ (Brassier, 2007: 110); and thus asking, how things that are 
beyond the remit of thought can impact on the subject. Brassier is clearly uncomfortable 
with the reach and application of Badiou’s work, since it seeks to create a delineation 
between ontology as an axiomatic formulation on the one hand, and a lived world of 
experience on the other, seeing this as a disjuncture between ‘discursive’ and ‘material’ 
categories. For Brassier, one of the major consequences of Being and Event is therefore 
that the two categories are logically, and must therefore be strictly, incompatible.4 
Brassier concludes that for Badiou, ‘the Big Bang, the Cambrian explosion, and the death 
of the sun [must] remain mere hiccups in the way of the world’ (Brassier, 2007: 113-14), 
which is to say that whilst Badiou’s subject exists within a logically derived field of 
discourse, any discussion of a subject’s involvement with a changing and dynamic 
material reality remains invalid. However, this is not to say that Brassier sees no value in 
Badiou’s work, or that there is little that we can take from it. Indeed, Brassier goes on to 
praise Badiou’s contribution to philosophical discourse, but emphasises that the value of 
Badiou’s work lies not in the concepts that he has generated, but in his methodology, 
saying that, ‘the veritable worth of Badiou’s work lies not in his theory of the event but 
rather in the subtractive ontology which was merely intended as its propaedeutic. 
                                                
4 Thus, whilst Being and Event as a research project could be said to embody Badiou’s own fidelity to the 
‘truth’ of what could be called the ‘event-of-the-event’ (in other words, having generated and delineated 
the concept of the event in the way that he does, Being and Event can in some sense be seen as an 
exposition of Badiou’s own fidelity to the arrival of the event as an event itself), as far as Brassier is 
concerned, the discourses of axiomatic ontology and lived experience cannot interact, since they are 
different in kind. If ontology is mathematics, then Badiou must therefore work within these limits, and not 
attempt to work in any register beyond the formal language of mathematics. 
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Badiou’s inestimable merit is to have disenchanted ontology: ‘being’ is insignificant, it 
means, quite literally, nothing’ (Brassier, 2007: 116). 
 
What is interesting about Brassier’s approach is that it highlights and acknowledges the 
strength of the process by which Badiou arrived at his concept of Being and its attendant 
procedures, as opposed to the idea of ontology-as-mathematics as a principle in itself. As 
such, if we take Brassier’s lead, and take a more nuanced view of how to make use 
Badiou’s work, we shall see that there are areas of contemporary thought that reflect 
aspects of Badiou’s thought, not necessarily using the same kind of philosophical, or 
indeed mathematical, language, but instead operate on thought in a similar way. Where 
Badiou used the non-being of the One, the generic extension, the indiscernible and the 
power set axiom amongst a range of other conceptual devices, in order to demonstrate 
that it must be possible for an individual to be able to think beyond the realms of their 
finite situation, in After Finitude, Quentin Meillassoux affirms thought’s ability to go 
beyond the confines of thought itself by introducing and subsequently destabilising the 
concept of the ‘correlation’. Meillassoux uses this term to discuss the relationship 
between human thought and, what, in Laruellian terms, we could again refer to as ‘the 
lived world of experience’, which is the subject of that human thought. Meillassoux 
informs us that, by ‘“correlation” we mean the idea according to which we only ever have 
access to the correlation between thinking and being, and never to either term 
considered apart from the other’ (Meillassoux, 2008: 5). If we think of Badiou’s void as an 
absolute, in terms of it standing in for the absolute limit of thought’s capacity to function 
or to describe what it encounters, then we shall see that although there are clearly 
significant differences in terms of their approach, in many ways Meillassoux and Badiou 
share the common goal of opening up human thought’s access to an infinite that is 
beyond the confines of finite experience. Following this, Meillassoux’s work can help us to 
understand the way in which an improvisation can be seen as a search for new responses 
that reaches out beyond finitude towards what Meillassoux describes as an infinite, ‘Great 
Outdoors’, an ‘outside which [is] not relative to us’ (Meillassoux, 2008: 7). 
 
1.2 Music and the correlation 
 
Meillassoux’s target is what he calls ‘post-critical’ thought (Meillassoux, 2008: 4), a 
philosophical approach to thinking that he sees as suggesting that, if anything can be said 
to exist, then it must exist solely in terms of that which perceives its existence. For 
Meillassoux, post-critical thinking requires us to accept that ‘it is naive to think we are 
able to think something’ that exists in its own right (Meillassoux, 2008: 4). In the case of 
human thought therefore, something can exist, only in terms of our capacity to perceive, 
think about or imagine it. Another consequence of thinking about human experience 
solely in terms of a correlation between objects of thought and the human capacity to 
think them, is that we quickly reach an impasse, where not only must everything that 
exists be thinkable, but more problematically, only that which is thinkable can exist. As 
such, any notion of the absolute, the real, or even the void is impossible, since there can 
be nothing that exists beyond the scope of human thought. In opposition to this, 
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Meillassoux’s intention is to construct a substantial and logical proof for an autonomous 
absolute that sits outside of the confines of what he sees as the ‘thesis of the essential 
inseparability of the act of thinking from its content’ (Meillassoux, 2008: 36), where ‘all we 
ever engage with is what is given-to-thought, never an entity subsisting by itself.’ 
(Meillassoux, 2008: 36). Meillassoux’s project in After Finitude is therefore to demonstrate 
that an absolute that is external to human thought must exist, which by definition would 
prove that a correlation between thought and the world is not the limit of human thought. 
 
One of Meillassoux’s definitions for what he calls ‘strong correlationism’ (which is a model 
of thinking that rejects any attempt to disprove the correlation by making reference to 
things that might ‘obviously’ appear to exist beyond the confines of our capacity to think 
them) is to say that, ‘it is unthinkable that the unthinkable be impossible’ (Meillassoux, 
2008: 41). Here Meillassoux is telling us that the strong correlationist model categorically 
rejects and invalidates any attempt (the first ‘unthinkable’) to say anything about whether 
or not something that lies beyond the reach of human thought (the second ‘unthinkable’) 
is possible or not. Fundamentally, Meillassoux is setting up strong correlationism as a 
perspective that illegitimises any attempt to say anything about anything that exists 
beyond the reach of human thought; where anything that goes beyond thought is literally 
inconceivable, and simply cannot be discussed. This is a complex (and slightly 
tautological) statement, which is as much concerned with what ‘unthinkable’ means as it is 
with the ‘unthinkable’ nature of what lies beyond thought, which is to say that it is not 
simply that we ‘cannot say anything’ or cannot speculate about what lies beyond thought, 
we formally do not have the capacity to even think about what is beyond thought. 
Meillassoux’s voicing of strong correlationism claims that even thinking about what is 
outside of thought, but still be a thinking that occurs within the boundaries of what is 
possible to think, and therefore by definition cannot be said to be engaging with anything 
outside of thought. However, one of Meillassoux’s primary objectives is to forcefully 
overturn this position and in doing so question what he sees as a problematic aspect of 
contemporary, ‘“post-critical” philosophy’ (Meillassoux, 2008: 41). We shall go on to look 
at how Meillassoux destabilises the limitations of a correlational perspective using the 
concept of facticity, but we shall now briefly look at some of the consequences of 
correlational thought for music. 
 
Meillassoux’s rejection of the correlation, along with Badiou’s offsetting of a situation that 
is presented to thought as opposed to a void that is foreclosed to thought, are both 
examples of the long-standing philosophical debate about the extent to which the world 
exists ‘for us’. In the context of musical practice, we find this issue being played out when 
we think about the extent to which a musician is able to make something that is really 
‘new’ as such, and whether they are able to create new experiences for listeners and 
audiences. To some degree, this is a question of definition, and in the case of an 
improvising musician, we might want to think about how far an improvisation might be a 
manufacturing of something that is genuinely new, in terms of its sonic aesthetics for 
example, or whether an improvisation is simply a gathering and arranging of available 
materials. From a Meillassouxian perspective however, we can now think about this in 
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terms of a more foundational principle and apply it to improvisation. If an improvising 
musician creates a piece of music, then the correlationist position would suggest that in 
order to make it, the piece must have been conceivable beforehand (in other words, an 
improvisation as a product of human thought, must have already been conceivable in 
human thought) which would therefore invalidate its existence as something definitively 
‘new’; it could only be a recycling of possibilities that were already in the musician’s mind. 
In addition, there is an issue of recognition: if a musician is able to create something that 
was previously inconceivable, and therefore for our current purposes qualitatively ‘new’, 
then how is it that we are able to engage with this music, since anything that is new, by 
definition would go beyond our capacity to apprehend it. 
 
The philosopher Graham Harman’s reading of Meillassoux’s work discusses the paradox 
of the new in terms of the pre-Socratic philosophy of Meno. Meno’s paradox, in Harman’s 
words, simply states that, ‘we cannot search for something if we already have it and 
cannot search for it if we do not have it’ (Harman, 2011: 130). In the paradox itself 
(quoted in Harman, 2011: 130), we can certainly see something of a pre-cursor to 
Badiou’s concept of fidelity to a future-anterior, in the sense that Plato’s description of 
Meno’s paradox speaks of the contradictory nature of searching for something without 
knowing what we are looking for, or finding something that we’re unable to recognise as 
the thing that we’re looking for. Just as Badiou would not allow us to identify an event or 
the generic indiscernible (the subject can only ‘name’ it), Harman and Socrates relate the 
difficulty of searching for and finding something that we do not understand, for how 
would we know what it was when we have found it? This sense of a lack of recognition 
well describes the experience that we may have when we find it difficult to relate 
innovative and experimental musical works to an existing frame of reference, and there 
are numerous instances of composers and musicians who have taken their audiences or 
fellow musicians beyond pre-existing and familiar categories of apprehension. The 
‘silence’ of John Cage’s 4’33”, the so-called ‘Noise Music’ of musicians such as Wolf Eyes 
and Merzbow5, and even Ornette Coleman’s experimentation with Jazz harmony of the 
                                                
5 In the essay ‘Genre Is Obsolete’, Ray Brassier discusses noise in the following way: ‘“Noise” not only 
designates the no-man’s-land between electro-acoustic investigation, free improvisation, avant-garde 
experiment, and sound art; more interestingly, it refers to anomalous zones of interference between genres: 
between post-punk and free jazz; between musique concrète and folk; between stochastic composition and 
art brut.’ Having put forward this affirmation of noise as disruptive force and unknown territory, he goes 
onto problematise ‘noise music’ as a genre: ‘Yet in being used to categorise all forms of sonic 
experimentation that ostensibly defy musico-logical classification – be they para-musical, anti-musical, or 
post-musical – ‘noise’ has become a generic label for anything deemed to subvert established genre’ 
(Brassier, 2007: online). As a result we can see that whilst noise as a genre may be problematic, in that its 
existence as a style of music undermines its own objectives of disrupting the codes and conventions of 
musical practice, musicians who produce ‘noise’ as a disruptive force within and between genres, and even 
Merzbow himself who could be said to be one of the main progenitors of noise as a practice in and of itself, 
have at some point, and at times continue to, subvert and confound their own and their audiences’ 
expectations of what constitutes recorded or performed music. As an aside, it is worth noting that the 
‘noise’ group Wolf Eyes collaborated with the improvising saxophonist Anthony Braxton on the album Black 
Vomit (2006), and whilst as a genre description the term ‘noise’ is acknowledgedly problematic, it can at 
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late 1950s that we discussed in Chapter One are all examples of the way in which 
listeners do not always recognise what they are hearing as music, and instead think of it 
as noise, or as disruptive sound. Clearly, a number of musicians are aware of the 
uncertainty that their work can provoke in an audience, and in this sense such recordings 
and performances reflect Cornelius Cardew’s idea about an AMM improvisation being a 
search for responses. In his recollection of a performance by the Onkyo musician Sachiko 
M, whose approach to improvisation takes the form of generating and modifying sine-
waves, the music writer and improviser David Toop tells us, 
 
Sachiko M sits on a theatre stage alone […] She begins in silence, a silence 
intermittently pin-pricked by high tones, small clicks, some abrasive electronic 
bursts […] Soon there are sections of the crowd given over to shouting, booing 
and whistling. Sachiko continues, seemingly unperturbed. The sounds she 
produces are not loud or disturbing in themselves yet they seem to propose 
something too unsettling for this crowd. (Toop, 2016: 7) 
 
This image of an unsettled crowd reacting aggressively to a music that they do not 
‘understand’ is a familiar story when we consider the history of musical and artistic 
development as a history of misunderstanding, intolerance and outrage in the face of new 
aesthetic experiences. Although these are to a certain extent, slightly informal examples 
of music’s ability to unsettle or surprise an audience, the relationship between an 
audience and their expectations for and their experience of a piece of music is analogous 
to the way in which Meillassoux problematises the correlationist perspective and its 
insistence that we are only able to think that which we are already able to think. 
 
1.3 De-correlating improvisation  
 
In After Finitude, Meillassoux’s investigation of the relationship between the finite and the 
infinite provides us with the material that enables us to think about whether it is possible 
to create a music that is genuinely and radically new, and why it is that new sounds and 
new structures in music should be so unsettling to audiences. For Meillassoux, it must be 
possible for us to think the unthinkable and within the context of the current study, where 
improvisation is understood to be a forming of thinking-in-action, it therefore follows that 
for a musician, it must be possible to improvise, create and perform the unthinkable. We 
shall now look in more detail about how Meillassoux demonstrates his assertion by 
turning to his work on ‘facticity’, and as a result, we can come to understand how, by ‘de-
correlating’ improvisation, we can think of an improvisation as an act of ‘real’ innovation 
and disruption, providing further insights into the disruptive potential of improvisation 
                                                
least be used to describe Wolf Eyes’ music as loud, discordant, abrasive and aggressive, although in this 
instance, their collaboration with Braxton can indeed be seen as an attempt to create a genuine disruptive 
noise between the worlds of noise music and free jazz. 
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that we discussed above.6 Meillassoux’s own response to the paradox of looking for 
something that we cannot recognise is to undermine what he sees as the finitude of the 
correlation in two ways, and he conceives of two strains of the correlationist perspective: 
a ‘weak’ and a ‘strong’ ‘correlationism’ in order to do this. Weak correlationism is for 
Meillassoux the Kantian formulation of the phenomenal and noumenal realms, where 
Kant reasoned that there is a world of experience (the phenomenon) as well as a world of 
the in-itself (the noumenon), but that it is logically impossible for humans to have any 
access to this noumenon. Strong correlationism is the process of ‘absolutising the 
correlation in itself’ (Meillassoux, 2008: 37), which is to say that the correlation between 
thought and as we have seen, what is thought about, becomes the only thing that can be 
thought (in other words, this variant will not allow for even the consideration of a 
noumenon in the way that Meillassoux’s reading of Kantian thought permits). As such, the 
correlationist model would compel us to accept that what is given in experience is 
fundamentally given for us, and that anything that we imagine to be beyond what is 
given, is precisely that: simply a product of our imagination. As far as Meillassoux is 
concerned, correlationism means that any conception of something beyond what is given 
in experience, is actually only the result of something that is already given in thought, and 
therefore trapped within foreclosed circle of finite thought. 
 
However, against the logic of the correlation, Meillassoux argues that it is through its own 
principles that the correlation comes to contradict itself. In order to completely overturn 
the correlationist position that claims there can be no such thing as the ‘in itself’, which 
Meillassoux defines as a ‘thing [that is] as it is without me, as much as it is with me’ 
(Meillassoux, 2008: 3), Meillassoux uses the concept of ‘facticity’ as a means by which to 
demonstrate the self-contradictory nature of the correlation. 
 
What I experience with facticity is not an objective reality, but rather the 
unsurpassable limits of objectivity confronted with the fact that there is a world; a 
world that is describable and perceptible, and structured by determinate invariants 
[…] Facticity thereby forces us to grasp the ‘possibility’ of that which is wholly other 
to the world, but which resides in the midst of the world as such. (Meillassoux, 
2008: 40) 
 
Facticity is therefore a way of presenting the problematic nature of thinking about the 
limits of thought itself and asks us to consider how it is that we can use thought to think 
about something that exists beyond the confines of thought. Another way of putting this 
is to say that facticity enables us to foreground the tension between understanding that 
we are being presented with a world that is not necessarily an objective reality, but at the 
same time, that any means of accessing a reality that might exist outside of that 
presented world must come from within that world. As such, Meillassoux uses facticity to 
identify and emphasise the inherent self-contradiction of the correlationist position, by 
                                                
6 In the context of this chapter, the word ‘real’ will denote something that has an existence that is not 
defined or governed by human thought’s capacity to think that thing, in other words, it has an existence 
that is outside of any thought-world correlation. 
In Through the Out Door 
156 
showing that the logic that supports the correlation must by definition simultaneously 
cancel it out. Brassier’s interpretation of Meillassoux’s work on facticity suggests that it 
can be used to articulate a slightly different way of conceiving our lack of knowledge 
about the grounds for knowledge itself. What is useful about Brassier’s commentary is 
that, rather than simply saying that we can have a knowledge about the presented world 
on its own terms, and that we can say nothing about how it comes into being or how it 
works, he instead contrasts ‘empirical’ knowledge of the world, with what we could call 
‘factical’ knowledge of the principles of knowledge. 
 
Contingency is empirical and pertains to phenomena: a phenomenon is contingent 
if it can come into or out of existence without violating the principles of cognition 
that govern phenomena.7 Facticity is transcendental and pertains to our cognitive 
relation to phenomena, and hence to the principles of knowledge themselves, 
concerning which it makes no sense to say either that they are necessary or that 
they are contingent, since we have no other principles to compare them to. 
(Brassier, 2007: 66) 
 
In this way, Brassier begins to open facticity up to scrutiny, going beyond a simple 
contrast between knowledge about the empirical world on the one hand, and a lack of 
knowledge on the other, and instead thinking in terms of an offset between knowledge 
about the empirical world as opposed to knowledge about knowledge itself. With this 
principle in mind, we can return to Meillassoux’s assertion that ‘that which is wholly other 
to the world […] resides in the midst of the world’, in order to engage with the idea that 
our knowledge about the limits of our knowledge, (in other words our knowledge about 
our lack of knowledge concerning the grounds for our knowledge) must occur within the 
domain of empirical knowledge. Although convoluted and tautological, it is important to 
establish Meillassoux’s position here, because it will have a significant impact on how we 
think about improvisation from this point onward. 
 
Meillassoux’s work on facticity presents us with two options as regards the correlation. On 
one hand, he tells us that if we accept the governing principles of facticity, if we 
‘absolutise’ facticity, we would need to accept that our experience (and knowledge) of the 
world is only ever of a world that is presented to us, (in other words that it is not ‘reality’, 
simply a ‘presentation’), but that we can have no knowledge or understanding of how it 
comes to be presented to us. As a result, this would mean that the correlation itself is de-
absolutised; it would become simply a concept ‘for us’, part of the empirical world that is 
                                                
7 Although Brassier’s approach is to site contingency as a property of the phenomenal world of experience, 
where it would be possible to measure contingent behaviours and occurrences against the ‘principles that 
govern phenomena’, as we shall see, Meillassoux uses contingency in a broader sense that is redolent of 
Badiou’s use of the term ‘void’. For Meillassoux, contingency functions as a way of referring to something 
that we have no means of understanding, just as Badiou’s void ‘names’ that which gives rise to the 
inconsistent multiple, but doesn't describe it. In his use of the term ‘necessary contingency’, Meillassoux 
makes it clear that for his purposes, ‘contingency’ is not simply an empirical concept that is used to describe 
the behaviour of phenomena, it can also be used to refer to a set of principles that we can have no way of 
understanding or explaining, as we see in his discussion of facticity. 
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presented to us, and not an autonomous fact or reality in itself (in literal terms, the 
correlation would not be ‘true’). On the other hand, however, Meillassoux tells us that if 
we insist on the truth of the correlation (if we wish to ‘absolutise’ the correlation), then we 
must simultaneously de-absolutise facticity. However, by asserting that ‘facticity is only 
true for-me’, Meillassoux states that the correlation itself must therefore be recognised as 
being ‘nothing more than the correlate of my act of thought’ (Meillassoux, 2008: 59), 
thereby comprehensively undermining the integrity of the correlation itself. Meillassoux’s 
point is that, if we choose to absolutise the correlation, any statement that is made from 
within the confines of the correlation, or within the empirical world, where this is seen as 
the limits of what is possible to discuss, then the reach of that statement must itself be 
limited by the reach of the correlation. Therefore, if the correlationist perspective rejects 
any statements about anything beyond the correlation, then it must therefore reject its 
own statements about anything that is beyond the boundaries of the correlation, such as 
‘absolute’ statements of fact. In short, the correlationist’s problem is that if the correlation 
is ‘true’, then it cannot be true, since any claims about the truth of a correlationist 
perspective would always have to come from a correlationist perspective. On the other 
hand, facticity, as a statement about our inability to know what underpins knowledge, is a 
claim that it is ‘true’ that there are certain things that we cannot know, but that we can be 
sure that we cannot know them, and this itself is a form of knowledge about the unknown. 
 
Following Meillassoux’s logic, then it must be possible from with the confines of the world 
that is presented to us, to have knowledge of something that is beyond those confines, 
even if, as Brassier says that our knowledge is that we know nothing about what is beyond 
those confines: even a knowledge about a lack of knowledge of what is beyond the 
presented world, and an awareness that the world that we experience is simply a 
presentation or a correlation is in itself tangible. Additionally, it is essential that we create 
a distinction in our thinking about the ‘principles of knowledge themselves’: we may have 
no knowledge about what these principles are or how they work, we can however 
confidently say that we know that we do not know these things.8 
 
As a consequence of the de-absolutisation of the correlation, Meillassoux concludes that 
it must be conceivable to think about an absolute that is beyond thought and which is 
accessible via thought. In other words, we must be able to ‘think’ the ‘unthinkable’. By 
absolutising facticity, and by demonstrating the necessary de-absolutisation of the 
correlation, Meillassoux thereby asserts that what we might take to be the truth of our 
experience, is in fact merely an aspect of a wider field of knowledge, that includes 
                                                
8 There is something of a re-playing here of Badiou’s differentiation of knowledge (of a situation, and what 
is presented within a situation, as conditioned by the finite) and truth (an interfacing with the infinite via the 
evental site, and our subsequent fidelity to the truth of the event). Our lack of knowledge or understanding 
of the principles that underlie knowledge and understanding clearly reflects Badiou’s contention that we 
can only ever name the void (ø), since we simply do not have the means to make any other statements 
about it. Throughout the discussion of facticity, we can clearly see Meillassoux grappling with a similar issue 
to Badiou: how do we use thought (something that is finite) to engage with something that is beyond 
thought (the infinite)? 
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knowledge about the experiences that we are having, as well as knowledge that we do 
not know anything about the underlying principles of that knowledge. At the beginning of 
the chapter, we saw Meillassoux using the concept of ‘necessary contingency’ in order to 
frame this (lack of) knowledge about the principles of knowledge. We can now complete 
this survey of Meillassoux’s thoughts regarding contingency, by understanding the way in 
which facticity works to demonstrate that contingency is a necessary part of our 
knowledge. We might think that we know the world, but for Meillassoux, what we actually 
know is that we can have no understanding of what the world is or how it works: that is 
the necessity of contingency. 
 
If we accept Meillassoux’s statements about facticity, then we might also accept that 
improvisation need not be limited to being an interaction with the world that we are 
presented with: if the correlation must be de-absolutised, then improvisation can be ‘de-
correlated’. A de-correlation of improvisation enables us to stop thinking about 
improvisation as an activity that occurs within a world that we ‘think’ that we know, and 
which we might imagine is the total sum of everything that we can know, where we might 
take our knowledge of musical structures, acoustic properties of sound, physical 
properties of instruments as examples of the limits of what can be known. Instead we can 
now think that whilst these kinds of variables might inform our experience, they do not 
encapsulate what is possible for us to know, and we can use improvisation as a probe and 
a means to imagine how our experience of the world can be modified by our knowledge 
that knowledge itself is underpinned by an unknowable contingency. 
 
Improvisation is a curious process in that its success is not necessarily defined by virtuosity 
or expert knowledge on the part of its practitioners. Instead, we could say that an 
improvisation is the result of a musician using their ability and knowledge as a means to 
either explore what is possible within and beyond musical frameworks or to explore and 
push themselves beyond their own limitations. In this sense, what can often make an 
improvisation engaging is a musician’s willingness to exceed their own expectations of 
themselves, and as we saw in our example of Sachiko M unsettling and angering an 
audience, she was able to exceed their expectations of what she should be doing as an 
improviser and of what kind of form music should take. In chapter two, we discussed an 
improviser’s relationship to the void, the evental site and the generic extension, where, by 
making a series of finite enquiries and reports about the presence of a fluctuation within 
the situation, an improvisation was framed as a searching for something (an indiscernible) 
that the improviser believes to be present (although they cannot discern it). This sense of 
improvisation as search is reflected in Meillassoux’s commitment to opening out thought 
to the possibility of a non-correlated experience, although in Meillassoux’s rendering of 
facticity, our relationship to an outside of thought is strengthened. Whereas Badiou used 
the event as a device to facilitate the entry into the finite world of something that had not 
previously been part of that world, Meillassoux goes further to say that by its very 
definition, it must be possible that thought is able to access something that exists beyond 
its own correlational context. In this sense, we can contend that acts of improvisation that 
challenge our comprehension, that experiment, innovate and discover new musical forms 
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that go beyond accepted classifications and categories reflect Meillassoux’s challenge to 
correlational thinking. In an interview with David Toop the improvising saxophonist John 
Butcher speaks of his interest in improvisation as a process of discovery, 
 
I was drawn to those aspects of music where what you’re engaged with is a 
mystery. Through being engaged with it you’re trying to discover more about that 
mystery and particularly what lies beyond the horizon which you can’t even 
glimpse yet. If you go through that process you hope to see that hidden part of 
the activity. (Butcher, quoted in Toop, 2016: 174) 
 
Here we see Butcher thinking about improvisation as a quest for something that he 
cannot recognise (a ‘mystery’) in a place that he does not understand (‘beyond the 
horizon’), which not only conveys a sense of Meillassoux’s Great Outdoors, but also brings 
us back to Meno’s paradox, in that Butcher’s experiments and his tracking of something 
that he is aware of but cannot yet grasp very much reflects the problematic idea of trying 
to find the unknown when we don’t know what the unknown looks or sounds like. Butcher 
goes on to say that, 
 
Very often in the course of rehearsing a gig something’s happening in the music 
and you semi-hear in your head what you’d like to do but you don’t know how to 
do it. Some of the time you will remember that when you’re at home and start 
working on it. It doesn’t come overnight, it’s a series of very, very small 
discoveries that add up to something over a period. There was a time I got 
extremely methodical about it - for about a year of looking at all the possible 
fingering combinations and discovering the overtone spectrum and then finding 
which ones you could bring out multiple tones in that overtone spectrum. 
(Butcher, quoted in Toop, 2016: 174) 
 
In this regard, we can see Butcher’s intuition for ‘semi-hearing’ something in his head as a 
process of grasping for a sound that he doesn’t quite have the faculties to comprehend. 
This resonates strongly with a de-absolutisation of the correlation, wherein a similarly de-
absolutised improvisation must reflect our ability to exceed the limits of what we can 
already know, or even what a correlationist view of human knowledge would delineate 
what we are able to know. Butcher’s description of something coming into his awareness 
that had not been there previously captures quite precisely Badiou’s idea about making a 
series of enquiries and reports into the presence of the generic extension. Butcher is now 
not only able to describe (and play) new tones in the overtone spectrum, but he is also 
able to account for the process of these possibilities coming into being. However, 
Meillassoux, by absolutising facticity moves us on from this position, and enables us to 
adapt our position. Instead of needing to maintain a commitment to the truth of an event, 
we simply need to remain committed to understanding that accessing an outside to 
human thought is a necessary function of human thought. Whereas in Badiouian terms, 
the improviser-as-subject was required to make a decision about the presence of the 
generic indiscernible, after Meillassoux we can now say that it is impossible that an 
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improviser could not now access an infinite great outdoors beyond the horizon of their 
finite context. This is not to say that an improviser somehow goes beyond the realms of 
the correlation in order to bring back disruptive music from the outside, however, when 
music does disrupt, surprise or unsettle audiences, it is the improviser’s capacity to 
exceed the limits of a correlation between thought and the objects of thought – a 
capacity shared with every other human – that causes this to happen. 
 
At its core, Meillassoux’s work establishes a principle. Whilst he does not provide us with 
a strategy, or a set of instructions about how to access an infinite beyond the confines of 
a presented world that we exist in, he does, however, suggest that logically, it must be 
possible to achieve such a going-beyond. His work is therefore a challenge: a challenge 
to think of how this happens. This is not to say that we need to invent ways of accessing a 
great outdoors to thinking, but to reflect on how the things that we do are already 
instances of thinking beyond the confines of a correlation. Improvisation is just such an 
activity, which demonstrates that by virtue of its capacity to surprise both the improviser 
themselves as well as their audience, an improvisation is a reaching into the outside. 
 
As a brief coda to this exploration of Meillassoux’s work, we can turn our attention more 
specifically to the work of John Butcher, whose album Invisible Ear (Butcher, 2003) 
enables us to more readily imagine how a set of performances can emerge from the 
process of semi-hearing and searching beyond a barely-visible horizon, and make audible 
certain aspects of our philosophical enquiry. 
 
Four tracks that are particularly suggestive of these ideas, are the pieces entitled ‘Cup 
Anatomical’, ‘Streamers’, ‘Dark Field’ and ‘Bright Field’. To an extent, all four tracks 
epitomise the process of discovery during rehearsal that Butcher describes; a moment 
when a sound arrives that takes us by surprise, or that captivates because it was not quite 
what we expected. Sometimes such sounds can be the by-product of another sound that 
we are playing – an unwanted squeak that occurs whilst we are trying to play another 
note – and sometimes whilst we are just running through scales, warm-up exercises, or 
even just playing without any fixed point of focus. Equally, sounds and ideas can come 
from deliberately trying to play an instrument in a new, or at least a previously untried 
way. 
 
The sounds on these pieces each testify to a moment of discovery or realisation on 
Butcher’s part, of something happening that subsequently suggested further study, 
exploration and refinement. ‘Cup Anatomical’ is the sound of Butcher rapidly fluttering 
the saxophone’s keys, whilst simultaneously blowing through the instrument raising and 
lowering that pitch of the airflow without sounding a note, and all the while using the 
sound of the bubbling spittle that gathers within a saxophone to create extra buzzing and 
whirring that is both reminiscent of fluttering insects and white noise. ‘Streamers’ is an 
improvisation that results from what could very well be the saxophone being held so 
close to a microphone that feedback begins to sound, but Butcher is careful not to step 
too far over this threshold, so that there is just enough feedback response to articulate 
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the sound of the keys being lifted arrhythmically. As with ‘Cup Anatomical’, although what 
results could be compared to another sound – in this case, the sound of a tuned metallic 
percussion instrument, such as a kalimba – this is not simply an exercise in creating a 
sound effect. What we hear is the sound of Butcher exploring a process, or a 
phenomenon, and as the piece progresses, he starts to allow the feedback to open out 
more, so that there is increasingly more of a see-sawing between the percussive sound of 
the key striking the saxophone’s body, and the hooting sound of the feedback response. 
‘Dark Field’ is not entirely unrelated to either of the previous pieces, in that initially, we 
hear Butcher blowing note-lessly through the saxophone. At times, we can hear short 
high-pitched notes, as quiet squeaks or squeals, but gradually, as with ‘Streamers’ 
Butcher begins to manipulate the keys, giving a similarly tuned, but now quieter, 
percussive aspect to the piece. Finally, ‘Bright Side’, is a fuller exploration of the high-
pitched squealing sounds result from overblowing into the saxophone’s mouthpiece, and 
at times, as with the multiphonics technique that Peter Evans employs, we can hear two 
tones simultaneously. In addition, Butcher uses other tonguing techniques, such as flutter-
tonguing, which gives the sustained whistling sounds a sense that they are rapidly 
oscillating, as we hear with electrically produced feedback. Again, whilst it would be a 
poor representation of Butcher’s playing to suggest that ‘Bright Side’ is simply his 
attempt at making his saxophone sound ‘like’ feedback, nevertheless, it may well be the 
case that this is another example of Butcher’s methodical approach; starting at a given 
point and then working through a set of processes and possibilities in order to make a set 
of sonic discoveries. 
 
In a more recent set of improvisations with the guitarist Andy Moor, on the record 
Experiments With A Leaf (Butcher and Moor, 2015), we can hear that some of these 
earlier experiments, have now resolved into techniques that are part of Butcher’s sonic 
palette. During the track ‘The Tongue Is A Flame’, Butcher employs the feedback-
sounding squeal that he explored during ‘Bright Side’ to counterpoint Moor’s low, 
overdriven guitar sounds, and as Moor uses either a tremolo bar or the guitar’s tuning 
peg to detune the guitar, we can hear Butcher splitting his single note into two 
intertwining whistles. Similarly, in the track ‘Fantasy Downsize’, from 4’30 onwards, we 
hear a brief passage where Butcher makes use of percussive keying, to work alongside 
Moor’s staccato string tapping. 
 
What the four Invisible Ear pieces comprehensively show is that, within the context of our 
discussion of Meillassoux’s work, improvisation is a process of coming to know that we 
don’t know something, and of letting-in from outside of our understanding something 
that we did not completely design ourselves. This is not to say that the sounds 
themselves are in any way transcendental, or outside of an empirical framework (how can 
they be – they are simply the results of a set of physical interactions between some 
mechanical and electronic sound-producing equipment and a human using their mouth, 
fingers and breath), instead, simply that Butcher may not necessarily driving all of these 
improvisatory processes and decisions himself. Whilst this conclusion in itself may not be 
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a huge revelation to the improvising music community, Meillassoux’s work gives us a 
strong grounding for why it might be the case. 
 
Clearly, John Butcher is a musician who has very much invented the way that he plays the 
saxophone, and, whilst he may not necessarily have been the first saxophonist to make 
use of many – or indeed any – of these sounds, to an extent he could be said to have 
evolved his own highly idiosyncratic musical language. Meillassoux’s forays into the Great 
Outdoors, allow us to understand that this is not necessarily just a music according to 
John Butcher. Something has pressed itself into Butcher’s playing technique, and the 
aesthetic choices that he is making, something that goes beyond his ability to simply 
author and control all of the sonic choices he has made. As Butcher suggests, it is the 
half-heard and imagined sounds that can spur further musical enquiry, but equally, it is 
the sense of knowing that our thought is surrounded by an incipient contingency that 
reminds us that improvisation is necessarily beyond our control.  
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2. Disassembling sonic assemblages: Improvisation and the will to contingency  
 
2.1 How we connect: matter makes music 
 
We have now seen how Meillassoux uses a sense of what human thought ‘must be like’ in 
order to justify his position regarding human thought’s capacity to access something 
beyond a correlation between itself and that which it thinks about. Having approached 
this issue from the perspective of thought, we shall now take a similar approach but think 
about it from a more material perspective, and consider the properties of matter as a way 
of exploring a similar thesis regarding our relationship with contingency. 
 
If Brassier concluded that Badiou’s philosophy had little to say about the Big Bang, the 
Cambrian explosion, and the death of the sun, then if we turn to a body of work that has 
more in common with Deleuze and Guattari’s approach to materialist thought, then we 
shall see that there are a number of opportunities to think about improvisation and the 
production of music in terms of more explicitly physical, sonic and even vibrational 
contexts. By taking as our starting point Deleuze and Guattari’s claim that, ‘the living is 
directly coupled to the individual phenomena of the atom’, (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004: 
315), we can begin by thinking of a music and sound as assemblages of interacting 
forces, as consistent multiplicities that can be regarded as both recognisable unities in 
themselves, as well as amalgamations of divergent intensities in constant flux. A musical 
assemblage would be both the product of, and simultaneously a producer of, new 
intensive flows all the way down to and up from the atomic level, since, as Deleuze and 
Guattari suggest, ‘at the core of the molecule, then at the core of the macromolecule, 
then of the virus, then of the one-celled individual, by subordinating the mass 
phenomena - one is led all the way to the organism that […] remains in this sense 
microscopic’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004: 315). 
 
In Earth Sound Signal: Energies and Earth Magnitude in the Arts, Douglas Kahn 
documents the way in which sonic, subsonic and infrasonic vibrations have been 
incorporated by a number of key musicians and sound researchers, in their search to 
expand the boundaries of music. As part of an assemblage, sound can play a critical part 
in shaping the way in which that assemblage impacts on the physical world, and Kahn 
coins the term ‘aelectrosonic’ to describe the way in which natural forces such as 
radiowaves, earthquakes and other similarly vibrant matter are sonic phenomena that 
have been investigated and utilised in the development of musical pieces by composers 
and researchers. 
 
Where the Aeolian operates between nature and music in acoustics, the 
Aelectrosonic does the same for electricity and electromagnetism. The character 
of the sounds in the Aelectrosonic has implications for the history of music, 
especially avant-garde and experimental music […] It is also a means to 
understand how energies move across distinctions of music and not-music, nature 
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and technology, as prefigured in the winds moving through manifestations of the 
Aeolian itself. (Kahn, 2013: 6) 
 
Kahn goes on to investigate the development of electromagnetic, atmospheric and other 
natural sounds as resources for musical compositions and performances, and to consider 
the nature of this ‘Earth Sound Music’ from a number of perspectives. Kahn’s own view of 
this phenomenon is that it can be divided into two modes: the mechanical and the 
Aelectrosonic, where, ‘the Aeolian is mechanical music in that it belongs within physics to 
classical mechanics, as do the sounds of acoustical instruments [whilst] the Aelectrosonic 
involves transduction across two major states of energy, converting electromagnetic 
activity into the mechanics of audible sound’ (Kahn, 2013: 55). Kahn’s work therefore 
suggests that we can think about music and musical assemblages not just in terms of 
physical relationships between a musician and their instrument, or with environmental 
sounds creating physical pressure on their ear drums, but also as assemblages of energy 
being converted into sound, a literal flow of energies and forces. In this sense, a musical 
assemblage brings everything into play and we could ‘disassemble’ a musician to think 
that their actions are the result of chemical, biological, mental, emotional and physical 
forces in just the same way as an instrument in an assemblage of physical, mechanical, 
organic, synthetic materials, and that sound itself (as Kahn suggests) can be an 
amalgamation of physical and electromagnetic forces: a musical assemblage is any and all 
of these things and can be seen as a consistent whole because of its capacity to produce 
a piece of music. Kahn draws on a number of examples to support his view that human 
interaction with natural phenomena has not only been both the inspiration, but has also 
provided the sonic material for a large number of contemporary sound and music works. 
In discussing the work of the composer Alvin Lucier, Kahn tells of Lucier’s interest in 
various naturally occurring sonic phenomena including planetary-scale weather events 
such as ‘whistlers’ and the sonic properties of a small room. 9 Lucier’s most famous piece I 
Am Sitting in a Room, which involved the composer recording and re-recording his 
speaking voice on two tape recorders in order to demonstrate the way in which the 
acoustic properties of a room alter the sounds in that room, is itself an example of a sonic 
assemblage, such that human, non-human and environmental properties come together 
to produce a musical outcome that itself was an expansion of the vocabulary of music. 
 
In a musical assemblage, if the musician themselves is simply one part of a greater play of 
forces that could include musical instruments, the properties of sound, a performance 
environment, then we could also think of an improvisation as an ‘improvisation-
assemblage’, where an improviser could be seen as interacting with a similar scale of 
forces and materials, and where they themselves become part of the assemblage, in 
order to generate an improvised musical outcome. In an improvisation-assemblage, the 
musician themselves simply becomes one component amongst many: the wood from 
which a violin has been carved, the mouthpiece of a saxophone, the reverberation time of 
                                                
9 Kahn informs us that Whistlers are whistling tones that result from lightning dispersing atmospheric gases 
whilst travelling between the Earth’s hemispheres that produce ‘purely pitched glissandi’ (Kahn, 2013: 109) 
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a performance space, the mood of an audience, the sounds of a passing train that 
penetrate a venue’s soundproofing, a ringing till, a guitarist’s injured wrist, a broken 
drumstick; all are elements that play a part in the development and exposition of musical 
form.  
 
Thinking of an improvisation as an assemblage presents us with a variety of opportunities 
to reconsider what might be happening when we improvise; we can certainly begin to 
reconsider notions of the improviser as virtuoso musical technician, or as master of their 
instrument and expert in their field of practice, when we think about the importance of a 
wide range of interacting forces. The musician and theorist David Toop discusses the 
assemblage-like qualities of an improvisation, when he suggests that music arises from 
the dynamic interplay of what we could call in Deleuze-Guattarian terms, ‘heterogeneous’ 
elements. For Toop, ‘the meeting place of fingers, strings and wood was where the music 
happened; not in the mind, or any mystical or theoretical place, but in the action of the 
moment’ (Toop, 2016: 275). The sense of human and non-human interaction coming 
together to produce an improvised musical outcome is certainly a compelling image, and 
Toop goes on to speak of the way in which musicians, through a sustained performance 
practice, can form a very physical bond with their instrument, and he suggests that to a 
certain extent, the musician and their instrument become part of each other. 
 
A tactile bond, body to body, is formed with the personified instrument, 
devotional object and devourer of time, complex and fraught with other 
touchings, holdings, intimacies. Over time the body is shaped against and by the 
instrument, as if merging. (Toop, 2016: 275)  
 
In the book Free Play: Improvisation in Life and Art, the improvising violinist Stephen 
Nachmanovitch tells us that ‘the violin bow moves across thirteen inches of string: infinite 
play in a limited space [it] moves until the meaning is manifest in both fine detail and the 
total gestalt’ (Nachmanovitch, 1990: 195). Nachmanovitch’s use of the term ‘gestalt’ very 
much reflects the idea of an improvisation-assemblage, connecting the movement of a 
bow on a violin string to a total musical outcome, and using this image to suggest a 
limitless range of musical possibilities that are contained within that finite movement. 
Whilst we might want to think about the limitless possibilities afforded by this ‘infinite 
play’ in terms of a Deleuze-Guattarian flow of intensities, we can also modify this idea by 
turning to another area of thought that has engaged with notions of contingency. Where 
Quentin Meillassoux used the concept of facticity to enable us to see contingency as the 
principle component of our knowledge, as we shall see, Nick Land’s work opens up the 
possibility for us to understand contingency as a necessary part of the material world. 
 
In Thirst for Annihilation, Land explored the relationships between thought, consciousness 
and material substance, reflecting on the physical conditions that allow human thought to 
operate, and regarding thought as a component in an assemblage of material forces. For 
example, in his discussion of the Nietzschean overman, Land proposes an alternative 
reading of the will to power. Whilst traditional readings might frame the overman quite 
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literally as a superior man, for Land, the overman does not ascend to the more-than-
human, in a conventional sense, but instead combines with material forces to become 
‘other-than-human’, and he states that the, ‘overman is not a superior model of man, but 
that which is beyond man; the creative surpassing of humanity’ (Land, 1992: 11). 
 
If we take this sense of going beyond the human and use it in combination with Kahn’s 
interest in Aeolian and Aelectrosonic forces, we can begin to think about to what extent 
the production of music could be such a creative surpassing of humanity, and the way in 
which an improvisation could be thought of as an act of disassembly; of the self and of 
music. If the production of music is for Deleuze and Guattari the formation of a bloc of 
affect, then Land’s Nietzsche would suggest that in the creation (and indeed experience) 
of this bloc, then something of substance - a self - is also lost, which evokes a dissipative 
aesthetic of improvisation. Whilst it might be compelling to think about the binding 
potential of an assemblage, Land’s intuition about the dissipatory tendencies of an 
assemblage require us to think not only in terms of assemblages ‘coming together’, but 
also their tendencies to ‘come apart’. As we continue to think through the way in which 
assemblages can work to create events and outcomes (such as a musical improvisation), 
we can also begin to consider that it may not simply be the inherent properties of 
assemblage components that are working together to create these outcomes. Instead, 
Land’s work suggests that an intrinsic contingency is continually pushing through and 
beyond human control. 
 
In Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things, the theorist Jane Bennett uses the 
concept of ‘vibrant matter’ to convey the agency of seemingly inanimate matter. Bennett 
describes electrical grids, power blackouts, large eco systems, and the planet Earth itself 
as examples of vibrant matter, whose ‘parts are both intimately interconnected and highly 
conflictual’ (Bennett, 2010: 23). Although Bennett and Land’s projects have separate 
trajectories, where Bennett is interested in the way that heterogeneous forces come 
together in order to produce certain types of effect, and Land is more concerned with a 
more fundamental material contingency that cannot necessarily be retrospectively 
explained in terms of the outcome of an event, we can use both of their work as a means 
to begin modifying our view of an improvisation as an assemblage. 
 
In describing the effects of a power blackout, Bennett describes how human intention 
may be folded into the workings of a greater whole, where there is, ‘not so much a doer 
(an agent) behind the deed (the blackout), as a doing and an effecting by a human-
nonhuman assemblage (Bennett, 2010: 28). Although Bennett is initially careful to 
maintain a distinction between assemblages and organisms, using an organism’s ability to 
self-organise in order to distinguish between ‘humans and their (social, legal, linguistic) 
constructions [and] very active and powerful nonhumans: electrons, trees, wind, fire, 
electromagnetic fields.’ (Bennett, 2010: 24), as her analysis deepens, she begins to 
explore the question of agency that the power blackout raised, and she asks whether an 
assemblage, like an organism, has the capacity to self-organise and form a culture 
(Bennett, 2010: 34). As a result, she theorises that although human agency is normally 
In Through the Out Door 
167 
held in higher regard than material agency, or even material-human interaction, humans 
themselves are in fact assemblages of non-human agents, and therefore are not so 
different from non-human assemblages. 
 
On close-enough inspection, the productive power that has engendered an effect 
will turn out to be a confederacy, and the human actants within it will themselves 
turn out to be confederations of tools, microbes, minerals, sounds, and other 
“foreign” materialities. Human intentionality can emerge as agentic only by way 
of such a distribution. (Bennett, 2010: 36)  
 
In this last passage, the focus shifts from the agency of the living seen as autonomous, 
self-propelling phenomena, to the way in which the human, as a ‘confederation of tools, 
microbes, minerals and sounds’, is in fact constituted as much by non-living, as by living 
elements. Bennett’s claim that the interactions of nonliving matter and energy are the 
driving forces behind events such as power blackouts suggests that being alive, is in fact 
simply a particular form of assemblage and configuration that inorganic material passes 
through. This nonliving agency is certainly key to the current discussion of an 
improvisation-assemblage as a collision between nonliving and living forms of matter, and 
as we shall in our further exploration of Nick Land’s and Ray Brassier’s ideas, it may be the 
case that what fundamentally connects humans to non-humans is a shared material 
tendency towards contingency. 
 
2.2 Disassembling the assemblage 
 
In Nihil Unbound, Brassier suggests that all life is simply a minor detour away from 
inorganic matter’s progression towards dissolution; hence the book title’s invocation of an 
unbounded nothingness. As he works through Freud’s essay ‘Beyond the Pleasure 
Principle’, Brassier configures an approach to thinking about human thought and 
unconscious drives in terms of a return to a state of pre-life, as almost something ‘more-
than-death’. Having established a context within which we can talk about improvisations 
and improvisers as assemblages, where an organism becomes enmeshed with what 
Bennett refers to as ‘foreign materialities’, we can now use Brassier’s work, which in itself 
draws on the work of Deleuze and Guattari, Land and Meillassoux among others, in order 
to develop a model for improvisation that ‘surpasses’ the assemblage, and turn to a set of 
terms that are familiar to the improviser: uncertainty, accident, randomness and 
contingency. Not unlike Meillassoux, one of Brassier’s chief concerns throughout the 
book is to establish certain key principles about the way in which human thought 
operates, and where we have seen Badiou turn to the void, and Meillassoux make use of 
contingency in order to frame a sense of what lies beyond the scope of human 
comprehension, Brassier suggests that, 
 
Death, understood as the principle of decontraction driving the contractions of 
organic life is not a past or future state towards which life tends, but rather the 
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originary purposelessness which compels all purposefulness, whether organic or 
psychological. (Brassier, 2007: 236) 
 
In this passage, Brassier’s comments about originary purposelessness and death reflect 
Land’s reconstruction of Freud’s ‘death drive’, which Land describes as ‘not a desire for 
death, but rather a hydraulic tendency to the dissipation of intensities […] in its primary 
dynamics it is utterly alien to everything human (Land, 2011: 283). One of Land’s lasting 
contributions to philosophical discourse is the idea that humans are not driven by or 
towards death, but are surrounded by, and infused with non-living matter; a slightly less 
melodramatic image than death. In the original text, Freud asserts that in terms of the 
existence and development of human life, rather than life being the result of drives which 
press for ‘change and development’ (Freud, 2003: 76), it is in fact the ‘conservative nature 
of organic life’ (Freud, 2003: 77) that is a fundamental organising principle. In this regard, 
Freud suggests that, 
 
[T]he elementary organism did not start out with any desire to change, and given 
the continuance of the same circumstances would have constantly repeated the 
selfsame life-cycle; but in the final analysis, so the argument goes, it must be the 
developmental history of our planet and its relationship to the sun that has left its 
imprint for us to behold in the development of organisms. (Freud, 2003: 78) 
 
This inherent conservatism would suggest that any assemblage, rather than being the 
result of a dynamic interplay between matter and forces, is in fact driven by a pre-existing 
movement towards dissipation. For Freud at least, this primordial state of nonliving, 
inorganicity is of paramount importance when considering the way in which living things 
interact. As such, it is therefore critical that we bear in mind this drive to repeat and to 
return to a former state of being that Freud suggests may be implicit in the human 
animal. 
 
It would contradict the conservative nature of drives if it were the goal of life to 
achieve a state never previously attained to. Rather, it must aspire to an old state, 
a primordial state from which it once departed, and to which via all the circuitous 
byways of development it strives to return. If we may reasonably suppose, on the 
basis of all our experience without exception, that every living thing dies - reverts 
to the inorganic - for intrinsic reasons, then we can only say that the goal of all life 
is death, or to express it retrospectively: the inanimate existed before the 
animate. (Freud, 2003: 78)  
 
If the ultimate ‘goal’ of life was indeed death and a return to the inanimate, then this 
would enable us to re-configure Bennett’s assemblage model as not simply a view of 
organisms as assemblages, and of assemblages as the consistent cohering of vibrant 
matter, but instead think of life and creative activity as mere serendipitous by-products of 
matter’s inevitable progression towards inorganic equilibrium. If we turn to 
Nachmanovitch’s view of a musician’s creative choices being the result of an evolutionary 
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process, we can now see that Freud and Land enable us to modify this position 
somewhat. 
 
We carry around the rules inherent in our organism. As living, patterned beings, 
we are incapable of producing anything random. We cannot even program a 
computer to produce random numbers; the most we can do is create a pattern so 
complex that we get an illusion of randomness. Our body-mind is a highly 
organised and structured affair, interconnected as only a natural organism can be 
that has evolved over hundreds of millions of years. (Nachmanovitch, 1990: 27) 
 
Where Nachmanovitch sees evolution and patterning as the intrinsic reason for our 
inability to create random or accidental performances, improvisations or indeed, events of 
any kind, Freud and Land seek to look beyond the organic and instead focus their 
attention on the tendencies of the materials that make up life itself. As such, Freud and 
Land’s ideas suggest a reconsideration of Nachmanovitch’s contention that ‘hundreds of 
millions of years’’ of evolution must have profoundly influenced our creative practice, and 
Land’s work in particular is an encouragement to focus on the way in which human 
thought might instead by guided and driven by primal inorganic ingredients, ceaselessly 
bent towards returning to their original inanimate state. This is Land’s sense of ‘hydraulic 
dissipation’, where Bennett’s temporary ‘confederations’ of ‘minerals and sounds’, and 
indeed, organic life itself come to be seen as simply fleeting moments during matter's 
unending movement back to the inanimate and chaotic.  
 
However, it is not Land’s intention to simply repeat Freud’s ideas, and simply recast 
assemblages as death-driven, self-dissolution machines, instead he uses them as a way to 
think about a different kind of patterning than the one Nachmanovitch imagines; one that 
recognises lineage and development, but at the same time conceives of a more complex 
set of drives. In a typically evocative image, Land describes the way in which patterning 
may come about as a result of impact, collision or even destruction, where he tells us that, 
‘the osmotic transfusion of saline chemicals from a drop of alien perspiration impacts 
upon a cluster of epidermal cells as an annihilating copulation’ (Land, 1992: 161). Land’s 
intention here is to convey the sense in which a destructive event can also be a creative 
event, and his phrase ’annihilating copulation’ certainly draws on Deleuze and Guattari’s 
work in A Thousand Plateaus, where the fictional Professor Challenger (‘who made the 
Earth scream with his pain machine’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004: 45)) is used to 
recalibrate experience in terms of geotrauma, such that having an experience of 
something means to be wounded or scarred by that something. The theorist Robin 
Mackay further develops this sense of experience leaving a permanent mark or trace, 
when he suggests that memory and the human form are manifestations of events at a 
cosmic scale, stating that, ‘geotraumatic cryptography must proceed as ultra-genealogy, 
accessing these memories deep-frozen and imprinted in the body and determining the 
planetary events which they index’ (Mackay, 2012: 21). Whilst these examples strongly 
communicate the way in which, as humans, we may indeed be influenced, and to some 
extent unable to break with our physical and evolutionary patterning, Land goes further 
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and develops a vision for an interpenetration of dead, undead and living matter, where 
the distinction between human and non-human has already broken down on a non-living, 
purposeless plane of consistency, telling us that, ‘particles decay, molecules disintegrate, 
cells die, organisms perish, species become extinct, planets are destroyed and stars burn 
out, galaxies explode’ (Land 1992: 205). These visceral images of decay, explosions and 
dis-integration serve to illustrate the disassembling tendencies of production-as-
destruction, and thus help us to understand that what we might take to be an assembling 
of mineral, microbial and sonic forces in an improvisation, may in fact be a dissolving of 
consistency into contingency. Elsewhere in Thirst for Annihilation, Land gives us a more 
detailed image of what this cosmic volatility and collision might mean at a human scale, 
 
The process of unbinding that is misleadingly named production takes place within 
a general field of expenditure […] Due to the fact that it is initiated by a preliminary 
loss [of binding], production is always (excessive) replenishment, and not the 
simple occurrence of plenitude. […] Rooted in lava and earthquake, the production 
process is condemned to the hazards of an inescapable volatility. (Land, 1992: 185) 
 
Production thus becomes a process of removing the normal constraints and contexts that 
hold things together and letting them come apart, for whilst an improvisation as an act of 
creative production might be an attempt to correct or replenish this loss of form or to 
simply give form to what is formless, for Land this would always be a replenishing in 
excess of what is needed. In this way, Land provides us with an image of improvisation 
that, as an act of disassembly, rather than giving form to a diverse set of forces, energies 
or intensities, simply generates and releases further volatility and disharmony. For the 
writer and curator John Corbett, the experience of listening to a piece of improvised 
music can indeed be a disorienting process that reflects this sense of unravelling, de-
structuring, un-‘binding’ that improvisation precipitates. 
 
Listening to [freely improvised] music in the moment is profoundly elastic […] 
Without many of the usual markers, it’s hard to know where you are in time, 
where you’ve been, and especially where you’re headed. (Corbett, 2016: 34) 
 
Corbett describes his experience of listening to improvised music as less ‘a matter of not 
getting lost’, but ‘an attempt at staying found’ (Corbett, 2016: 35), which would suggest 
that attempting to maintain a sense of orientation and being fixed within time, is to try to 
ward off the an improvisation’s tendency to disorient the listener by unbinding our normal 
experience of time. 
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3. Improvisation, contingency and time 
 
3.1 If I could turn back time: Improvisation and time part one 
 
In the following passage, we see Nachmanovitch articulating the idea that the shape and 
structure of the human hand is a key component in improvisation: not only does it 
determine the way in which we create and express sounds, but more fundamentally, the 
characteristics of the human hand have governed and determined the design and 
construction of musical instruments themselves. 
 
For the musician, of all the structures that impose their discipline on us, the most 
ubiquitous and marvellous is the human hand. Beginning with the fact that the 
hand has five digits and not six or four, the hand predisposes our work toward 
particular conformations because it itself has a shape. The kind of music you play 
on the violin or piano […] is intimately influenced by the shape of your hands, by 
the way they move, by their remittances. The structure of the hand is not ‘just 
anything’; the fingers have certain characteristic relationships, certain ranges of 
relative movement, certain kinds of crossing, torquing, jumping, sliding, pressing, 
releasing movements that guide music to come out in a certain way. 
(Nachmanovitch, 1990: 82) 
 
Although Nachmanovitch seems committed to the idea that improvisation is ultimately 
dictated by a musician’s physical characteristics, we can again think beyond a 
straightforwardly linear connection between physical form and musical outcomes, and 
instead consider the way in which all of the components that Nachmanovitch is making 
reference to; a piece of music, the movements of hands and fingers, the ergonomic 
design of musical instruments, the evolutionary development of human appendages; all 
are traces of the passing of time, and in this sense a human hand could be said to have 
no more influence over the design of an instrument or the shaping of a piece of music, 
than any other evolutionary forces that have impacted on the forming of the human hand 
itself. Land quotes Bataille in order to offer a stark reminder; ’were you to stop a short 
moment: the complex, the gentle, the violent movements of worlds will make your death 
a splashing foam’ (Bataille, cited in Land, 1992: 174). Much of Land’s work in Thirst for 
Annihilation focuses on the way in which human endeavour really can be seen as such a 
‘splashing foam’ in comparison to much larger timescales and a wider field of physical 
and chemical movements, passages and relationships, and Land is not alone in thinking 
about different conceptions of time in order re-evaluate human experience. 
 
In his own analysis of After Finitude, Brassier acknowledges Meillassoux’s contention that 
the correlation, although not disproved, is certainly problematised by the presence of 
what Meillassoux calls the ‘arche-fossil’ (Meillassoux, 2006: 10). The arche-fossil is 
Meillassoux’s way of articulating the fact that a time period which existed prior to the 
appearance of human life, was populated by objects, such as the arche-fossil, that had an 
existence that did not in any way rely on someone’s ability to either think about or 
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perceive them. However, Meillassoux admits that our ability to imagine the arche-fossil 
could indeed be a function of a correlationist world ‘for us’, in other words, our 
knowledge of the arche-fossil or of the fossil record are still aspects of our ability to know 
things, and he therefore simply uses the arche-fossil as a pre-cursor to the more 
substantial dismantling of the correlation that was discussed earlier. For Brassier, the 
arche-fossil is a far more potent image that enables him to make use of a wider set of 
ideas and to further explore notions of time frames that exist beyond the limits of our 
own. Brassier suggests that the time humans are living in (which he terms 
‘anthropomorphic time’), is distinctly different to any anterior, or indeed posterior, time, 
and he uses these different time frames as a starting point from which to launch his own 
attack on the correlation. Brassier makes reference to the philosopher Jean-Francois 
Lyotard’s assertion that, ‘after the sun’s death, there will be no thought left to know its 
death took place’ (Brassier, 2007: 229), in order to further map out what thinking in terms 
of post-human, as well as pre-human time could mean, and concludes by claiming that 
the correlation must ‘already [be] cancelled’ (Brassier, 2007: 229). This is not to say that 
once humans have died out that there will simply be no correlation,10 instead it is a more 
complex position that involves understanding posterior time in the same way that 
Meillassoux uses facticity to understand that the world that we experience is only a 
presentation that, as Graham Harman says, can only be ‘described, not deduced […] it is 
merely there, and we cannot know exactly why (Harman, 2011: 29). Once we know that 
the correlation is not the sum of everything that can be known, and that an outside must 
exist, then so too must a conception of a non-correlated, posterior time exist within 
anthropomorphic time.  
 
[T]here is an absolute disjunction between correlational time and the time of 
extinction, precisely insofar as the latter is not just a localisable spatiotemporal 
occurrence, and hence something that could be chronologically manipulated 
(although it is certainly also this), but rather the extinction of space-time. Thus, it is 
not so much that extinction will terminate the correlation, but that it has already 
retroactively terminated it. (Brassier, 2007: 230) 
 
As we can see in this passage, for Brassier, what marks posterior time as being utterly 
different to anthropocentric time, is that time and space as we understand them will 
cease to exist (or as Brassier suggests, space-time will go extinct). Therefore, his sense 
that this extinction of space-time will retroactively terminate the correlation does not 
literally mean that we will experience the collapse of space-time in our own time, but as 
we saw with Meillassoux’s treatment of facticity, once we have allowed for the existence 
of a non-human posterior time, then it is impossible for a non-human conception of 
space-time not to exist. In a similar way, Brassier’s vision of a past that is perpetually yet 
to be, is a past that is beyond comprehension, and as with Meillassoux’s infinite, we can 
                                                
10 Brassier uses the concept of the ‘eschatological’ extinction of thought (Brassier, 2007: 229) to 
describe a future situation where nothing will be alive and therefore all thought, correlationist or 
otherwise, will be gone) 
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think it, but never arrive at it, it is perpetually at the edge of our understanding. Where 
Land provides us with a sense of scale, a sobering reminder that the concerns of humans 
are merely an ephemeral foam in relation to the incomprehensibly vast epochs of time 
that have brought universes, planets, life and indeed musical performances into being, 
Brassier’s project is more subtle, and does not simply diminish human time in comparison 
to cosmic time. Instead, Brassier works to establish a means of understanding that cosmic 
time can permeate human time, and if we turn again to Nachmanovitch, and his 
suggestion that a musician might also be a composite figure, a product of pre-conscious 
forces that influence the decisions we make and at the same time part of a network of 
temporal, spatial and mental connections, we can think about how Brassier’s ideas might 
work within the context of improvisation. 
 
An improviser does not operate in a formless vacuum, but from three billion 
years of organic evolution; all that we were is encoded somewhere in us. Beyond 
that vast history, we have even more to draw upon: the dialogue with the Self - a 
dialogue not only with the past but with the future, the environment, and the 
divine within us. As our playing, writing, speaking, drawing, or dancing unfolds, 
the inner, unconscious logic of our being begins to show through and mould the 
material. This rich, deep patterning is the original nature that impresses itself like 
a seal upon everything we do are. (Nachmanovitch, 1990: 27) 
 
As with Brassier, Nachmanovitch is clearly interested in the way that human activity is 
influenced and moulded by a pre-human set of conditions, such as physical evolution, as 
we have already seen, and in this passage, where he makes reference to ‘organic 
evolution’ and ‘encoding’, there is an emphasis on the way in which our biology also 
shapes our creative activity. A notable proportion of Nachmanovitch’s Free Play is spent 
working through the assertion that evolutionary patterning guides and influences human 
creativity, but his point here about an improvisation not simply being a matter of 
individual choice and taste, provides us with an opportunity to think in broader, and more 
‘speculative’ terms. Although concepts such as the ‘divine’, the ‘unconscious logic of 
being’ and ‘original nature’ are problematic for a number of reasons, not least because 
there is no formal argumentation that informs Nachmanovitch’s work, simply a set of 
assumptions and intuitions, they can nevertheless help us to articulate the ideas that 
Meillassoux and Brassier have developed. Whilst defining what constitutes our ‘original 
nature’ may prove to be a highly contentious exercise, this allusion is a useful way of 
framing Brassier’s contention that an awareness of a non-human time must already exist 
within human time. What is curious about Nachmanovitch’s use of the phrase, ‘the divine 
within us’, is that it suggests that in some way, we are able, by improvising, to enact this 
non-human time, which enhances our earlier response to Meillassoux’s work that it is not 
simply that we might be able to think the unthinkable, but that we must be able to think 
it, and that any human activity, such as improvisation, is therefore a manifestation of this 
thinking of unthinkable. Brassier enables us to expand on this idea and imagine that it is 
not simply an outside to thought that conditions human activity, but an outside to time, 
and whereas Nachmanovitch proposes that an improvisation may well be the result of 
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evolutionary forces over a linear time period, we can now extend this proposition to think 
that an improvisation is also a playing-out of non-human time within a human conception 
of time. 
 
3.2 Accidental music: the return of contingency 
 
Both Brassier and Meillassoux’s work allow us to think it is possible to conceive of 
something in thought that is beyond human thought, and having gone on to establish a 
set of connections to improvised music practice, we shall go on to further explore the way 
in which improvisation might act as a vehicle that can facilitate an interfacing between the 
inside and the outside of human thought and time in relation to the work of Reza 
Negarestani. However, in order to complete this discussion of the relationship between 
an improvisation and intrinsic patterning, and to reintroduce the concept of contingency, 
we shall turn once more to the work of Nick Land. Along with Brassier’s discussions of 
‘originary purposelessness’, Land also makes use of Freud’s death drive in such a way as 
to suggest that death as the inanimate state to which life returns, is without purpose, 
claiming that, ‘between matter and death there is both a certain identity and an intricate 
relation, or, in other words: a unilateral difference appending matter to the edge of zero 
[…] matter is no more simply dead that it is simply anything else (Land, 1992: 111). Here, 
Land is suggesting that, far from being simply dead matter, the inorganic, or at least non-
living, is something far more complex, and his unwillingness to accept that matter is 
either ‘simply anything’ or in any way easy to understand reminds us of the importance of 
remaining wary of overly deterministic interpretations of human development and 
certainly its relationship to improvised music making. 
 
In one of his more compelling statements, he articulates a range of ideas that can be 
traced in the work of Meillassoux and Brassier in order to outline what he sees as the 
fundamentally contingent nature of an accident. 
 
Chance is not a pre-ontological arche-reserve of possibilities, and to think of it as 
such is […] reducing chance to randomness once again. A chance has no essence 
outside its instantiation […] Chance is not some kind of infra-, super-, or ur-being, 
and there is no sense at all in which it surreptitiously ‘is’. The ‘ground’ of the 
accident is even more accidental than the accident itself. (Land, 1992: 158)  
 
Although the claim that an accident comes without precedent seems to be a somewhat 
obvious point, Land uses the idea of the groundlessness of chance in order to show that 
‘accident’ and ‘randomness’ are both constructions, and that in order to understand what 
‘accidental’ really means in its fullest sense, we must do to the concept of an accident, 
what Brassier and Meillassoux do to the correlation: we must destabilise and unground it, 
and think of it in terms of a Meillassouxian sense of contingency. For Land, there are no 
drives towards anything, since chance rests on a purposelessness, which as with Brassier’s 
different versions of time, is a non-anthropomorphic, anterior and posterior, 
purposelessness.  
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Thus, Land provides us with the means to establish a convergence between Meillassoux 
and Brassier’s positions. To strengthen this convergence, and to generate another useful 
perspective on improvisation, we can also make use of Peter Hallward’s rephrasing of 
Meillassoux’s statement about the necessity of contingency. In the essay ‘Anything is 
Possible: Review of Quentin Meillassoux’s After Finitude’, Hallward writes, ‘nothing is 
necessary, apart from the necessity that nothing be necessary’ (Hallward, 2011: 130), and 
this statement allows us to return to improvisation and think again about the way in which 
the improviser as a living organism, and an improvisation as an assemblage are indeed 
able to reflect and enact the contingency, purposelessness and non-necessity that 
Brassier and Meillassoux have left us with. 
 
Although as we have seen, Stephen Nachmanovitch’s approach and use of terminology 
can be problematic; as a practitioner, he is able to offer some useful insights into the 
creative practice of improvisation. In the following passage, he talks about improvisation’s 
relationship to what he refers to as ‘life as it is’, and again it is this commitment to seeing 
improvisation as a part of life that is compelling, as it echoes Brassier and Meillassoux’s 
conclusions about non-human time and outside thought. 
 
The free play of creativity is not the ability to arbitrarily manipulate life. It is the ability 
to experience life as it is. The experience of existence is a reflection of Being, which is 
beauty and consciousness. Free play is that which makes this experience accessible to 
the individual. (Nachmanovitch, 1990: 189) 
Whilst, as Meillassoux and Brassier have asserted, we can have no way of comprehending 
the nature of Being, except to say that it is utterly contingent and without any identifiable 
purpose, Nachmanovitch’s intuition that an improvisation is the ability to experience life 
as it is, allows us to think about what this experience might be, and therefore what the 
implications might be for improvisation. As Brassier and Meillassoux’s work demonstrates, 
supported by the ideas of Land, Freud and Deleuze and Guattari, our existence does to 
some extent reflect what Nachmanovitch refers to as ‘Being’, but what we could more 
narrowly define within our current context as ‘knowledge’: a knowledge of the limitations 
of our knowledge in terms of its relationship to the world that we experience. Whereas 
earlier, we saw Nachmanovitch suggest that ‘we are incapable of producing anything 
random’, we can now understand that our knowledge must be permeated by a thinking 
that exceeds the correlation between thought and what is thought about and that 
therefore if improvisation is ‘to experience life as it is’, then the process of improvising 
may indeed be a process of engaging with something that is not of the world around us, 
but can be accessed in the world around us. 
 
3.3 Improvisation and decay: Bringing the outside inside 
 
Our analysis of Brassier and Meillassoux’s thought, along with Land’s contributions, has 
enabled us to enlarge our thinking about improvisation and go beyond some of the more 
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standard approaches to thinking about this approach to creative music practice, as 
evidenced in the work of Stephen Nachmanovitch. Where Brassier and Meillassoux have 
presented arguments to substantiate their common claim that it must be possible to think 
something that is non-correlated, their work is less clear about how this thought might be 
manifested. Brassier himself problematised Badiou’s work on the relationship between 
the void and the situation, saying, ‘ultimately, Being and Event establishes a necessary 
link between the void of being and the ontological situation only at the cost of severing 
any intelligible connection between being and the multiplicity of presentation (Brassier, 
2007: 111), and to a degree, we face similar complications when thinking about how a 
great outdoors to thought, or a posterior time, might in practical terms interact with 
thought. Whilst we have already work through a number of cases that allow us to trace 
the presence of a non-correlational thought process and activity, we shall now turn to the 
work of the philosopher Reza Negarestani and consider the way in which, by developing a 
model of ‘nested interiorities’ (Negarestani, 2010: 392), his ideas allow might us to think 
of improvisation as a means of interacting with that which is in thought, but which is not 
of thought. 
 
In order to develop a context in which to discuss such a passage between thought and an 
outside of thought, we shall begin by following Negarestani’s line of argument in the 
essay ‘Undercover Softness: An Introduction to the Architecture and Politics of Decay’, 
before turning to his work in the book Cyclonopedia: Complicity with Anonymous 
Materials in order to more comprehensively engage with improvisation once more. In 
‘Undercover Softness’, Negarestani discusses what he calls the ‘calculus of putrefaction’ 
(Negarestani, 2010: 385), an image that brings to mind some of the ideas relating to 
death that we encountered in Brassier and Land’s work. Negarestani fuses the concept of 
death and dying with the more well-established image of Leibnizian calculus that Deleuze 
frequently makes reference to in his work, to convey the idea that the process of decay is 
never complete, as with an asymptotic curve that continually bends towards zero without 
ever reaching it. Negarestani presents us with, ‘the problem of the infinitesimal 
persistence of the decaying object, [wherein] it becomes increasingly difficult to say when 
the process of decay ceases to exist and is supplanted by complete ontological 
annulment of extinction (Negarestani, 2010: 387), which is something of an inversion of 
the thanatropic purposelessness that we encountered with Land and Brassier. In place of 
a living organism that always carries with it traces of its own inanimate and inorganic 
origins, we can think instead of a living organism in a perpetual, non-dying state of decay 
that never reaches the final point of extinction, such that death is not so much static, but 
always, as Negarestani says, ‘twisting’ (Negarestani, 2010: 388). In this sense, Negarestani 
is drawing on Georges Bataille’s assertion that ‘death is not necessary […] the simple 
forms of life are immortal’ (Bataille, 1991: 32), as a starting point from which to create his 
own configuration of some of the ideas relating to finitude, assemblages (or compounds) 
and time that we have discussed so far. To give further substance to this principle of 
decay, Negarestani states that, 
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In decay, the infinitesimal persistence of the decaying object marks a limitropic line 
of transition along which the interiority of one decaying object falls back onto the 
interiority of its constitutive ideas, and those ideas in turn are undone to other 
fundamental interiorities whose intrinsic nature is exterior to the decaying object. 
As the ideas break into their more fundamental but minimal ideas, the infinitesimal 
persistence of the object becomes asymptotic to the extinction of the object. 
(Negarestani, 2010: 388) 
 
For Negarestani, the notion of an object persisting at the edge of dissolution is a central 
issue, and many of his ideas are concerned with establishing a framework within which he 
is able to justify and account for the asymptotic relation between persistence and 
extinction. In this sense, Negarestani’s ideas about the way in which decay curves towards 
death but never arrives, are also something of a re-staging of Deleuze’s description of the 
folding of matter in the book, The Fold, where Deleuze tells us that, ‘A fold is always 
folded within a fold, like a cavern in a cavern. The unit of matter, the smallest element of 
the labyrinth, is the fold, not the point which is never a part’ (Deleuze, 2006: 6). As 
Deleuze suggests, what lies at the heart of a fold is simply another fold, and we can see in 
Negarestani’s image of ‘infinitesimal persistence’ the way in which the interior of a 
decaying object eventually folds back onto its own exterior, very much following 
Deleuze’s idea of that way that a ‘fold is always folded in a fold’. In addition to drawing on 
Deleuze’s work, we can also trace Freud’s legacy in the image of an undercover softness, 
and whilst writing about the potential immortality of germ-cells, Freud quotes the 
evolutionary biologist August Weismann, saying, ‘the mortal part is the body in the 
narrower sense of the word […] it alone is subject to natural death […] the germ-cells, 
however, are potentially immortal inasmuch as they are capable under certain favourable 
conditions of developing into a new individual’ (Freud, 2003: 84), we can identify another 
precursor to the idea of a calculus of decay. In the context of the immortal germ-cells, 
Negarestani’s key insight is the way in which, after Freud, death can be seen as a kind of 
un-living, and that this death-without-dying can be presented as a prime attribute of 
matter itself. When Freud goes on to further elaborate Weismann’s argument, we can 
clearly see an early voicing of the idea of persistence of a substance, here couched as 
vision of a unicellular organism that both pre-figures and outlasts the multicellular human 
subject. 
 
[U]nicellular organisms [are] potentially immortal, death only entering the picture 
with the multicellular organisms. While the death of these higher organisms is 
indeed a natural one in [Weismann’s] view, that is to say a death arising from 
inherent factors, it does not rest upon a primal attribute of living matter. (Freud, 
2003: 85) 
 
Here we see Freud using Weissman’s work to support the idea that whilst death may be 
inherent for multicellular organisms, this is not necessarily the case for single-cell 
lifeforms. Whilst this material appears somewhat tangential to the issue of improvisation 
itself, it not only emphasises a number of the arguments already raised in the chapter that 
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seek to decentre claims about inherent patterning in human evolution, physical 
movement and gesture as well as creative freedom, but it also enables us to construct a 
clear picture of some of the ideas that have influenced Negarestani’s work. In a key 
passage in ‘Undercover Softness’, Negarestani picks up on a similar point to Freud and 
establishes the components of his concept for a calculus of putrefaction, by claiming that 
the ‘the course of exteriorisation conforms to the differential fields enveloped inside or 
extended from the interiorised horizon’ (Negarestani, 2010: 391). As a result, we can think 
of a Moebius strip-like movement between the ‘interiorised’ and exteriorised horizons 
that form a link between a unicellular and multicellular organism. Deleuze also helps us to 
understand this sense of horizons-as-folds between the organic and inorganic in another 
passage in The Fold, when he asks, ‘where is the fold moving? As we have seen, it moves 
not only between essences and existences [but] between the inorganic and the organic in 
the sense of bodies’ (Deleuze, 2006: 137). By linking what he refers to as the ‘nestedness 
of interiorities’ to ‘decay’s process of exteriorisation’ (Negarestani, 2010: 392), 
Negarestani achieves his vision of a relentless, twisting inside-becoming-outside-
becoming-inside that he also discusses in the essay ‘Notes on the Figure of the Cyclone’ 
in terms of the whirling, unstable consistency inside-outside edge of a cyclone 
(Negarestani, 2012). The calculus of decay is therefore an image of cyclonic interior-
exterior movement and in this way, Negarestani enables us to understand a means by 
which the ancestral-anterior time that Brassier and Meillassoux speak of is folded into the 
present via an infinitely convolving series of nested horizons, which is to say that anterior 
time as infinite interior continually twists itself into the decaying exterior of 
anthropomorphic time.  
 
In claiming that, ‘the course of decay’s process of exteriorisation is conducted in 
accordance with spatial involutions, differential rates and modes of distribution immanent 
to nested interiorities’ (Negarestani, 2010: 392), Negarestani enables us to understand 
how an immanent infinity can persist inside the finite context of a decaying object, 
showing that a continuous series of decaying interior horizons are able to perpetually 
open and out as an exterior that then folds back into itself. The fact that Negarestani 
frames this involution as being ‘immanent to nested interiorities’, is of critical importance 
here, since it opens up the possibility for us to think about the way in which his ideas can 
be applied to Brassier and Meillassoux’s conclusions, and to improvisation, suggesting in 
a compelling a means to understand how anterior-posterior time can persist within 
anthropomorphic time, and absolute contingency can exist within seemingly chance 
occurrences. Also worth noting at this stage, is that thinking about exteriority as a nested 
immanence to a certain extent reflects Badiou’s theory of the event and his use of the 
power set axiom, which enabled us to generate non-contradictory relationships between 
a finite situation and a generic indiscernible and the void respectively, such that we are 
able to account for the presence within a situation of that which cannot be presented 
within a situation. 
 
We can now turn, again, to Attali’s Noise: A Political Economy of Music in order to 
develop a sense in which the creation of music, as an organisation of sound, is analogous 
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to Negarestani’s image of decay. As we saw with Nachmanovitch, Attali does not 
necessarily present us with facts or ‘truths’ about music, but his description of the ever-
present nature of noise certainly speaks to the concept of nested interiorities. Early on in 
the book, Attali tells us that, 
 
Our science has always desired to monitor, measure, abstract, and castrate meaning, 
forgetting that life is full of noise and that death alone is silent: work noise, noise of 
man, and noise of beast. Noise bought, sold, or prohibited. Nothing essential 
happens in the absence of noise. (Attali, 1985: 3) 
In configuring noise in this way, Attali is suggesting that noise is an unnameable 
presence, an immaterial force that both surrounds and infuses life. Obviously, his 
reference to death is noteworthy in the context of a number of the discussions in this 
chapter, although we can see that Attali’s project is not a philosophical investigation into 
the relationship between noise and death. Instead, his work is a claim about the nature of 
music, in that the production of music is a process that harnesses and organises noise, 
informing us that, ‘music, the organisation of noise […] reflects the manufacture of 
society; it constitutes the audible waveband of the vibrations and signs that make up 
society’ (Attali, 1985: 4). If we think of an improvisation as the organisation of noise, we 
can imagine the way that noise might infinitesimally persist in an improvisation in the 
same way that Negarestani uses Leibnizian calculus to describe the perpetual rot of a 
decaying object. As we have seen, the composer Henry Cowell suggested that ‘the 
“disease” of noise permeates all music’ (Cowell, 2004: 22), and in this regard, the 
spontaneous production of music as a moment-to-moment modulation of the noise-germ 
into a format or medium that can be recognised as music, such that music becomes a 
contextualised expression of this raw material. However, Land’s reading of production as 
‘unbinding’ adds a greater depth to this image, wherein the non-human, contingent 
volatility that is noise, is not simply organised through improvisation, it is released. 
Improvisation as a process wherein a musician engages with an extended range of 
possibilities and potentialities in order to produce music is therefore not simply the 
shaping of what was previously dis-organised and without shape, it is an engagement 
with an immanent and nested noise that allows that interior noise to continually re-
organise the exterior. This is the critical distinction that Negarestani allows us to make; 
which is to suggest that making music is not simply about organising noise, it is a more 
complex process that involves being organised by noise, by bringing the noise-as-
contingency into a human context. Couched in terms of the calculus of decay, an 
improvisation thus becomes an infinitely decaying, but self-consistent object, where, ‘a 
perpetual deformation […] does not dismantle the primal formation by erasing its 
fundamental ontological registers or minimal formal traits, but […] ceaselessly pushes the 
formation to new levels of degeneration by infinitely building over and through it’ 
(Negarestani, 2010: 418). 
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As with Land’s thirst for annihilation, and unbinding of volatility, Negarestani’s sense that 
creativity involves a ‘degeneration’, that allows the unformed and decaying interior of an 
organised system, structure or organism to reshape and reform what lies outside of it, 
according to a non-anthropomorphic and contingent set of principles, is itself a 
redefinition of what a creative process such as improvisation might be. Negarestani 
enables us to imagine that Meillassoux’s great outdoors can be perpetually folded back 
as a ‘great indoors’, a non-human indoors that keeps opening onto an outside that is 
deep within, wherein ‘the calculus of decay constitutes the ecology of our interiorised 
worlds’ (Negarestani, 2010: 429). Improvisation, as a folding horizon between interiorised 
worlds and the exterior world of human experience can therefore be thought of as a 
process of re-calibrating and reshaping of the sonic properties of that exterior world. 
 
3.4 Out of time: Improvisation and time part two 
 
Along with from this radical ‘updating’ of Deleuze’s theories of the Fold within a context 
of thanatropic and Speculative thought, Negarestani also explores alternate conceptions 
of time, another theme that appears in the work of Land, Meillassoux, Deleuze and 
Badiou.  By adapting and reconfiguring Deleuze’s notion of Aion and Chronos as an 
‘ungraspable and cosmic time’ and a ‘temporal conception of time’ (Negarestani, 2010: 
403) or ‘vital time’ (Negarestani, 2010: 404), wherein temporal-vital time describes the 
human experience of time, Negarestani creates a vision of cosmic time that exists beyond 
a human, and by implication a correlationist, framework. Cosmic time clearly bears a 
strong relation to Brassier’s, and to some extent Land’s, conception of a timescale which 
is both anterior and posterior to thought, such that we see Negarestani proceed to 
establish that vital time exists within a context of cosmic time, such that ‘the temporal 
conception of time is an interiorised or bounded form of absolute [cosmic] time’ 
(Negarestani, 2010: 403). In a similar way that we have seen Badiou talk of the structural 
differences between the finite and the infinite, Meillassoux offset the correlation and 
facticity, and Brassier strictly delineate between anthropomorphic as opposed to anterior 
or posterior conceptions of time, Negarestani also states that, ‘the cosmic time of non-
belonging and pure contingencies can never be fully appropriated or assimilated 
(interiorised) by vital time and its temporal conception’ (Negarestani, 2010: 404). In order 
to resolve this incompatibility between vital time and cosmic time, Negarestani conceives 
of a means to bridge the gap between these two forms of time and thus to a certain 
extent re-stages Badiou’s concept of conducting finite enquiries and minimal reports, 
which enabled the latter to permit the eruption of the infinite within the finite. Whereas 
Meillassoux and Brassier rely on logical formulation to demonstrate that it is impossible 
that an absolute cannot exist, Negarestani provides us with a method, or at least an 
image, of the means by which cosmic time can be apprehended and experienced within 
the context of vital time. 
 
For Negarestani, the two forms of time are incommensurable, for whilst vital time is only 
possible because it exists within the context of cosmic time, a contingent and absolute 
time must by definition be non-graspable by humans. He therefore conceives of a third 
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form of time, which he names ‘the insider conception of cosmic time’ (Negarestani, 2010: 
406), in order to create a passage between the first two. To allow for the appearance of 
this insider time within vital time, Negarestani re-applies the logic of Fold, to generate a 
sense in which the different types of time are nested within each other, and where the 
insider form of cosmic time manifests as a process of ‘putrefaction or decay’, again an 
asymptotic unbinding or unravelling that points towards a ‘return toward pure 
contingencies of cosmic time’ (Negarestani, 2010: 407). Although absolute time is only 
perceivable as a form of vital time, Negarestani suggests that we experience cosmic time 
as an eruptive force that expresses the ‘incommensurable tensions between cosmic 
contingencies within life and its manifestations’ (Negarestani, 2010: 407). Again, we can 
think of this eruptive volatility in terms of the absolute volatility that Land and Meillassoux 
discuss, and Negarestani also provides us with his own reading of such a volatility, where 
he informs us that the ‘unfolding of cosmic time's pure contingency through life and by 
life is expressed by decay as a dysteleological process’ (Negarestani, 2010: 407). 
Dysteleology conveys a similar sense of absolute purposelessness that we have 
encountered elsewhere, and by using it as a way of describing the effects of decay, we 
arrive at an image that now connects us to Laruelle’s interpretation of heresy, such that 
we can think of improvisation as a means to dysteleologically and heretically disrupt 
normal experience. If improvisation as ‘insider time’ is to work as an unleashing of cosmic 
time into human time, then David Toop’s description of the way in which Derek Bailey 
became increasingly involved in a freely improvised music practice and moved away from 
the British jazz and light entertainment circuit of the 1950s and 60s, suggests that the 
process of improvising can not only bring something into immediate consciousness that 
generates surprising and unexpected sonic outcomes, it can also create a longer term  
change in behaviour. Toop discusses how Bailey’s playing style shifted almost 
imperceptibly from being a professional musician with a penchant for improvising in an 
exploratory way whilst playing show tunes, to someone who was simply no longer able to 
play successfully in a cabaret or a dance hall, writing, 
 
Over time the person who moved between these two drastically different worlds could 
no longer disguise his transformation […] In one instance the manager of the Cabaret 
Club in Manchester, a jazz fan, rejoiced when Bailey joined the band: at last I’ll have 
something to listen to. After six months he wanted Bailey to leave: I don’t know what’s 
happening to you but I don’t want to listen to that shit all night. (Toop, 2016: 285)11 
                                                
11 Worth noting, in this context, are Bailey’s own thoughts on this period of change in his life. In the book 
Derek Bailey and the Story of Free Improvisation (Watson, 2013), in one of the interview excerpts, Bailey 
informs Watson that ‘There’s another side to this, of course. My disenchantment with jazz stemmed from 
the realisation that I couldn’t do what the people I admired had done. I’d started in the wrong place at the 
wrong time, possibly in the wrong race, a conclusion I’d reached much earlier. I wasn’t going to be Charlie 
Christian. After that, it was about playing every fucking thing I could lay my hands to and looking to get rid 
of some of my musical ignorance.’ Watson responds by asking, ‘You stopped doing commercial gigs when 
you found you could make a living by playing art music?’, to which Bailey replies, ‘Let me try and explain 
this. I’ve never thought I could do anything – what I do now or playing commercial music – unless I did it 
full-time. This is a personal thing: however other people manage it, I couldn’t play music part-time. It might 
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In describing his own practice, John Butcher talked about a process of experimentation 
with sonic materials and the discovery of new techniques; localised disruptions that 
enabled him to develop his practice as an improvising musician and to enlarge his 
instrumental and improvisational vocabulary. However, Toop indicates that for Bailey, a 
more wholesale change had occurred that meant the very foundations of his musical 
ideas and approach to playing had been irrevocably transformed. Perhaps this gives the 
clearest indication of the way in which a disruptive non-human time, working through 
Bailey’s music in the shape of an infinitesimally persistent noise, came to change Derek 
Bailey into a very different kind of musician, such that what had been outside of him, was 
now inside. 
In Cyclonopedia: Complicity with Anonymous Materials, a philosophical-
fictional exploration of oil, ancient history and global politics, in the context of 
what can now be recognised as post-Landian Speculative thought, Negarestani 
first establishes the language that we have seen him go on to use elsewhere in 
order to describe the whorling, convolving motion of eternally decaying, 
infinitely porous matter. In creating the concept of Nemat-space, Negarestani 
conveys an image of a physical environment riddled with holes, also configured 
as ()hole complex, in order to express the existence within the world of that 
which is not of the world. In the following passage, we can see Negarestani 
creating the original framework for insider time that he here refers to as 
Incognitum Hactenus. 
Incognitum Hactenus - not known yet or nameless and without origin until now - is 
a mode of time in which the innermost monstrosities of the earth or ungraspable 
                                                
be to do with what the alternatives might be but, mainly, whatever attention I can muster I need for this 
stuff, exclusively.’ (Watson, 2013: 155-6). Clearly, Derek Bailey’s relationship with improvised music making 
was complex, and rooted in a particular combination of cultural reference points and personal experiences. 
As was acknowledged in the introduction, improvised music making itself has an equally complex 
relationship with jazz, and in many ways, it might be possible to trace an intersection of these personal and 
cultural complexities within Bailey’s own shifting musical aesthetics during this dance hall period. In another 
interview extract in Watson’s book, Bailey tells us that, ‘The guitar-playing Uncle George was an early 
musical influence. I was interested in what he did, I particularly liked his radio […] My early musical 
impressions are very much associated with that guy, his life, because he was a musician – he didn’t do what 
the rest of the family did, which was gruesome! The fucking steel works and all that shit.’ (Watson, 2013: 57) 
 
Thus we can see that within Bailey’s own musical trajectory, there is a relationship both to his working class 
roots, which in many ways connects him to some of George Lewis’ ideas relating to Afrological impulses 
within music (Watson informs us that ‘as far as Bailey is concerned, “community” is by definition neither 
exotic nor pre-industrial’ (Watson, 2013: 55), in reference to the record Village Life, that Bailey made with 
the South African musicians Louis Moholo Thebe Lipere), and yet at the same time a desire to move on 
from both the musical as well as the working environments of his working-class background (or, in Bailey’s 
words, ‘When somebody says they would rather work in a factory than play music that they don’t like or 
don’t believe in, the answer’s obvious. It means they’ve never worked in a factory.’ Watson, 2013: 58)). 
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time scales can emerge according to the chronological time that belongs to the 
surface biosphere of the earth and its populations. Incognitum Hactenus is a 
double-dealing mode of time connecting abyssal time scales to our chronological 
time, thus exposing to us the horror of times beyond. (Negarestani, 2008: 49) 
 
Insider time as Incognitum Hactenus: a ‘double-dealing mode of time’ that gives us a 
stronger sense of the folding and nesting of different types of time. In rendering cosmic 
time as an ‘abyssal’ time and colouring this with evocative images of monstrosities and 
horror of times beyond, Negarestani is clearly casting his ideas within the context of 
horror fiction, although the fundamental point that he is making here, that coming into 
contact with something that is outside of a frame of reference is a shocking, disconcerting 
and barely comprehensible experience, again resonates with much that we have been 
discussing. In short, Incognitum Hactenus and the calculus of decay allow us to 
understand the way in which an improvisation is an engagement with and a releasing of 
an infinite, cosmic time into human, vital time, that interferes with normal experience in 
order to create a sense of time that is at odds with normal clock time, and a sonic 
experience that, whilst it is firmly bounded by our capacity to know things, is also a 
disruption of that knowledge; as we saw in John Corbett’s description of his experience 
of listening to an improvised performance, he found it ‘hard to know [where he was] in 
time’ (Corbett, 2016: 35).  
 
In a reference to the jazz musicologist Ekkehard Jost’s interpretation of the pianist Cecil 
Taylor’s approach to rhythm, Corbett suggests that Taylor’s music proceeds via ‘swells in 
volume [that are] calibrated with crests in speed (Corbett, 2016: 29), improvisation can 
manufacture new types of time. If we turn to Jost’s original extensive mapping of Taylor’s 
use of rhythm in a variety of his pieces, we develop a clear sense of the way in which 
Taylor’s music can create eruptions in sound that create a strong sense of Negarestani’s 
image of decay and insider time. Instead of what Jost describes as the expected ‘contrast 
of tension and relaxation’ that we would hear in conventional jazz, he suggests that the 
pianist replaces it with ‘an alternation of tension and stagnation’ (Jost, 1994: 69). Such an 
approach to stretching and freezing time created a very particular aesthetic, one of a 
number of instantly recognisable features of Taylor’s music. However, this is not to say 
that Taylor’s approach to improvising creates music that sounds ‘like’ the absolute 
contingency of cosmic time, simply that his music’s ability to jolt and reconfigure the 
structuring principle of musical and rhythmic progression is redolent of Negarestani’s 
dysteleological decay. To take the point even further, such that we can fully appreciate 
the way in which an improvisation brings to mind Incognitum Hactenus, Jost goes on to 
discuss the way in which Taylor’s music also creates a meshing of different aspects of 
time: 
 
As time went on, Taylor compensated the ‘stagnating’ motion by a kind of 
playing whose dynamos impetus arose not from off-beat phrasing but from 
combining the parameters of time, intensity and pitch, thereby creating a new 
musical quality, energy […] Energy is not equivalent to intensity (measure in 
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decibels) […] Energy is, more than anything else, a variable of time. […] the 
kinetic impulses emanating from Taylor’s music are based on the rise and fall of 
energy. (Jost, 1994: 69-70) 
 
Clearly, the idea of ‘stagnating motion’ calls to mind the calculus of decay, which in turn 
evokes Brassier's intuition for a residual state of contingency, or at least the nothingness 
(Brassier’s Nihil Unbound) that remains within human life. Similarly, if we think about the 
‘energy’ that Taylor creates as a variable of time, as a partition within a larger inaccessible 
whole, this also speaks of the way that the irreducible remainder of the primordial deeps, 
or the folding internal horizon of cosmic time within vital time can become manifest as 
destabilising, and disorienting experience: almost a re-timing of time. In Earth Sound 
Signal, Douglas Kahn tells us that, ‘radio was heard before it was invented’ (Kahn, 2013: 
1), suggesting that, whilst as a communications tool, radio can be considered to be a 
human invention, the affective power of radio waves have always affected us, and bound 
us into an assemblage, prior to our conscious knowledge of the process. Subsonic 
vibrations and infrasonic radiowaves are fleeting arcs of sonic energy that can be 
captured and transduced into audible sound, but as with Alvin Lucier’s Whistlers, these 
are momentary occurrences that are bound into a trajectory of self-dissolution. 
Improvisation may well be a similarly transductive process, wherein humans use their 
instruments as lightning conductors, to capture a moment of freefall of the infrasonic 
vibrations that provide the architecture of our physical world. Furthermore, an 
improvisation becomes a thinking-as-music process, an insider time that produces music 
as a trace of the twisting through and in-between of the vital time of experience and the 
chaotic time of the great outdoors. 
 
Mark Wastell provides us with a compelling ‘sonification’ of this idea on the album Come 
Crimson Rays, a series of three improvisations performed, according to the album’s liner 
notes using only a ’32 inch Paiste Tam Tam’ (Wastell, 2007). Whilst the history of music is 
littered with examples of music that could variously be described as ‘hypnotic’, 
‘meditative’, ‘contemplative’, Wastell’s performances on this record are a fascinating 
document of a music that, to paraphrase John Corbett, is profoundly elastic, which is to 
say that the three pieces that make up the record – ‘Come’, ‘Crimson’ and ‘Rays’ – are all 
performances, that once they have commenced, bear very little relation to any sense of 
beginning or ending.  
 
On the twenty-minute opening track ‘Come’, Wastell is content to allow the Tam Tam – a 
large, suspended gong that he sounds using a soft-headed beater – to sound for 
extended periods, and as the sound starts to decay, he gently strikes the gong again to 
rekindle the sound. On the second track, ‘Crimson’, Wastell constantly strikes the gong so 
to create both a continuous higher pitched, shimmering set of overtones and at the same 
time and underlying, pulsing fundamental tone. Just audible throughout the track is 
Wastell’s gentle tapping of the metal of the gong itself, although it is clear that the two 
sounds just described are the key aesthetics of this piece. The cloud-like shimmer of the 
overtones changes as the piece progresses, but as with the first track, there is no sense 
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that the change is headed towards or away from a fixed point, instead, Wastell’s playing 
simply allows us to experience the interactions between the various aspects of the Tam 
Tam’s sonic properties. From eleven minutes until the end of the piece at 12’53, Wastell 
begins to de-emphasise the overtones and we are left with the decaying sound of the 
lower fundamental note, similar to the performance on ‘Come’. The final track, ‘Rays’, 
reflects the slow, patient strike-and-wait approach of ‘Come’, although if anything, 
Wastell’s playing is now even softer. What is clear from the restraint and delicacy involved 
in his playing at this point is that the sound of the gong, the qualities and complexities of 
the metal, the way in which subtle changes in Wastell’s attack create minute differences in 
the note’s pulse rate, and the speed of the note’s decay, are all pushing outward to 
inform the shape of the music that Wastell is creating. Whilst an instrument’s tonal and 
frequency limitations might often create dynamic, thrilling, uncomfortable, or any variety 
of listening experiences, what the minutely observable changes in tone allow us to 
contemplate, is the very kind of outsider time that Negarestani talks about. Whilst 
humans might make gongs, or saxophones, or guitars, the sounds that we produce with 
them are not ‘of’ us, and yet neither are they ‘of’ the instrument. Wastell’s performances 
on Come Crimson Rays are windows of insider time that make it clear that what fills up 
and shapes human time, is an outside time that refuses to be enclosed within a human 
frame of reference. Thus Wastell’s patient striking of a 32 inch Tam Tam creates tones 
that are coming into and out of existence, that have relationships with each other, that 
create difference tones, timbral complexities. Whilst humans have learned to create 
gongs, with which to activate certain sounds, this is simply a way of framing something 
that forever pushes itself into our awareness from outside of what we can understand. An 
improvisation is simply a forcing open of insider time that allows this experience, this 
playing and listening, to happen.  
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Conclusion 
 
With the outside on the inside: musical improvisation according to contemporary 
materialist thought  
 
This project set out to expand the language that we use to talk about improvised music 
practice, and to use contemporary philosophical thought to offer new perspectives on 
musical improvisation, and think through how and why it works.  
 
To complete this process, this conclusion will focus on two key areas. To begin, we shall 
bring together the principle ideas that have arisen in the preceding four chapters that 
have enabled us to progress our thinking about improvisation, which will be followed by 
an examination of two emergent trends in contemporary philosophy that suggest 
directions for future thought. 
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1. Matters arising  
 
In many ways, the work of Deleuze and Guattari provided us with an important starting 
point for some of the key narratives in the study. As such, chapter one introduced the 
concept of immanence that would go on to underpin the philosophical modelling that we 
encountered throughout the project. Where Laruelle wrote of a set of ‘Philosophies of 
Difference’, we could well frame this research project as an examination of improvised 
music practice in terms of ‘Philosophies of Immanence’, in the sense that all of the 
thinkers that we have encountered have undertaken to explore the way in which human 
thought and creative practice, in fact, all of life, and even all geological and cosmological 
movements, can be thought of in relation to an Absolute, or a Real, that is immanent to 
the movements and changes that we experience in what, in this study, has been variously 
referred to as the ‘empirical world’, ‘the world of real causes’ or the world of ‘lived 
experience’.  
 
Initially, Deleuze and Guattari’s work presented us with the idea of an immanent real, a 
real that is different to the real of lived experience, but in later chapters, the distinction 
between two different registers of the real was brought into much sharper focus, and we 
saw Laruelle distinguishing between the Real (with a capital ‘R’), or the One, as a non-
conceptualisable absolute, and the real (with a lower case ‘r’) of lived experience. Badiou 
set up an opposition between a situation and the void, where on the one hand we can 
have knowledge of a situation, but we can have no knowledge of the void. Finally, 
Meillassoux set the correlation against the ‘great outdoors’ of thought, claiming that 
whereas the correlation principle aims to contain everything that is thought about within 
the confines of what we are supposedly able to think about, against thought’s necessary 
capacity to ‘think the unthinkable’; in other words, arguing that it must be possible to 
conceive of something that is not simply the product of our own thought processes. 
 
Unlike Deleuze and Guattari, in chapter two, we saw Badiou establishing a divide 
between what can and cannot be thought, suggesting that, from our vantage point within 
the world of lived experience, we can have no knowledge of what lies outside it. Although 
there were clearly fundamental differences between his and Deleuze and Guattari’s work, 
there was more than a passing resemblance between Badiou’s void and Deleuze’s 
difference in the way in which a persistent no-thing or impersonal immanence that 
pervades and infuses everything was a constant presence in their work. In spite of their 
differences, we are left with the sense in which both Deleuze (along with Guattari) and 
Badiou were working to solve a similar problem, albeit from different perspectives and 
with different philosophical tools.  
 
The first two chapters thus enabled us to position improvisation within the context of 
immanence, and to think about whether a successful improvisation could be seen as 
either as a reconfiguring of something that already exists or as a deliberate summoning of 
something which quite definitely had had no previous existence. Deleuze and Guattari’s 
work generated a context within which we were able to begin discussing how a creative 
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act can be understood to be an act of disruption; a breaking of given codes and a 
reconstruction of new ways of understanding and relating to what is given in experience, 
where de- and re-territorialisation remake the familiar as unfamiliar, whilst for Badiou, 
being faithful to a truth sets up an artist-creator, or subject-as-improviser, as someone 
who forces into hearing, something that categorically had not previously been present.  
 
These foundations provided key vectors for the thesis in terms of thinking about how the 
creative act of improvising might happen, about our role in this making process, and in 
broad terms, how it is that improvisation could destabilise the familiar codes that listeners 
might have for appreciating and engaging with a musical performance, thereby forcing us 
to listen to a piece of music on its own terms: as Deleuze and Guattari say, it must ‘stand 
on its own’.  
 
Peter Hallward describes Badiou’s philosophy as being, ‘militant in its very essence’ 
(Hallward, 2003: 3), a militancy that materialises via the latter’s deployment of ‘faith’ and 
‘forcing’ in Being and Event. For our subject-as-improviser, the matter of believing that 
something different can happen – that we can make a new (kind of) music – is not only an 
empowering position to take up in regards to believing in the value of our musical efforts, 
but in conjunction with the act of forcing, we become able to recognise ourselves as 
makers of the radically new. This is a valuable perspective for thinking through 
improvisation, since it allows us not only to recognise ourselves as conduits of something 
that arrives from the outside of experience and knowledge – in other words, we believe 
that something different can happen, and we recognise ourselves as the agents of 
creating that difference - but we can then act on, and respond to this difference (as 
subject to the ‘truth’ of an event). 
 
Laruelle picks up a similar theme in his discussion of heresy. It could be said that the 
heretical decision is a similar militancy in action, a self-aware act of searching and making 
– the act of forcing in another guise - which is the deliberate, enacting, or performing, of 
that which cannot be grasped or understood. In Laruellian terms, a creative act, a heresy, 
is the making of the real, via a cloning of the Real. 
 
Badiou’s and Laruelle’s work thus provides us with a context for thinking about an 
improviser as a figure who acts as a channel for the production of the real, a self-aware 
decision maker and producer of real experiences. For Badiou this is achieved via a fidelity 
to the truth of an event, whilst for Laruelle the real is produced by cloning the One-Real. 
Here is where Laruelle’s ideas, particularly because of his work on the concept of the 
Future Christ (where the Future Christ becomes the instigator for a new type of time), can 
brought alongside Badiou’s and Deleuze and Guattari’s work. In a broad sense, there is a 
common theme that permeates all of their work that concerns a creative process of 
making something new. Whether this is an act of reterritorialisation, of forcing, or of 
heresy, a creative act is an authoring of a new aesthetic paradigm, and the simultaneous 
generation of distortions and disruptions in experience. Simply put, in terms of these 
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philosophical contexts, an act of improvised music making renders already-existing 
aesthetic codes and creative paradigms obsolete. 
 
Although our discussions of Deleuze and Guattari’s work led to thinking of improvisation 
as a point of experimentation on and across a plane of immanence, where the twin tactics 
of deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation gave a sense of the way in which human 
actions reshape the environment in order to create new experiences, within a non-
philosophical context, we can identify an essential and critically important difference 
between deterritorialisation and heresy. So whilst deterritorialisation exists within the 
context of the plane of immanence, and as such allows for an infinite number of 
combinations and re-combinations between component parts, heresy does not engage 
with an immanent plane (that engagement is already given), instead the heretic clones 
unilateral immanence. For Deleuze and Guattari, it would seem that the components are 
interchangeable given that there is a sense of emergence and return to the plane of 
immanence; things emerge from one another, deterritorialise one another and therefore 
immanence itself becomes a constant that underpins and allows for this process to 
continue. Heresy allows for no such reciprocity. The heretic produces real causes that can 
in no way be recombined; and as such, each new improvisation is its own, forceful 
decision-as-practice; a clone of the Real. 
 
Similarly, the discussion of improvisation in terms of Badiou’s theory of the event, led us 
to interrogate the way in which the subject-as-improviser develops a fidelity to a truth that 
had hitherto not existed within that improviser’s conscious awareness. Badiou’s explicit 
claim that ’the One is not’, at first sight appears to run counter to Laruelle’s approach, 
although on closer inspection, the real thrust of Badiou’s argument seems less 
determined to abolish any such concept as the Real, simply that the Real cannot be 
configured in terms of a unified principle: for Badiou the Real is a set of inconsistent 
multiplicities. Indeed, as previously discussed, Badiou’s proposal and critique is chiefly 
targetted at Deleuze’s vitalist vision of the ‘univocal’ Being, and as we saw, Badiou’s main 
concern appears to be a dissatisfaction with Deleuze’s decision to put forward a Real that 
is both single and multiple at the same time. Again, Laruelle avoids this impasse by 
asserting a Real within which everything is given, and there is certainly a clear distinction 
here between the One and the multiple, in that as already discussed, Deleuze’s One-All 
suggests that we can somehow infer a set of characteristics for the One, which Laruelle 
expressly disavows. Throughout the first three chapters, we can discern something of a 
theoretical tussle between Deleuze, Badiou and Laruelle, no doubt due to the fact that for 
a time they were philosophical contemporaries, and as such we could also take Laruelle’s 
marked engagement with the One as the central feature of his non-philosophical model, 
as yet a further denunciation of Badiou’s set-based ontology. 
 
The One-in-the-last-instance, the absolutely non-mixed, radicalises the void of Being, 
delivers it from the ultimate optical-formal closure (without for all that negating or 
denying the latter). It is radical immanence, or immanence through superposition. 
(Laruelle, 2013: 118) 
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When Laruelle suggests that the One is equivalent to ‘immanence through superposition’, 
not only does he harness this aspect of quantum physics to communicate the way in 
which radical immanence is a state in where all possible futures are available at once, he 
is also developing a concept that reflects the main concerns of the thinkers whose work 
features in the final chapter of this study: absolute, radical or necessary contingency. It is 
worth reiterating at this stage, that whilst the layout of the chapters suggests something 
of a genealogy of thought, and that indeed to a certain extent, we can identify a 
sequence of development, Laruelle’s ideas do not necessarily prefigure the work we see 
in chapter four. Although Ray Brassier does indeed work through Laruelle’s non-
philosophical project as part of his own philosophical research in Nihil Unbound, it is clear 
that many of the ideas relating to contingency, superposition, and absolute randomness 
have been part of philosophical discourse prior to Laruelle’s development of radical 
immanence. 
 
Having established a framework that reconfigures our understanding of, and our 
relationship with the Real, Laruelle’s other significant contribution to this study are his 
ideas relating to photo-fiction. As we saw in chapter three, the non-philosophical concept 
of heresy in some way reflects this concept, but it is the underlying principle, whereby a 
photo-fiction is the creation of a parallel to the lived world, a world that creates its own 
codes and principles, that is key to evolving a language for improvisation. As such, we 
began to think of an improvisation as an example of what Laruelle had termed a ‘music-
fiction’, mapping out the way in which an improvisation creates a set of conditions and a 
set of principles that are both given in-One, and at the same time no ‘of’ the world that 
they were formed in, even though there is nowhere else that they could have been 
formed. In this way, Laruelle’s work does indeed reflect some of the main tendencies that 
we see in Deleuze and Badiou, firstly by suggesting that the radically immanent One 
provides the ongoing framework for the lived world, and therefore, as with the Deleuzian 
concepts of the virtual and the plane of immanence, which, unlike the truth procedure, 
there is no requirement for a mathematically-enabled engagement with a Real-Absolute. 
Secondly, Laruelle reflects Badiou’s ideas in that the superposition of the One means that 
it is fundamentally cut-off from knowledge, in the same way that the void can only ever be 
named rather than known, which as we have seen, means that there is little point in 
talking about any potential qualities that a virtual immanence might have, such as 
intensity or movement. This leaves us with the sense that an improvisation is a cloning of 
a One that is radically outside of human conception, on the inside of a lived world, not 
necessarily bringing an unknowable radical immanence into the world, but nevertheless 
bringing into our awareness something that does not reflect the conditions of its 
production. Whilst in some ways, this could be interpreted as a simple updating of the 
idea that a bloc of affect must stand on its own, Laruelle’s point is that a photo-fiction, 
and thus a music-fiction, exists precisely because we cannot experiment with virtual 
intensities in the way that Deleuze and Guattari describe; we simply clone an unknowable 
Real, thereby setting up the conditions for an improvisation to disorient, as well as disrupt 
familiar codes, by not drawing on established musical principles and meanings. 
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In chapter four, Brassier’s and Meillassoux’s work gave us an indication of some of the key 
trajectories that have developed under the banner of Speculative Realism, and we were 
able to establish that to a certain extent, Meillassoux has extended some of the lines of 
enquiry that emerged from our explorations of Badiou’s work, although where the latter 
configured a finite subject’s engagement with a necessarily infinite set that lay outside of 
the situation in his theory of the event, Meillassoux shifted the offsetting of finitude and 
infinity in order to contrast the idea of a finite philosophical correlation with an 
unbounded and unboundable great outdoors. For our purposes, Meillassoux’s project 
showed us firstly, that any correlation between thought and the objects of thought does 
not exist (in other words human thought must be able to conceive of something that is 
not simply another aspect of human thought, it must be able to think outside itself) and 
secondly, that what does exist outside of human thought is necessarily contingent. This 
latter claim is one of the more complex aspects of Meillassoux’s thought, where his 
ultimate focus is to not only show that, as with Badiou’s void and Laruelle’s One, what lies 
beyond human thought cannot be conceptualised, but more centrally, that the things that 
happen in the lived world are grounded on what he calls a ‘necessary contingency’, 
wherein ‘contingency is such that anything might happen, even nothing at all’ 
(Meillassoux, 2008: 62). This then is the underlying contention of Meillassoux’s argument, 
which is to express the view that only absolute contingency can be seen to necessarily 
exist; in simple terms, nothing is necessary apart from the fact that things might or might 
not happen (or anywhere in between). 
 
[From] absolute necessity of contingency alone we can infer an impossibility that is 
every bit as absolute - for there is in fact something that this primary atom of 
knowledge ensures us is absolutely impossible, even for all powerful chaos, and 
this something, which chaos will never be able to produce, is a necessary entity. 
Everything is possible, anything can happen - except something that is necessary, 
because it is the contingency of the entity that is necessary, not the entity. 
(Meillassoux, 2008: 62) 
 
We can take this as a reflection of Laruelle’s concept of determination-in-the-last-instance, 
in the sense that the superposition-as-undecidability of the One is similar to Meillassoux’s 
rendering of contingency: we can have no understanding of it, all we are able to do is 
recognise that it exists. Whilst Meillassoux, unlike Laruelle, makes no claims about our 
ability to perform or enact this necessary contingency, we can, however, draw further 
parallels between their work. Once we have stepped through the various stages of 
Meillassoux’s thought process, firstly, by accepting that what is produced by human 
thought is not the sum of all knowledge, and secondly, by applying this axiom to 
improvisation and understanding that although it is a process that is brought about by 
human thought, it must therefore remain possible that an improvisation is not entirely 
under the control of human thought (which we saw in the discussion ‘de-correlating 
improvisation’). We come, therefore, to the conclusion that what is a necessary 
component of an improvisation is contingency: in fact, this is the only thing that can be 
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said to be a necessary part of improvisation. In sum, one of Meillassoux’s lasting 
contributions to this study is that he has provided us with further evidence to show that 
knowledge must be able to exceed a thought-world correlate. Although he makes no 
claims about processes such as deterritorialisation, the truth procedure, the heretical 
decision or indeed insider time, in many ways, his simple affirmation that it must be 
possible to think outside of the correlation suits our purposes very well: for an improviser, 
it must be possible to think, and therefore improvise, outside of ourselves, to go beyond 
what we already think, and to create things that are genuinely new and unanticipated. 
 
Whilst Deleuze, along with Guattari, introduced us to a context, to a way of thinking 
about improvisation in terms of immanence, perhaps the key turning point for this project 
were the consequences of Badiou’s delineation between human thought and that which 
is categorically not of human thought. In some ways, we could see all of the thinkers that 
we encounter in chapters three and four as developing a response to the challenge that 
Badiou lays down, in the sense that they share a common agreement that we must be 
able to think about that which lies beyond the bounds of human thought; but further than 
this, we must either be able to ‘access’ it, as Badiou himself attests with his theory of the 
event, and Meillassoux, confirms with his conviction that we must be able to think the 
unthinkable, or ‘enact’ or ‘perform’ it, as Laruelle, Brassier and Negarestani suggest. We 
are therefore left with something of a choice: if improvisation is a type of lived thinking, 
then is it a thinking that accesses the great outdoors, or is it a thinking that cannot but 
help perform the great outdoors?  
 
Whilst Meillassoux’s great outdoors certainly shows more than a trace of Badiou’s logical 
mathematisation of ontology, Brassier and Negarestani move the argument in a different 
direction, and develop a set of philosophical models and perspectives that suggest that 
the bifurcation of the finite and the infinite is not able to provide the fullest, or indeed the 
most human-oriented account of human thought. What these thinkers show is that, 
fundamentally, our actions cannot help but be connected to a Real that is outside of us. 
What is around us is not simply a function of our capacity to think or perceive it, quite the 
opposite in fact: we are part of something that we cannot understand, however, we are 
able to enact this non-comprehendible Real through our actions; in fact we cannot do 
otherwise. Throughout chapter four, we made reference to the work of the improvising 
musician Stephen Nachmanovitch, whose aim was to show that our biological patterning 
must ultimately prevent us from creating anything that is strictly the result of free choice 
or a random decision. What Negarestani, Brassier, Meillassoux and Laruelle enable us to 
see, is that, in fact, it is far from possible that we are not able to create things that, in a 
sense, are out of our control. Negarestani’s concept of ‘Incognitum Hactenus’ or insider 
time, along with Laruelle’s cloning and photo-fiction, and Badiou’s model of forcing, 
allows the outside to operate within a time frame that we can experience; an image that is 
particularly useful when thinking of a time-based activity such as improvisation. At its 
core, all of this philosophical modelling therefore allows us to think that improvising is a 
means to bring what is outside of human thought onto its inside. 
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Throughout this research process, what has become clear is that Laruelle, Brassier, 
Meillassoux and Negarestani are all working on projects that seek to firmly establish the 
existence of an absolute Real that is independent of human thought, and for Laruelle, that 
it is possible for humans to not only think this real, but to enact this Real in the production 
of real causes. Badiou certainly offered a way of identifying some of the key vectors in this 
development process, and by framing this relationship as a bringing into the lived world 
of experience the non-human contingency of the One, the Real or the absolute, we can 
see that the heretical decision precipitates non-historical time as the man-in-person and 
as Future Christ, whilst insider time provokes the rupturing of human time by absolute, 
cosmic time – both related to the impetus that Badiou confers on the act of forcing, a 
very deliberate act of ‘making something happen’.  
 
Ultimately, this study has enabled us to think through what to some degree are familiar 
concepts in contemporary thought, the notion of immanence, Deleuze and Guattari’s 
concepts of de- and reterritorialisation, assemblage and the body without organs, 
Badiou’s mathematical ontology and even Laruelle’s more abstract theory of non-
philosophy. These theories have clearly impacted on a number of contemporary thinkers, 
whose work has provided the grounds for us to reconsider human thought’s capacity to 
think beyond itself, and therefore think through the possibilities of re-drawing a 
conception of improvised music practice. As discussed above, we no longer need to be 
concerned with the either / or of improvisation’s limits: it is neither a bounded repetition 
of human thought’s self-reflexive world, and a replaying of imprinted genetic memories, 
nor is it a transcendental leap into a metaphysical realm of pure ideas and sounds. 
Instead it is a real performing of an absolute Real, improvisation creates real ruptures and 
distortions in time, not through an assemblage of vital forces, but through replaying and 
cloning a radical immanence that we are already part of. In sum, this thesis has provided a 
context - philosophies of immanence - along with a set of positions vis-a-vis the limits of 
our knowledge, and a set of vehicles via which we are able to either deny perceived limits 
to our knowledge, or at the very least find new ways to problematise and overcome such 
limits to knowledge, such as forcing, heresy, facticity and insider time, and thus theorise 
these ideas in terms of improvisation; thinking though the process of production and 
identifying a possible cause of improvised music’s capacity to surprise, enthrall, wrong-
foot or otherwise engage its audience. 
 
To complete and give this survey a more contemporary aspect, we can now examine two 
recent essays by Brassier and Negarestani that suggest potential for further development 
and future research in these areas, where we shall find further interest the idea that what 
is outside of human thought, may in fact be a necessary and integral part of what is inside 
human thought. 
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2. Prometheanism and Inhumanism 
 
When a musician creates music spontaneously, improvising without any predetermined 
structure without adhering to a set of fixed principles, Bailey calls this ‘free’ improvisation. 
However, given the fact that we are limited by our ability to think and act by the 
constraints of our bodies and our brains, to what extent can we say that a free 
improvisation really is free? As we shall now see, two recent developments in 
philosophical thought can enable us to reflect on what such a notion of ‘free’ might 
actually mean, and thus provide us with an opportunity to think more concretely about 
Derek Bailey’s claim for a ‘free improvisation’. 
 
This study provided us with examples of where music can be seen to be a catalyst, or at 
least an analogy, for philosophical thought itself, including Badiou’s ‘Schönberg-event’ 
that we encountered in chapter two (which described the arrival of a new paradigm in 
Western Classical composition), the child singing in the dark that provides with us the first 
element of Deleuze and Guattari’s Refrain, along with bird song, the synthesiser and 
becoming-music all of which appear as inspirations and illustrations throughout A 
Thousand Plateaus. We have seen Laruelle engage extensively with extra-philosophical 
practices, including photography, quantum physics and religion, in order to broaden the 
reach of his non-philosophical project, to the extent that the photographic stance, 
superposition and heresy have all become core components of his non-philosophical 
project. And finally, as we shall see later in this chapter, Brassier directly engages with 
free improvisation itself as a means of thinking through the workings of autonomous 
rational thought. This study has therefore opened up the possibility of thinking about 
improvised music practice from a range of contemporary perspectives, and although the 
task was not without its challenges, developing new ways to think and write about music, 
was more than possible, and a number of directions in thought were opened up. 
 
As we saw in the introduction,1 for Ray Brassier at least, what was common amongst the 
original Speculative Realists was what he identified as their shared ‘antipathy’ to 
correlationism. As we have seen, this antipathy has taken contemporary thought in a 
number of different directions, and from the perspective and trajectories that we have 
discussed in this study, two further developments suggest themselves as having a 
continued relevance to improvised music practice: Brassier’s ‘Promethean project’ that he 
outlines in the short essay ‘Prometheanism and Its Critics’, and Reza Negarestani’s 
Inhumanism, as detailed in ‘The Labor of the Inhuman’.2 Both essays demonstrate an 
increased focus on the way in which reason, whilst it is a human, and therefore real 
process, 3 by its very nature must be able to create real and substantive change in the 
world. What is more, and what is therefore particularly significant to a study that is 
                                                
1 See page 4 
2 Both essays appear in Accelerate: The Accelerationist Reader, published in 2014  
3 Here again, we can bring to mind Laruelle’s differentiation between the Real as absolute and the real as 
lived and empirical world of experience. Hence in this context, human thought is seen as a ’real’ process  
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concerned with thinking about the potential of an improvising musician to genuinely 
innovate, is that for both Brassier and Negarestani, human reason is by definition more 
than a simple re-run of the biological patterning that we have seen Nachmanovitch 
alluding to. 
 
In the essay ‘A Plea for Prometheus’, Alberto Toscano frames Prometheanism in terms of 
systems of political thought, and argues that ‘the Promethean act’ is a thought which is 
focused on destabilising what he regards as a synthetic subdivision between an ‘infinite 
“super-power”’ of ‘divine (or political) authority‘ and ‘human mortality’ (Toscano, 2009: 
254). Clearly, we have seen the separation of the infinite and the finite as a necessary 
component of both Badiou’s and Meillassoux’s work, but for Toscano, such a division is 
problematic and should be replaced with a rendering of human thought that fully and 
formally embraces its situatedness. As such, Toscano suggests that we stop ‘thinking in 
terms of infinite demands, which, as finite entities, we can always be excused from 
fulfilling, and think instead of absolute or unconditional demands’ (Toscano, 2009: 254). 
These ‘absolute’ and ‘unconditional’ demands are the real and actual contexts that we as 
humans are faced with as a result of our being living organisms that engage with an 
empirical world, and whilst Toscano’s reading of Prometheanism forms part of an 
established project in political thought that dates back to Marx, we could well apply his 
sense of absolute demands to the practice of making music, where instead of using finite 
resources in order to engage with an infinite set of possibilities, we can instead think of a 
musician’s humanity as being ‘sufficient’ to the task in hand. This sense of sufficiency is 
important and Toscano makes it clear that, ‘the demands and prescriptions that a 
“Promethean” politics carries are not […] infinite and unfulfillable; they are specific but 
unconditional demands made on our capacities that, although certainly limited in kind, 
are often more than sufficient’ (Toscano, 2009: 255). Whilst Toscano does not undertake 
an extensive exploration of what form this kind of human sufficiency might take, he does 
however provide us with a context that enables us to carry on thinking beyond the 
speculative outcomes suggested by Meillassoux, and which suggests a narrowing of focus 
that can help us to give shape to the more practice-oriented, but nevertheless somewhat 
abstract non-philosophy of Laruelle. For whilst non-philosophy is manifestly a thinking of 
both the Real and the real that does not seek to create an absolute or synthetic 
bifurcation between the two, by thinking ‘from the real-human’ instead of from the Real-
One’, as Prometheanism suggests, we may come closer to a thinking ‘from’ improvisation. 
 
With this rough sketch of Prometheanism in mind, we can now turn to Brassier’s and 
Negarestani’s own more recent explorations of rational thought in terms of their 
respective Promethean and Inhuman projects. Brassier informs us that, ‘Prometheanism is 
simply the claim that there is no reason to assume a predetermined limit to what we can 
achieve or to the ways in which we can transform ourselves and our world’ (Brassier, 2014: 
470). Clearly, he has modified the project’s terms of engagement somewhat in relation to 
the way in which Toscano presented the argument, here denying any limits on human 
thought with a simple refusal of finitude, although as we shall see, Brassier’s position does 
seem to be closer to Toscano’s than the above statement suggests. Negarestani presents 
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us with an inhumanism designed to establish that the bounded human condition, as with 
Toscano’s Prometheanism, is not only in and of itself capable of producing a rational 
thought that is without limits, but that this is fundamentally what human thought is: a 
necessary agent of real change. For Negarestani therefore, inhumanism ‘is a commitment 
to humanity in the entangled sense of what it means to be human and what it means to 
make a commitment - it is a rational project’ (Negarestani, 2014: 443), which suggests 
that we are never more than human when we see ourselves in terms of the inhuman.  
 
Negarestani conceives of the inhuman as an impulse that creates ‘catastrophes’ and 
‘ruptures’ in order to progress and create new expectations and boundaries for human 
thought (Negarestani, 2014: 450). In a series of statements that call to mind his earlier 
work on Incognitum Hactenus, where this ‘insider’ time made possible the emergence of 
non-human, cosmic, absolute time at a human scale, Negarestani develops an image of 
reason and rational thought that renders it as an autonomous and ‘discontinuous’ 
‘content of humanity’. 
 
The discernment of humanity requires the activation of the autonomous space of 
reason. But since this space - qua content of humanity - is functionally autonomous, 
even though its genesis is historical, its activation implies the deactivation of historical 
anticipations of what humanity can be or become at a descriptive level (Negarestani, 
2014: 450). 
 
This functional autonomy implies a kind of necessary exponentiality, not quite the 
necessary contingency that Meillassoux described, where only contingency itself was seen 
as being a necessary component of the Real-Absolute, but Negarestani does present us 
with a version of reason that is not predictable, such that its activation has the potential to 
create unexpected outcomes for human development. In this way, we see Negarestani 
developing an image of reason as both part of the human and at the same time 
something of a steersman, or possibly even a Deleuzian probe head, where, by almost 
splitting off from itself, human thought re-orients and guides itself towards unimagined 
futures; Incognitum Hactenus as insider thought.  
 
Inhumanism is the labor of rational agency on the human. But there is one caveat 
here: rational agency is not personal, individual or even necessarily biological. The 
kernel of inhumanism is a commitment to humanity via the concurrent construction 
and revision of the human as oriented and regulated by the autonomy of reason 
(Negarestani, 2014: 446). 
 
What is interesting here is that rather than creating a limit-point between the finite and 
the infinite, as we have seen in Badiou and Meillassoux, Negarestani identifies a split 
within thought itself, such that the human capacity to think both outside of itself and in on 
itself, whilst never leaving itself is a move to overcome the finite / infinite divide that 
otherwise presents us with the problem of using thought to engage with something that 
is beyond thought.  
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Where Negarestani invokes a self-radicalising insider thought that uses the ‘in’ in the 
inhuman, to outline an enlightened humanism that can oppose what he sees as an 
attempt ‘to degrade humanity either by confronting it with its own finitude, or by abasing 
it before the backdrop of the great outdoors’ (Negarestani, 2014: 427),4 Brassier draws on 
natural science, and thinks in terms of what he describes as the ‘PRE’-human so as to 
perform a similar overhauling of human thought. In the short essay ‘Unfree Improvisation / 
Compulsive Freedom’ that was presented as part of a performance with the noise 
musician Mattin, Brassier suggests that in order to generate a more accurate 
understanding of what the ‘free’ in free improvisation might mean, then we should 
examine the notion of ‘self-determination’ in terms of two human behaviours: pattern-
governed behaviour, and rule-conforming behaviour. It is worth quoting Brassier’s 
formulation at length here, where he states that we should, 
 
view freedom as an act of self-determination where it is not the self that exerts a 
determining power through its act, but rather the act that determines itself. In order to 
make sense of this, it is necessary to understand the reflexivity at work in the notion of 
“self-determination” not as that of the self acting on itself but instead as that of the 
act acting on itself. I will use the word “act” to mean this act acting on itself. The 
ability to act is composed out of two distinct strata of behaviour: that of pattern-
governed behaviour on one level, and that of rule-conforming behaviour on the other. 
The act results from the superimposition of these two levels; i.e., from the 
superimposition of rule-conforming behaviour onto pattern-governed behaviour. It is 
the product of the intrication of these two levels, but it cannot be reduced to either 
(Brassier, 2013 online). 
 
With this complex formulation, Brassier is suggesting that freedom emerges as an 
autonomous, ungoverned force as a result of the intermeshing of these two more 
‘rudimentary’, governed processes, where pattern-base behaviour is a biological drive, 
whilst ‘rule-conforming behaviour is the relaying of culturally acquired dispositions’ 
(Brassier, 2013 online). Brassier’s point is that as organisms with biological and 
environmental drives, we do indeed, as Nachmanovitch suggests, repeat the ‘rich, deep 
patterning [of our] original nature that impresses itself like a seal upon everything we do 
are (Nachmanovitch, 1990: 27), and conform to the dictates of our surroundings, which 
would bring into question the extent to which we are able to make a ‘free’ choice whilst 
freely improvising. However, in a move that reflects Negarestani’s claims about the 
autonomy of human reason, Brassier offsets the way in which a freedom of thought or 
expression might come about. For Brassier, the result of the collision between pattern 
repetition and rule conformity is the autonomous ‘act’, where we see a thought as an act, 
                                                
4 For Negarestani, inhumanism is a commitment to what he refers to as ‘enlightened humanism’ 
(Negarestani, 2014: 427), and is an affirmation of human ‘sapience’: our capacity to do more than simply 
repeat our biological patterning and programming. As such, rational thought is seen as our uniquely human 
ability to take things as true and to make things come true (what he describes as ‘the mark of a believer’ 
and ‘the mark of an agent’ respectively (Negarestani, 2014: 432)). 
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just as we could think of a musical gesture as an act. We came across a similar perspective 
in Laruelle, where cloning was a performing of the One. In this instance, we now have a 
free act as a performing of autonomous reason, of the human capacity to think freely, to 
create experiences and to precipitate change. It is worth noting here that in constructing 
this formulation, Brassier makes a (potentially knowing) reference to the well-used phrase 
that we discussed in chapter one,5 wherein established jazz musicians tell younger players 
that in order to improvise well, then they must ‘learn the rules and then forget them’. 
Brassier tells us that,  
 
[O]ne must acquire the ability to conform to a rule before one can become able to act 
because of a rule: the ability to obey is the prerequisite for the ability to command 
[since] mechanisms must acquire the ability to represent the rules governing their own 
behaviour in such a way as to perceive the governing pattern as such (Brassier, 2013 
online). 
 
This becoming aware of the fact that we are motivated by rule-conformity is clearly the 
first part of developing an autonomous response, and whilst Brassier emphasises that it is 
important to recognise that this self-awareness does not constitute freedom as such, it is 
nevertheless an essential part of enabling free action to occur. As he says, ‘this 
recognition changes the rule from a constraint into a motivating reason for action’ 
(Brassier, 2013 online), which allows us to track in a similar way to Negarestani, the 
emergence of a force, of a property that is of the human, but that simultaneously acts on 
the human. 
 
To complete this plotting of the emergence of the autonomous act, we can turn to 
Brassier’s discussion of free improvisation within this context, which provides us with a 
similarly enhanced conception of what this freedom might now involve. Again, it is worth 
quoting Brassier at length in order to have a full sense of what he means and how his 
argument works. 
 
The ideal of “free improvisation” is paradoxical: in order for improvisation to be free in 
the requisite sense, it must be a self-determining act, but this requires the involution 
of a series of mechanisms. It is this involutive process that is the agent of the act—one 
that is not necessarily human. It should not be confused for the improviser’s self, which 
is rather the greatest obstacle to the emergence of the act. The improviser must be 
prepared to act as an agent—in the sense in which one acts as a covert operative—on 
behalf of whatever mechanisms are capable of effecting the acceleration or 
confrontation required for releasing the act. The later arises at the point of intrication 
between rules and patterns, reasons and causes (Brassier, 2013 online). 
                                                
5 In chapter one, this point was raised with reference to Lee Konitz and Ornette Coleman, where the 
learning and forgetting of rules was compared to the process of learning how to write with a pen, such that 
the act of using a pen becomes less and less noticeable, and instead we are able to turn our focus to what 
is being written with the pen 
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The ‘free’ act of improvisation is therefore the result of the ‘unfree’ improviser creating 
the conditions for the free act itself to arise and be released, and this sense of the self (or 
the improviser) being the secret agent, speaks directly to Negarestani’s claim that in 
order for autonomous reason to be activated then ‘historical anticipations’ must be de-
activated, such that human thought becomes a facilitator and an instigator of an 
autonomous, free act, rather than the producer in the strictest sense. 
 
Following these various arguments and operations, we now have a conception for 
freedom of thought and action that suggests that it is precisely because of our genetic 
patterning that we can, and indeed must be able to create real causes that have real 
effects in the world. Our ability to recognise that we are influenced by genetic patterns 
and subject to environmental conditions is a necessary part of this process and, as 
Brassier says, ‘recognising the un-freedom of voluntary activity is the gateway to 
compulsive freedom’ (Brassier, 2013 online). Negarestani voices a similar perspective, 
stating that, ‘to be free one must be a slave to reason. But to be a slave to reason (the 
very notion of freedom) exposes one to both the revisionary power and the constructive 
compulsion of reason (Negarestani, 2014: 458), and it is noteworthy that both thinkers 
speak of the ‘compulsive’ nature of freedom and autonomous reason, which is to say that 
in being human, we are ‘bound’ to be free. In the 2007 essay ‘Genre Is Obsolete’, we see 
Brassier beginning to pre-figure some of these ideas that have now been presented 
within the context of Prometheanism, and he articulates a view of musical creativity that 
reflects a similar kind of boundedness, and locatedness in terms of a human capacity to 
create new musical forms and genres. What is clearly at issue for Brassier, as well as for 
Tom Smith the leader of the group To Live and Shave in LA whose music Brassier 
discusses, is the fact that creation of music is not so much to do with creating form out of 
an infinite set of variables (which in itself reflects an ongoing narrative within the 
Promethean and Inhuman context), but instead that the creation of new music arises out 
of an offsetting of a bounded set of ‘incompossibles’, a set of variables and possibilities 
that are incompatible and cannot exist together. Brassier’s initial focus is the way in which 
Smith uses the term ‘PRE’ to describe To Live and Shave in LA’s approach to genre, 
saying that, 
 
[T]he only banner which Smith is willing to affix to Shave’s work is that of what he calls 
the ‘PRE’ aesthetic. PRE is ‘a negation of the errant supposition that spiffed-up or 
newly hatched movements supplant others fit for retirement [...] PRE? As in: all 
possibilities extant, even the disastrous ones’ (Brassier, 2007 online). 
 
Smith’s (and Brassier’s) use of the word ‘PRE’ suggests that thinking about musical 
creativity as never-ending process of radical innovation misunderstands two fundamental 
issues relating to creative practice. Firstly, setting a finite human in opposition to an 
infinite set of possibilities, becomes another way of suggesting that a musician stands in 
the face of ‘the totality of possibility’ which, as ‘a synonym for God, […]  we must 
With the outside on the inside 
  202 
renounce’ (Brassier, 2007 online). In other words, as with the Promethean move away 
from the subject’s engagement with infinite truth or thought’s opening onto a great 
outdoors, as with Toscano, we can think in terms of the human-musician being adequate 
to the task of creating music. Brassier goes on to say that, 
 
[T]he only available (uncompromisingly secular) totality is that of incompossibles. If all 
possibilities are extant, this can only be a totality of incompossibles, which harbours as 
yet unactualised and incommensurable genres (Brassier, 2007 online). 
 
Not only does this statement suggest that, as far as a creative or improvising musician is 
concerned, the creative choices available to them are limited, but it also points towards 
the way in which Brassier’s ‘Compulsive Freedom’ emerges from the interaction of 
bounded and rule-driven behaviours. ‘PRE’ is very much the key term here, because it is 
an acknowledgement of the way in which autonomous rational thought and creative acts 
arise by virtue of the fact that we are rule-driven and limited organisms, and not because 
we are somehow able to transcend these limitations. In suggesting that, ‘PRE could be 
understood as Smith’s response to a quandary concerning musical innovation’, Brassier 
recognises that,  
 
The imperative to innovate engenders an antinomy for any given genre. Either one 
keeps repeating the form of innovation; in which case it becomes formulaic and 
retroactively negates its own novelty. Or one seeks constantly new types of innovation 
[but] it is never enough to keep multiplying forms of invention; one must also produce 
new genres within which to generate new forms. Noise becomes generic as the form 
of invention which is obliged to substitute the abstract negation of genre for the 
production of hitherto unknown genres (Brassier, 2007 online) . 
 
As such, Brassier is making the point that within a given genre, innovation for innovation’s 
sake rapidly ossifies and simply becomes another recognisable trope within that genre. At 
the same time, if one chooses, or attempts to reject genre entirely, instead focusing on 
pure innovation (which could otherwise be seen as the production of meaningless noise 
so as to avoid capture within any genre boundaries), then this too collapses into a genre 
in and of itself, where ‘noise’ simply becomes one of a number of aesthetic variables. Any 
attempt to forego the human limits of musical creation would thus result in the 
production of increasingly anodyne and generic music, whereas the acceptance of a rule-
bound and PRE-generic compulsion allows for the emergence of an autonomous, and 
therefore radical creative practice. 
 
As Brassier goes into further detail about the group’s performance practice, we can begin 
to understand how these ideas can connect to a wider set of issues that relate to the 
production of improvised music. 
 
[J]ust as Shave’s sound usurps formlessness by incorporating an unformalisable surplus 
of sonic material, Smith’s words embody a semantic hypertrophy which can only be 
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transmitted by a vocal that mimes the senseless eructations of glossolalia (Brassier, 
2007 online). 
 
This senselessness of sound and vocal delivery emblematises both Smith’s original 
intuition for a PRE-generic approach, as well as Brassier’s more detailed proto-
Promethean narrative; the radically new and disconcerting arises from a harnessing of the 
absolutely human in terms of a meaninglessness produced by an overabundance of sonic 
material and vocalisations. Not only does this surplus remind us of trumpeter Peter Evans’ 
interest in creating ‘information overload’ (Evans, in Hunter, 2008) that we discussed in 
chapter three6, but it also connects us to David Toop’s description of a performance by 
the improvising vocalist Phil Minton. 
 
Listening at Cafe Oto to the vocal trio of Sharon Gal, Elaine Mitchener and Phil 
Minton I witnessed his body’s pulling back and leaning to the side, the voice a 
mutter stream of dissociated almost language, a virtuoso repression of sense. 
Improvising vocalists work in this way at the edge of words or within words, 
resistant to words. Sound metamorphosis scatters discarded word-from cocoons to 
float at the edge of cognition. Categories, difference, the particular, all blur into 
possibilities of non-verbal polyphony; writing has no words to describe a 
withholding of words (Toop, 2016: 45). 
 
Toop’s focus on Minton’s physical movements and his feeling that he is listening to an 
‘almost language’ resonates closely with what Brassier has been discussing. In this 
passage, we are presented with an image of the vocalist hovering at the edges of his 
humanity, bringing into being sounds that are of human origin but which offset and 
countermand normal communicative and musical codes. Toop’s description of Minton’s 
‘virtuoso repression of sense’, is very much to the fore here, since this gives us a graphic 
image of the way in which the vocalist can be seen to have both learnt and forgotten the 
rules of music making and communicating, and at the same time is acting as a ‘secret 
agent’ to precipitate the emergence of a radical, and therefore rational, disruption to the 
progression of music and thought. 
 
Whilst Brassier provides us with a means to think about the act of improvising as an 
example of compulsive freedom and disruptive reason, we can turn once more to 
Negarestani’s presentation of a slightly different perspective, in order to draw this brief 
discussion of Prometheanism and Inhumanism to a close. Although Negarestani suggests 
that, as with Prometheanism, Inhumanism itself is also a project, for him it is a practice 
that evolves over time, and cannot necessarily be discerned in individual instances. 
 
Liberation is a project, not an idea or a commodity. Its effect is not the irruption of 
novelty, but rather then continuity of a designated form of labour. Rather than 
                                                
6In chapter 3 we saw Evans articulating his desire to play the trumpet ‘as much as possible’, and his interest 
in creating an ‘information overload’. 
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liberation, the condition of freedom is a piece-wise structural and functional 
accumulation and refinement that takes shape as a project of self-cultivation 
(Negarestani, 2014: 464). 
 
As with Toscano, there are clearly a number of political overtones that feed into 
Negarestani’s work, and the sense in which ‘liberation is not a commodity’ very much 
speaks to the latter’s commitment to not only defining inhumanism both as a political as 
well as a philosophical programme. However, the key insight for us is the way in which 
Negarestani sees inhumanism as a ‘piece-wise accumulation and refinement’ that is not so 
concerned with producing moments of freedom, but looks instead to a more sustained 
production of a self that understands its own inherent freedom and autonomy. There are 
strong echoes here of Derek Bailey’s framing of his own practice as an improviser in terms 
of an unbroken continuum, that we discussed in chapter two.7 For Bailey, his playing was 
not so much about the moment-to-moment personal expression that constitutes a live or 
recorded improvised music performance, but instead, it was a lifelong commitment to 
developing a practice; not so much the production of ‘free’ music, but the ’freeing’ of 
music and of the self over time. For Negarestani, the sustained development of rational 
thought is a necessary commitment to keeping ‘irrationalism’ at bay, and in another 
statement that is redolent to Bailey’s commitment to process, he tells us that ‘the 
sufficient content of freedom can only be found in reason […] In a strict sense, freedom is 
not liberation from slavery. It is the continuous unlearning of slavery’ (Negarestani, 2014: 
465). This continued ‘unlearning’ is therefore also something of a sustained watchfulness, 
and as with To Live and Shave in LA’s Tom Smith, the imperative here is to avoid 
irrationalism by falling prey to a way of thinking that falsely promises freedom. Whilst a 
commitment to unlearning and thinking in terms of the PRE-generic may seem to run 
counter to a sense of development and progress that we would normally associate with a 
musical practice, Derek Bailey was very much aware of the need to remain vigilant to 
becoming ensnared in formulaic approaches to improvising. As discussed in chapter one, 
part of Bailey’s practice came to involve maintaining an awareness of the way in which his 
interactions with certain musicians had the potential to take on certain features, and 
become in and of themselves habit-forming, thereby losing what had originally been 
interesting about those interactions. Again, as we have already seen him suggest, ‘[once] 
you start playing the music, you stop improvising’ (Bailey, 2004: 47). 
 
In a similar way, the guitarist and educator Joe Morris, whose work and ideas we explored 
in chapter three, also discusses the importance of a sustained practice and an adherence 
to discipline as a means of unlocking creative processes. As an educator, Morris’ 
suggestion for musicians who are wishing to develop an affinity for improvised music 
making, is that freedom in performance is the result of sustained care and rigour, rather 
than an impulsive action; in other words, freedom is not a musician simply playing 
                                                
7 In chapter 2, we saw Mark Wastell and Brian Marley using Bailey’s description of his own practice in order 
to form part of the title of their edited volume of writing about improvised music practice, Blocks of 
Consciousness and the Unbroken Continuum 
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whatever they ‘feel like’ playing. In describing his motivations for writing Perpetual 
Frontier: The Properties of Free Music, Morris tells us that, 
 
It is a meta-methodology, or a methodology that can be used to construct a 
methodology. It does that by describing properties – things that are always used and 
are always adjusted in every methodology within Free Music […] I use methodology 
because free music has formal elements and informal ones, each reliant on the other 
to become the whole (Morris, 2012 online). 
 
Where Negarestani suggests an ongoing commitment, Morris presents us with a 
methodology, a process that views the components of improvised music practice as 
elements within a framework that can contribute to the production of a music that is 
‘freed’ from conventional expectations of form and content. Morris seeks to enlarge our 
view of what improvisation is and what it can achieve, and in other notable echo of 
Negarestani’s interest in a long-term project that avoids easy capture by short-term 
irrationalism, Morris speaks of the way that the practice of ‘free music’ is not only 
concerned with the production of particular instances of surprising or captivating sounds 
and structures within a performance, but has a wider interest in the manufacture and 
development of platforms, environments, languages and instruments: 
 
Free music is an art form that has been made by individuals […] who invented the way 
they play their instruments and invented platforms on which to play that music, based 
on whatever aesthetic value they thought mattered to them […] In free music, artists 
synthesise, interpret, and invent material. But invention to some degree is the goal. 
And invention can be accomplished by the discovery of a new synthesis or new 
interpretation (Morris, 2012 online). 
 
In this way, Morris demonstrates a commitment to the contexts that surround the 
production of free music, in a sense, he is interested in the production of the production 
processes themselves, an interest that we see reflected in Brassier’s detailing of the 
human subject’s facilitation of the conditions that allow for the emergence of rational 
thought. In summary then, Morris’ commitment to practice encourages us to remain open 
to an ongoing process of development and change that will allow for the continued 
production of a freed, ‘PRE’ music. 
 
The idea of that undiscovered place, one that enlightens someone or enhances the 
life of the player or listener, is not a finished concept. It’s a perpetual frontier. By 
determining to leave things open-ended in concept and still allow for a better 
understanding of how things can be done, not just why things should be done, we 
allow for the possibility that more will emerge (Morris, 2012 online). 
 
As a result of these perspectives, we can very much think of free improvisation or free 
music practice, as a grounded and entirely human experience, that at its root is a means 
to invent ‘conditions of freedom’, in other words further invention that is free from any 
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form of necessary patterning or predetermination. Brassier and Negarestani’s work 
enables us to think in ever more detail about improvisation as a located practice that, 
whilst it continues to reflect Laruelle’s non-philosophical ideas relating to heresy and 
cloning of the One, becomes an ever more human activity; thinking from the human, 
rather than from the One. Clearly, we are now a considerable distance away from 
correlationism, where human thought was locked in a self-reflexive relationship with its 
own ability to understand and think the world; inhumanism and Prometheanism insist that 
by our very nature we must always be able to think beyond, and thus develop ourselves. 
For Brassier, 
 
Prometheanism is the attempt to participate in the creation of the world without 
having to defer to a divine blueprint. It follows from the realisation that the 
disequilibrium we introduce into the world through our desire to know is no more or 
less objectionable than the disequilibrium that is already there in the world (Brassier, 
2014: 485). 
 
In other words, Prometheanism understands that the disequilibrium that is inherent in 
human thought is the means by which human thought transforms itself into something 
more than it was, is a completely human, natural process, and our participation in ‘the 
creation of the world’, as a parallel for the production of new music, is also an ongoing 
commitment to our ability to think that a new music is possible. To adopt Sadie Plant’s 
phrase, improvisation thus becomes a ‘radical gesture’,8 a radicalisation of thought and of 
practice against themselves which enables us to bring out an insider thought and thereby 
continue to create the world. 
 
Having explored and examined at length such a broad set of philosophical strategies and 
conceptual developments, we can indeed come to understand that a new language for 
talking about musical improvisation is possible. The theoretical innovations of Deleuze, 
Guattari, Badiou, Meillassoux, Brassier and Negarestani have enabled us to expand our 
conception of what improvisation is, to the extent that we can see it as a musical practice 
which is driven by our capacity to think beyond the limitations of thought itself. As such, 
improvisation is a ‘lived thinking’, or in Laruellian terms, a thinking according to playing: a 
thought process that is activated by our engagement with physical, sound-producing 
objects, a set of rules and principles that inform our decisions about what sounds to 
make, as well as our capacity to respond to sonic and other environmental stimuli. 
 
Following the recalibration of improvisation in terms of Badiou’s theory of the event, 
Meillassoux’s assertion of a great outdoors to thought, Laruelle’s work on fiction and 
heresy, and Brassier and Meillassoux’s work on the relationship between absolute time 
and human, or vital time, we can also see that improvisation has the capacity to disrupt 
accepted codes and practices by forcing, what we could call in Badiouian terms, a re-
count, or even a reformatting of what is given in terms of what had previously been 
                                                
8 After Plant’s book on the Situationist International entitled, The Most Radical Gesture 
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impossible to foresee or anticipate. Thus improvisation reminds us that what is 
contingent, is not simply the unexpected, but the unimaginable. 
 
And finally, Negarestani’ theory relating to Inhumanism and Brassier’s work on 
Prometheanism have now shown us that thinking, at its core, is a disruptive process, and 
thus, if thinking is a constant process of ‘out-thinking’ ourselves, then it follows that 
improvisation, as a thinking-in-action, enables us to ‘out-improvise’ ourselves. 
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3. Coda 
 
To bring this study to a close, I would like to end with a personal anecdote. Throughout 
this project I have taken a deliberately distanced approach with my writing style, in order 
to give the project a necessary formality that can allow for the greatest clarity in terms of 
unfolding and applying the philosophical perspectives that have been explored. 
However, the further that I have taken this research, the more I have found that a 
particular personal experience presses itself into my thoughts. 
 
Whilst studying jazz improvisation and contemporary and electronic composition as a 
postgraduate student, without being asked, one of my tutors at the conservatoire took it 
upon himself to tell me his reasons for disliking, and indeed for disapproving of free 
improvisation. As far as he was concerned, composition allowed a composer to break with 
ingrained or unconscious impulses and create music that was ‘really’ free of human habit, 
whilst free improvisation itself was like, ‘going for a twenty-minute walk from your house 
everyday’; sooner or later, you would be bound to run out of new places to discover and 
the whole exercise would inevitably become repetitive and boring. However, as we have 
seen throughout this concluding chapter, perhaps given particular focus in Brassier and 
Negarestani’s recent work, my former tutor’s concerns were ungrounded for two reasons. 
Firstly, both improvisation and composition are both human activities, the product of 
human thought and an engagement with a set of principles governing musical practice 
and a set of music and sound-related tools that are ready to hand. In this sense neither 
improvisation nor composition are any more ‘free’ than the other, they are both simply 
different types of human activity. However, what this study has shown us is that this very 
locatedness as a human activity enables us to see improvisation, as with composition, as 
something that is not simply a result of unfree decision making. As Meillassoux and 
Brassier have shown us, improvisation cannot help but be part of a thought that is able to 
go outside of itself, whilst Laruelle would enable us to see an improvisation as an act of 
heresy, the creation of a music-fiction that, as with Negarestani’s claims about insider 
time, creates ruptures within human experience: for Negarestani, disruption is caused by 
allowing a time that is outside of human time to appear inside it, whereas for Laruelle, an 
improvisation as a performing of the One, clones the Real-Absolute, we are the point of 
determination that is radical immanence. All of these thinkers have worked to show us 
that what is outside of thought can also be on the inside of thought, and that a repeated 
journey of twenty minutes must therefore always harbour the potential to open up to the 
unknown and the contingent, as Badiou reminds us, the void is always out there. If we 
return finally to Brassier’s Prometheanism project, he tells us that, 
 
The sin of Prometheanism then consists in destroying the equilibrium between the 
made and the given - between what human beings generate through their own 
resources, both cognitive and practical, and the way the world is, whether 
characterised cosmologically, biologically, or historically. The Promethean trespass 
resides in making the given. By insisting on the possibility of bridging the ontological 
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hiatus between the given form the made, Prometheanism denies the ontologisation of 
finitude (Brassier, 2014: 478). 
 
Prometheanism thus conveys the sense in which the improviser is able to make the given, 
making changes to the world that in turn create changes for other humans, and that 
improvisation, as autonomous thought in action, can be seen to be genuinely free. 
Improvisation as a Promethean practice, by collapsing the familiar into the unfamiliar, by 
pushing us to the limits of our capabilities, by opening us onto new types of time and 
creating ruptures in experience, is the spontaneous creation of music through live 
performance, that remains within and yet always beyond our reach. Insider time, great 
outdoors, actually free improvisation.   
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